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LUISA BRIGITTE HULSRØJ 
NATIONAL SOCIALISM IN CONTESTED GERMAN BORDERLANDS, 1922-1933 
 
This dissertation examines how the special conditions of Weimar Germany's 
contested borderlands shaped the activities and evolution in them of the ascendant Nazi 
movement. For this comparative project, it draws on material from five regions – Upper 
Silesia, the Border Province Posen-West Prussia, Masuria, eastern Pomerania, and 
Schleswig – that between them encapsulate the diversity, in geographic location and in 
the fluidity of ethnic and national dividing lines, of the country's borderlands. It opens 
with a discussion of how reportedly formative experiences of the borders' vulnerability 
before, during, and just after the First World War influenced later Nazi activists' political 
trajectories. The second chapter shows how Nazis colonized the commemoration of post-
war military and plebiscitary border struggles so as to associate their movement with 
those events' prestige. Chapter three analyzes other borderland-specific forms of 
propaganda. The fourth chapter looks more closely at the contradictory claims Nazi 
borderland propaganda made about the association between race and nation. On the one 
hand, the movement viewed this relationship as coextensive and fixed, from which it 
followed that the borderlands were theatres of conflict between well-defined and all-
encompassing peoples. On the other, Nazi activists in the borderlands relaxed a hard-and-
fast racial determinism that they understood to be impracticable for their political, 
irredentist work. The fifth chapter focuses on political violence of an ethno-nationalist 
nature, committed to quell the possibility of further foreign claims on German land. The 
sixth chapter explores Nazis' conflict and cooperation about border matters with the 
government and the wider far right. The final chapter surveys the reception of Nazism’s 
borderland activism by non-Germans and by ethnic Germans across the border. The 
rising Nazi movement, it overall emerges, engaged actively with concerns and 
 
resentments common in regions where Germany's post-war territorial losses constituted 
an acute, immediate reality.
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Introduction: National Socialism and Weimar Germany’s Contested Borderlands 
 
“I think that especially my borderland experiences led me to the N.S.D.A.P.,” 
August Marleiter wrote in 1934.1 The Upper Silesian was one of almost 700 respondents 
to an essay contest that the American sociologist Theodore Abel, with the support of the 
NSDAP, arranged that year in order to make sense of Germany’s recent political 
transformation through first-hand accounts from those who had joined the party before 
1933.2 Of the respondents over a third had, like Marleiter, a connection to “[e]thnic 
border areas” and “[o]ccupied areas.”3 That amounted, Peter Merkl, who statistically 
analyzed Abel’s collection in the 1970s, calculated, to an “overrepresentation of between 
2.0 and 3.0.”4 While some of these essay writers did not mention the borderland nature of 
the places they lived in or had lived in, others, like Marleiter, foregrounded how their 
experience of the German borders’ vulnerability had shaped their political outlook and 
priorities. That border concerns underpinned their political consciousness, their texts 
implied or, like Marleiter’s, professed, had laid the ground for their eventual embrace of 
the NSDAP.  
This narrative that nationalist competition prepared the way for Nazism in the 
border regions has been taken up by one branch of the literature about borderlands. In an 
analysis of a sample of around 1,500 war criminals, sociologist Michael Mann, for 
instance, found that refugees from the lost territories but also natives of Upper Silesia, 
Schleswig-Holstein, East Prussia, and, to a lesser extent, the Baden-Saar-Palatinate 
region were overrepresented in his sample , by factors of 1.94, 1.5, 1.33, and 1.25 
 
1 “Ich glaube, daß gerade meine Grenzlanderlebnisse mich mit zur N.S.D.A.P. geführt haben.”; August 
Marleiter, accessed May 3, 2020, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58289/august-span-
classqueryhlmarleiterspan?ctx=50ebb136-9f0a-45f5-9b30-f5f1dff00a79&idx=0. 
2 “Newly Digitized Nazi Biograms Now Available,“ Hoover Institution, last modified January 9, 2017, 
https://www.hoover.org/news/newly-digitized-nazi-biograms-now-available. 
3 Peter Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika: 581 Early Nazis (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press,1975), 18.  
4 Ibid.  
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respectively compared to these regions’ share in the German population.5 Similarly, he 
noted, “[s]ome 12 percent of the top Nazis but only 4 percent of Weimar Cabinet 
Ministers had been born abroad.”6 “[E]mbittered ethnic imperial revisionism” was, Mann 
therefore postulates, a driving force for Nazism.7 
While it does contain chapters acknowledging that borderlands were neither 
intrinsically nationalist nor violent, the edited volume Shatterzone of Empires 
overwhelmingly agrees that once nationalism did take hold in these regions, they became 
zones of often violent tensions. Nationalism there, after all, could never be merely about 
solidarity with one’s own, for the question of how the envisioned nation state was to deal 
with those of a different ethnicity or national identification was actue there. The ethnic 
others among whom nationalists of any given stripe lived had to be tolerated, assimilated, 
or purged.8 Violence, all the more brutal for being so fratricidal,9 often resulted and, the 
editors add, was “intended not only to evict or to kill members of other ethnic or religious 
groups but also to erase a past whose memory would deny the legitimacy of the 
perpetrators.”10 The Nazis, however, appear in this narrative, fleshed out in the volume’s 
both geographically and chronologically varied contributions, only in the context of the 
Second World War. 
Gregor Thum, in his chapter in Shatterzone of Empires as well as in his 
contributions to the volume Helpless Imperialists, which he co-edited, proffers an 
explanation for why the Nazi regime perpetrated unprecedentedly lethal nationalist 
population politics during the war. His premise is that imperialists everywhere were, 
 
5 Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 225. 
6 Michael Mann, Fascists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 156. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Omer Bartov and Eric Weitz, “Introduction: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, 
Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands,” in Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, 
Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands, eds. Omer Bartov and Eric Weitz (Bloomington: University 
of Indiana Press, 2013), 5. 
9 Ibid., 12. 
10 Ibid. 
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counterintuitively, haunted by fear, since their ambitions were always greater than the 
means, however awesome, available to them to accomplish these ends.11 Simultaneously, 
imperial failure would mean humiliation in the  international arena.12 In this context, 
Thum describes, the lingering fear of another Polish uprising combined with anxieties 
concerning demographic trends unfavorable for Germans in the Eastern provinces 
prompted the Prussian inner colonization programs of the late 19th century.13 When it 
became evident around the turn of the century that these measures were ineffectual, the 
radicalization of inner colonization was called for, including by interest groups and 
cultural figures.14 These demands led to drastic new laws, such as  one permitting the 
expropriation of Polish landowners, but in the pre-war Empire, which generally honored 
the rule of law, they never could unfold their full potential.15 During the First World War, 
the army leadership made far-reaching plans for a Germanization of Eastern Europe, but 
instead the conflict ended in Germany’s defeat, of which the loss of Eastern territories 
became “the symbol.”16 Their recouping became the litmus test for the nation’s 
resurgence, so that defeat stoked rather than decreased Germans’ imperial ambitions.17 
How the Third Reich waged the Second World War in Eastern Europe, Thum maintains, 
was the product of having learned from “the experience of the failed pre-1918 
Germanization policy” and of therefore having determined to abandon the legal and 
ethical constraints that had brought about this failure.18 
 
11 Maurus Reinkowski and Gregor Thum, “Helpless Imperialists: Introduction,” in Helpless Imperialists: 
Imperial Failure, Fear, and Radicalization, eds. Maurus Reinkowski and Gregor Thum (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 8-9. 
12 Ibid., 11-12. 
13 Gregor Thum, “Imperialists in Panic: The Evocation of Empire at Germany’s Eastern Frontier around 
1900,” in Helpless Imperialists: Imperial Failure, Fear, and Radicalization, eds. Maurus Reinkowski and 
Gregor Thum (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 142-144. 
14 Ibid., 145-147; Gregor Thum, “Megalomania and Angst,” in Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and 
Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands, eds. Omer Bartov and Eric Weitz 
(Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2013), 52-54. 
15 Thum, “Imperialists in Panic,” 154-155. 
16 Ibid., 160. 
17 Ibid., 161. 
18 Ibid., 161-162. 
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Liulevicius too in his The German Myth of the East explored Nazism’s 
relationship with evolving ideas about the East. The East, he avers, was for Germans a 
space onto which aspirations for and anxieties about their own nation were projected.19 In 
the late 19th century, when the crisis of confidence in Germanization policy that Thum 
too describes took hold, the East came to be seen by some as an entity unto itself, 
perennially locked in nationalist struggle. Simultaneously, the notion of the Drive to the 
East – that is, of a German predestination to expand eastward – came into its own.20 
Germany, despite all current shortcomings of Germanization efforts, was destined to 
prevail. The First World War resulted in grander plans than ever for the East, particularly 
in the wake of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk,21 but these came crashing down, all the more 
shockingly for having been preceded by such elevated hopes, when Germany was 
defeated and had to cede many of its Eastern territories.22 Following this diminution of 
the German presence in the East, all sorts of ideas about how to engage with this space 
circulated. These ranged from visions for utopian socialist worker’s colonies23 over 
Stresemann’s policy of trying to keep open the possibility of a border revision by 
rapprochement with the Western Allies24 to the völkisch Artaman League’s hopes of 
creating a bulwark of Germandom with the volunteers it sent to Eastern farms.25 From 
this kaleidoscope of ideas concerning the East, the Nazis, when they came to power, 
selected “the worst and most extreme” ones.26 Nazi thinking about the East was a 
mainstay of propaganda and education even before the Second World War27 and, in the 
 
19 Vejas Liulevicius, The German Myth of the East: 1800 to the Present  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 2. 
20 Ibid., 121-122. 
21 Ibid., 145-147. 
22 Ibid., 152. 
23 Ibid., 162. 
24 Ibid., 161-162. 
25 Ibid., 163. 
26 Ibid., 170. 
27 Ibid., 178-181. 
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shape of – among other things – the Holocaust28 and the General Plan East, came to 
horrible fruition during it.29  
Nationalization and attendant conflict was, however, only part of the story, for 
national indifference, that is, the lack of any stable identification with one national 
community, remained widespread at least among the populations of some borderlands. 
The literature on this topic that has sprung up in the past two decades took Rogers 
Brubaker’s 2004 Ethnicity without Groups as its formative influence. Conceived as a 
critique of what he terms “clichéd constructivism,” Brubaker’s work critiques scholarship 
that demonstrates the constructed nature of ethnic or national groups, yet, assuming 
stability once constructed, carries on treating such groups as fundamental units of 
analysis, thereby continuing to reify the very categories of practice constructivism is 
meant to challenge.30 Instead, the sociologist urges the investigation of “group-ness,” 
which he defines as the degree to which a set of people identifies as a group, as a 
variable.31 Such a focus on group-ness and on the processes that influence it can, 
Brubaker proposes, de-center ethnic and national groups as the subjects of scholarship. 
The study of group-ness would also allow researchers to concentrate their analysis on 
cases of low group-ness, in contrast to scholarship’s traditional concentration on 
instances of high group-ness, which has contributed to making ethnic and national groups 
appear natural, fixed, and all-encompassing.32  
Tara Zahra laid out how Brubaker’s ideas applied to historical practice in 
“Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis.” In the 
article, Zahra makes the case that the way to “’rescue History from the Nation’” is to go 
beyond scaling the focus of historical inquiry up or down to the sub- or transnational 
 
28 Ibid., 194-195. 
29 Ibid., 200. 
30 Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 2-3.  
31 Ibid., 11. 
32 Ibid., 12.  
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levels and to make a point instead of investigating instances of low national group-ness.33 
Such low group-ness is not, she insists, a pre-modern phenomenon, definitively overcome 
by the nation-building processes chronicled in such classics as Peasants into 
Frenchmen,34 but rather a reality that persisted well into the twentieth century even in 
some of Europe’s most highly developed regions, notably Silesia.35 Despite how 
commonplace national indifference was, it has not left “much of a paper trail.” 36 The 
nationally indifferent naturally did not organize.37 Nationalists, meanwhile, strove to 
eradicate national indifference and obscured its persistence in the face of their 
nationalizing efforts through practices like censuses that did not record bilingualism.38 
For their part, historians have focused on nationalist politics and instances of high 
national group-ness. Even social and cultural history, whose professed aim it is to write 
history from below, have concentrated on the successful building of national loyalties on 
the ground and on nationalism’s penetration of everyday life. Where national loyalties 
have been found to have been weak or irrelevant, this circumstance has been attributed to 
the overriding significance of other – for instance dynastic, regional, or religious – 
loyalties.39 Historians, Zahra suggests, have been unable to conceive of groups that 
simply lacked national loyalties. Traceable only in indirect ways, national indifference 
comprised a range of behaviors according to location and period, from the total lack of 
any national identity still possible in the Austrian Empire to opportunistic side switching 
in, for example, post-war states where a nationality was a requirement.40 These ways of 
being are united only by their failure to conform to nationalists’ expectation that national 
 
33 Tara Zahra, “Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis,” Slavic 
Review 69, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 94. 
34 Ibid., 96.  
35 Ibid., 99-100. 
36 Ibid., 106. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 109-112. 
40 Ibid., 101-104. 
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identity be inherent and unchanging.41 National indifference is thus “fundamentally a 
negative and nationalist category.”42 Just, however, because national indifference was a 
non-community originating in the nationalist imagination does not diminish its value as a 
subject of study, Zahra argues, any more than its imagined nature diminishes that of the 
nation. Once imagined, national indifference became a category no less real or 
consequential than the nation itself.  
Unlike the nationalists who invented the category, however, historians should, 
Tahra urges, avoid considering national indifference an aberration and instead assume it 
as the default state, seeking to explain why and how under specific circumstances 
national group-ness increased.43 Zahra herself published a monograph chronicling how 
Czech and German nationalist activists sought to nationalize children in regions where 
national indifference remained the status quo. Jeremy King’s Budweisers into Czechs and 
Germans similarly recounts how nationalist politics triumphed over non-national and 
supra-national ways of being in Bohemian Budweis, where language use was once 
considered incidental and dynastic loyalties reigned supreme, and turned the populace 
into one divided between Czechs and Germans. Pieter Judson, meanwhile, has catalogued 
the fields through activism in which nationalists hoped to shape the Austrian Empire’s 
largely nationally indifferent language frontiers into the zones of encounter and conflict 
between clearly delineated nationalities that nationalist ideology held they should be.  
In Schleswig-Holstein too, Peter Thaler has demonstrated, national identification 
was voluntaristic and changeable in nature. Citing Ernest Renan’s provocative 1882 
characterization of the nation as a “daily plebiscite" and apparently unaware of more 
recent literature about national indifference,44 Thaler draws attention to the endorsement 
 
41 Ibid., 103. 
42 Ibid., 105. 
43 Ibid., 118. 





of a shared history and of a common vision for the future as a central component of 
national identity.45 In Schleswig-Holstein, Thaler elaborated, speakers of the Danish 
Southern Jutish dialect from the mid-19th century onward had a choice between two 
developing nationalisms. Some favored Denmark, part of which kingdom the duchies had 
been since the 15th century,46 whereas others valued the cultural, political, and economic 
ties with Germany more.47 Which past individuals preferred to invoke was, furthermore, 
subject to change and depended on political circumstance in particular.48 
Much more attention than on Schleswig has been bestowed on Upper Silesia. That 
ethnicity and nationality did not map neatly onto one another there was evidenced by the 
unintuitive 1921 plebiscite result, which saw Germany triumph over Poland in a 
referendum that queried which state inhabitants wanted their – after all ethnically 
majority Polish – region to belong to. Richard Blanke, for one, has pointed out that for 
Germany to prevail in a region that ethno-objectively should have been Polish, forty 
percent of the votes for Germany would have had to be cast by Polish-speakers.49 This 
circumstance has led the plebiscite's outcome, then and now, to be dismissed or to be 
attributed to German advantages and pressure. Poland, however, had some advantages of 
its own.50 In any case, Blanke noted, advantages mattered only because of the widespread 
national indifference, for in a perfect nationalist world, voters would have chosen their – 
supposedly inherent – nationality without regard for expediencies of the moment.51 “In 
sum,” Blanke concluded, “aside from a conditioned acceptance of objective or ethnic 
nationality as the only real kind, we do not have very good reasons for assuming the 
 
45 Peter Thaler, Of Mind and Matter: The Duality of National Identity in the German-Danish Borderlands 
(West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2009), could not check page due to lack of access to CUL during 
corona crisis 
46 Ibid., could not check page due to lack of access to CUL during corona crisis 
47 Ibid., could not check page due to lack of access to CUL during corona crisis 
48 Ibid., could not check page due to lack of access to CUL during corona crisis 
49 Richard Blanke, “Upper Silesia, 1921: The Case for Subjective Nationality,” Canadian Review of Studies 
in Nationalism 2 (1975), 243-244. 
50 Ibid., 245-255. 
51 Ibid., 251-252. 
 9 
existence of underlying, truer national sentiments among the 300,000 Upper Silesian 
Poles who voted for Germany. … The best explanation for this seems to lie in the 
primacy of subjective sentiments over objective characteristics in the determination of 
national orientation.”52 
Blanke’s is an argument for a civic rather than an ethnic understanding of national 
identity, but Upper Silesia has also become the second focus of the study of persistent 
national flexibility, besides work like that of Zahra, King, and Judson, which is rooted in 
debates about the internal national frontiers’ role in the Austrian Empire’s decline. The 
role that Catholicism and the Church played in maintaining national indifference in 
Upper Silesia is illuminated by James Bjork in Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism 
and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland. He tells how the 
Kulturkampf politicized Catholicism and bonded Upper Silesian Catholics of all linguistic 
backgrounds,53 just for a Polish particularist faction to emerge within the Catholic Center 
party shortly thereafter.54 This Polish wing of the party fared well in the 1893 Reichstag 
election55 and in the ensuing decade both German and Polish nationalist activism outside 
the confines of the Center party flourished.56 The regional National Democratic 
movement under Wojciech Korfanty won Reichstag seats in 190357 and did so even more 
resoundingly in 1905.58 German nationalist associations too flourished.59 By the early 
1910s, however, National Democracy was losing ground, for its delegates had not 
maneuvered the Reichstag successfully.60 All the while, the conservative Bülow 
government's victimization of Polish nationalists and other Upper Silesian Catholics alike 
 
52 Ibid., 256. 
53 James Bjork, Neither German Nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European 
Borderland (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008), 21-37. 
54 Ibid., 44-46.  
55 Ibid., 42-43. 
56 Ibid., 89-98. 
57 Ibid., 106-109. 
58 Ibid., 114-115. 
59 Ibid., 93-98. 
60 Ibid., 145-147. 
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had led to rapprochement between them.61 In the 1912 Reichstag election, National 
Democracy thus lost a seat and narrowed its lead over the Center party,62 which 
recuperated some of its earlier electoral losses.63 A revival of Polish nationalism took 
place late in the First World War, however, because Korfanty understood how to channel 
into his movement the social unrest that rocked Germany from 1917 onwards.64  
After the war, the Allies initially intended to grant Poland the mainly Polish-
speaking region outright, as T. Hunt Tooley has documented.65 In response, separatism, a 
movement advocating instead the idea of a genuinely supranational, independent Upper 
Silesian state united by its Catholicism, gained traction.66 In the end, British prime 
minister David Lloyd George persuaded the American president Woodrow Wilson to 
hold a plebiscite before making decisions about Upper Silesia's future, hoping that such a 
vote would avert future German irredentism should that country lose.67 Both the German 
and Polish plebiscite campaigns made substantial concessions to Upper Silesian self-rule, 
since separatism had proved so popular and the powerful Center Party, though German-
leaning, continued to flirt with it. Poland, for one, was quick to pledge sweeping 
autonomy for a future Upper Silesian voivodeship.68 The Prussian government accorded 
Upper Silesia provincial status69 and passed a law affording provinces greater 
independence, including in language and school policy.70 These pledges were 
complemented by vigorous state-funded propaganda efforts, which on the German side 
were run most notably by the Vereinigte Verbände Heimattreuer Oberschlesier.71 Polish 
 
61 Ibid., 131-133. 
62 Ibid., 151-152. 
63 Ibid., 157. 
64 Ibid., 189-192. 
65 T. Hunt Tooley, National Identity and Weimar Germany: Upper Silesia and the Eastern Border, 1918-
1922 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 46.  
66 Ibid., 57; Bjork, Neither German Nor Pole 198-203.  
67 Tooley, National Identity and Weimar Germany, 49-51.  
68 Ibid., 166.  
69 Ibid., 114. 
70 Ibid., 111. 
71 Ibid., 157-158. 
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nationalists additionally launched two short-lived uprisings, in the summers of 1919 and 
1920 respectively. In contrast to this nationalist fervor, the overwhelming majority of 
Catholic priests continued to counsel moderation and unity in religion,72 as Bjork 
recounts, with about 40% refraining from publicly voicing any national preference at 
all.73 Once the referendum finally took place on March 20, 1921, it was Germany that 
carried the day, winning 59.6% of votes at 97.5% voter participation. Though much has 
been made of German intimidation, violence, Tooley has convincingly argued, had no 
determining effect on this outcome, for it only escalated after the referendum.74 
Disgruntled Poles rose up a third time, succeeding in conquering two-thirds of the 
province.75 German Freikorps and Selbstschutz groups, covertly encouraged by the 
government,76 soon pushed the insurgents back, however, a triumph epitomized by their 
victory in the battle of St Anne Mountain.77 Quiet returned. In the fall, the League of 
Nations drew a border that awarded almost three-quarters of Upper Silesia to Germany 
but two-thirds of the region's industrial district, theretofore Germany's second largest 
after the Ruhr, to Poland.78  
Neither country accepted this border as final, since contemporaries recognized 
that the plebiscite result was not the product of firm national loyalties. In fact, the 
plebiscite and border change only spurred on further nationalizing competition. A ritual 
rivalry of memory cultures developed, Peter Polak-Springer has demonstrated, that lasted 
through the Second World War. Germany and Poland each countered the respective other 
 
72 Ibid., 240-241. 
73 Ibid., 233-236. 
74 T. Hunt Tooley, “German Political Violence and the Border Plebiscite in Upper Silesia, 1919-1921,” 
Central European History 21 (1988), 96-98. 
75 Tooley, National Identity and Weimar Germany, 255. 
76 Ibid., 95. 
77 Ibid., 96. 
78 Ibid., 257. 
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country’s commemorative rallies,79 monumental buildings,80 propaganda films, and the 
like with equivalent events and projects of their own.81 As a result, Germany’s and 
Poland’s rival nationalist cultures were, in many ways, interchangeable, as the 
Germanization of the Forum Katowice, an interwar Polish architectural prestige project, 
after Germany’s annexation of Eastern Upper Silesia in 1939 illustrates. One overly 
modern building was torn down, while the others simply had Polish symbols removed 
and German ones added. The engraved letters RP, short for “Rzeczpospolita Polska,” on 
what was now the Gauhaus were simply reinterpreted to mean “Regierungspräsidium.”82 
Nazi campaigns during the war to rid Eastern Upper Silesia of all signs of Polish heritage, 
including beloved Catholic imagery like the Black Madonna of Częstochowa,83 or to 
increase German language use met with resentment.84 Therefore, Nazi authorities were 
soon no longer hailed as liberators but, even more so than their Polish predecessors, 
perceived as a carpet-bagging, condescending, intrusive external elite, which treated 
natives as second-class nationals and hence citizens.85 In Western Upper Silesia too, 
Polak-Springer highlights, Nazis’ imposition of a nationalist reading of the landscape was 
received largely with disinterest. Locals, for example, ignored the monumental 
Reichsehrenmal for the Freikorps fighters of 1921 erected by the Nazis on St Anne 
Mountain and instead continue to treat the mount primarily as a pilgrimage site.86 The 
Nazis did not definitively prevail in the contest of memory cultures that had raged since 
the border alteration. 
 
79 Peter Polak-Springer, Recovered Territory: A German-Polish Conflict over Land and Culture, 1919-89 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 58-77. 
80 Peter Polak-Springer, “Landscapes of Revanchism: Building and the Contestation of Space in an 
Industrial Polish-German Borderland, 1922-1945,” Central European History 45, no. 3 (September 2012), 
492-513. 
81 Polak-Springer, Recovered Territory, 69-71. 
82 Ibid., 156-157. 
83 Ibid., 161. 
84 Ibid., 170-174. 
85 Ibid., 150; Ibid., 162-163. 
86 Polak-Springer, “Landscapes of Revanchism,” 511. 
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Whereas Polak-Springer examines Nazism’s interaction with national indifference 
only in the context of the Third Reich, Brendan Karch’s monograph Nation and Loyalty 
in a German-Polish Borderland does touch on the pre-1933 relationship between the 
Nazi movement and Western Upper Silesia’s Polish minority. Despite harassment at Nazi 
hands, Polish activists, he claims, at that time placed hopes in the Nazi rhetoric of racial 
separation, since they thought it would end an assimilationist competition they were 
losing.87 In the first years of the Third Reich, these Polish nationalists could feel validated 
in their optimism, Karch continues. The Polish minority enjoyed protection from 
Gleichschaltung, such that Upper Silesians could within its organizations “reconstitute 
social and religious networks that had been dismantled.”88 Belonging to Polish groups 
furthermore provided exemption from onerous new duties, like those attached to the 
Reichserbhofgesetz and participation in Nazi organizations.89 Membership surged.90 After 
the Geneva Accord that since 1921 had guaranteed minority rights on both sides of the 
Upper Silesian border expired in 1937, however, the Nazi government drastically 
increased Germanizing pressures and the persecution of Polish nationalist activists.91 In 
the short term this change in policy did succeed in suppressing most traces of the region’s 
Polish heritage, including, most controversially, Polish-language church services.92 The 
Second World War, however, reversed these Germanizing advances. At first, the 
outbreak of war led to the sending of Polish nationalists to concentration camps, which 
scared the population.93 Overall, however, Nazi administrators could hardly treat Upper 
Silesia’s population as one that was not fully German, since that would have been an 
admission of Germanization’s failure and one that would have cost the army willing 
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soldiers.94 Consequently, Western Upper Silesia was not included in the Volksliste that 
was instituted in annexed parts of Poland, including Eastern Upper Silesia.95 That the 
thoroughly German nature of Western Upper Silesians was a fiction was exposed, 
though, when the region saw an influx of, sometimes forced, laborers, including many 
from the region’s formerly Polish portion. Western Upper Silesians and these new 
arrivals proved impossible to distinguish, which meant that prohibitions on mixing could 
not be enforced. The resultant frequent, often amicable mingling with Polish laborers 
gave rise to Western Upper Silesians using Polish more again.96 By the time the Red 
Army marched on Upper Silesia, it was therefore as outwardly Polish as it had not been 
since before the plebiscite.97 This circumstance enabled most Upper Silesians to stay in 
their Heimat when it became part of Poland after the war. Upper Silesians’ performance 
of nationality had thus continued to successfully adapt. 
In literature about national indifference at borders other than Upper Silesia’s, 
engagement with Nazism is sparse. Thaler’s study of Schleswig in fact makes no mention 
of Nazism at all. Jeremy King addresses the influence Nazism’s rise to power in 
Germany exerted on the dynamics between Czechs and Sudeten Germans in Bohemia 
and the nationality policies pursued in the wartime Protectorate only in the final twenty 
pages of his monograph.98 Judson focuses even more exclusively on the imperial era, 
with only the concluding chapter looking forward into the post-World War I era. Even 
this chapter concerns itself primarily with the peace settlement, observing about the Nazis 
only that it was their policy of population shifting, alongside the Soviets’, that finally 
nationalized East Central Europe, not the success of nationalist activism.99 Only Tara 
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Zahra in her Kidnapped Souls substantially contributes to understandings of Nazism, in 
one chapter chronicling in detail the tension between Nazi racial thought and the 
Protectorate’s more complex national reality. Her findings will be explored in more detail 
in a later chapter of this dissertation. 
Both the literature about national indifference and that about a conflict-centric 
vision of the borderlands have their merits and defects. This dissertation engages with 
both narratives and simultaneously puts the Nazi movement’s interaction before 1933 
with the borderlands’ specific circumstances center stage in a way it has not been before. 
Nazism’s borderland activism, it emerges, actually speaks to both strands of historical  
literature about border areas: on the one hand, it relied on hardened nationalists who saw 
their home regions as battlegrounds between nations, but on the other, it had to appeal to 
ethnically ambiguous or nationally indifferent populations. That the pursuit of nationalist 
conflict and the accommodation of more complex ethnic and national realities coexisted 
in the Nazi movement challenges the tendency of scholarship to treat the two prevailing 
narratives about borderlands as mutually exclusive. If widespread and resilient national 
indifference was the fundamental reality of borderlands, then nationalism was really just 
a movement dangerously but superficially superimposed on that reality, one side appears 
to think. Very real violence and tension can end up being downplayed and the 
perspectives of those, who genuinely did see their world through a nationalist lens, 
neglected. The other scholarly faction, meanwhile, by buying uncritically into nationalist 
historical narratives about borderlands fails to see the circumstances that contradict these. 
This dissertation will examine the interplay between the Nazi movement and both of the 
important facets of borderland reality, nationalist strife and national indifference. 
Borderlands’ reality was, however, hardly monolithic. Germany’s interwar border 
regions differed from one another in myriad ways and this dissertation’s case studies 
have been carefully chosen to reflect that diversity: the Border Province Posen-West 
Prussia, composed of the sparse remains of the two provinces once obtained in the Polish 
Partitions; the Pomeranian Regierungsbezirk Köslin, which jutted out far into the Polish 
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Corridor; Masuria, with its Polish-speaking but loyally German population; Upper 
Silesia, industrial, Catholic, and largely nationally indifferent; and finally Schleswig, on 
the border with Denmark. In selecting these regions for study, I have relied on a 
relatively narrow understanding of the term borderland. I have included only immediate 
border regions, corresponding in several cases to post-war plebiscite zones. While the 
Border Province and Upper Silesia have been included in their entirety, such an approach 
seemed less prudent in other cases. After all, while the Regierungsbezirk Köslin 
protruded into the Polish Corridor to near Danzig, Pomerania’s westernmost parts were 
nearer Berlin than the Polish border. Likewise, whereas Schleswig had seen a border 
referendum in 1920 and lost its northern half to Denmark, Holstein, which extends all the 
way down to Hamburg, had not been included in that vote. Masuria, which too had been 
subject to a plebiscite in 1920, lay in the much larger and diverse province of East 
Prussia. In these three cases, I have therefore only incorporated the relevant parts of the 
provinces into this study. Other scholars have employed looser definitions of the term 
borderland, with Michael Mann, for example, using entire provinces as his units of 
analysis. Peter Merkl likewise worked with large territorial units in his statistical 
evaluation of Abel's collection. Yet Mann himself observed that the borderland-specific 
effects he found increased in strength with proximity to the border.100 Therefore, I have 
made my study more fine-grained.  
It should further be noted that the term borderland is used here as a shorthand for, 
specifically, contested borderlands. When interwar Germans spoke of Grenzländer, they 
tended, after all, to refer to those regions that had a recent history of nationalist struggle. 
Naturally, Germany had other international borders that do not fit that description, such 
as the borders with Switzerland or Czechoslovakia. These cases are not at issue here. 
There were, of course, more contested borderlands than could be considered here. 
In East Prussia, the Regierungsbezirk Marienwerder had like Masuria been subject to a 
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plebiscite in 1920 and Tilsit and its surrounds bordered the League of Nations-
administered Memel region. Lower Silesia was wedged in between Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. Most importantly, of the numerous respondents to Abel’s essay contest 
who were connected to borderlands many hailed from territories adjoining France. 
Integrating these areas would have provided an added counterweight, besides Schleswig, 
to the Eastern focus of this study. However, the occupation of the Rhineland was a 
primary driver of radicalization there and it would have been too difficult within the 
scope of this project to try to disentangle that radicalizing effect from any the border 
alteration in and of itself exerted.101 Further archival research would also not have been 
feasible during the timespan of a doctoral project, especially as the areas bordering 
France did not neatly map onto a Regierungsbezirk as other case studies do, complicating 
the search for relevant archival material. Similar considerations apply to the German 
areas abutting Eupen-Malmédy, which had been lost to Belgium after the war. That said, 
a handful of Abel’s respondents from near France did testify that it was not solely the 
experience of occupation that had given rise to their receptivity for Nazism but also that 
of expulsion from Alsace-Lorraine or that of the new border’s proximity. Where I had in 
any case come across material like this from borderlands other than my case studies, it 
has sometimes been incorporated. A more systematic examination of Nazism in these 
regions does, however, remain desirable. 
Given that other Western border areas will not be considered, questions may arise 
regarding whether Schleswig, the only Western borderland included, can be legitimately 
compared to the four Eastern regions and whether, therefore, this dissertation can claim 
to arrive at any conclusions about German contested borderlands in general. After all, 
how Germans perceived Denmark and Poland differed considerably, with the latter, but 
not the former, held to be inferior to Germany in terms of both racial worth and 
civilizational level. Arguably because Denmark had never been seen as lesser, it was in 
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the early 1930s not characterized by the same nationally motivated violence that plagued 
the other case studies. In every other respect, however, Schleswig exhibited the same 
conditions as its Eastern counterparts: It too struggled economically, blaming its 
difficulties partly on the loss of its hinterland.102 Its population too remained, in large 
parts, nationally indifferent. Its political culture too, like its pioneers of Nazism, was 
shaped by the decades-old national struggle, the recent plebiscite, and the territorial loss. 
It too saw critiques of the republican government and its constituent parties clothed in 
criticism of their handling of the border situation. And its National Socialists too were 
faced with a non-German minority on their side of the border and a vocal ethnic German 
minority on the other. What is more, at the time the borderlands, including Schleswig and 
the others studied here, understood themselves as a community of regions linked by a 
shared fate. As will be shown in the chapters devoted to commemorative culture and Nazi 
propaganda in the borderlands, regional Nazi party branches – like regional governments 
– would send one another telegrams on the anniversaries of plebiscites. Dedicated 
borderlands pages in regional Nazi newspapers carried stories about other border areas. 
Every comparative study foregrounds relevant commonalities like these, while 
acknowledging but fundamentally relegating to the background sometimes considerable 
differences.  
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One thing that most but, it should be noted, not all case studied considered here 
had in common was the magnitude of electoral support for the NSDAP. In Germany as a 
whole, the Nazi vote share in Reichstag 
elections jumped from 2.6% in 1928 to 
18.3% in 1930 and from there to 37.3% and 
33.1% in July and November 1932 
respectively.103 Schleswig, Masuria, eastern 
Pomerania’s Lębork county, and parts of 
the Border Province surpassed these 
national vote shares greatly: There, the 
NSDAP in July 1932 won between 44% 
and 73% (see Fig. 1). In that election, 
Schleswig-Holstein became the first and 
only Wahlkreis in a free election to return a Nazi majority, of 51%.104 In Upper Silesia, in 
contrast, the party received a share of votes below the national average. Only 1% of 
Upper Silesians in 1928 and 9.5% in 1930 cast their ballots for the NSDAP, but the gap 
had narrowed by 1932. 29.2% and 26.8% of voters endorsed the NSDAP in July and 
November respectively of that year.105 The Center Party, meanwhile, maintained a fairly 
steady vote share in the region throughout the 1920s and early 1930s. This lesser 
electoral success in Upper Silesia does not, however, invalidate investigating how 
Nazism there interacted with the province’s borderland nature. After all, Nazis in Upper 
Silesia might have been a minority, but a sizable and vocal one that, as Bolko Janus 
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Figure 1: Jürgen Falter, Thomas Lindenberger, and 
Siegfried Schumann, Wahlen und Abstimmungen in 
der Weimarer Republik (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1986), 
230-231. 
The case study areas have been marked. 
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observes in his monograph about Upper Silesia, was able to significantly influence the 
tone and themes of public discourse.106 
Another thing to be mindful of is that border regions were also characterized by 
circumstances other than their proximity to borders and that these too factored into 
Nazism’s rise there. Except for Upper Silesia, all the case studies examined here were 
Protestant agrarian regions. Such areas have been found by psephologists to have been 
core constituencies for the NSDAP across Germany by 1930.107 The NSDAP became, 
Wolfram Pyta has argued, a Milieupartei,108 with an exceptionally well-organized 
agrarian propaganda apparatus that penetrated into the smallest villages.109 The party’s 
trademark was, naturally, its emphasis on Volksgemeinschaft,110 which was well-received 
in those villages, notably in Schleswig-Holstein, that were fairly socio-economically 
homogeneous and had flat hierarchies.111 The idea also held out to farmers the promise of 
an elevated position in a future Volksgemeinschaft.112 In the present, voting for the largest 
opposition party, farmers hoped, would result in greater attentiveness to their needs on 
the part of the parliaments and on the part of urbanites, many of whom were likewise 
joining the movement.113 The notion of Volksgemeinschaft fell on less fertile ground in 
the socially stratified East Elbian manorial villages.114 Even there, though, the party 
thrived, because it made attractive political offers to all social groups: Estate owners were 
lured with the prospect of positions in the movement and in an eventual Nazi state 
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commensurate with their social rank.115 Simultaneously the party took up land agents’ 
demand that formal qualifications for their job be introduced, so that competition from 
cheaper lateral recruits, which exploded during the Great Depression, would be 
eliminated.116 Pledges to improve, without class struggle, living conditions and 
opportunities for professional advancement appealed to farm laborers.117 Among both of 
the latter groups the NSDAP was furthermore popular because unlike the DNVP it was 
not, for all its efforts to win them over, as explicitly a party of the Junker.118 Shelley 
Baranowski’s narrative in The Sanctity of Rural Life is similar, albeit with a greater 
emphasis on the significance of Junker leverage. Using Pomerania as a case study, she 
describes the centrality to rural self-concepts of what she calls the “rural myth,” the idea 
that an idealized version of rural life was the foundation of a healthy nation.119 
Traditionally, the DNVP had been the champion and beneficiary of this myth. With that 
party in decline, the NSDAP could take up this role.120 Though Baranowski extensively 
chronicled how the Nazis and the older right attacked one another,121 she ultimately 
concludes that the Nazi movement profited decisively from the united nationalist front 
that both it and the DNVP upheld.122 Socially influential, DNVP-supporting Junker 
pressured those dependent on them, for instance, to participate in far-right events and 
campaigns that incorporated the NSDAP.123 Their discourses were shared with the 
Nazis124 and they displayed “’benevolent neutrality’” toward the ascendant movement.125 
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Junker toleration and even support made it possible, Baranowski holds, for the NSDAP 
to become the party of the rural milieu. 
The economy, moreover, was as much of a priority for borderlanders in the early 
1930s as it was for Germans elsewhere. Even at the best of times, the geographically 
marginal, thinly settled, industrially and infrastructurally underdeveloped, and 
agriculture-dependent border regions had lagged behind the rest of the country 
economically. Upper Silesia, home to the second-largest industrial area after the Ruhr, 
was the exception. Then, in 1928 grain prices dropped due to worldwide overproduction. 
Later, the drastic decline in consumer demand for meat and dairy engendered by the 
Great Depression compounded farmers’ plight.126 From 1928 onwards, increasing 
numbers of them could no longer service their debts and the number of foreclosures 
surged.127 In response, farmers imposed illegal and unilateral moratoria on interest and 
tax payments.128 They also called for autarchy, as foreign products were undercutting 
theirs despite protectionist tariffs. The government reacted: Measures to facilitate debt 
restructuring and relief for East Elbian agriculture, known as Osthilfe, had been in place 
since 1926129 and more were passed in 1931.130 Similar aid packages existed for north 
German farmers too.131 Many, however, did not use the financial respite to future-proof 
their businesses but instead ran their businesses in unchanged fashion and counted on 
continued subsidies.132 For its part, Upper Silesia was hit hard by the industrial 
unemployment crisis of the early 1930s.  
Reducing Nazism’s success to a response to economic distress has rightly, 
however, been questioned. After all, the KPD stood to profit from economic suffering 
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too. Furthermore, a contemporary study found that the primary reaction to the economic 
crisis was not political radicalism at all but “apathy and resignation.”133 Other countries, 
like the United States, were what’s more at least equally hard hit, yet voters there did not 
abandon democracy.134 Economics were, finally, rarely discussed in isolation. The East 
Elbian Oberpräsidenten, for example, excelled at invoking their provinces’ embattled 
border location to secure economic aid.135 Ordinary borderlanders in Abel’s sample 
attributed their difficulties finding employment to the economic downturn that came with 
territorial losses or their politicization to witnessing the economic harm the so-called 
bleeding borders were doing. An engagement with circumstances beyond the economic 
on the part of historians therefore remains necessary. 
Politicized violence too was hardly unique to the Weimar Republic’s borderlands. 
Its prevalence between 1930 and 1933 and the resulting “vacuum of order,” if not of 
power, are key to explaining the demise of the republic, Dirk Blasius has contended.136 
He concedes that the street fighting of the late Weimar years was not a conventional civil 
war137 and that the number of casualties was low compared to the rate of membership in 
paramilitary organizations.138 As a “category of experience and interpretation,”139 
however, the “civil war situation” was, he maintained, very real.140 Bernhard Fulda has 
been more reluctant to consider Weimar’s last years an actual “civil war situation.” 
Rather than the violence itself, he has averred, it was the inflation of violence by the 
(tabloid) press that created the debilitating sense of crisis.141 Whether the threat of civil 
war was real or imagined, it shaped political decision-making, especially in 1932. With a 
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view to pacifying the streets, the Reich government in the spring of 1932, for instance, 
made the choice to ban the SA, an episode that is the at the center of Fulda’s analysis and 
the starting point of Blasius’. The decision prompted calls by the right for the – much less 
belligerent – Social Democratic Reichsbanner to be prohibited too, a request that the 
minister responsible, the lieutenant general without party affiliation Wilhelm Groener, 
rejected. He defended the one-sided ban, amid protest from the NSDAP delegates, in a 
Reichstag speech, a defense for which chancellor Brüning in turn defended Groener.142 In 
response, the right clamored for the government’s resignation. Hindenburg, eager to court 
the right-wing press after having just run as the republican candidate for president, 
announced that he would no longer sign the emergency decrees on which Brüning’s 
government relied, forcing it to quit.143 Brüning was replaced by the conservative von 
Papen, who lifted the SA ban144 and seized a bloody altercation in Altona in mid-July as 
an excuse to remove a Social Democratic Prussian government from power that he 
declared unable to contain the spread of violence.145 The hope for an alliance with the 
Nazis dissolved, however, after Hitler rejected anything other than the chancellorship 
during coalition negotiations on August 13 and Hindenburg refused to grant just that for 
fear of fueling the violence by granting one side such power.146 For months thereafter, the 
government tried to figure out how to maintain its authority and public order while 
unwilling to work with the left and unable to team up with the Nazis.147 In the end, of 
course, it offered the chancellorship to Hitler after all. This Nazi ascension to power was 
not, Blasius submits, the end of civil war but rather the perpetuation of civil war: The 
state had been taken over by one of the warring parties, which for the next twelve years 
proceeded to terrorize its opponents.148 
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The violence that occurred in the border regions in the early 1930s needs to be 
understood partly in this context. The brutal murder of a Polish-speaking Communist 
sympathizer in Upper Silesian Potempa, for example, which will be treated in detail later, 
had national ramifications, for Hitler’s defense of the murderers showed a countrywide 
public that Nazism’s commitment to legality and democracy were skin-deep.149 However, 
in the borderlands violence also stood in another tradition, namely that of the so-called 
nationalist struggle. The everyday harassment and small-scale violence involved in this 
struggle persisted throughout the 1920s. In fact, the arguably most notable instance of 
borderlands violence since the fighting of the immediate post-war years took place when 
a Polish opera performance in Upper Silesian Oppeln sparked riots in April 1929, before 
the proliferation of political violence of the early 1930s. The Potempa murder, albeit after 
the fact, was framed and understood as ethnic violence too. Nationalist violence in the 
borderlands does not neatly fit the standard chronology of Weimar political violence. 
While its national context will be taken into account as necessary, political violence that 
occurred in the borderlands in the early 1930s will therefore in this dissertation primarily 
be considered against the backdrop of these regions’ history of violent nationalist 
competition. The nationwide radicalization of politics, the economic crisis, and the 
synergy between Nazism and rural Protestant milieus indubitably powerfully shaped 
borderlanders’ political opinions, but this study aims to contribute an additional layer of 
insight by investigating the ways in which Nazism engaged with the borderlands qua 
borderlands. 
 The archetype of the Eastern German frontier prior to the First World War were 
the provinces of Posen and West Prussia. Therefore the history of this so-called Prussian 
Partition constitutes crucial background knowledge for any investigation of German 
borderlands history, even though of the case studies considered here only the Border 
Province was an erstwhile partition territory. Germans had settled in Posen and West 
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Prussia as privileged farmers and entrepreneurs since the Middle Ages.150 Like the Jews, 
these settlers formed an affluent minority with special protections, which engendered 
jealousy. By and large, however, the Polish Commonwealth’s inhabitants considered the 
coexistence of different ethnicities "inevitable and natural." 151 By the 18th century, 
however, the once-mighty Commonwealth was in decline. Between 1772 and 1795 it was 
partitioned three times by the surrounding Great Powers – Russia, Prussia, and Austria – 
until there was no independent Polish state left.152 Only after the Polish uprising of 1830, 
however, did the Prussian government begin to pursue explicitly Germanizing policies,153 
giving rise in turn to the beginnings of Polish nationalist grassroots work.154 Germanizing 
pressures built under Bismarck, who considered Prussia's Polish-speaking population a 
threat to the consolidation of the new German nation state155 and therefore built anti-
Polish measures into his Kulturkampf against Catholic particularism.156 Instead of 
advancing Polish-speakers’ Germanization, however, the Kulturkampf politicized even 
the previously apolitical among them.157 Subsequent bills tried to restrict the use of Polish 
language use.158 Poles' landownership, meanwhile, was targeted by the Prussian 
Settlement Commission, which was tasked with buying up Polish estates and parceling 
them out to German settler-farmers. This program was intended to reverse unfavorable 
demographic trends, for Poles had high birth rates while at the same time many Germans 
were migrating westward in search of industrial jobs.159 Settlement in the East proved 
 
150 William Hagen, Germans, Poles, and Jews: The Nationality Conflict in the Prussian East, 1772-1914 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 1-6. 
151 Ibid., 29. 
152 Ibid., 35. 
153 Ibid., 84. 
154 Ibid., 91. 
155 Hans-Erich Volkmann, Die Polenpolitik des Kaiserreichs: Prolog zum Zeitalter der Weltkriege 
(Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016), 37. 
156 Hagen, Germans, Poles, and Jews, 129. 
157 Volkmann, Die Polenpolitik des Kaiserreichs, 74. 
158 Ibid., 78-81. 
159 Ibid., 83; Hagen, Germans, Poles, and Jews, 132-134. 
 27 
unattractive to Germans, though, and the scheme therefore ineffective.160 All the while, 
populist Polish politics, fueled by increasing “Germanophobia” among Polish-
speakers,161 gained ground.162 
After a short reprieve following Bismarck’s fall from power, chancellor Bernhard 
from Bülow in particular reinstated Bismarck’s hard anti-Polish line.163 His government, 
for instance, scrapped Polish-language religious instruction in schools.164 Its 1908 
Association Law additionally banned the use of Polish in public assemblies, though the 
Progressives successfully pushed through a twenty-year grace period for the most heavily 
Polish-speaking districts.165 An Expropriation Law, specifically limited to Polish estates, 
was also adopted in order to shore up the settlement program.166 The controversial 
legislation was not deployed, however, until 1912 and then only on a small scale. 
Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, faced with a lack of foreign policy successes, felt at that 
time that he had to comply with parliamentary pressure to make use of the law’s 
powers.167  This token implementation of the Expropriation Law was grist on Polish 
nationalists’ mills and simultaneously galled the German right, which had hoped it would 
be utilized more widely.168 This was, after all, the heyday of German nationalist interest 
groups like the Deutscher Ostmarkenverein.169 It was also Bethmann Hollweg who, due 
again to political pressure, in the spring of 1914 introduced a bill that would have made 
the sale or parcellation of land contingent upon the approval of the local Landrat and that 
would additionally have granted the Prussian Settlement Commission veto power over 
the arrangements for sale of Polish-owned land. The First World War broke out, though, 
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before this proposal could pass.170 These aggressive curtailments of their property rights 
contributed to the continued flourishing of Polish populism, spearheaded by National 
Democracy.171  
Early on in the First World War, Germany conquered Russian Poland. There, a 
Polish puppet kingdom was set up in order to incentivize Prussian Poles to support the 
German war effort and enlist in the army.172 The kingdom's establishment was ratified by 
Russia in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.173 While pretense was strategically being made 
abroad at supporting Polish independence, within Germany Poles were repressed more 
than ever. A promise, given in the militarily difficult days of 1917, to relax language 
restrictions was broken174 and the colonization commission furnished with additional 
funding, even though Germany's financial resources were stretched thin.175 Propositions 
to introduce one man, one vote in the Prussian Diet were opposed by Conservatives in 
part because such reform would have yielded Polish majorities in the Eastern 
provinces.176 Even without this harshness, however, Germany’s loss of Poles’ loyalty was 
inevitable, for since the failure of the 1863 Polish uprising they had placed their hopes for 
the resurrection of a Polish state in a shake-up of the European order through a major 
war.177 In 1918, the province of Posen duly revolted and joined the new Polish republic. 
Being deprived of the partition territories, considered integrally Prussian and then 
German for a century and a half, was felt as a keen humiliation by Germans, all the more 
so as the loss did not even eliminate Germany's minority problem.178 A rump minority 
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remained.179 This residual minority was composed mainly of lower-class Polish-speakers, 
since the better-off moved to Poland.180 This decapitated Polish milieu was largely 
apolitical, with Polish parties and the Union of Poles in Germany unfolding wider 
relevance mainly during election seasons.181 This lack of political organization prevailed 
even though Poles enjoyed a good legal position in the Weimar Republic. Immediately 
after the war, the republican government had contemplated pursuing openly repressive 
minority politics that would have removed many of Poles' legal rights, but in the end it 
placed its hopes instead in a "soft variant" of gradual assimilation.182 Minorities' equal 
rights before the law and their right to the upkeep of their nationality were guaranteed by 
both the Prussian and federal constitutions.183 On the ground, however, German officials 
were granted considerable leeway in dealing with minorities and instructed to keep a 
close watch on their doings.184 The losses of Versailles had left the government 
apprehensive that minorities might become a potential advance guard for additional 
claims by neighboring states on German land.185 The same anxieties about the possibility 
of further territorial losses underlay the continuation of the settlement program.186 
German policy towards its Polish minority was furthermore influenced by Poland's 
treatment of its much larger German one, with German measures often intended either as 
retribution or "conciliatory accommodation" in the face of illiberal Polish handling of 
ethnic Germans.187  
The Border Province Posen-West Prussia was the heir to the Prussian Partition. 
The precedent for its establishment was set, Mathias Niendorf recounts, when 
administrators fled Bromberg during the 1918 Posen Uprising and moved their offices to 
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the mid-sized town of Schneidemühl, which was to become the provincial capital. 
Officials conducted their business from there until West Prussia too was definitively 
handed to Poland in the peace settlement.188 They then successfully lobbied for the few, 
non-contiguous remainders of the Partition territories to be preserved as a province of 
their own. Formally founded in 1922,189 the province bore a name that consciously 
foregrounded its character as a mutilated “Traditionsprovinz.”190 This rump province's 
Polish population was concentrated in three of its nine districts, Meseritz and Bomst in 
the south and Flatow in the north.191 In the southern two counties, what Polish movement 
there was had been rendered leaderless by the migration of the affluent to Poland, but 
Flatow was home to pastor Domanski, the president of the Union of Poles and head of its 
district branch.192 It was with attacks on Domanski and his camp that the Nazi party made 
a name for itself.193 Nationalist clashes took off in the province in the early 1930s in 
particular, when severe economic malaise increased susceptibility to nationalist rallying 
cries that targeted not only the neighboring Polish state but also the Polish minority 
within.194 In 1938, the Border Province was dissolved and merged into the surrounding 
Prussian provinces for administrative convenience.195 There is not much work on the 
Border Province besides Niendorf’s. Detlef Mühlberger published a psephological study 
about the region, which was, however, blind to the border context. Edmund Spevack’s 
early 1990s study of interwar irredentist propaganda in the province, meanwhile, was 
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clouded by his anxiety that the newly reunited Germany might once again make similar 
demands.196 
 There are no works dedicated specifically to eastern Pomerania in this period, but 
robust regional history literatures have developed about the remaining case study regions. 
Since the scholarship concerning Upper Silesia is deeply interwoven with that on national 
indifference, that region’s history and historiography has been already recounted above. 
Why national indifference, in contrast, never took hold among Masuria’s also Polish-
speaking autochthonous population, which came instead to ardently identify as German, 
is the central question of literature about Masuria. Masurians, it has found, were 
profoundly loyal to the Hohenzollern monarchy and long considered themselves Polish-
speaking Prussians. This self-conception was regarded as unproblematic up until the 
foundation of the German Empire197 and few Germanizing measures were instituted 
before then,198 though Masuria's Polish vernacular contributed to its image as an 
uncivilized backwater.199 After the foundation of a German nation state, however, 
Germanizing pressures set in.200 Masurians had no alternative loci of identity to turn to. 
For the devoutly Protestant Masurians, confessional differences posed an insuperable 
barrier to identification with Catholic Poland. What shadow of a Polish movement 
existed in the region was run and funded entirely by Polish outsiders from the Prussian 
Partition and Russian Poland.201 A distinct regional identity that, like Upper Silesia’s, 
could serve as a counterpoint to national identities also failed to develop, with nascent 
efforts to celebrate regional heritage casting the Heimat as part of a greater German 
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whole.202 During the First World War, Germanization accelerated further. Shared 
frontline service and contact with soldiers quartered in the area strengthened Masurians' 
ties to the German national community.203 The wider German citizenry, in turn, for the 
first time took an interest in Masuria, which as the victim of the Russian invasion of 
1914/15 was the only region on German soil to see fighting.204  
 After the war, the Polish delegation to the peace conference at Versailles laid 
claim to Masuria, despite the native population's German identification.205 The French 
were prepared to grant Poland the region outright, but the British and Americans insisted 
on a plebiscite.206 In preparation for the referendum, the Ostdeutscher Heimatdienst 
coordinated a potent, partly Polish-language German propaganda campaign.207 The Polish 
campaign, meanwhile, depended on outside organizers and funding, like the pre-war 
Polish movement had done.208 The difference in the two campaigns' resonance is best 
captured by the discrepancy in their supporter numbers: Whereas the grassroots 
organization set up by the Heimatdienst attracted 171,131 members in 928 branches,209 
the Polish equivalent drew “’only fourteen Masurians of entirely unknown value’” even 
when it recruited in a prisoner-of-war camp with the promise of early release.210 The 
plebiscite result reflected this imbalance of sympathies, for Germany won 97.8% of the 
vote, while Poland attained merely 2.2%.211 With the exception of Soldau and surrounds, 
Masuria was therefore retained by Germany.212 Poland dismissed the referendum's 
outcome as the product of German terror and of centuries of Germanization, but even 
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under the liberal Weimar Republic the Polish national movement did not take off.213 
Germany, on the other hand, celebrated its victory, which, having come at a time when 
the country was in profound crisis, was extolled as demonstrating that Masurians’ 
attachment to Germany was genuine and exceptionally steadfast, not merely 
opportunistic.214 Nevertheless, the durability of Masurians' national identification 
continued to worry German officials and activists as long as linguistic assimilation had 
not been achieved.215 Therefore, Germanizing initiatives continued to be pursued216 and 
any definition of the Masurians as a minority vehemently opposed, due to the protections 
that came with that classification.217  
 Masurians themselves in the early years of the republic saw in Hindenburg the 
best replacement for the monarchs they had revered and therefore supported the 
DNVP.218 Plagued by poverty and embittered that economic aid to East Prussia did not 
reach them, they, however, soon grew disenchanted with the republic, in whose 
government the DNVP had on occasion participated.219 Hitler and his Nazi party filled 
the resulting vacuum, garnering vote shares as high as 70.6% in some counties in 1932.220 
Once in power, the Nazis' infrastructure and agricultural improvement projects gave rise 
to an unprecedented economic boom and consequently the Third Reich’s peacetime years 
came to be remembered as Masuria’s golden age.221 The Nazi government too, however, 
expressed frustration with the persistence of the Polish vernacular, even at NSDAP party 
meetings,222 and therefore ran Germanization programs very akin to those of preceding 
governments.223  
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 Schleswig-Holstein followed a path to Nazism very different from that of its 
fellow borderland regions in the East. For centuries, the two duchies had been governed 
in personal union by the Danish monarchs but had also maintained close ties to the 
German cultural and economic sphere. Once competing nationalist movements took root 
in the 19th century, they advocated for the full incorporation of the duchies into the 
Danish and Prussian states respectively. In 1864, Bismarck's military victory over 
Denmark settled the matter. Before the First World War, the electorate of the new 
Prussian province embraced the liberal opposition, whose nationalism, agriculture-
friendly free-trade policies, and hostility toward the conservative Prussian establishment 
it endorsed.224 Accordingly, in the first post-war elections in 1919 the Wilhelmine 
opposition parties, namely the Social Democrats, the German Democratic Party, and the 
regional Landespartei, together garnered over 80% of votes.225 A shift to the right, 
however, soon occurred, with the DNVP winning vote shares as high as in the Eastern 
Prussian provinces.226 The nationalist fervor underlying this development was generated 
in part by the plebiscite held in Schleswig in 1920, which the peace settlement had 
mandated at the request of Danish nationalist activists and politicians, even though 
Denmark had not been a combatant country.227 In the lead-up to the vote, all German 
parties defended the indivisibility of Schleswig and supported the German campaign, but 
the chief organizing committee thereof nevertheless from the beginning linked its protests 
against the threat to Schleswig to "its aversions against the new government."228 For the 
referendum, Schleswig was divided into two zones, the northern one of which voted in 
February, while the southern one did so in March. The first zone, where about 75% had 
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cast their ballots for Denmark, Germany lost, but it retained the second, where over 80% 
voted German.229 Whereas Southern Schleswig's upholding of its Germandom and the 
sense of Volksgemeinschaft of the plebiscite period came to be remembered fondly, the 
loss of North Schleswig was deeply resented.230  
The border alteration inspired grievances partly because of the detrimental 
economic impact it had in particular on Flensburg, which lost its hinterland.231 It was the 
further economic distress caused by the agricultural crisis of the late 1920s that ignited 
the notorious Landvolkbewegung, which from 1928 committed acts of civil disobedience 
protesting the measures imposed by the government and by the banks on insolvent 
indebted farmers. A radical wing of the movement eventually began carrying out 
terroristic attacks, which led many former supporters, including the NSDAP, to distance 
themselves from it.232 Following the collapse of the Landvolkbewegung about a year after 
it took off, most of its adherents joined the NSDAP.233 By that time, the NSDAP was 
more generally prospering in Schleswig-Holstein, winning more votes there than 
anywhere else in the country. In July 1932, the province became the only electoral district 
ever to return a majority for the NSDAP in a free election. 
Schleswig-Holstein’s embrace of Nazism soon spurred first attempts at 
explanation. Already in 1934 Rudolf Heberle wrote a sociological monograph examining 
the relationship between the province’s rural population and the Nazi movement, though 
it was only published much later. More recently, scholars, particularly those around the 
Arbeitskreis zur Erforschung des Nationalsozialismus in Schleswig-Holstein e.V., have 
produced a wealth of scholarship about Nazism, including its roots, in the region. Edited 
volumes have been a favorite format: Schleswig-Holstein 1800 bis heute: Eine 
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historische Landeskunde by editors Uwe Danker and Utz Schliesky, Schleswig-Holstein 
und der Nationalsozialismus by editors Uwe Danker and Astrid Schwabe, and earlier 
“Wir bauen das Reich”: Aufstieg und erste Herrschaftsjahre des Nationalsozialismus in 
Schleswig-Holstein by editors Erich Hoffmann and Peter Wulf all compiled insightful 
pieces. Gerhard Paul in his Landunter: Schleswig-Holstein und das Hakenkreuz single-
handedly contributed a wealth of vignettes. The particularly early rise of Nazism in 
Dithmarschen, a set of two counties in Holstein and therefore outside the immediate 
border area, is remarked on in all the literature about Schleswig-Holstein, though few 
pieces are dedicated specifically to the phenomenon. Frank Omland’s chapter 
“Dithmarschen und der Aufstieg des Nationalsozialismus” is an excepton. However, the 
volume in which it appeared, like much of the literature about Schleswig-Holstein, is 
written for the general public and does without citations. Neither in these general interest 
books nor in the scientific monographs is the new, contested border considered in relation 
to Nazism’s rise. The exception are a few older works like Rudolf Rietzler’s 1982 Kampf 
in der Nordmark: Das Aufkommen des Nationalsozialismus in Schleswig-Holstein 1919-
1928 and Peter Heinacher’s 1986 Der Aufstieg der NSDAP im Stadt- und Landkreis 
Flensburg (1919-1933). This paucity of substantive engagement with borderland 
conditions in scholarship about Nazism in Schleswig-Holstein persists even though 
counties in the province’s north, including Südtondern and Schleswig, eventually became 
regional Nazi bastions.234 
The history and politics of Schleswig-Holstein and of the other case study regions 
were evidently shaped by their closeness to contested borders. Yet the neighboring ethnic 
German territories have always loomed larger in the public consciousness.235 What 
narratives about Germany's borderlands qua borderlands do exist, meanwhile, have rarely 
treated the Weimar era, aside from the period of plebiscitary and military struggles at its 
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start. Considered more often in light of their Protestantism, rural character, and economic 
distress, the regions' borderland location has seldom informed examinations of their 
Weimar-era politics and of the in many cases precipitous ascent of Nazism there. Some, 
in fact, deem investigations of the influence of border proximity on politics unwarranted. 
Richard Bessel, for instance, has relied on the assumption that the German East was not 
differentiated from the rest of Germany by its vicinity to the borders in his Political 
Violence and the Rise of Nazism in order to be able to employ it as a representative case 
study from which to draw conclusions about the ascent of Nazism across the country.236 
The same issues as elsewhere, he claimed, dominated politics there and, he contended, 
even discourses concerning the border and its effects, which one might think shaped 
politics in the Eastern border regions in particular, were neither more salient nor more 
preponderant in these areas than in the rest of Germany.237 Bolko Janus' dissertation 
about Upper Silesia has likewise asserted that, despite the nearby border and the recent 
history of violence, “Overall, the level and character of hypernationalism in Upper Silesia 
was indistinguishable from hypernationalism in the rest of Germany.”238 
Hypernationalism, Janus stressed, was strongest in Upper Silesia’s north and west, the 
parts of the region that were both most ethnically German and farthest away from the 
border.239 Brendan Karch too has maintained that the province's proximity to the border 
and its ethnic multiplicity did not shape voter behavior. In contrast to Janus' emphasis on 
the NSDAP's strength in Upper Silesia's most German counties, however, Karch arrived 
at this conclusion precisely because Polish-speakers too voted for that party.240 Since 
Nazis' anti-Polish propaganda consisted of vague generalities, it was not perceived as 
truly menacing, Karch held, and Upper Silesians of all backgrounds could therefore turn 
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to the Nazi party as an outlet for protest voting.241 Ethnicity was thus irrelevant to 
politics. 
 This conclusion of Karch's that the support of some Polish-speakers for the Nazi 
party renders the matter of the border and of ethnicity irrelevant to the study of voting 
behavior in Weimar-era Upper Silesia is, however, something of a jump. Janus' assertion, 
meanwhile, that radical nationalism in Upper Silesia was no different from that elsewhere 
is belied by some of his dissertation's preceding parts. These chronicle the role of former 
Freikorps fighters in the regional Nazi movement,242 the party's rhetoric and actions 
targeting Poles or the border, and, on the other hand,243 the membership in the NSDAP of 
individuals from autochthonous, Polish-speaking backgrounds.244 Bessel's book, for its 
part, does devote a chapter to the Nazis' participation in the Eastern borderlands' 
Reichswehr-sponsored Grenzschutz units. An article of his furthermore remains the best 
on the above-mentioned Potempa murder.245 Shelley Baranowski mentions instances 
when the NSDAP attacked the DNVP246 or the government for supposedly granting Poles 
preferential treatment.247 She, like Bessel, Karch, and Janus, does not let the borderland-
specific rhetoric and behaviors she encountered inform her narrative, but exist they 
clearly did.  
 This study therefore sets out to illuminate the interplay, heretofore sidelined, 
between the ascendant Nazi movement and the concerns, experiences, and conditions of 
contested borderlands. It opens with a discussion of how Nazi activists connected their 
political trajectory with reportedly formative experiences of the German frontiers before, 
during, and after the First World War. The second chapter goes on to demonstrate how 
the Nazis colonized the commemoration of post-war contention over the German borders 
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in order to attach to their movement the prestige associated with frontier defense. Chapter 
three surveys the other themes and methods of borderland-specific publicity. The fourth 
chapter looks more closely at the kinds of claims Nazi propaganda in border regions 
made about the relationship between race and nation. By examining this question within 
the setting of Germany’s own long-standing border areas, the chapter contributes a new 
perspective to a literature that has considered the tensions between Nazi racial thought on 
the one hand and, on the other, the in reality more complex relationship between ethnicity 
and nationality on the ground primarily in the context of the Third Reich’s wartime 
occupation of Eastern Europe. The nationalist nature of political violence in the 
borderlands and the associated narrative that the Nazi movement was the best protector of 
regions where Germandom was under threat are the focus of the following chapter. The 
sixth chapter is devoted to interactions between borderland Nazism and the central and 
regional governments as well as between the movement and the established right. It 
concentrates on the critiques Nazis levelled at both for their handling of the borderlands’ 
situation, while also reviewing Nazis' collaboration with the rest of the far right on border 
matters. The final chapter explores the reception of Nazism’s borderland activism by 
non-Germans and by ethnic Germans across the border. It highlights how Nazis' conduct 
played into the hands of the formers' opportunistic denunciations of all Germans as 
oppressive in their nationalism, while achieving only a mixed reception among the latter. 
Negotiation of the concerns and resentments of those for whom Germany’s postwar 
territorial losses and ethnic multiplicity were daily lived realities was, it emerges, a 
substantial part of burgeoning Nazism in the country’s much-contested borderlands. 
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The Post-War in the Borderlands 
 
 While during the Weimar Republic’s last years the National Socialist movement 
often achieved prodigious electoral successes and certainly pronounced visibility in 
Germany’s contested borderlands, it constituted, there as elsewhere, only a small if vocal 
minority during the years immediately following the upheavals surrounding the post-war 
territorial settlement. Nevertheless, the experience of those turbulences, as well as of 
anxiety about the borderlands’ situation before and during the war, reportedly laid the 
foundations for borderland residents’ later embrace of Nazism, even if their political 
trajectory did not lead them directly to that party when it was still at the political fringe. 
Valuable work exists chronicling the ties between post-war paramilitary groups, which 
were based in the borderlands or came there to participate in armed border conflicts, and 
the Nazi party. The role individual paramilitary leaders, including borderland locals, took 
on in the party has been touched on too. Going beyond this focus on the paramilitaries 
and their commanders, this chapter draws on egodocuments, first and foremost American 
sociologist Theodore Abel’s collection of autobiographical sketches, to illuminate rank-
and-file Nazis’ engagement with the borderlands’ condition. Many cited pre-war national 
tensions, wartime realizations of Germany’s vulnerability, and the fears, sufferings, and 
joys of plebiscites, armed struggle, and expulsion in their responses to Abel’s prompt of 
“Why I Became a Nazi.” This pattern indicates that these circumstances shaped 
respondents’ political views and development, or at least had become an internalized 
justificatory narrative. In contrast to the more official, impersonal sources on which 
subsequent chapters will have to rely, the egodocuments employed here permit the 
investigation of border experiences’ connection with Nazism not just at an earlier time 
but on the individual level. 
 The Nazi movement’s intertwinement with the paramilitary scene, which had 
sprung up in opposition not only to the revolution but also to the looming territorial 
losses, is well-known. One of the environments where this enmeshment was particularly 
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germane was in the border regions where the Freikorps had fought. On the national level, 
many leadership figures, such as Heinrich Himmler, Ernst Röhm, and Martin Bormann, 
had in those years been members of Freikorps and Rudolf Höss1 and Kurt Daluege, a 
native Upper Silesian, had fought in Upper Silesia.2  Many other participants in the 
fighting also attained official posts in the Third Reich.3 This identification of the NSDAP 
with the aims and ideology of the Freikorps was even officially celebrated in a ceremony 
in Munich on the tenth anniversary of the Beer Hall Putsch.4 For Upper Silesia 
specifically, a 1976 monograph about the German Freikorps in the region documented 
paramilitary veterans’ role as the “avantgarde of fascism” in the region.5 In the work, 
Franciszek Biały describes how several Freikorps leaders soon after its establishment in 
August 1921 agreed to put their troops under the command of the SA, which until the 
spring of 1923 was headed by a veteran of the Ehrhardt Brigade’s participation in the 
Upper Silesian fighting. Most prominent among these Freikorps commanders was 
Gerhard Rossbach, who was recruited to the NSDAP in the summer of 1922 alongside 
Edmund Heines, the later SA leader for Silesia, Heinz Hauenstein, and Peter von 
Heydebreck, the hero of St Anne Mountain. Rossbach and Hauenstein in particular took 
responsibility for building up the Nazi movement in Silesia and outside Bavaria more 
generally. Urging strength in unity, Hauenstein ordered his Freikorps to join the Nazi 
movement.6 Rossbach in an analogous speech to his adherents declared, “’Four days ago 
I was in Upper Silesia. I can assure you here in Bavaria that soon we will make the most 
backward part of Upper Silesia a small Bavaria [in the sense of making it National 
Socialist]…. It is a vital necessity to form a unified powerful organization, which would 
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https://www.dhm.de/lemo/biografie/biografie-rudolf-hoess.html. 
2 “Kurt Daluege 1897-1946,” Lebendiges Museum Online, accessed June 11, 2020, 
https://www.dhm.de/lemo/biografie/kurt-daluege. 
3 Franciszek Biały, Niemieckie Ochotnicze Formacje Zbrojne Na Śląsku w Latach 1918-1923 (Katowice: 
Śląski Instytut Naukowy, 1976), 184-202. 
4 Ibid., 171. 
5 “Awangarda faszyzmu”; Ibid., 140. 
6 Ibid., 141. 
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finally make order in today’s nonsense, from this tangle of numerous nationalist groups 
and unions competing with each other. Germans need strong leadership again.’”7 In this 
spirit, Rossbach, Hauenstein, and Schlageter, a high-ranking member of Hauenstein’s 
corps, set about establishing branches of the NSDAP and, when that was banned, the 
Großdeutsche Arbeiterpartei first in Berlin and then across Upper Silesia’s industrial 
district. By the end of 1922, branches of the latter party operated in Gleiwitz, 
Hindenburg, Beuthen, Cosel, Kandrzin, Rosenberg, Kreuzburg, and Oppeln. In 
Hindenburg and Kreuzburg the chairmen and deputies were Freikorps members and in 
Gleiwitz the seconds-in-command were Selbstschutz veterans.8 The branches’ 
memberships too consisted largely of Freikorps men, Biały repeatedly alleged. Rossbach, 
however, went to prison in early 1923 for masterminding a plot to overthrow the 
republican government and captain Eberhardt, his deputy in Upper Silesia, showed little 
initiative, leaving the aforementioned Peter von Heydebreck free to establish rival 
counterrevolutionary Freischar units. These he sought to integrate into the, within this 
scene, increasingly powerful NSDAP, but he was initially rebuffed by Göring, who 
informed him that the party leadership was concentrating on Bavaria for now. He met 
with more understanding, however, from Göring’s second-in-command, a veteran of the 
Ehrhardt brigade, and thus Heydebreck’s Freischar bands were subordinated to the Nazi 
party after all.9 Heydebreck’s ambition to unite all paramilitary groups in Upper Silesia 
under his command, however, was resisted by Alfred Mildner, the head of the powerful 
Bund Oberland there.10 In the end, however, Heydebreck appears to have won the 
struggle for influence, for it was he, rather than Mildner, who was put in charge of the 
 
7 “’Przed czterema dniami byłem na Górnym Śląsku. Mogę was tutaj w Bawarii zapewnić, że niebawem 
uczynimy z najbardziej zacofanej części Górnego Śląska małą Bawarię…Koniecznością życiową jest, aby 
z tego kłębowiska licznych rywalizujących ze sobą nacjonalistycznych grup i związków utworzyć jednolitą 
potężną organizację, która zrobiłaby wreszcie porządek z tym dzisiejszym nonsensem. Niemcy potrzebują 
znowu silnej władzy.“;  Ibid., 143-144. 
8 Ibid., 145. 
9 Ibid., 157-158. 
10 Ibid., 167. 
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paramilitary formations meant to carry out the Beer Hall Putsch in Upper Silesia, though 
the coup was defeated before they ever received the signal to act.11 In this failure’s wake, 
Heydebreck left the region to help Ernst Röhm set up the Frontbann, a substitute 
organization for the now-prohibited SA.12 In 1925, when the ban on the organization had 
been lifted, he re-founded the Upper Silesian SA13 and after the Nazis’ take-over of 
power Heydebreck became the leader of the SA group Pomerania. He had an Upper 
Silesian village named for him, which retained this designation even after he was 
murdered in the Night of Long Knives. Other native participants of the conflict of 1921 
took up positions at the provincial or local level during the Third Reich. Most 
prominently, Helmuth Brückner became the Gauleiter for Silesia and was provisionally 
responsible for Upper Silesia too. His deputy and simultaneously the police president for 
Breslau was Edmund Heines of the Freikorps Roßbach. Josef Adamczyk, a Freikorps 
fighter from Upper Silesia’s heavily Polish Rybnik district and prominent Nazi agitator 
during the Weimar years, became the Landeshauptmann for Upper Silesia, from 1939 to 
1941 that of the united province Silesia, and finally of Lower Silesia. Max Fillusch, who 
had fought in 1921 after having been discharged from the army in 1918 as wounded, 
became the founder of Upper Silesia’s first SA unit and later the mayor of the important 
industrial town of Zabrze. Hans Ramshorn, the SA leader for Breslau during the early 
1930s, attained the post of police chief of Gleiwitz, another major industrial town.14 
Bolko Janus likewise enumerates regionally high-profile Nazi officials who had fought in 
the Freikorps. Beyond those already mentioned, he includes Johann Harnys, the region’s 
 
11 Ibid., 168. 
12 Ibid., 171. 
13 Juliane Haubold-Stolle, Mythos Oberschlesien: Der Kampf um die Erinnerung in Deutschland und in 
Polen 1919-1956 (Osnabrück: fibre, 2008), 155; see also: Bolko Janus, Germans and Poles: Identity, 
Culture, and Nationalism in German Upper Silesia, 1918-1933 (PhD diss., University of New York at 
Buffalo, 1995), 163-164. 
14 Biały, Niemieckie Ochotnicze Formacje Zbrojne Na Śląsku, 181. 
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later SS chief, and Oppeln’s police chief after the Nazi seizure of power, Wilhelm 
Metz.15 
Scholarship on other regions too makes mention of Nazi groups’ and leaders’ 
roots in the post-war struggle against border alterations. Bogusław Drewniak’s study of 
the Weimar-era Nazi movement in Pomerania, for instance, notes that Freikorps veterans 
living on neighboring estates would often band together to form an NSDAP branch, 
becoming some of the party’s earliest members and propagandists in the region.16 Hinrich 
Lohse, Schleswig-Holstein’s Gauleiter, for his part, got his first taste of politics in the 
plebiscite-era Landespartei.17 In the establishment of NSDAP and SA branches in his 
Gau’s northernmost city Flensburg, Peter Heinacher has detailed, the Germania youth 
group, which brought together former youthful plebiscite campaigners, played a vital 
part.18 
As the examples of this youth group and the Pomeranian Freikorps fighters-
turned-farm laborers hint at, not only prominent Nazi cadres but also small-time activists 
looked back on a paramilitary past. Using previously little explored party Stammbücher 
kept during the Third Reich about officeholders in the local branches of the party and of 
its affiliate organizations, Upper Silesian historian Mirosław Węcki probed what these 
activists’ paramilitary experience was and how they framed it. Service at the front, he 
points out, does not distinguish Upper Silesian Nazis from their party comrades 
elsewhere in Germany, nor, in fact, from Germans of other political convictions. In 
contrast to Upper Silesians, however, soldiers from most other parts of Germany did not 
 
15 Bolko Janus, “Germans and Poles: Identity, Culture, and Nationalism in German Upper Silesia, 1918-
1933“ (PhD diss., University of New York at Buffalo, 1995), 163-164. 
16 Bogusław Drewniak, Początki Ruchu Hitlerowskiego na Pomorzu Zachodnim, 1923-1934 (Poznan: 
Wydawnictwo Poznanskie, 1962), 34. 
17 “Lohse, Hinrich“, Deutsche Biographie, accessed July 25, 2021, https://www.deutsche-
biographie.de/sfz54110.html; for more information about Lohse, see also Uwe Danker’s forthcoming 
Hinrich Lohse – eine wissenschaftliche Biografie des schleswig-holsteinischen NSDAP-Gauleiters und 
Oberpräsidenten 
18 Peter Heinacher, Der Aufstieg der NSDAP im Stadt- und Landkreis Flensburg (Flensburg: Gesellschaft 
für Flensburger Stadtgeschichte e.V., 1986), 244-261. 
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return home to plebiscite and insurgency and, in contrast to Nazis and their far-right ilk, 
Germans of differing political bents did not generally patronize the paramilitiaries that 
had sprung up in response thereto.19 Nazis were thus free to invoke their participation in 
these paramilitary formations as nationalist credentials that justified their admission to 
and promotion within the party. This legitimizing function was particularly relevant for 
those who had been too young to serve at the front. Both the already-mentioned Josef 
Adamczyk and Kreisleiter Johann Schweter, for instance, had hence been just barely too 
young to fight in the war. They had, however, secured the expected nationalist record by 
fighting in 1921.20 Other Nazi officials too routinely mentioned their paramilitary past, 
with some recounting fighting the Polish insurgency despite severe wartime injuries. One 
official in the National Socialist People’s Welfare, for instance, had fought in East 
Prussia in 1914, before being severely wounded while fighting the Russians in Hungary’s 
Carpathian Mountains. Having been taken to a Russian field hospital and then to Siberia, 
he spent over six years as a prisoner of war before returning to Germany by boat from 
Vladivostok. Just home and 30% disabled due to his injuries and a bout of malaria 
contracted in Siberia, he nevertheless took part in the combat against the insurgency and 
earned the Silesian Eagle II Class.21 
 Contemporaries themselves often considered Upper Silesia’s Nazi movement a 
dangerous hold-over from the plebiscite period. “Upper Silesia with its strong national 
contrasts, with its unrest through occupation, insurgencies and partition for a long time 
has seemed to the National Socialists a particularly favorable arena,” the regional Social 
Democratic Oberschlesisches Volksblatt wrote in December 1922. “Under the mask of 
the Selbstschutz all sorts of dubious folks were brought there. Erhard [sic] and Roßbach 
have demonstrably good connections there. Cudgel Kunze’s agitation could unite 23 000 
 
19 Mirosław Węcki, “Losy górnośląskich nazistów podczas I wojny światowej,” in Górny Śląsk a I wojna 
światowa, eds. Jarosław Racięski and Michał J. Witkowski (Katowice: Muzeum Śląskie, 2016), 179-180. 
20 Ibid., 180-181. 
21 Ibid., 186. 
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votes behind him. There is indubitably the intention to make Upper Silesia a particular 
hearth of the National Socialist movement,” the paper continued.22 The Vossische Zeitung 
published a similar warning the following month. The vulnerable borderland, it held, 
required peace and quiet to recover from recent years’ unrest and to tackle border-related 
issues effectively, but the Nazi movement, which sought to turn Upper Silesia into “a 
colony of a movement thus far centralized in Bavaria,” stood in the way of such 
tranquility. The core of this troublesome party’s membership was formed by erstwhile 
Selbstschutz men, the daily alleged, re-organized into Nazi paramilitaries and housed and 
employed by the region’s industrialists and large landowners. While the Nazi movement 
had not as yet, the Vossische conceded, amassed much strength, the paper worried it soon 
might, for already over 300 Nazis had recently marched in Beuthen.23 The Polish Zgoda 
too complained that Nazis, who had been able to remain in Upper Silesia long beyond the 
cessation of paramilitary operations thanks to funding from secret organizations, were 
behind the increasingly frequent reports of violent assaults on the region’s Polish 
population. Pointing up widespread sympathy for Nazism among police officers, who 
consequently failed to intervene against its excesses, the Zgoda called for the higher 
police authorities to expel negligent policemen from the force and Nazi “pests” from the 
region.24 A February 1923 letter from a local official to the Regierungspräsident 
resonated with that suggestion. Small groups of Nazis had on two separate occasions 
entered a hotel and a café respectively in order to harass Jewish patrons, the letter 
reported. These incidents had contributed to the dissolution of the Großdeutsche 
 
22 “Oberschlesien mit seinen starken national Gegensätzen, mit seiner Unruhe durch Besatzung, Aufstände 
und Abtrennungen scheint den Nationalsozialisten seit langem als ein besonders günstiges Feld. Unter der 
Maske des Selbstschutzes wurde allerhand zweifelhaftes Volk dorthin gebracht. Erhard und Roßbach haben 
nachgewiesenermaßen dort gute Verbindungen. Knüppel-Kunzes Agitation konnte 23 000 Stimmen auf 
sich vereinigen. Es besteht zweifellos die Absicht Oberschlesien zu einem besonderen Herd der 
nationalsozialistischen Bewegung zu machen.”; “Die Faszisten in Oberschlesien,” Oberschlesisches 
Volksblatt, December 23, 1922. APO, NPO, 989. 
23 “eine Kolonie der bisher in Bayern zentralisiert gewesenen Bewegung”; “Nationalsozialismus in 
Oberschlesien,” Vossische Zeitung, January 9, 1923. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 856, Nr. 421.  
24 “Schädlinge”; “Die Orgeschplage. Nächtliche Übergriffe der Hakenkreuzler.” (copy), January 9, 1923. 
GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 856, Nr. 728.  
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Arbeiterpartei by the Oberpräsident, the message concluded, and had sparked efforts to 
expel from Upper Silesia those who ostensibly sojourned there for its protection from 
further Polish aggressions but who really brought it only continued unrest.25 This theme 
of far-right troublemakers who stayed on in Upper Silesia financed and fed by shadowy 
capitalists is taken up by Biały in particular, whose work is shaped by the communist 
biases of 1970s Poland. 
 While the sources discussed until now elucidate the absorption of active post-war 
militants into the NSDAP, egodocuments like Abel’s can illuminate how borderland 
experiences informed the Weltanschauung of those whose paths to the party were more 
round-about. The American sociologist invited party members, who had joined prior to 
1933, to submit “accurate and detailed descriptions of their personal lives, particularly 
after World War I” to the essay contest he had organized specially. The best entries were 
awarded cash prizes worth 400 marks in total. “Special attention,” Abel enjoined, “should 
be given to accounts of family life, education, economic conditions, membership in 
associations, participation in the Hitler movement, and important experiences, thoughts, 
and feelings about events and ideas of the post-war period.”26 Held in cooperation with 
the NSDAP, which circulated Abel’s announcement to all its branches and through the 
party press, the competition garnered 683 entries, ranging from sparse autobiographies 
less than a page long to detailed vitae that run on for tens of pages.27 Around a hundred of 
these so-called biograms were confiscated by the FBI in 1943 “’in search for evidence 
against some persons on their list’,” Abel informed the Hoover Institution Library & 
Archives, where the documents are housed.28 In 1952, both he and a staff member of the 
 
25 Letter to the Ministry of the Interior, February 15, 1923. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 856, Nr. 421. 
26 “Newly Digitized Nazi Biograms Now Available,“ Hoover Institution, accessed June 18, 2020,  
https://www.hoover.org/news/newly-digitized-nazi-biograms-now-available.  
27 Theodore Abel, The Nazi Movement: Why Hitler Came to Power (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), 4.  
28 Sarah Patton, E-mail to the author, June 10, 2020; see also: Peter Merkl, Political Violence under the 
Swastika: 581 Early Nazis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 63.  
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archive contacted the FBI about the return of the missing stories, but the FBI informed 
them that none of the documents “were maintained in their files.” 29  
The sizable collection that does remain is as an invaluable yet underused source, 
which only Abel himself and political scientist Peter Merkl have published on. Abel’s 
1938 The Nazi Movement: Why Hitler Came to Power identified four principal, 
interdependent factors that, judging by the biograms, fueled Nazism’s success: 
widespread discontent with the Weimar Republic, the appeal of Nazi ideology and 
particularly of its emphasis on community, an aura of efficaciousness, and, of course, 
Hitler’s charismatic leadership.30 This multicausal, primary source-based model he 
developed in opposition to then-prevailing unsubstantiated psychoanalytic31 and Marxist 
interpretations of Nazism.32 Merkl’s Political Violence under the Swastika: 581 Early 
Nazis, meanwhile, was published in 1975 and takes a statistical approach to the 
biograms’ evaluation. Not, in fact, primarily concerned with political violence, Merkl 
assigns tags – from age, locality, and confession to thematic ones like primary object of 
enmity or main ideological theme – to the texts and proceeds to analyze the correlations 
between them. Simplistic and reductive, this method obscures the narratives’ 
multifacetedness. If, for example, a respondent expressed hostility towards both Marxists 
and Jews only one of those groups would be tagged as his foremost target of hatred, 
ignoring his other antipathy and any connections between them. Such flattening of the 
biograms robs Merkl’s calculations of meaning, as becomes particularly clear whenever 
he quotes from the texts at any length. The multiplicity of factors and feelings that feature 
in them belies the simple correlations quotes are meant to illustrate. 
Both Merkl and Abel address the weaknesses of the collection itself, with 
respondents’ trustworthiness the primary concern. After all, contestants were writing not 
 
29 Ibid. 
30 Abel, The Nazi Movement, 166-183.  
31 Ibid., 187. 
32 Ibid., 199. 
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only with hindsight but presumably also with a view to showing themselves and their 
movement in a flattering light.33 They may also, as some indeed admitted, have submitted 
vitae with their American audience specifically in mind.34 Yet, Abel, who for all his 
disagreement with them generally presumes his respondents’ sincerity, points out that 
they felt proud of their movement and of their actions and self-righteous about their 
views.35 They felt no need to hide even violence or anti-Semitism; to the contrary, many 
biographies brim with them. In 1934, pride was not yet dimmed by the war’s outcome. 
Abel and Merkl both conclude that while individual respondents may have omitted 
unsavory events, by and large the collection represents the Nazi movement’s brutality 
and prejudices accurately. What they do find is that the respondents are not representative 
of the Nazi party. Essay contests necessarily exclude the functionally illiterate and those 
lacking confidence in their writing skills.36 Civil servants, well-educated and comfortable 
writing, conversely make up a larger percentage of respondents than their share in the 
party.37 Those early converts who joined the party before the watershed 1930 Reichstag 
election are also disproportionately numerous in the collection.38 Furthermore, some 
regions and, due to more or less forceful advertising of the contest, branches were 
likewise overrepresented.39 Among the regions in whose favor the geographical 
distribution is skewed are the territories once occupied by the French and the Belgians 
and Germany’s Eastern borderlands, which together, Merkl notes, account for over a 
third of responses.40 While Merkl’s definition of borderlands is broad and includes entire 
Gaue, the Abel collection does, thanks to this overrepresentation, provide a wealth of 
testimonies about Nazis’ borderlands experiences. 
 
33 Ibid.,  6-7; Merkl, Political Violence, 8. 
34 Merkl, Political Violence, 7.  
35 Abel, The Nazi Movement, 7; Merkl, Political Violence, 8. 
36 Merkl, Political Violence, 6. 
37 Ibid., 14. 
38 Ibid., 12. 
39 Ibid., 7. 
40 Ibid., 17-18. 
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To be sure, for many of these borderlands respondents, the accident of locality 
played no part in the story they told about themselves and they focused instead on, for 
example, their opposition to Marxism or their economic woes. For others, by contrast, 
their borderlands background formed a core part of their narrative, starting with their 
family histories. Three men claimed that their families had arrived in the East centuries 
ago, helping to settle and cultivate it. Erich Hinz’s ancestors, on both sides of the family, 
had reportedly come to the Province of Posen from Brandenburg during the reign of 
Frederick the Great.41 At around the same time, Schoepke’s forebears had settled in “the 
empty Eastern space” that was by the 1930s the corner between the Border Province, 
Brandenburg, and Pomerania.42 Helmut Mateske’s forefathers, meanwhile, had arrived in 
the Border Province even before that, as Bohemian Brethren who had fled to Poland 
rather than fight against fellow Protestants in the Schmalkaldic War. There, they had 
subdued the swampy land with the plow.43 Those whose families arrived in the East far 
more recently, as part of early 20th-century settlement schemes, took no less pride in their 
contribution. Gustav Bemeiker’s family had come to the region around Tilsit before his 
birth, yet he too identified deeply as a settler.44 Willy Unger’s family moved to a farm in 
the Province of Posen shortly after his birth in 190145 and Willi Scharf’s likewise 
relocated there in 1908, when he was just four.46 Walter Treue’s family too had moved to 
 
41 Erich Hinz, accessed September 18, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58581/span-
classqueryhlerichspan-span-classqueryhlhin?ctx=df23c12d-71e7-4393-86eb-376cfbdd091a&idx=0. 
42 “in den leeren Ostraum”; Schoepke, accessed September 18, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58386/span-classqueryhlschoepkespan?ctx=e95033d1-115d-
4de2-9201-ef07ad5977ef&idx=0. 
43 Helmut Mateske, accessed September 18, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58677/helmut-span-classqueryhlmateskespan?ctx=5ccc5c78-
3812-4493-b281-48d12a170f85&idx=0. 
44 Gustav Bemeiker, accessed September 18, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58586/span-classqueryhlgustavspan-span-
classqueryhlbe?ctx=865c4b35-4d33-45ee-b823-ef1225121c83&idx=0. 
45 Willy Unger, accessed September 18, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58743/span-
classqueryhlwillyspan-span-classqueryhlung?ctx=44055d56-a17a-43fd-b959-d45b347f19e9&idx=0. 
46 Willi Scharf, accessed September 18, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58655/span-
classqueryhlwillispan-span-classqueryhlsch?ctx=ce423b6c-54fc-455f-aff2-1c1d590ffda9&idx=0. 
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West Prussia in 1904 when he was only a few months old. About the ensuing time he 
wrote that, “Now years of hardest work began for my parents, as the uncultivated ground 
first had to be made productive and at home bitter poverty often reigned.”47 These men’s 
understanding of the frontier was rooted in a sense that they, Germans, had settled the 
East and made it productive, earning the rights to these regions by their toil.   
 The question of ownership of border regions had engendered, some biograms 
claimed, sometimes violent hostility already before the First World War. Growing up in a 
poor family in West Prussia that spoke a local Low German, Max Schmidt, for example, 
had learned to regard the estates’ Polish-speaking carriage drivers and their children as 
“foreigners.”48 One unnamed respondent, meanwhile, came from Saxony, but his father 
had, as a “border German” from an area that had since come under Polish rule, become 
acquainted in his youth in the 1870s with the “nationality and border struggle,” which 
already then “raged” between Germans and Poles “quite strongly.” Made a “fanatical 
nationalist” by this experience, the father raised his son in that spirit.49 On the Austrian 
empire’s internal German-Czech frontier, Raimund Mayer too had encountered 
nationalist conflict. Even as a child, he recalled, he knew “the fight, which we borderland 
Germans in the old monarchy already had to fight for our Germandom.”50 “Maintaining 
 
47 “Nun begannen für meine Eltern Jahre härtester Arbeit, galt es doch unkultivierten Boden erst mal 
ertragfähig zu machen und es hat oft bitterste Not im Hause geherrscht.”; Walter Treue, accessed 
September 18, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58538/span-classqueryhlwalterspan-span-
classqueryhltr?ctx=c36d008d-f6b5-49cc-96b5-bf0fe22fa212&idx=0. 
48 “Ausländer”; Max Schmidt, accessed September 18, 2019, 
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Polen gehört, und lernte daher schon in früher Jugend den Nationalitäten- und Grenzkampf kennen, der 
damals in den siebziger Jahren des 19l. Jahrhunderts ziemlich stark zwischen Deutschen und Polen tobte. 
Er blieb daher bis an sein Lebensende 1929 ein fanatischer Nationalist. Dementsprechend erzog er mich 
auch.”; unknown, accessed September 18, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58297/span-
classqueryhlunknownspan?ctx=fe4606fd-2fae-4a4a-9653-60016966fcd5&idx=2. 
50 “…kannte ich als Kind den Kampf, den wir Grenzlanddeutsche bereits in der alten Monarchie für unser 




[German] education and folk customs in such border areas,” he remarked, “that is 
something one cannot get an insight into as a Reich German. As school children we 
already had feuds, which frequently took a rather bloody course. When one Sunday such 
a squabble between the German and Czech boys took place again, I knocked the right 
external ear off an opponent with a piece of slate.”51 Mayer and the others regarded the 
nationality struggle as in the natural course of things, with the post-war hostilities and the 
antagonisms resulting from the losses incurred then the contemporary manifestations of a 
long-standing dynamic. 
Other respondents, however, offer a more positive account of the pre-war era, 
describing a peaceful co-existence that only after the war turned out to have been 
precarious. Werner Kauffmann, son of a Posen estate owner, wrote: “In the holidays, I 
knew nothing better than to roam through fields and forests with the children of the farm 
hands of German and Polish mother tongue, of Lutheran and Catholic confession, 
resident on my father’s estate and to also learn practical skills in agriculture, in the manor 
forge and the manor’s cartwright workshop. With many of my then-companions a close 
friendship without any trace of differences of social rank united me then, which was only 
definitively torn apart by the events on the basis of the Versailles Treaty.”52 Kauffmann 
thus portrayed himself not as naturally and invariably antagonistic toward Polish-
speakers, but as moved to a confrontational attitude by post-war developments. August 
 
51 "Die Erziehung und die volkstümlichen Gebräuche auf so Grenzgebieten zu erhalten, davon kann man 
als Reichsdeutscher keinen Einblick bekommen. Als Schulkinder hatten wir bereits Fehden, die desöftern 
ziemlich blutig verlaufen sind. Als eines Sonntags wieder so ein Geplänkel zwischen und deutschen und 
tschechischen Jungens stattfand, schlug ich mit einen [sic] Schieferstein einen [sic] Gegner die rechte 
Ohrmuschel ab.”; Ibid. 
52 “In den Ferien kannte ich nichts schöneres, als mit den Kindern der auf dem Gute meines Vaters 
ansässigen Landarbeiter deutscher und polnischer Muttersprache, evangelischer und katholischer 
Konfession durch Feld und Wald zu streifen und auch die praktischen Handgriffe in der Landwirtschaft, in 
der Gutschmiede und Gutsstellmacherei zu erlernen. Mit vielen meiner damaligen Gefährten verband mich 
damals ohne jede Spur sozialer Rangunterschiede eine enge Freundschaft, die erst durch die Geschehnisse 




Marleiter, who had grown up in Upper Silesia’s far Western Neißer Ländchen, which 
bordered the Sudetenland, took a kindred position. As a child, his nationalism had been 
sparked by the perplexing observation that the Austrian Germans across the border were 
culturally German and yet did not belong to the German state. Their struggle against the 
empire’s other, hostile nationalities, without support from their government, awakened 
his “deepest sympathy.”53 The pan-German nationalism Marleiter developed at the Upper 
Silesian border with the Sudetenland did not, however, manifest in antagonism toward 
the Polish-speakers in other parts of his province. Rather, he determinedly portrayed 
indigenous Upper Silesians as thoroughly German. When he moved “to another border 
area” about 100 kilometers to the East to become a teacher in Rybnik county,54 the most 
heavily Polish-speaking in the province, Marleiter, for example, found to his surprise 
that, “…these ‘pollacks’ were not actually Poles, but proudly felt Prussian and German. I 
had far fewer difficulties with the population as a teacher speaking German only than 
many a Polish-speaking colleague. I was always gladly invited to family parties and 
found there that among the autochthonous Upper Silesian population a Polish question 
did not actually exist.”55 “It,” he maintained instead, “was carried into Upper Silesia 
artificially by Polish clergy, agents, through doctors and particularly pharmacists, who 
had moved there from Poland and Posen.”56 This supposed influx of Polish agitators had 
made him, unlike Kauffmann, deeply concerned about Germany’s Eastern politics. In his 
biogram, he pilloried the imperial government for having been soft with regard thereto 
and professed that it had become apparent to him during these pre-war years that “only 
 
53 “stärkste Anteilnahme”; August Marleiter, accessed September 18, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58289/span-classqueryhlaugustspan-span-
classqueryhlma?ctx=5e111d47-774a-4fa1-8590-ddbf637551e9&idx=0. 
54 “in ein anderes Grenzgebiet”; Ibid. 
55 “Mit Erstaunen sah ich, daß diese “Pollacken” [die er im vorigen Satz als Wasserpolnisch-sprechend 
beschreibt] gar keine Polen waren, sondern sich stolz als Preußen und Deutsch fühlten. Ich habe als nur 
deutsch-sprechender Lehrer weit weniger Schwierigkeiten mit der Bevölkerung gehabt, als mancher 
polnisch sprechende Kollege. Gern wurde ich auch immer zu Familienfeiern eingeladen und fand dabei, 
daß bei der eingesessenen Oberschlesischen Bevölkerung eine polnische Frage gar nicht existierte."; Ibid. 
56 "Die ist in OS künstlich hineingetragen worden durch polnische Geistliche, Agenten, durch Ärzte und 
namentlich Drogisten, die aus Polen und Posen zuzogen.”; Ibid. 
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the unanimous standing together of all Germans without differences of class or 
confession and beyond the borders can protect us from the Slavic flood and at all save the 
people.”57 He nevertheless remained positive about Upper Silesia’s native population, 
who, as eager as other Germans to defend the fatherland, had fought exceptionally 
bravely in the First World War and thus provided a towering example of just such 
standing together. Unlike those who reportedly experienced a ferocious nationality 
struggle already before the war, Marleiter and his ilk considered the anti-Polish attitudes 
that had done their part to lead them to the NSDAP a reaction to Polish agitation that had 
disturbed the German-led, multiethnic harmony that they envisaged as the borderlands’ 
natural state. 
 The First World War features as a disruption of the borderlands’ status quo, 
however conceived, mainly in biograms by East Prussians, who had experienced the 
region’s invasion by the Russians in the war’s early months. In the first days of war, ten-
year-old Josef Trzarka’s family, which owned a tavern in Ortelsburg county, had fifty 
soldiers quartered with them and refugees, whose villages had already fallen to the 
Russians, were coming through. When the Russian army advanced on Ortelsburg, 
Trzarka and his family fled too. Two days after the Battle of Tannenberg they returned to 
find their home destroyed. Though the Russians never actually passed through again, the 
Trzarkas fled twice more and for years thereafter Josef and the other village boys got up 
to “mischief” with abandoned guns and munition.58 Refugees bearing news of the 
Russian invasion passed through twelve-year-old Walter Szimba’s village in Lötzen 
county as well and evacuation was soon ordered. After a few days’ stay with an uncle in a 
different part of the county, they could return and bring in the harvest, but in October 
 
57 “Ich lerne aber eine Erkenntnis in diesen Jahren: nur das einmütige Zusammenstehen aller Deutschen 
ohne Unterschied des Standes und der Konfession und über die Grenzen hinaus kann uns vor der 
slawischen Flut schützen und uns als Volk überhaupt retten.”; Ibid. 




they had to flee again and this time were sent all the way to Hannover. Szimba’s neighbor 
and aunt did not want to leave the village. The former spent five years as a prisoner in 
Siberia, while the latter was found dead in the basement of the family home.59 The most 
detailed and harrowing account of East Prussia’s invasion though is provided by the then-
teenaged Frau Nieke, a servant from Lyck county. Despite passing refugees’ 
recommendations, she and other members of the household chose to hide in barges 
among the local lake’s reeds rather than flee. Having spent several cold days thus, they 
returned to the village only for Frau Nieke and the other young women to be plagued by 
fear of rape. They did not wash for days and wore old women’s clothes, hoping that the 
Russian soldiers would neither recognize nor desire them. After one officer had 
expressed a liking of her, Frau Nieke spent a night hiding in the basement, praying that he 
would not come to fetch her. In the end, they did have to quit the village in October 1914 
and Frau Nieke, weary of life in the refugee camp and wishing to be useful, registered 
with the police in early 1915 and was given a post knitting for the military in Osnabrück. 
She thereupon left East Prussia permanently.60  
 In contrast to the trauma experienced by East Prussians, two respondents 
remembered the mobilization they witnessed at Germany’s borders in 1914 in a more 
hopeful way. In a borderlands-specific variation on the fabled spirit of that year, Upper 
Silesian G. Goretzki told, all parties were forgotten as everyone united around Germany’s 
defense with thoughts of “’The fatherland is in need’. – ‘Borderland in danger!’.”61 For 
Kurt Liebelt from the Province of Posen too the onset of war was formative. His parents 
were liberal former civil servants, with no appreciation of Nazism, but they had not, he 
said, shaped his political outlook decisively. “Far more significant for me as a border 
 
59 Walter Szimba, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58735/walter-
span-classqueryhlszimbaspan?ctx=3f86b4fc-735d-48bd-a1c3-9da3c7f67c23&idx=0. 
60 Frau Nieke, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58403/span-
classqueryhlfrauspan-span-classqueryhlniek?ctx=7a9fd573-29b4-4b11-9786-8240d0d23769&idx=0. 




German were the impressions during the first time of the war, when we experienced the 
deployment of troops to the East, and the post-war time with the Polish uprising. 
Particularly in the time after the war, during which we suffered the ever more ruthless 
pressure of the Poles, I grew conscious for the first time that Germandom was something 
for which one must fight,” he wrote.62 Liebelt remembered the borderlanders’ 
Augusterlebnis, like the fight for their home regions after the war, as having brought 
home to him the necessity and efficaciousness of their united, impassioned defense, a 
task the NSDAP was continuing. 
 That post-war moment of German territorial vulnerability could arise only, some 
respondents maintained, because borderlands residents who were at root German had 
fallen under the sway of Polish activists. August Marleiter, for one, blamed Upper 
Silesia’s plebiscite and the increasing Polish sympathies that necessitated it on the 
influence of outside agitators, who he, as mentioned above, had already held responsible 
for pre-war stirrings of Polish nationalism. “When the November revolution broke out the 
foreign elements in Upper Silesia primarily came to the foreground and,” he averred, 
“understood how to steer the socialist-bolshevist wave that went through the masses of 
workers onto nationalist-Polish territory and to turn it against Germandom, by calling the 
German owners, civil servants, factory leaders oppressors. Only thus could the Polish 
question get going in Upper Silesia.”63 Nevertheless, the plebiscite’s outcome and the 
 
62 “Weit wesentlicher waren für mich als Grenzdeutschen die Eindrücke während der ersten Zeit des 
Krieges, wo wir die Gruppen-Aufmärsche nach dem Osten erlebten, und die der Nachkriegszeit mit dem 
Polenaufstand. Namentlich in der Zeit nach dem Kriege, in der wir ständig unter dem immer 
rücksichtsloserem Druck der Polen zu leiden hatten, wurde mir zum ersten Male bewusst, dass das 
Deutschtum etwas war, wofür es zu kämpfen galt.”; Kurt Liebelt, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58441/span-classqueryhlkurtspan-span-
classqueryhllieb?ctx=7289d3f2-6b60-47a3-8215-9c81cb403372&idx=0. 
63 “Als die Novemberrevolution ausgebrochen war, da traten in Oberschlesien in der Hauptsache die 
landfremden Elemente in den Vordergrund und verstanden es, die sozialistisch-bolschewistische Welle, die 
durch die Arbeitermassen ging, auf’s national-polnische Gebiet zu lenken und gegen das Deutschtum zu 
richten, indem sie den deutschen Besitzer, Beamten, Werksherrn als Unterdrücker bezeichneten. Nur so 




local make-up of the Selbstschutz proved, he argued, that there was no native desire for a 
border change. Eduard Holema, another Upper Silesian, agreed: “If the Upper Silesian 
inhabitants had so far been good German patriots, then the lost war, helped by Polish 
agitators, who promised the Upper Silesian population golden mountains in the case of 
Upper Silesia’s allocation to Poland, beguiled the sense of many inhabitants. On the one 
side there was Germany after the lost war, tearing itself apart and surrounded by victor 
states, in part occupied militarily, paying enormous reparations, on the other side Poland, 
surrounded by the nimbus of resurrection, paying no reparations and therefore also not 
shy with its promises.”64 Despite this rhetoric and Polish terrorism, the plebiscite, as a 
victory for Germany, was “proof of the love of Upper Silesia’s inhabitants for the 
German fatherland.”65 
Germans, Abel’s respondents emphasized, faced the threat to the borderlands 
united, across party and other lines. Winfried Harhausen, at the time a child in Bromberg, 
described how in that city, “In those days there was there no party, but only Germans, 
who loved their Heimat above all and who were prepared to defend it to the last.”66 When 
a delegation of foreign parliamentarians had come to see the national situation in 
Bromberg for themselves, he recalled, unity had reigned, with his father, a prominent 
pastor, speaking to the gathered crowds and being met with cheers and choruses of Ein’ 
feste Burg ist unser Gott. In language reminiscent of that usually reserved for August 
 
64 “Waren bisher die oberschlesischen Bewohner gute deutsche Patrioten, so hat doch der verlorene Krieg 
auch hier, unterstützt durch polnische Agitatoren, die der oberschlesischen Bevölkerung, im Falle der 
Zuteilung Oberschlesiens ans Polen, goldene Berge versprachen, die Sinne vieler Bewohner betört. Auf der 
einen Seite lag Deutschland nach dem verlorenen Kriege, sich selbst zerfleischen und umgeben von den 
Siegerstaaten, zum Teil militärisch besetzt, ungeheure Kontributionen leistend, auf der anderen Seit Polen, 
umgeben von dem Nimbus des Neuauferstandenen, keine Lasten von Kriege aus leitend und daher auch 
nicht zag in seinen Versprechungen.”; Eduard Holema, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58441/span-classqueryhlkurtspan-span-
classqueryhllieb?ctx=7289d3f2-6b60-47a3-8215-9c81cb403372&idx=0. 
65 “als Beweis der Liebe der oberschlesischen Bewohner zum deutschen Vaterlande”; Ibid. 
66 “In diesen Tagen gab es dort keine Partei, sondern nur deutsche, die ihre Heimat über alles liebten, und 




1914, Schoepke, who had experienced this time in rural West Prussia, likewise recounted 
how, “All of a sudden all parties had vanished and there was one big German Party, 
which now tried to obtain for Germandom what was at all still possible…The misery 
about the Heimat, about blood and soil, united the population. The whole person often 
baulked unconsciously with heart and soul against this unnatural-ness. But it was too 
late!”67 Upper Silesian Goretzki made the comparison with the spirit of 1914 explicit, 
writing “Once more love of the fatherland flared up in the people like in those August 
days of 1914. Everything that can move, young, old, frail, everyone made the election 
journey to Upper Silesia. Victory was ours!”68 The experience of the post-war moment, 
Heinacher too observed in his study of Flensburg’s Nazi activists, gave then-young men a 
taste of what the much-vaunted August 1914 had been like.69 This acclaimed unity was 
conspicuous to Wilhelm Trapp, from the Province of Posen, by the absence thereof he 
found outside the borderlands. “On June 10, 1921 I emigrated from the territory ceded to 
Poland, because I was reluctant to become a Polish soldier,” he explained and remarked, 
“I felt alienated by the disunity of the Germans here, in contrast to those in the ceded 
territory.”70 
 
67 “Mit einem Male waren alle Parteien verschwunden, und es gab, eine grosse Deutsche Partei, die nun 
versuchte für das Deutschtum herauszuschlagen, was noch irgendwie möglich war…Die Not um die 
Heimat, um Blut und Boden hatte die Bevölkerung geeint. Der ganze Mensch sträubte sich oft unbewusst 
mit tiefster Seele gegen diese Naturwidrigkeit. Aber es war zu spät!”; Schoepke, accessed September 18, 
2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58386/span-classqueryhlschoepkespan?ctx=e95033d1-
115d-4de2-9201-ef07ad5977ef&idx=0. 
68 “Nochmals flammt im Volke die Vaterlandsliebe wie in jenen Augusttagen 1914 auf [N.B.: Vergleich 
Abstimmung-spirit of 1914!]. Alles was sich bewegen kann, Junge, Alte, Kranke, Gebrechliche, alle treten 
die Wahlfahrt nach Oberschlesien an.”; G. Goretzki, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58483/g-span-classqueryhlgoretzkispan?ctx=6415e05e-16d2-
4293-9957-1da6294c93cd&idx=0. 
69 Peter Heinacher, Der Aufstieg der NSDAP im Stadt- und Landkreis Flensburg (Flensburg: Gesellschaft 
für Flensburger Stadtgeschichte e.V., 1986), 244. 
70 “Am 10.6. 1921 bin ich aus dem an Polen abgetretenen Gebiet ausgewandert, weil es mir wiederstrebte 
[sic] Polnischer Soldat zu werden. Befremdet hat mich die Uneinigkeit der Deutschen hier, im Gegensatz 




 This united defensiveness of Germany found expression in plebiscite 
campaigning. Eduard Holema, for instance, reported that “German-thinking, loyal” 
Upper Silesians had everywhere established associations.71 “I too,” he proudly told, “was 
among them and served the Verband der heimattreuen Oberschlesier as secretary. This I 
did until the last day of the leaving of my Heimat, despite threatening letters and threats 
from the Poles. Even today it is a happy memory for me that I could assist a great number 
of my compatriots with help and advice and was allowed to raise up many a demoralized 
compatriot.”72 Holema continued his activism in the Vereinigte Verbände Heimattreuer 
Oberschlesier, which maintained branches composed of internal migrants across 
Germany, even after he took a job in Berlin in 1923. Max Rudolph, meanwhile, boasted 
that his wife had propagandized for Germany during the run-up to the Upper Silesian 
plebiscite.73 Even children got involved. Paul Matter, who grew up in East Prussia’s 
Marienburg county, took his first political steps as a ten-year-old, when he distributed 
leaflets with the message that “we East Prussians all wanted to remain German” in 
preparation for the region’s 1920 plebiscite.74 Similarly, Heinz Gefaeller was asked in 
school to collect signatures for West Prussia and Danzig and soon learned that East 
Prussia and the Memel region, where he lived, were in jeopardy too. Lying in bed, he 
cried bitterly and prayed that he be allowed to remain German.75  
 
71 “deutschgesinnten heimattreuen Oberschlesier”; Eduard Holema, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58441/span-classqueryhlkurtspan-span-
classqueryhllieb?ctx=7289d3f2-6b60-47a3-8215-9c81cb403372&idx=0. 
72 “Auch ich war unter ihnen und leistete als Schriftführer dem Verband der heimattreuen Oberschlesier 
Dienste. Dies habe ich bis zum letzten Tage des Verlassen meiner Heimat, trotz Drohbriefe und 
Bedrohungen seitens der Polen, getan. Noch heute ist es mir eine glücklich Erinnerung, daß ich in diesen 
Irrungen und Wirkungen einer großen Unzahl meiner Landsleute mit Rat und Tat beistehen und so 
manchen zermürbten Landsmann aufrichten durfte.”; Ibid. 
73 Max Rudolph, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58793/span-
classqueryhlmaxspan-span-classqueryhlrudol?ctx=0e0cc75c-4a2d-47bf-943f-4a9e2d159493&idx=0. 
74 “daß wir Ostpreußen alle deutsch bleiben wollten”; Paul Matter, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58572/span-classqueryhlpaulspan-span-
classqueryhlmatt?ctx=1c827577-abf1-42ac-a799-97b67cd60aa6&idx=0. 
75 Heinz Gefaeller, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58393/heinz-
span-classqueryhlgefaellerspan?ctx=083cf521-5da1-492f-846d-3c176f95a9aa&idx=0. 
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Many more respondents came to the German borders’ armed defense. A great 
many of these volunteers came from the German interior with A. Knell from the 
Palatinate,76 Friedrich Kell77 and Karl Kell from Pomerania,78 Richard Quack from 
Potsdam,79 a certain Stehen from Brandenburg,80 and Arthur Herrmann,81 Paul Fritze,82 
and Wilhelm Gorf from Berlin all mentioning they had served in the army’s Grenzschutz 
units or in Freikorps, primarily in Silesia.83 A certain Stummeyer lived and worked in 
Hamburg-Harburg, but bragged of having smuggled munitions into the region when he 
was in Upper Silesia with the Organisation Escherich.84 Paul Grosche from Swinemünde 
returned from several years at the front just to fight with various Freikorps in the Baltics, 
against the Spartacists, for the Kapp putsch, and, of course, in Silesia.85 For men like 
these, participation in the borders’ protection was an exploit to be added to mostly 
lengthy nationalist CVs.  
More interestingly, other militants, some of them youths, lived in the regions they 
sought to defend. Max Lenz, for example, joined the Grenzschutz in his native Border 
 
76 A. Knell, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58645/a-span-
classqueryhlknellspan?ctx=4f06f1cd-de9d-4078-9584-a2abd6bc0683&idx=0. 
77 Friedrich Kell, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58711/span-
classqueryhlfriedrichspan-w-span-classquery?ctx=1633006a-d59b-4245-918b-979fd979abea&idx=0. 
78 Karl Kell, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58708/span-
classqueryhlkarlspan-span-classqueryhlkell?ctx=dcddcde8-e191-4487-aa8b-ed1981bd4baf&idx=0. 
79 Richard Quack, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58499/span-
classqueryhlrichardspan-span-classqueryhlq?ctx=4d959ce5-2c1e-44eb-b369-90adbd5969cb&idx=0. 
80 Stehen, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58532/span-
classqueryhlstehenspan?ctx=6c4553f6-21d2-4deb-aadd-fa479029f8dc&idx=0. 
81 Arthur Herrmann, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58807/span-classqueryhlarthurspan-span-
classqueryhlhe?ctx=66d02121-a2e0-4eff-b0e2-d5a1b4e2dbd0&idx=0. 
82 Paul Fritze, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58330/span-
classqueryhlpaulspan-span-classqueryhlfrit?ctx=ab9d54d6-717d-415f-be99-88ef58bedd5b&idx=0. 
83 Wilhelm Gorf, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58617/span-
classqueryhlwilhelmspan-span-classqueryhlg?ctx=f11497ea-634e-4c24-998d-6a65b7461b3f&idx=0. 
84 Stummeyer, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58258/span-
classqueryhlstummeyerspan?ctx=98c6d3df-8da6-450a-a737-5a0fdae83bf1&idx=0. 
85 Paul Grosche, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58266/span-
classqueryhlpaulspan-span-classqueryhlgros?ctx=6e83e3f9-f51c-436f-ad93-51df5cafdfa9&idx=0. 
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Province in July 1919 at just seventeen.86 Roland Schoenfelder, meanwhile, was the son 
of a military father from near Stettin and had spent his youth in cadet schools in or near 
Berlin but refused to become an officer “by Ebert’s grace.”87 Instead, he moved to West 
Prussia to learn agriculture, where he joined the local Grenzschutz immediately. Walter 
Treue, for his part, lamented that, “the unhappy ending of the war also did not bring any 
better days, for now the Pole became rebellious.”88 “German settlers, however, held what 
they had acquired in years-long, arduous work fast in their hands,” he related, “even we 
boys of 15 years kept watch day and night with weapon in hand and gave bloody battle 
on December 4, 1918 near Kulmsee to the Pole, who at least for now gave up the idea of 
returning.”89 Standing up to the Poles was, for him, his proudest youthful achievement. 
Other local Grenzschutz volunteers were veterans of the world war. Upon his 
return from the front, Goretzki, for instance, was dismayed to find Upper Silesia changed 
by Polish agitators, writing, “Here it is the same too. My Upper Silesian Heimat has 
become different. False leaders of the people have appeared and poisoned the people’s 
minds. Here Germany, here Poland. 4 years ago one only knew the watchword Germany 
here!”90 In response, he promptly joined the Grenzschutz. He then left to study in Görlitz 
 
86 Max Lenz, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58591/span-
classqueryhlmaxspan-span-classqueryhllenz?ctx=1d1b1e74-e9a4-4d13-8b64-b620865be6ca&idx=0. 
87 “von Ebert Gnaden”; Roland Schoenfelder, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58800/roland-span-
classqueryhlschoenfelderspan?ctx=a2de450d-ddbc-4871-b4c9-669e821a2513&idx=0. 
88 “…das unglückliche Kriegsende brachte auch keine besseren Tage, denn jetzt wurde der Pole 
rebellisch."; Walter Treue, accessed September 18, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58538/span-classqueryhlwalterspan-span-
classqueryhltr?ctx=c36d008d-f6b5-49cc-96b5-bf0fe22fa212&idx=0. 
89 "Jedoch deutsche Ansiedler hielten was sie in jahrelanger, mühevoller Arbeit erworben hatten fest in 
ihren Händen, selbst wir Jungen von 15 Jahren hielten mit der Waffe in der Hand Tag und Nacht wache 
und lieferten dem Polen am 4. Dezember 1918 bei Kulmsee ein blutiges Gefecht, so daß er vorerst das 
Wiederkommen vergaß.”; Ibid. 
90 “Auch hier dasselbe. Meine oberschlesische Heimat ist anders geworden. Falsche Volksführer sind 
aufgetreten und verhetzen das Volk. Hier Deutschland, hier Polen. Vor 4 Jahren kannte man hier nur die 




but returned in 1921 to do “my service in the Deutscher Schutzbund.”91 Erich Hinz 
similarly detailed how, “When my fatherland collapsed in 1918 and my Heimat was 
threatened by Poland, I signed up voluntarily for the Grenzschutz in Upper Silesia.”92 
When he returned to the former Province of Posen on leave to visit his family, it had 
fallen under Polish rule and he was expelled. Walter Kählitz, from a Berlin suburb, 
meanwhile, had only just moved to West Prussia after the war to learn agriculture, when 
he was called upon to defend his new home region and became a company commander in 
the reserve Grenzschutz.93 Johann Klaaßen enlisted in the Grenzschutzkommando Löbau 
straight out of military service.94 These men took pride in prolonging their armed 
commitment to the vulnerable Germany to which they returned. In his one-page biogram, 
Kurt Daum, for instance, focuses on his wartime experience as a volunteer of the first 
hour who had been wounded twice and then concludes, “On December 1, 1918 I was 
dismissed home. Through the Poles’ insurrection I was again a Grenzschutz soldier with 
the Infantry Regiment 61 from January 3, 1919 to August 1, 1919.”95 A certain Wiesch 
from Küstrin had likewise been eager to participate in the war, but, as a teenager, had had 
to wait to be drafted until the spring of 1918. He was dispatched to the front that fall. 
Dismissed around Christmas 1918, he signed up for the Grenzschutz on January 4, 1919 
and served in assorted units in what became the Border Province.96  
 
91 “meinen Dienst im deutschen Schutzbund”; Ibid. 
92 “Als 1918 mein Vaterland zusammenbrach u. meine Heimat bedroht wurde durch Polen - meldete ich 
mich freiwillig zum Grenzschutz nach Oberschlesien.”; Erich Hinz, accessed September 18, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58581/span-classqueryhlerichspan-span-
classqueryhlhin?ctx=df23c12d-71e7-4393-86eb-376cfbdd091a&idx=0. 
93 Walter Kählitz, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58497/walter-
span-classqueryhlkahlitzspan?ctx=2f9ffe4b-49df-4ac3-a870-00920a46ca92&idx=0. 
94 Johann Klaaßen, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58741/span-
classqueryhljohannspan-klaaen?ctx=b1e03fc6-4267-4aa1-9ddd-5507d06fc459&idx=13. 
95 “Durch den Aufstand der Polen war ich wieder Grenzschutzsoldat beim Infanterie Regiment 61 vom 
3.1.1919 bis 1.8.1919.”; Kurt Daum, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58732/span-classqueryhlkurtspan-span-
classqueryhldaum?ctx=6d0eeec3-61e2-4059-9abb-8a21ac9ff86c&idx=0. 
96 Wiesch?, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58592/span-
classqueryhlwieschspan-?ctx=c4cad02a-b7d4-4836-af17-4b03648aab66&idx=0. 
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One respondent’s story lends some credence to contemporary republican fears 
that Nazism’s initial growth in Upper Silesia was facilitated by nationalist fighters 
remaining in the region. Erich Femke had been born in 1885 in Pomeranian Ziezeneff to 
a father who was a veteran and invalid of the 1866 Austro-Prussian war. His tales 
inspired Erich to wish to pursue a career as a soldier. Despite being rejected repeatedly, 
he continued to apply to the army and was eventually accepted. After serving in the First 
World War, he initially joined a Grenzschutz company in East Prussia, but was 
discharged in October 1919 in the course of the army’s downsizing. The following month 
he received a job as a border guard with the Upper Silesian customs administration. 
Occupation troops arrived in the region soon after he did and he witnessed how 
“Frenchmen, Poles, and insurgents worked hand in hand, brought munitions and weapons 
over the border and much else besides.”97 The next year he married back home in 
Pomerania and was then joined in Upper Silesia by his bride for a “quite romantic” first 
year of marriage, during which he, among other things, trained his wife in the use of 
firearms, so that she could defend herself against the rising tide of everyday violence.98 
When the situation heated up further in 1921, however, Femke sent his wife home to 
Pomerania. With her safely gone, he took on the hazardous role of messenger for the 
German paramilitaries, which he continued to perform even behind enemy lines. For this 
he was later awarded the Upper Silesian Eagle II Class, an order that the army created for 
those who had served in its Silesian Grenzschutz units in 1918-1919 and that the 
commander of the Selbstschutz semi-officially reinstated in 1921 with the acquiescence 
of the regional army command.99 After Upper Silesia’s partition, he was transferred to the 
new customs office in Borsigwerk, where conflict promptly erupted once more, lasting 
 
97 “wie Franzosen, Polen und Aufständische Hand in Hand arbeiteten, Munition und Waffen über die 
Grenze brachten und vieles andere mehr”; Erich Femke, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58487/span-classqueryhlerichspan-span-
classqueryhlfem?ctx=703e6ae1-e518-43bf-9192-c58549229a1d&idx=0. 
98 “ziemlich romantisch“; Ibid. 
99 "Schlesischer Adler," Schlesien Portal - Offizielle Homepage der Landsmannschaft Schlesien, accessed 
September 23, 2020, http://landsmannschaft-schlesien.de/schlesien/schlesischer-adler/. 
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three weeks. Femke got in touch with the Selbstschutz again and there heard of “a Hitler 
movement” for the first time.100 While he followed the Beer Hall Putsch with interest and 
was, by his own account, almost reported by three colleagues for exclaiming “’Long live 
Hitler and Ludendorff’” in that context, he primarily focused on his career in the mid-
1920s.101 He was promoted to a post as Oberzollsekretär in Annaberg, where he joined 
the Nazi party in 1929, before transferring back to Pomerania in 1931 after over a decade 
in Upper Silesia. Unfortunately, Abel received no biograms from anyone still resident in 
Upper Silesia in 1934; rather, all the many people who reported on the region had moved 
away. Similarly, very few respondents had joined the party prior to November 1923. 
These geographical and chronological limitations of Abel’s sample preclude further 
inferences concerning the make-up and motivations of the early Upper Silesian party.  
 The resistance to border alterations put up by both militants like Femke and 
civilian activists was, of course, in vain and many Germans left their homes when 
territories were ceded to neighboring states, a traumatic experience that crops up 
repeatedly in the biograms. Some writers referred to their exile only briefly and matter-
of-factly. Bartsch, for example, mentions only perfunctorily in his opening paragraph that 
the village in which he was born now lay in Lithuania.102 Oskar Hollatz’s one-page text 
likewise treated his leaving Graudenz county in 1925 at the Polish authorities’ behest 
cursorily.103 In similarly few words, Rudolf Freimann, whose Russian German family had 
settled in the Province of Posen when he was fifteen, described his “precipitate” 
departure from there when he opted for German citizenship.104 Due to his anti-Polish 
 
100 “einer Hitlerbewegung”; Ibid. 
101 “‘Hoch lebe Hitler und Ludendorff’”; Ibid. 
102 Bartsch, accessed September 28, 2020, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58394/span-
classqueryhlbartschspan?ctx=0c0d31a1-adad-417a-980f-ad11f1e7415f&idx=0. 
103 Oskar Hollatz, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58726/span-
classqueryhloskarspan-holiatz?ctx=c0a4e933-6aea-4981-b83e-449cb54c635a&idx=1. 




political views, Kurt Daum too opted for Germany and left Graudenz county in 1922.105 
Walter Treue, who had chronicled his family’s settler existence and villagers’ determined 
struggle against the Poles in some detail, tersely concluded that his family was expelled 
in 1920.106 Leokardia Kogalski was expelled, in her case from the Province of Posen, 
having first been made, as a nurse, to tend the Polish wounded.107 Wilhelm Henkel also 
explained that his family was expelled from Alsace by the French authorities for being 
non-native Germans.108 Some had very concrete reasons for choosing to leave once their 
regions changed hands. Max Schmidt quit West Prussia because he did not know any 
Polish.109 Kurt Liebelt’s family, meanwhile, moved from the Province of Posen to Berlin 
when he was fourteen because his father had refused to continue his work in the postal 
service under Polish rule.110 Max Rudolph was unable to continue his employment as a 
trained chemist in one of Upper Silesia’s foundries, for which he had moved to the region 
in early 1918, because it was on Polish territory from 1921 and he declined to adopt 
Polish citizenship.111 Willy Unger was denied not only the inheritance of his deceased 
father’s farm but was also expected to serve in the Polish army, so he too opted for 
German citizenship in 1925.112  
 
105 Kurt Daum, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58732/span-
classqueryhlkurtspan-span-classqueryhldaum?ctx=6d0eeec3-61e2-4059-9abb-8a21ac9ff86c&idx=0. 
106 Walter Treue, accessed September 18, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58538/span-
classqueryhlwalterspan-span-classqueryhltr?ctx=c36d008d-f6b5-49cc-96b5-bf0fe22fa212&idx=0. 
106 “Auch hier dasselbe. Meine oberschlesische Heimat ist anders geworden. Falsche Volksführer sind 
aufgetreten 
107 Leokardia Kogalski, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58530/span-classqueryhlleokardiaspan-
kogalski?ctx=182d8168-99c6-46be-a1cd-0ce31e861489&idx=0.  
108 Wilhelm Henkel, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58626/span-classqueryhlwilhelmspan-span-
classqueryhlh?ctx=0102e73d-3c1a-4c86-9d0b-2f0044b73914&idx=0. 
109 Max Schmidt, accessed September 28, 2020, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58500/span-
classqueryhlmaxspan-span-classqueryhlschmi?ctx=a070d35e-6090-435a-80fa-9191719645d7&idx=0. 
110 Kurt Liebelt, accessed September 28, 2020, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58441/span-
classqueryhlkurtspan-span-classqueryhllieb?ctx=20ec6a46-a63b-469c-b5c4-6e889cf80882&idx=0. 
111 Max Rudolph, accessed September 28, 2020, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58793/span-
classqueryhlmaxspan-span-classqueryhlrudol?ctx=3c80a7e0-790a-4d9e-ae04-0a421a07c1a9&idx=0. 
112 Willy Unger, accessed September 28, 2020, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58743/span-
classqueryhlwillyspan-span-classqueryhlung?ctx=2ed119a7-c8b6-4384-8a79-4667cd9f84f1&idx=0. 
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A few highlighted not only that they had had to leave their homes, but also told of 
the emotional and economic distress they suffered during the process. Helene Radtke 
from Alsace, for instance, faced the possibility of family break-up. Her husband was for 
unspecified reasons not permitted to stay in Alsace after the war and she promptly joined 
him in Kassel. Soon, however, she returned to Alsace under her maiden name to fetch her 
child. Obtaining permission to leave again with her child was also hard to come by, but 
she insisted on returning to her husband. This resulted in her definitive expulsion and her 
loss of “all rights in my Heimat.”113 Schoepke, meanwhile, had feared for the life of his 
child and related the harrowing feeling of having to watch his then two-months-old 
daughter, an active member now of the League of German Maidens, almost die of cold 
during their departure from West Prussia.114 Willi Scharf’s father did die, of an illness he 
had contracted during the war, and was buried on December 1, 1921, the designated day 
for the first round of expulsions from the Province of Posen, a coincidence that carried 
deep symbolic weight in then-teenaged Willi’s eyes. His family’s expulsion was deferred, 
but when they finally did set out for Germany in October 1922, it was misery. Their train 
of refugees was sent from one camp to another, finding them all at capacity, before 
finally being deposited in a crowded former prisoner camp in Upper Silesia. Living 
multiple families to a room, with inferior food, was a humiliating step down for Willi 
from the middle-class existence his family had achieved in their fourteen years as settlers 
in the Province of Posen.115 August Marleiter had a similarly dismal experience of 
refugee life, spending five years in a barracks camp in Upper Silesian Neiße, the 
hometown he had left eighteen years earlier, before finally obtaining a teaching job in the 
 
113 “alle Rechte in meiner Heimat”; Helene Radtke, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58432/helene-span-classqueryhlradtkespan?ctx=f26dafe5-
548c-4fb8-86ee-e944f09d510a&idx=0. 
114 Schoepke, accessed September 28, 2020, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58386/span-
classqueryhlschoepkespan?ctx=03943079-0175-4338-b883-dc8ccb07f021&idx=0. 
115 Willi Scharf, accessed September 28, 2020, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58386/span-
classqueryhlschoepkespan?ctx=03943079-0175-4338-b883-dc8ccb07f021&idx=0. 
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Ruhr in 1926.116 Waldemar Groetschel too found it difficult to gain a foothold after 
moving from eastern Upper Silesia to Leobschütz county in the region’s still-German 
part, which he blamed on being frozen out due to his opposition to the Center Party.117  
Some respondents or their families did not – or not immediately - quit the lost 
territories, a choice that too entailed hardship and bred bitterness. Erich Hinz, as 
mentioned above, fought in Upper Silesia and was interned when he went to visit his 
family in Filehne county, whose southern half had become Polish, while on leave. Asked 
to join the Polish army, which was then fighting the invading Soviet Union, he refused 
and was expelled. His family, however, stayed and still lived in Filehne county at the 
time of writing. Soon, Hinz wrote, his brother, fifteen years younger than he, would 
become liable for Polish military service.118 Werner Kauffmann’s father too initially 
stayed put. When Werner tried to return to help him run the family’s estate, the local 
starost warned him that he, as a former German reserve officer, was unwelcome and, 
since his visa was also running out, would be arrested if he did not leave again within 
twenty-four hours. Thus, he returned to Germany, where his father, having sold his 
property for money that would shortly be rendered worthless thanks to inflation, joined 
him.119 Like Werner’s father, Winfried Harhausen, the pastor’s son from Bromberg, at 
first stayed there. “We saw our mother cry, didn’t understand ourselves what it means to 
have lost the Heimat, because for us this was initially all something new. Only later did 
 
116 August Marleiter, accessed September 28, 2020, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58289/span-classqueryhlaugustspan-span-
classqueryhlma?ctx=25e23b34-57a7-40e4-811d-09569cf49dd2&idx=0.  
117 Waldemar Groetschel, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58343/span-classqueryhlwaldemarspan-span-
classqueryhl?ctx=8b69cc40-82fc-4e66-a3c8-814fa0b6d093&idx=0. 
118 Erich Hinz, accessed September 23, 2020, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58581/span-
classqueryhlerichspan-span-classqueryhlhin?ctx=df23c12d-71e7-4393-86eb-376cfbdd091a&idx=0. 




we recognize our heavy loss,” he recalled.120 It was later too that he comprehended the 
importance of maintaining Germandom abroad and his parents’ decision to continue in 
Bromberg for that reason. Winfried throughout his youth commuted to school first to 
Danzig and then to Posen and even served in the Polish army, but in 1927, instead of 
going to work for a German newspaper in Poland as he had intended, he moved to 
Germany to attend university. One fellow late re-settler by the name of Gustav Sorge 
even attracted the attention of Michael Mann in his study of the radicalization of later 
Nazi war criminals. Sorge’s family had left him to hold the fort, so to speak, in Polish 
Upper Silesia while they fled west, in order that he might one day reclaim their 
smallholding there. By the time he did leave for German Upper Silesia after all in 1930, 
he had developed a great hatred of the Poles. A year after his relocation, Sorge joined the 
Nazi party and the SS. During the war, he became an NCO in a death camp, where his  
brutality earned him the moniker “Iron George.”121  
The separation or near separation from Germany sparked not only intense 
bitterness, however, but also pronounced sentimentalism. Schoepke paints a vivid picture 
of how his choir’s practices were transformed by the impending expulsion. German songs 
were sung with newfound earnestness and pathos, regularly moving singers to tears. Each 
rehearsal thus became “an hour of grief and leave-taking,” each song “a holy chorale.”122 
When the moment to leave did come, it was a poignant experience for Erna Stoyke. She 
was born in the West Prussian village of Plowenz in 1913, but “I was only granted a few 
years to take joy in the property of my ancestors. One day, it was shortly before 
 
120 “Wir sahen unsere Mutter weinen, begriffen selbst noch nicht einmal, was es heisst, die Heimat verloren 
zu haben, denn für uns war das alles zunächst etwas neues. Erst später erkannten wir den schweren 
Verlust.”; Winfried Harhausen, accessed June 18,2020, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58291/winfried-span-
classqueryhlharhausenspan?ctx=5ab0f859-20cb-44e5-934c-822ea3dd1899&idx=0. 
121 Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 196-197. 




Christmas of the year [1921], I was fetched home from the boardinghouse of a small 
town to never return there again. An order had been issued by the Polish government to 
leave the formerly kerndeutsch area within 24 hours. In that moment I did not really 
know what it meant, until my parents told me take leave from your and your ancestors’ 
Heimat. Once more I walked as a child through the places that had become so dear to me, 
and then everything was meant to be over.”123 Heinz Gefaeller, who grew up near Tilsit, 
had also experienced the postwar uncertainty surrounding the fate of East Prussia as a 
school-aged child and had cried in bed, praying to stay German. His wish was granted, 
but he felt the loss of the adjacent Memel territory keenly. Despite it having come under 
foreign rule, he and his friends continued to enjoy going swimming on the river’s 
opposite bank. “One day after swimming,” he recounted, “I filled my pockets with stones 
and brought them over the now-border, over the Queen-Luise-Bridge. Triumphantly I 
emptied them out in the proud consciousness of having brought a piece of earth, even if 
they were only stones, back into the fatherland.”124 In contrast to Gefaeller’s mourning, 
Marta Gruse, originally from West Prussia but resident in the Marienburg area, 
foregrounded the fierce joy of loss averted. She recalled, “In 1919 the Posen province and 
a part of West Prussia became the Polish Corridor as a consequence of the Versailles 
Treaty. My hometown Bromberg was also occupied; a scream of indignation and sorrow 
 
123 “Nur wenige Jahre war es mir vergönnt, mich an dem Besitz meiner Väter zu erfreuen. Eines Tages, es 
war kurz vor Weihnachten des Jahres 192[durchgestrichene Zahl], wurde ich aus der Pension eines kleinen 
Städtchens nach Hause geholt, um nie mehr dort wiederzukehren. Es war der Befehl von der polnischen 
Regierung ergangen, binnen 24 Stunden das einstmals kerndeutsche Gebiet zu verlassen. Ich wusste im 
Augenblick nicht so recht was es bedeutete, bis meine Eltern mir sagten, nimm Abschied von deiner sowie 
deiner Vorfahren Heimat. Noch einmal ging ich als Kind durch die Stätten, die mir so liebe worden waren, 
und dann sollte alles aus sein.”; Erna Stoyke, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58583/span-classqueryhlernaspan-span-
classqueryhlstoy?ctx=fa9aba14-49c7-4cb6-a253-2207205d285e&idx=0. 
124 “Eines Tages nach dem Baden füllte ich meine Taschen mit Steinen und brachte sie über die 
nunmehrige Grenze, über die Königin-Luise-Brücke. Triumphierend schüttete ich sie aus mit dem stolzen 
Bewusstsein ein Stücken Erde und wenn es auch nur Steine waren ins Vaterland zurückgebracht zu 




went through our heart. Then in 1920 came the plebiscite for our region here, which 
heaven be thanked turned out thus that we remained with Germany. Nobody can take 
away from one that wonderful feeling of joy to be a German. And our youth also again 
has this attitude when one asks them: ‘What would you want to be if you weren’t a 
German? – I only want to be a German!’”125  
 For many respondents, the borderlands’ jeopardy and forfeiture was interwoven 
with the November revolution but distinct therefrom, a key juncture at which they lost 
faith in a republican government perceived as pusillanimous. In contrast to those who like 
him took up weapons for Upper Silesia’s defense or travelled there to vote in the 
plebiscite, Goretzki, for example, wrote, the government had proven “wimpish.”126 
Already in the two years preceding the plebiscite, when he, as a student in Görlitz, 
attended political meetings of various hues, he had shunned Marxist rallies, because “We 
live in a borderland – and our Silesian land is surrounded by hostile neighbors!”127 No 
more did he trust the Center Party to safeguard Upper Silesia’s best interests. The son of 
Catholics with Polish surnames, Goretzki observed about post-war Upper Silesia that, “It 
was also painful for me as a Catholic to see how Roman-Catholic clerics, who studied at 
German universities, lived in Germany in good times, now agitate against my Germany. 
My Roman-Catholic faith received a sensitive crack.”128 Priests’ ostensible campaigning 
 
125 “1919 wurde dann infolge des Versailler Vertrags die Provinz Posen und ein Teil Westpreußens der 
polnische Korridor. Meine Heimatstadt Bromberg wurde auch besetzt; ein Schrei der Empörung und des 
Jammers zog durch unser Herz. Dann kam hier für unsere Gegend 1920 die Volksabstimmung, die 
Gottseidank so ausfiel, daß wir bei Deutschland blieben. Das herrliche Gefühl der Freude, Deutscher zu 
sein, wird einem niemand nehmen. Und so ist auch unsere Jugend wieder eingestellt, wenn man die fragt: 
‘Was möchtest du sein, wenn du kein Deutscher wärst? - Nur Deutscher möchte ich sein!’”; Marta Gruse, 
accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58573/span-
classqueryhlmartaspan-span-classqueryhlgru?ctx=96dd8611-8481-4c31-bd2b-157de92e0da1&idx=0. 
126 “schlapp”; G. Goretzki, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58483/g-span-classqueryhlgoretzkispan?ctx=6415e05e-16d2-
4293-9957-1da6294c93cd&idx=0. 
127 “Wir leben ja im Grenzland - und unser Schlesierland ist von feindlichen Nachbarn umgeben!”; Ibid. 
128 “Für mich als Katholiken war ausserdem schmerzlich zu sehen, wie römisch-katholische Geistliche, die 
auf deutschen Hochschulen studiert, in guten Zeiten in Deutschland gelebt haben, jetzt gegen mein 
Deutschland hetzen. Meine römisch -katholische Glaubensauffassung hat einen empfindlichen Sprung 
bekommen.”; Ibid. 
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for Poland during the plebiscite, allegedly including by abusing the sacrament of 
confession to extract promises from voters, eroded his faith. When he continued to 
witness the Center party’s supposed power politics as a civil servant in Lüneburg, he 
formally left the church. Already in a pre-war context, Goretzki’s fellow native Upper 
Silesian Marleiter likewise censured the federal government’s “weak and vacillating 
attitude”129 with regard to “questions of Auslandsdeutschtum”130 and East Germany as 
well as the Center Party’s “dubious and ruinous attitude” to Polish nationalist activism.131 
After the war, Upper Silesia’s occupation and insurgencies reinforced his impression that 
among peoples “right lay only with the strong.”132 The government had by this logic 
acted dishonorably by disarming. He also throughout the republican years continued to 
repudiate the Center in particular for its unreliability in the Upper Silesian question. 
Schoepke went so far as to portray the government as not only complicit by its meekness 
but downright pleased with the country’s territorial losses. When the Vistula corridor was 
granted Poland “[w]ithout consideration for economic, geographic, historical or völkisch 
concerns,” he thus complained, “[t]he association of enemies [Feindbund] found splendid 
support from Marxism in Germany, which at every new German loss of territory 
expressed its satisfaction. Marxist and democratic rabble after all always convinced 
through word and writing that Germany was at fault for the world war and had to atone 
therefor.”133 Marta Gruse’s rejection of the government, meanwhile, was explicitly anti-
Semitic. What came of Jews, “foreign people,” holding the reins of power, she wrote 
 
129 “schwache und schwankende”; August Marleiter, accessed September 18, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58289/span-classqueryhlaugustspan-span-
classqueryhlma?ctx=5e111d47-774a-4fa1-8590-ddbf637551e9&idx=0. 
130 “Fragen des Auslanddeutschtums”; Ibid. 
131 “zweifelhafte und verderbliche Haltung”; Ibid. 
132 “das Recht nur beim Starken liegt”; Ibid. 
133 “Der Feindbund fand trefflichste Unterstützung durch den Marxismus in Deutschland, der ja bei jedem 
neuem Gebietsverlust Deutschlandds seine Genugtuung ausdrückte. Marxistsiches und demokratisches 
Gesindel überzeugte ja immer wieder durch wort und Schirft, dass Deutschland am Weltkriege schuld sein 




derisively, was illustrated by the “deplorable Treaty of Versailles.”134 Richard Quack, 
too, argued that Germany could only be debased so much in the wake of the defeat, 
particularly by the Treaty of Versailles, because Jews controlled the corridors of power. 
Disillusioned, he joined “[t]hose Freikorps leaders who wanted to save what could still 
be saved” in Upper Silesia until 1922.135 He was convinced that from there “these rulers, 
who were in Jewish pay, would have been finished off, if only the opportunity had 
existed.”136  
 Playing to an established trope of right-wing rhetoric, others claimed to have lost 
faith specifically because they perceived the government to have inadequately supported 
the armed resistance to border changes or even to have sabotaged it by acceding to 
agreements with the Allies.137 Max Rudolph, for example, declared, “If the Social 
Democratic government in Berlin had not stayed General Höfer’s hand, then our brave 
Selbstschutz folks would have chased the insurgents across the border.”138 Then-teenaged 
Willi Scharf chronicled the valiant fight of his county Grenzschutz against the Poles, 
which raged just outside his home village, only to conclude by lamenting that it was all 
for naught. At the behest of a government that had signed a peace treaty prescribing 
 
134 “Und war es vollkommen klar geworden, wenn solche artfremden Menschen uns regieren, dann wird 
es bald traurig um unser geliebtes Deutschland aussehen. Das bewies dann auch der unselige Vertrag von 
Versailles.”; Marta Gruse, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58573/span-classqueryhlmartaspan-span-
classqueryhlgru?ctx=96dd8611-8481-4c31-bd2b-157de92e0da1&idx=0. 
135 “Jenen Freikorpsführern, die noch retten wollten, was zu retten war, schloss ich mich an und ging als 
Soldat nach Oberschlesien.”; Richard Quack, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58499/span-classqueryhlrichardspan-span-
classqueryhlq?ctx=4d959ce5-2c1e-44eb-b369-90adbd5969cb&idx=0. 
136 “Ich bin davon überzeugt, dass gerade von Oberschlesien aus, diesen damaligen in jüdischem Solde 
stehenden Machthabern schon der Garaus gemacht worden wäre, wenn nur die Möglichkeit bestanden 
hätte.”  
137 See: Juliane Haubold-Stolle, Mythos Oberschlesien: der Kampf um die Erinnerung in Deutschland und 
in Polen 1919-1956 (Osnabrück: Fibre, 2008), could not check page due to lack of access to CUL during 
corona crisis 
138 “Wenn die sozialdemokratische Berliner Regierung den General Höfer nicht in den Arm gefallen wäre, 
so hätten unsere braven Selbstschutzleute die Insurgenten über die Grenze gejagt.”; Max Rudolph, accessed 
September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58793/span-classqueryhlmaxspan-span-
classqueryhlrudol?ctx=0e0cc75c-4a2d-47bf-943f-4a9e2d159493&idx=0. 
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narrower boundaries than could be defended, the Grenzschutz had had to withdraw 
behind the Versailles borders. Similarly let down by the government’s lack of support for 
a defensible position, Wilhelm Lembke from Bromberg related, “One day it was said that 
Polish insurgents had occupied Posen and Hohensalza and were marching on Bromberg. 
Soldiers, who were still ready to fight, were in short supply and thus the Grenzschutz and 
citizens’ militias were mobilized. Reinforcements requested from Berlin, that is, from the 
government, did not come. I did not understand this conduct, for if one had had the 
intention to hold Posen province, it would have been a trifle.” For this reason, he recalled, 
his “loyalty and faith began to totter-.”139 
 A few men hoped to get the chance to redress the territorial losses incurred by a 
weak-willed government by joining the army. After his family was expelled from West 
Prussia and took up residence in Brandenburg, for instance, Walter Treue enlisted as a 
soldier “in order to surely be able to be there when it comes to the getting back of the 
Heimat.”140 “In the belief that one day the decision will after all come and that we will 
take back by force what they have stolen from us,” Willi Scharf too wrote of the time 
following his family’s expulsion, “I signed up voluntarily for the army in order to be 
trained in case of a conflict.”141 He left again, however, when he realized that no such 
 
139 “Eines Tages hiess es, polnische Insurgenten hätten Posen und Hohensalza besetzt und seien im 
Anmarsch auf Bromberg. Soldaten, die noch kampfbereit waren, waren wenig vorhanden und so wurden 
Grenzschutz und Einwohnerwehren mobilisiert. Von Berlin, d.h. von der Regierung erbetene 
Verstärkungen kamen nicht heran. Das ganze Gebühren war mir nicht klar, denn wenn man die Absicht 
gehabt hätte, die Provinz Posen zu halten, wäre es eine Kleinigkeit gewesen. Und wieder gerieten Treue 
und Glauben ins Wanken—.”; Wilhelm Lembke, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58498/span-classqueryhlwilhelmspan-span-
classqueryhll?ctx=3fc101b8-3b6a-4941-8ed7-f1f622ae8c5b&idx=0. 
140 “Doch ich wollte durchaus Soldat werden, um ja gleich dabei sein zu können wenn es ans zurückholen 
der Heimat ging.”; Walter Treue, accessed September 18, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58538/span-classqueryhlwalterspan-span-
classqueryhltr?ctx=c36d008d-f6b5-49cc-96b5-bf0fe22fa212&idx=0. 
141 “In dem Glauben, daß eines Tages doch die Entscheidung kommen wird und wir mit Gewalt uns das 
zurückholen das man uns gestohlen hatte, meldete ich mich freiwillig bei der Reichswehr um im Falle einer 




campaign would be fought anytime soon. Roland Schoenfelder, meanwhile, dedicated 
himself to the building up of the illegal Black Reichswehr in Eastern Germany, whose 
task, he held, was the organization of men and materiel for the defense of Germany’s 
Eastern borders from “the imminent danger of a Polish invasion.”142 The Black 
Reichswehr, he opined, was “in the Eastern marches…the foundation of National 
Socialism.”143  
 Economic troubles, on the regional and personal level, precipitated by the post-
war settlement also weighed on respondents. Already, the pecuniary plight expellees 
reported undergoing has been outlined: They had to abandon jobs, belongings, and real 
estate. Texts sent in from the Rhine-Ruhr areas even more often detailed how the Franco-
Belgian occupation, punishments for resistance to it, and exile derailed individuals’ 
careers. The economic dynamics the unfavorable peace treaty produced in Germany’s 
other borderlands were likewise held responsible for individual travails. Max Rudolph, 
who had relocated to Upper Silesia in 1918 to work as a chemist for the Friedenshütte, 
was, after a stint as the operator of an independent lab, employed from 1922 onwards by 
the Königs- and Laurahütte, now in Poland. When he refused Polish citizenship in 1924, 
he was expelled. He settled in Beuthen and opened a private laboratory again, but 
“through the relinquishing of the most valuable parts of Upper Silesia” too few 
commissions were coming in.144 Rudolph had to sell and moved to Berlin, where he, after 
a spell of unemployment, worked in quick succession as a lab technician at the technical 
university, the founder of a short-lived rechargeable battery firm, and a lecturing assistant 
at the university. This employment insecurity he blamed on Germany’s territorial 
reduction. Georg Deutscher similarly had to give up his career in the administration of 
 
142 “die naheliegende Gefahr des Poleneinmarsches”; Roland Schoenfelder, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58800/roland-span-
classqueryhlschoenfelderspan?ctx=a2de450d-ddbc-4871-b4c9-669e821a2513&idx=0. 
143 “in der Ostmark [...] der Grundstock des Nationalsozialismus”; Ibid. 
144 “Durch die Abtretung der wertvollsten Teile Oberschlesiens kamen nicht mehr genügend Aufträge ein.”;  
Max Rudolph, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58793/span-
classqueryhlmaxspan-span-classqueryhlrudol?ctx=0e0cc75c-4a2d-47bf-943f-4a9e2d159493&idx=0.  
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the same foundry, where his father had also been a miner, when it moved its headquarters 
from Berlin to Poland.145 While he landed a civil service job, G. Ullein from Tilsit was 
less fortunate. Born in 1907, he began his biogram with a tribute to the Tilsit of his 
childhood, a flourishing center of trade between the German and Russian empires. Since, 
however, the “’peace treaty’” had crippled the city.146 Customs barriers and the “mean-
spirited attitudes” of the new surrounding countries curbed the city’s trade and wealth.147 
“And now,” he lamented, “many young people have like me to leave their jobs in order to 
get a different job in the province and the Reich.”148 He laid his difficulties firmly at the 
feet specifically of the peace settlement. While the above men cited the economic 
repercussions the post-war order had for them personally when asked why they became 
Nazis, others were galvanized by the disruption to the borderlands’ economies more 
generally. Max Reimann, for one, was stationed in Upper Silesia as a civil servant from 
1920 to 1922, where his assignment included ensuring that coal was delivered to Poland, 
Italy, and Czechoslovakia as mandated by the peace treaty.149 The task embittered him. 
Toward the end of the decade, Oskar Klinkusch too spent time professionally in Upper 
Silesia and there witnessed “the blessings of the ‘peace treaty’.”150  
It was then that Klinkusch “resolved to join the NSDAP in order thus to do my 
part for the liberation of the fatherland.”151 Keim from the Palatinate likewise linked his 
 
145 Georg Deutscher, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58525/span-classqueryhlgeorgspan-span-
classqueryhldeu?ctx=fddc5739-e4d6-4a83-a846-6214ae18fc88&idx=0. 
146 “‘Friedensvertrag’”; G. Ullein, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58396/g-span-classqueryhlulleinspan?ctx=f488b5b8-8e0d-
4696-910f-941f4d694ce3&idx=0. 
147 “engherzige Auffassungen”; Ibid. 
148 “Und nun geht es vielen junger [sic] Menschen wie mir, sie müssen ihren Arbeitsplatz verlassen, um 
sich in der ‘Provinz’ bzw. im ‘Reich’ einen anderen Arbeitsplatz zu verschaffen.”; Ibid. 
149 Max Reimann, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58329/span-
classqueryhlmaxspan-span-classqueryhlreima?ctx=93a0c38f-f3b9-4e5a-b8e6-774a5c9e2103&idx=0. 
150 “die Segnungen des ‘Friedensvertrages’”; Oskar Klinkusch, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58569/oskar-span-classqueryhlklinkuschspan?ctx=9fd387a3-
6442-4fb6-8ac9-addffc792b8c&idx=0. 
151 “…und jetzt entschloss ich mich, der NSDAP beizutreten, um so zu meinem Teil an der Befreiung 
meines Vaterlandes mitzuarbeiten.”; Ibid. 
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becoming a party member to his border experiences, writing that “if a liberation of 
Germany was possible, only Adolf Hitler could implement it.”152 South German Martin 
Daiser, the author of a 1930 polemic detailing his experience as a worker in Upper Silesia 
in 1920, also experienced his political awakening thanks to the ethnic and political 
circumstances of that borderland. He had arrived a Communist, but the sole fellow 
German in Daiser’s mine, Heinrich, set him right: “Heinrich and I became ever better 
friends, for in this goddamned nest one could observe every day, after all, that many, 
many years would pass until that time when the words “Proletarians of all nations unite!’ 
would one day have become reality – and that probably the end of the world would have 
arrived already before then. In the meantime, it would remain a phrase like so many 
others, which as usual the German proletarian had fallen for. I had to agree with Heinrich 
when he said: ‘Well, there should be a party, better yet a movement, that is German and 
nevertheless social; first the Germans must become brothers, all, all…’”153 The 
efficaciousness of this national unity they envisaged was confirmed in his eyes when a 
German train and a French military transport crashed and the unified defense of all the 
city’s Germans against the resulting anti-German terror allowed them to briefly gain 
control of Katowice.154 Most forthrightly, August Marleiter concluded his biogram with 
the affirmation, “I believe that precisely my borderland experiences have led me to the 
 
152 “…dass, wenn eine Befreiung Deutschlands möglich war, diese nur Adolf Hitler durchführen konnte.”; 
Keim, accessed September 19, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58404/span-
classqueryhlkeimspan?ctx=cb3ca610-5fc5-4683-b1db-64aa6ba77390&idx=0. 
153 “Heinrich und ich wurden immer bessere Freunde, denn hier in diesem gottverfluchten Nest konnte man 
ja jeden Tag feststellen, daß bis zu dem Zeitpunkt, an dem die Worte ‘Proletarier aller Länder vereinigt 
Euch!’ einmal Wirklichkeit geworden sein würden noch viele, viele Jahre vergehen dürften - und 
wahrscheinlich das Ende der Welt schon vorher herbeigekommen sein würde. Einstweilen bliebe es eine 
Phrase wie so viele andere auch, auf die wie immer der deutsche Proletarier hereingefallen war. Ich musste 
Heinrich recht geben, wenn er sagte: ‘Ja, eine Partei, besser noch eine Bewegung müsste es geben, die 
deutsch und doch sozial eingestellt wäre; die Deutschen müssten selbst erst Brüder werden, alle, alle…’”; 
Martin Daiser, “Deutsche Brüder in Not: Selbsterlebtes aus dem Polenaufstand im oberschlesischen 
Abstimmungsgebiet 1920,” [1930]. BArch, NS 26/629. 
154 Ibid. 
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N.S.D.A.P.”155 Others did not articulate this connection between borderland experiences 
and Nazi membership explicitly, with it instead an undercurrent in narratives that are, 
after all, designed to explain “Why I Became a Nazi.” While this emphasis on the border 
may in some cases have been contrived to arouse sympathy in the biograms’ readership, 
on the whole it challenges the conventional assertion that regionally specific issues and 
perspectives played no appreciable role in the political outlook of borderlands electorates.  
 On many borderlanders, it is clear, the border and the upheavals surrounding it – 
before, during, and particularly after the First World War – had a formative impact. By 
highlighting Germany’s and Germandom’s vulnerability they attracted respondents to 
radical nationalism. However, none of them came to the NSDAP directly from post-war 
paramilitaries like the leadership figures and the party’s early core, which form the focus 
of extant scholarship about Nazism’s emergence in the borderlands, did. In fact, many 
had never engaged in any formal border-related activism at all. Instead, they tended to 
take more circuitous routes to Nazism, with border experiences acting as a long-range 
influence rather than as a direct feeder into the party. It was sensibilities like theirs that 
Nazism was catering to when it, as the next chapter will showcase, participated in the 







155 “Ich glaube, daß gerade meine Grenzlanderlebnisse mich mit zur N.S.D.A.P. geführt haben.”; August 
Marleiter, accessed September 18, 2019, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58289/span-
classqueryhlaugustspan-span-classqueryhlma?ctx=5e111d47-774a-4fa1-8590-ddbf637551e9&idx=0. 
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Colonizing Memory Culture 
  
 Many later Nazis were shaped, as the previous chapter has suggested, by their 
experience of the borders’ precarity and in particular of the resultant post-war plebiscitary 
and paramilitary struggles for their preservation. The centrality of these events to 
collective memory and nationalist mythology in the border regions led the Nazi 
movement to insinuate itself into their commemoration. In doing so, the movement laid 
claim, much like it famously also did with the frontline experience, to a heritage with 
which the NSDAP as an organization did not in actuality possess a direct or unique 
connection.1 Mostly, this appropriation occurred organically as Nazi activists, themselves 
products of their regions’ memory cultures, disseminated their political ideology within 
their existing networks, a process that Rudy Koshar has identified, in a different setting, 
as key to the party’s breakthrough in the early 1930s. Cooperation in matters of 
commemoration with other right-wing, nationalist groups was thus usually 
unproblematic, as was participation in collective commemorative ceremonies. Even 
commemorations organized specifically by the party imitated existing custom. The Nazi 
movement did, however, claim for itself not only origins in the post-war struggles but 
also a continued special relationship with their spirit, which, it maintained, it alone, with 
its mass character and uniquely uncompromising, activist nationalism, preserved and 
could rekindle more widely for the achievement of irredentist ends. These pretensions 
were employed to juxtapose the Nazi party on the one hand to the government and its 
constituent parties, which were held to have failed then as now, but also on the other to 
rival radical-nationalist organizations with roots in the post-war conflicts. These were in 
rare but notable instances taken over outright by the Nazis as their movement rapidly 
 
1 Mirosław Węcki, “Losy górnośląskich nazistów podczas I wojny światowej,” in Górny śląsk a I wojna 




gained ground. Strength thus became both the rhetorical and the practical foundation of 
Nazism’s colonization of a memory culture that it otherwise shared largely unchanged 
with the wider right-wing milieu.  
Rudy Koshar spotlighted the “interpenetration of nazism [sic] into prior social 
networks” of the right in his 1986 monograph Social Life, Local Politics, and Nazism: 
Marburg, 1880-1935.2 Arguing against the popular perception, dating back to Max 
Weber, that it was the political passivity of Germany’s voluntary groups that smoothed 
the way for Nazism’s rise, Koshar emphasized that it was to the contrary precisely the 
politicization of the bourgeois associational realm that made Nazism’s electoral successes 
of the early 1930s possible and lasting.3 Marburg had long been, he describes, a right-
wing bastion, a circumstance that would eventually give rise to Nazi vote shares well 
above the national average.4 In 1929, however, the town’s political stage was still 
dominated by a cluster of organizationally weak conservative-nationalist parties favored 
by a bourgeoisie that held a “deep distrust of bureaucratized parties linked to large 
constituencies,” like the Social Democrats, and of party politics’ perceived intrusion into 
public life.5 In this atmosphere, clubs and associations acted as “'substructures' of more 
visible parties, pressure groups, and city governments” that, while ostensibly unpolitical, 
fostered engagement with politics.6 How the Nazi movement interacted with this 
important “intermediary structure” between social and political life, Koshar urged, 
deserves more scrutiny.7 Steps in that direction had, Koshar points out, already been 
taken, with William Sheridan Allen in his famous case study of Northeim recognizing its 
penetration of associational life as prerequisite for Nazism’s success there.8 Since long 
 
2 Rudy Koshar, Social Life, Local Politics, and Nazism: Marburg, 1880-1935 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1986), 11. 
3 Ibid., 4-5.  
4 Ibid., 179. 
5 Ibid., 6. 
6 Ibid., 7. 
7 Ibid., 11. 
8 Ibid. 
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before joining that party, eventual Nazis, Koshar showed, had been members of various 
societies, such that later they were not so much infiltrating these as “Nazi party 
involvement was part of ongoing social intercourse.”9 Gradually, Nazis affiliated with 
other groups gained “moral authority over [these] organizations” and the Nazi party, in 
turn, became “the political hub, the focus of legitimacy and material power, that 
bourgeois constituencies,” with their proclivity for weak parties, “had lacked.”10 All the 
while, the circumstance that the party apparatus neither planned nor steered these joint 
members’ dissemination of Nazism only “enhanced the legitimacy of their message.” 11 
Koshar credits the effects of “cross-affiliation” not only with producing the sizeable vote 
shares the Nazi party won in Marburg in 1930 but also with ensuring that this outcome 
did not remain a one-off occurrence in an unstable, ever-changing political landscape.12 
Alongside the sports clubs, choirs, student and interest groups, and veterans’ associations, 
whose suffusion with Nazism Koshar studied, in the borderlands organizations that 
claimed stewardship of the post-war struggles’ legacy were part and parcel of right-wing 
associational life. It is therefore worth examining how the movement “grappled, 
negotiated, and clashed” with these groups and engaged with the heritage they 
represented.13 
 Nazism often harked back to highlights of German history – notably moments of 
activist mass nationalism like the popular response to war’s outbreak in 1914, the 
subsequent frontline experience, or even the farther back Wars of Liberation of 1813 – to 
endow itself with a nationalist genealogy. In the borderlands, this cobbled-together 
backstory prominently included specifically border-related historical events, particularly 
the post-war struggles but occasionally also ones like Germans’ uprising against Danish 
rule in 1848. The myth of borderland Nazism’s origin in those campaigns was 
 
9 Ibid., 185. 
10 Ibid., 202. 
11 Ibid., 203. 
12 Ibid., 202. 
13 Ibid., 11. 
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occasionally articulated quite explicitly, notably by Flensburg’s Kampfzeit Hitler Youth 
leader. In his mid-1930s chronicle of the Grenzjugendbund Germania, which had been 
the nucleus of the city’s Hitler Youth, he declared that in 1920, the year of the Schleswig 
plebiscite, the NSDAP as a party had not yet spread to Flensburg, but that “’the swastika 
banner was already carried’” by him and his comrades in the Germania.14 “’Only out of 
the Germania did the freedom party NSDAP later develop’,”15 he asserted, writing also 
that, “’He who wants to understand Flensburg, its National Socialist movement, has to 
know about these days of struggle and victory [in the plebiscite period]. He must know 
that the activists of that time were also the activists of the National Socialist 
Kampfzeit.’”16 Indeed the Germania had been the successor to the Excentric Club, an 
association of teens, among them the author, active in the German plebiscite campaign,17 
and had in 1930, after many years of independent Hitlerite activism, merged itself into 
the Hitler Youth as Flensburg’s first chapter, which retained the byname Germania.18 The 
Grenzjugendbund had moreover contributed numerous founding members to the city’s 
NSDAP and SA branches.19 The chronicle’s portrayal of Nazism’s genesis in Flensburg 
thus contained some truth, even if the mass of Nazi members would not have had the 
same pedigree of plebiscite activism as the Germania-incubated leadership. At the 
dedication of Oppeln’s Brown House, Gauleiter Helmuth Brückner likewise worked with 
half-truths when he “reminded” his roughly 3,000 listeners that “the root of the Upper 
Silesian Hitler movement was formed from the Freikorps Heydebreck, which defended 
 
14 “‘Im Jahre 1920 wurde von uns bereits das Hakenkreuzbanner geführt. Eine Partei NSDAP gab es hier 
noch gar nicht. Erst aus der Germania ist später die Freiheitspartei NSDAP hervorgegangen.’”; Peter 
Heinacher, Der Aufstieg der NSDAP im Stadt- und Landkreis Flensburg (Flensburg: Gesellschaft für 
Flensburger Stadtgeschichte, 1986), 244. 
15 Ibid. 
16 “‘Wer Flensburg, seine nationalsozialistische Bewegung kennen will, muß um diese Tage des Kampfes 
und des Sieges wissen. Er muß wissen, daß die Aktivisten jener Zeit auch die Aktivisten der 
nationalsozialistischen Kampfzeit waren.’”; Ibid., 247. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 261.  
19 Ibid., 244, 251.  
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this part of German land in the time of the uprising.”20 While Peter von Heydebreck 
himself had indeed gone on to found Upper Silesia’s SA in 1925, to claim that his 
Freikorps had been the nucleus of Upper Silesian Nazism was to exaggerate.21 The 
symbols of the Selbstschutz were at times appropriated as well. Thus, an SA leader 
carried a Selbstschutz flag in a 1932 parade near Gleiwitz, for which he was sentenced to 
three months’ imprisonment before winning the appeal,22 and a police raid on SA offices 
in Cosel that same year found over a thousand Selbstschutz armbands.23  
Selbstschutz memorials, meanwhile, were often focal points for Nazi rallies, as 
sometimes were memorials to earlier episodes. When an SA motorcade headed from Kiel 
to Flensburg for a Deutscher Tag there, for instance, it stopped to pay its respects at a 
monument dedicated to the “sons of our Heimat fallen in the fight against Denmark” in 
1850. Two Upper Silesian celebrations of the so-called Reichstrauertag, however, 
illustrate Selbstschutz memorials’ particular prominence.24 On the 1930 Reichstrauertag, 
an annual day of remembrance observed by the Nazi movement on November 9, the day 
of the failed Munich putsch, to commemorate its dead, Gleiwitz’s Nazis laid down a 
wreath at the local cemetery’s Selbstschutz memorial. Police, led by a violent and anti-
Nazi constable, wantonly beat up and arrested participants, the Nazi press alleged.25 It 
was the following year’s Reichstrauertag celebration in nearby Beuthen, however, that 
 
20 “Gauleiter Helmuth Brückner begrüßte die ihm vertrauten oberschlesischen Kameraden und erinnerte 
daran, daß der Stamm der oberschlesischen Hitlerbewegung aus dem Freikorps Heydebreck gebildet 
wurde, das diesen Teil deutschen Landes in der Aufstandszeit verteidigt habe.”; “Die Einweihung des 
‘Braunen Hauses’,” Oberschlesische Tageszeitung, August 24, 1931. APO, RO, 1803.  
21 Juliane Haubold-Stolle, Mythos Oberschlesien: Der Kampf um die Erinnerung in Deutschland und in 
Polen 1919-1956 (Osnabrück: fibre, 2008), 155; see also: Bolko Janus, Germans and Poles: Identity, 
Culture, and Nationalism in German Upper Silesia, 1918-1933 (PhD diss., University of New York at 
Buffalo, 1995), 163-164. 
22 “Schlesien: Ein ungültiges Fahnenverbot: Die Selbstschutzfahne von Schönwald,” Schlesische Zeitung, 
March 24, 1932. APO, NPO, 1025.  
23 Report, March 21, 1932. APO, RO, 1805. 
24 “im Kampfe gegen Dänemark gefallenen Söhne unserer Heimat”; “Der ‘Deutsche Tag’,” Flensburger 
NS-Zeitung, July 23, 1932.  
25 “‘Gummiknüppel raus! Ihr…, wollt ihr nicht schärfer zufassen?’,” Völkischer Beobachter, November 15, 
1930. APO, RO, 1802.  
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really made journalistic waves. Having been prohibited from holding their 
commemoration at the town’s Selbstschutz monument, Beuthen’s NSDAP chapter simply 
laid a wreath there during the march to the main ceremony at the cemetery. On their way 
back, one SA man successfully asked a police officer’s permission to have his 
photograph taken with the memorial. When he took off his coat for the photo to reveal 
full SA uniform, the officer intervened on the basis of the uniform ban in place at the 
time. The SA man was taken to the nearest police station amid violent Nazi protests and, 
though he was let go once his uniform had been confiscated,26 this caused the Upper 
Silesian far-right press to rail against the police’s supposed terror against nationalists.27 
Both incidents, apart from their journalistic repercussions, are notable for Nazis’ 
honoring of the slain of the Selbstschutz on a day dedicated to the memory of Nazism’s 
fallen. By appropriating ceremonies, symbols, and rhetoric in this manner, the Nazis 
invested their movement with a prestigious backstory.  
Among the associations that likewise claimed that heritage, Nazism by the early 
1930s had gained traction. Gleiwitz’s branch of the Vereinigte Verbände Heimattreuer 
Oberschlesier, for example, was in 1931 in charge of the town’s celebration of the 
plebiscite’s tenth anniversary and its rightist majority voted, twice, to invite Prince Ernst 
Rüdiger von Starhemberg, a former Freikorps leader and one-time National Socialist, as 
the keynote speaker. When the branch’s Social Democratic and Centrist members as well 
as Oberpräsident Lukaschek protested, the headquarters of the Verbände turned the 
commemoration’s organization over to the municipality, which arranged for Gleiwitz’s 
erstwhile plebiscite commissar, who also happened to be a veteran of St Anne Mountain, 
to speak. While the republicans’ intervention did prevent the appearance of a far-right 
orator with a Nazi connection at the rally, the episode also exposed the rift within the 
 
26 “Polizei und Nazis am Selbstschutzdenkmal: Zwei Darstellungen,” Allgemeiner Lokal-Anzeiger, 
November 11, 1931. APO, RO, 1804.  
27 “Beuthener Polizei gegen Nationalsozialisten,” Ostdeutsche Morgenpost, November 10, 1931. APO, RO, 
1804; “Beuthener Polizei gegen Nationalsozialisten,” Ostdeutsche Morgenpost, November 11, 1931. APO, 
RO, 1804. 
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branch and the predominance of Nazi sympathies in it.28 Similarly, the branch of the 
Vereinigte Verbände in Spandau, though it was not in the borderland, came under Nazi 
sway. The Abel respondent Eduard Holema related how he in 1926 took over the roughly 
150-strong group from a Marxist predecessor and set about “reshaping it in a nationalist 
spirit.”29 From 1929, Holema explicitly advocated for Nazism, in response to which 
many quit the chapter. Yet by 1931 half the board’s members were Nazis and by the time 
of Hitler’s takeover more than half the ordinary members too were registered Nazis or 
sympathizers, by Holema’s account.30 Just as in Gleiwitz, Nazism had gained the 
ascendancy within the nationalist Upper Silesian association.  
Movement between the NSDAP and the wider Selbstschutz milieu was fluid, 
precipitated in particular by intra-party conflicts and bans of the party. In 1926, less than 
a year after the NSDAP’s re-founding, for example, malcontents in Beuthen, excluded by 
the Ortsgruppenleiter, set up a branch of the Völkischer Frontkriegerbund instead, 
declaring their organization the alternative chosen by “former Selbstschutz and frontline 
fighters” in the face of the NSDAP branch’s “fragmentation.”31 In 1932, when the party 
was far more established, a similar schism occurred in nearby Hindenburg. A government 
report noted that the exclusion of a local Sturmbannführer had led numerous SA men to 
leave the SA branch and instead join the Bund ehemaliger Selbstschutzkämpfer, which 
became a “receptive reservoir for dissatisfied elements of the SA.”32 In times of 
prohibition, meanwhile, the nationalist associational realm often provided cover for Nazi 
activism, as when Ernst Schmitt, an Abel respondent, re-established his local Nazi party 
 
28 Haubold-Stolle, Mythos Oberschlesien, 150-151. 




31 “die ehemaligen Selbstschutz- und Frontkämpfer,” “Zersplitterung”; “Betrifft: Nationalsozialistische 
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei und Tannenberg-Bund,” January 13, 1926. APO, NPO, 989.  
32 “Aufnahmereservoir für unzufriedene Elemente der SA.”; “Politische Einstellung des 
Selbstschutztraditionsvereins ‘Bund ehemaliger Selbstschutzkämpfer, Sitz Hindenburg.’,” February 10, 
1932. APO, NPO, 1000.  
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branch in Landsberg an der Warthe under the designation Grenzschutz-Ost in 1923.33 
When chancellor von Papen banned the SA in the spring of 1932, Wilhelm Pisarski, 
founder and head of the Verein ehemaliger Selbstschutzkämpfer Beuthen O/S.-Nord, 
endeavored with some success to absorb Beuthen’s former SA men into his 
organization.34 Pisarski’s Verein ehemaliger Selbstschutzkämpfer was, actually, an 
example not only of a substitute in hard times but also of discontents splitting off from 
the party. Having fought in the First World War and in the defense of Beuthen from 
Polish insurgency in 1921, Pisarski had turned his former Selbstschutz division into a 
Traditionscompagnie, which was, however, disbanded after an assault on a member of 
the Polish minority in 1926.35 Government reports suggest that he formed a new 
Traditionscompagnie the following year out of the Selbstschutz veterans’ section of 
Beuthen’s Frontkriegerbund.36 After this second Traditionscompagnie was disbanded in 
1928 following its violent dispersing of a Polish-Catholic School Association parent-
teacher meeting,37 Pisarski joined the NSDAP, becoming head of the local SA Sturm and 
a city councilor for the party.38 The archival record is somewhat confused as to when 
precisely he left the party. In 1930, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him 
for engaging in Nazi activism as a civil servant and, it is recorded, he was excluded from 
the party for having a criminal record due to his failure to comply with weapons 
possession laws.39 Meanwhile it is also recorded that in 1931 Pisarski and 
Ortsgruppenleiter Koch were in conflict, with Koch openly wishing to oust Pisarski and 
Pisarski in turn threatening that the SA would no longer provide Saalschutz for party 
 
33 Ernst Schmitt, 4. 
34 “Betrifft: Wiederaufnahme des ausgeschlossenen Magistratsassistenten Pisarski, Beuthen, in der 
NSDAP,” June 27, 1932. APO, RO, 1805.  
35 Report, November 13, 1932. APO, NPO, 1000.  
36 “Betrifft: Frontkriegerbund,” May 20, 1927. APO, NPO, 990.  
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events.40 By 1932 he was certainly no longer a member of the NSDAP, nor did he ever 
renew his membership before 1933.41 Instead he had founded the aforementioned Verein 
ehemaliger Selbstschutzkämpfer Beuthen O/S.-Nord, which numbered 280 members by 
late 1932,42 among whom Pisarski “promoted National Socialism unceasingly.”43 
Reportedly, his promotion bore fruit. While there seem to have been no formal ties 
between the Verein and SA, informal cooperation did occur, with Pisarski and his 
veterans for instance attending the swearing-in of new SA men in early 1932.44   
 With this competitive but in many ways like-minded nationalist associational 
domain, Nazism shared practices aimed at celebrating and reinforcing the Germandom of 
the borderlands. One such practice were the so-called Deutsche Abende, politicized 
showcases of folk culture popularized by the Ostmarkenverein before the war and current 
by then among völkisch-nationalist groups across Germany.45 In the borderlands these 
evenings were sometimes hosted as stand-alone affairs, such as one held by the local 
NSDAP chapter in December 1929 in the Border Province’s Schönlanke,46 but also 
frequently in conjunction with rallies, such as during the 1930 day-long set of events 
hosted by the Stahlhelm in Eastern Pomeranian Varzin to protest alleged Polish territorial 
greed47 or at a 1932 regional SA gathering in Flensburg.48 In a similar vein, the Freie 
Kieler Studentenschaft, the University of Kiel’s umbrella organization for fraternities, 
began attending the Knivsberg festival, a celebration of Germandom in northern 
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Schleswig held annually since 1894,49 as a group in 1931, having come under the 
leadership of the National Socialist German Students League in mid-1930.50 That first 
year, the borderland division of the Studentenschaft sold around 250 subsidized tickets 
and the participating students, apart from taking part in the wider festival, held their own 
“Versailles rally” on the Knivsberg.51 They returned the following year in order to, as an 
advertisement in the Studentenschaft’s magazine urged, “show the severed Germandom 
in North Schleswig that the German people stands behind it in loyalty”52 and by 1933 the 
festival had become a celebration not just of North Schleswig’s Germandom but of its 
rapidly deepening Nazism.53  
 The most crucial item in the borderlands’ nationalist repertoire, though, were 
commemorations of plebiscites and battles and while Nazis held their own such 
ceremonies on occasion, they also often engaged with others’ celebrations. De rigueur 
across most of the political spectrum, though with widely varying emphases and 
messages, Upper Silesian völkisch groups had held anti-Polish rallies on the anniversary 
of the plebiscite since the early 1920s,54 while ministers including the SPD’s Carl 
Severing participated in the five-year anniversary in Oppeln.55  Severing also spoke five 
years later at the central commemoration of the plebiscite’s tenth anniversary as did 
chancellor Brüning. Across the Reich, federal and Prussian government agencies flew 
flags on half-mast and across Upper Silesia three minutes of silence were kept at noon in 
all public spaces.56 Petitioned by the Vereinigte Verbände, Breslau’s archbishop ordered 
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all Catholic churches to ring their bells at 11:30 am on the day of the anniversary.57 In 
May of that year, the ten-year anniversary of the legendary battle for St Anne Mountain 
was honored with a separate ceremony, in which National Socialists participated 
alongside Selbstschutz veterans, the Vereinigte Verbände Heimattreuer Oberschlesier, 
and the Center Party’s Kreuzschar, though they booed when Oberpräsident Lukaschek 
spoke.58  
 Borderland Nazi newspapers' reporting on occasions like the much-celebrated 
tenth Upper Silesian plebiscite anniversary drew on and praised other groups’ work. The 
Nazi Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung, for instance, published the text of a telegram 
sent in honor of the anniversary by the Schleswig-Holsteiner-Bund, the conservative-led 
successor to the plebiscite era’s central campaigning organization, which compared the 
two regions for both having been torn asunder despite German referendum victories and 
assured Upper Silesia of the solidarity of Germany’s other “border tribes.”59 
Anniversaries of Schleswig’s own plebiscites were similarly accompanied by 
sympathetic coverage on the part of the Tageszeitung of commemorative work done by 
other nationalist groups and individuals. The Nazi paper, for example, reprinted an 
interview that Pastor Schmidt-Wodder, the German minority’s representative in the 
Danish parliament, had done with the Nationaltidende under the title “We demand border 
revision!”60 Schmidt-Wodder’s speech at a plebiscite commemoration in Kiel the 
following February, which had been organized by North Schleswig’s Wohlfahrts- und 
Schulverein in cooperation with the Schleswig-Holsteiner-Bund, the Verein für das 
Deutschtum im Ausland, and the Verein Heimattreuer Nordschleswiger, was also 
reported approvingly.61 Ceremonies held in Schleswig, Kiel, and Flensburg on March 14, 
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1930, the tenth anniversary of the day of the southern zone’s plebiscite, under the 
auspices of municipalities, the Verein Heimattreuer Nordschleswiger, and the Schleswig-
Holsteiner-Bund received positive coverage as well,62 and the Tageszeitung again printed 
a commemorative text by Pastor Schmidt-Wodder.63 The commemorative celebrations in 
Flensburg and Kiel in March of the following year, when speakers, in the same vein as 
the above-mentioned telegram, congratulated Upper Silesia on the tenth anniversary of its 
plebiscite victory and pronounced Schleswig’s referendums forerunners for those in the 
East, were likewise reported on favorably.64  
 Expressly National Socialist commemorative content was, in contrast, sporadic. 
On the tenth anniversary of the Upper Silesian referendum, the East Prussian party organ 
Preußische Zeitung did, for instance, run excerpts from the Nazi sympathizer Arnolt 
Bronnen’s 1929 novel O.S.65 In these extracts from Bronnen’s literary glorification of the 
Freikorps’ fight against Polish insurgency a Southern Tyrolean volunteer gives each Pole 
he kills the new Italian name of one of his home region’s towns, signifying the 
interlinked nature of the border struggles.66 Other articles merely threw in platitudinous 
invocations of Nazism's commitment to the borderlands and to irredentism. One piece 
about the post-plebiscite suffering of North Schleswig’s Germans concluded, for 
instance, “We in the Reich, particularly we National Socialists, intend not to forget our 
borderlands over day-to-day politics and  more than ever to show our brothers outside 
through deeds that we stand with them loyally” and recommended sponsoring a 
Tageszeitung subscription for a minority school or association as a way of keeping that 
promise.67 Another concluded with the declaration that, “Theirs is our loyalty, which we 
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National Socialists believe we can best demonstrate through our struggle for the National 
Socialist Greater Germany, in which all German minorities will once be united with the 
motherland. That is our vow on March 14!”68 These perfunctory remarks did little to 
mask that plebiscite commemoration was essentially an area in which the Nazi movement 
did not differentiate itself from the right-wing nationalist mainstream.  
 Though the party did not veer from accepted right-wing commemorative norms, it 
did incorporate the hosting of independent plebiscite and battle commemorations into its 
propagandistic repertoire. A particularly well-documented Nazi commemoration of this 
kind took place in Masurian Lyck in July 1931. Planned to coincide with a visit to the 
small town by the East Prussian NSDAP’s popular Fusel band, Lyck’s SA leadership 
planned to hold a ceremony at the memorial stones dedicated to the plebiscite with the 
band and the SA in white shirts, if permission to sport uniform attire in public could be 
bullied out of the police.69 Such authorization was apparently not obtained, for the rally, 
preceded by a propaganda march through town, was in the end a ticketed affair, held in 
the Nazis’ preferred meeting hall in Lyck. There, 1,200 supporters gathered to hear the 
speaker Matuczs, who urged his audience to fight the Young plan, a controversial 
reparations payment scheme, with the same unity and determination that they had shown 
during the plebiscite campaign.70 In Upper Silesia, the St Anne Mountain was a site of 
memory particularly prominently assimilated by the Nazi movement. In May 1931, the 
National Socialists not only participated in the official ten-year anniversary celebration 
there, but alongside the Stahlhelm also hosted separate commemorations in various small 
towns near the mountain,71 taking the opportunity to expound far-right views on the 
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events and heritage of 1921 that were impermissible at ceremonies of a broader political 
make-up.72 The Untergau Upper Silesia furthermore planned a big, region-wide Nazi 
gathering, writing to the region’s Oberpräsident to request a one-day lifting of the 
speaking ban on “Selbstschutz fighter and Gauleiter” Brückner.73 A Nazi 
commemoration of the battle had also been convened there the previous year and in both 
years Nazis observed the anniversary of the plebiscite too with celebrations on the 
mountain.74  More plainly political rallies regularly also took place on St Anne Mountain. 
In June 1929, for instance, one Abel respondent, Erich Femke, who worked as a customs 
official in Annaberg, joined the NSDAP at a rally on that mountain,75 and in July 1932 a 
borderland rally with Hermann Göring drew around 35,000 to the site.76 Nazism’s 
appropriation of the St Anne Mountain eventually culminated in the opening in May 
1938 of the so-called Reich Memorial there. The 33-foot high mausoleum, with the 
Reich’s largest amphitheater down the hill, was a monumental expression of Nazism’s 
portrayal of itself as in the tradition of the Freikorps and Selbstschutz, whose fallen the 
structure honored.77 Eventually in the Third Reich commemoration, from the St Anne 
Mountain ceremonies to the Knivsberg festival, came fully under Nazi auspices, but up 
until 1933 the party’s independent events only established it as one stakeholder among 
many in a widely popular commemorative tradition.  
Though the Nazi movement’s involvement in commemoration was thus usually 
unobtrusive, it could at times be more bellicose, with the republican government the main 
target of hostile rhetoric. Post-war territorial losses were blamed on the “mistakes of the 
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‘liberal epoch’,”78 while the Freikorps, supposed precursors to Nazism, were credited, in 
a frontier version of the stab-in-the-back myth, with preserving the remaining borderlands 
for Germany in the face of republican obstruction.79 Hitler himself declared in Masurian 
Allenstein that, “It was not the party comrades of Mr. Severing, it was our party 
comrades who spilled their blood for Silesia’s defense. However, the best parts of Upper 
Silesia were still lost, because the party comrades of Mr. Severing ruled while our party 
comrades bled to death on the battlefields.” 80 Having failed Germany once, Severing and 
his ilk were now, he alleged, once again selling Germany out, while falsely accusing their 
Nazi opponents of unwillingness to defend Germany’s borders in case of attack.81 
Speakers who, unlike Hitler, did have personal experience of the Upper Silesian uprising 
brought this to bear in their denunciations of the government. In March 1932, for 
instance, Gauleiter Helmuth Brückner gave a speech in Gleiwitz, in which he reflected 
“in connection with Selbstschutz experiences of a personal nature from 1921” on the, by 
implication bad, “character of the Reichsbanner.”82 Josef Adamczyk similarly declared 
himself to be speaking not as a man of his party but as “a former Selbstschutz fighter and 
refugee” at a December 1930 rally protesting the anti-German electoral terror that had 
recently swept Polish Upper Silesia.83 In his speech, Adamczyk contrasted the heroism of 
the Selbstschutz with the dark machinations of the Center Party, whose dignitary Ulitzka 
had, he alleged, been in charge of disarming the Selbstschutz. Therefore neither that party 
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nor the unpatriotic Social Democrats had any right now to speak out against Polish terror, 
for which they, by undermining Upper Silesia’s defenses back in 1921, bore considerable 
culpability.84 Only the Nazi party, Adamczyk implied and his audience’s banners 
explicitly stated, could restore the lost territory’s afflicted German minority to the 
protection of German sovereignty. Likewise, the defenders of the violence with which a 
Polish opera performance in Oppeln met from Nazi and like-minded protestors in 1929 
repeatedly compared the incident to post-war history. Despite government censure of the 
disturbance, far-right newspaper man Lothar Knaak proclaimed, the rioters had been right 
that Upper Silesians ought to defend the national integrity of their Heimat, so that the 
Selbstschutz fighters would not have “given their life in vain on the St Anne Mountain.”85 
A flyer released by Oppeln’s NSDAP chapter likewise criticized the government's 
promise of swift punishments for the violence's perpetrators. The urgency of their aim, 
namely for Germans to become "master of the situation" again in Upper Silesia, it 
underlined by enjoining readers to remember “the uprising 1921 and the blood bath of the 
St Anne Mountain.”86 As mentioned, Matuczs, addressing the plebiscite commemoration 
in Masurian Lyck, invoked the spirit of the post-war era to encourage his audience’s fight 
against the Young Plan. “As united as the Germans once went into the plebiscite struggle, 
exactly thus we must go to the referendum. The predatory greed must vanish from the 
memory of the Polish beast. Now only a united will and unity can save Germany from 
ruin. Therefore, it is the duty of each German to bethink himself of the war years as well 
as the plebiscite era,” he adjured.87   
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 Fellow right-wing organizations shared this disparaging assessment of the 
government’s current and past record, but themselves on occasion became objects of 
criticism or infiltration and takeover. Sometimes the Nazi movement’s attempts to 
insinuate itself into more established groups were silent and strategic. In Silesia, for 
example, the recently established subdivision Ostland, probably the precursor to the 
division of the same name in Darré’s ministry for agriculture, sent around a missive to 
members of the Gauleitung, district leaders, and speakers in June 1932 explaining that its 
task was to prepare the vulnerable borderland culturally and politically for Germany’s 
projected weakest hour, that between the Weimar Republic’s demise and the National 
Socialists’ firm establishment in power, on which the country’s Eastern neighbors would 
surely seek to capitalize. To that end, the subdivision would be formed of select well-
connected individuals, who would be charged with observing and influencing, among 
others, nationalist associations, journals, youth groups, Grenzlandschulen, and their 
ethnic German networks. The letter concluded with a call to inform Count Yorck von 
Wartenburg, the Gau’s consultant for Eastern questions, of organizations and papers that 
warranted monitoring and, of course, of party members interested in participating in the 
subdivision’s work.88  These plans echo an order Ernst Röhm issued to the SA Gaue 
earlier that year, instructing the SA to be ready to secure the border during the transition 
period between republican and Nazi rule by monitoring border traffic and ensuring no 
opponents of the new regime entered or exited the country.89 Going beyond Röhm’s 
purely military plan of action, the subdivision Ostland, in view of the Nazi party’s few 
dedicated border-political infrastructures, hoped to co-opt others’ in order to secure the 
border at the Nazis’ moment of domestic political triumph. In the end, however, Hitler’s 
legal and smooth assumption of power assured that neither scheme, which were never 
fleshed out anyway, was needed. 
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 Other, more demonstrably successful Nazi bids to gain control of commemorative 
groups turned on the assertion that the party was not just a competitive but a superior 
steward of nationalist heritage. In 1931, the Kameradschaft ehemaliger 
Selbstschutzkämpfer, Ortsgruppe Gleiwitz fell victim to such a coup. The relationship 
between the Kameradschaft and the NSDAP had always been tense, as a complaint the 
former lodged with the regional government in mid-1931 illustrates. In it, the 
Kameradschaft portrayed its foundation in mid-1929, when activity by Poland’s 
paramilitaries threateningly increased, as the remedying of the Selbstschutz veterans’ 
initial failure to organize themselves after the battles of 1921. When rising fears of a 
potential Polish invasion had subsequently led other associations, like the NSDAP and 
the Stahlhelm, to also found defensive battalions, the Kameradschaft had prevailed on 
them to form a federation of self-defense units. This consortium had, however, quickly 
succumbed to squabbles over leadership positions, in which the Selbstschutz veterans of 
the Kameradschaft had been brushed aside. Consequently, the Kameradschaft now aimed 
to set up its own battalion again and demanded government support, threatening that if 
the Kameradschaft was not endorsed as alone entitled to form self-defense formations, it 
would turn to the people of Gleiwitz directly.90 Undaunted by the vague threat, the 
government in its report on the matter suggested that some Kameradschaft leaders be 
found responsible positions in the official Grenzschutz to forestall a sense of grievance, 
but also dismissed the claim that the Kameradschaft was Gleiwitz’s first Selbstschutz 
veterans’ group. The Landesschützen had brought veterans together since the early 1920s 
and the Kameradschaft had really been set up to provide its disgruntled founders with the 
leadership positions they had failed to win in the Stahlhelm and the NSDAP.91 No 
endorsement was thus forthcoming from a government that naturally saw the border’s 
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defense as the province of the army, was scarcely interested in getting mixed up in the far 
right’s internal frictions, and eventually even investigated claims that the leader of the 
Kameradschaft, Dlugosch, had once lost a job for embezzlement.92 The tension with the 
NSDAP documented by the complaint and by the government’s response thereto came to 
a head the following month, when a certain Meyer, an active Nazi who had formerly been 
the chairman of the local DVFP and then until 1929 of Gleiwitz’s NSDAP branch, called 
a meeting of Selbstschutz veterans under the pretense of planning the following month’s 
commemoration on the St Anne Mountain. In reality, however, he had contrived the 
meeting to argue the case that most of the Kameradschaft membership was uneasy about 
its policy of party-political neutrality and about its acceptance of government funding. 
Since, Meyer claimed, they wanted an explicitly nationalist association instead, he asked 
Dlugosch to dissolve the Kameradschaft. When Dlugosch unsurprisingly refused and left 
with his dozen or so supporters, the majority of remaining members voted in support of 
Meyer’s suggestion, founding the Selbstschutz-Traditionsverein “SS.OS.” with him at its 
head.93 At the magistrate’s intervention, Meyer agreed to dissolve the SS.OS. and merge 
it back into the Kameradschaft if the majority of members agreed, but when he put the 
proposal to them, he prefaced it with a speech accusing the Kameradschaft of scheming 
against the SS.OS. with the authorities, of reserving the right to (re-)admit only members 
it deemed suitable, and of allying itself with the Jews.94 Predictably, the proposition to re-
join the Kameradschaft was voted down and the SS.OS. endured through the summer, 
when the documentary thread ends, a fact the decimated Kameradschaft tried to leverage 
in renewed attempts to curry favor with the regional government.95  
 The Kameradschaft’s was a case of merely local profile, but the assault in the 
second half of 1932 on the prestigious Schleswig-Holsteiner-Bund reverberated across 
 
92 Letter, August 19, 1931. APO, NPO, 1000. 
93 “Gründung eines neuen Selbstschutztraditionsvereins (“SS.OS.”) in Gleiwitz,” April 30, 1931. APO, 
NPO, 1000. 
94 “Selbstschutz-Traditionsverein ‘SS.OS.’ in Gleiwitz,” May 18, 1931. APO, NPO, 1000. 
95 Letter to the Regierungspräsident, August 13, 1931. APO, NPO, 1000. 
 97 
that region. As Broder Schwensen’s dissertation-turned-monograph about that 
organization’s internal dynamic chronicles, an internal opposition led by lawyer and Nazi 
sympathizer Dr. Bernhard Schmidt and backed by Eckernförde’s Nazi mayor Dr. 
Wilhelm Sievers had emerged already in late 1931. These now-critics were long-standing 
members of the Bund and in that sense exactly the brand of internal Nazi influencers 
Koshar studied.96 Now, however, they highlighted the stagnation of the Bund, which was 
grappling with a dwindling number of branches and members, and blamed it on an 
ineffective leadership headed by the passé Wilhelm Iversen. Instead, they demanded a 
revival of the activist spirit of the Bund and of the demand for the border to run again 
along the Königsau, the pre-war border river.97 While, as an oppositional newspaper 
commentary professed, “a Schleswig-Holsteiner-Bund is as justified and necessary today, 
if not more so, than at the time of its foundation,” it could only achieve the requisite 
vitality, it was implied, under Nazi auspices.98 Despite Sievers’ leading role in this 
opposition, the Bund’s leadership decided to go ahead with plans to host the 1932 annual 
convention in Eckernförde, affording him as mayor and leader of the local Bund chapter a 
key role in an event at which half the leadership posts, including the chairmanship, would 
be up for election.99 Going well beyond the gradual and informal expansion of Nazi 
influence spotlighted by Koshar, the opposition moved into the open a day before the 
congress’ start, publicly announcing its intention to make a bid for these positions in an 
article by Schmidt run by the far-right Kieler Zeitung100 and by the Nazis’ own 
Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung.101 
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The piece derided the Bund as a “puny club,” which under Iversen’s impotent 
leadership had failed to connect with the “nationalist flame” – that is, Nazism – that by 
putting “the nationalist idea” first had come to blaze in Schleswig-Holstein and 
increasingly within the Bund itself.102 It then concluded by expressing the hope that this 
disconnect would be resolved at the convention and that thereby the Bund would become 
an organization capable of “sending shivers down the spines of the Danes” once more.103  
Naturalist metaphors, akin to that of the flame, for Nazism’s might were subsequently 
repeatedly employed at the convention itself, with the movement most often likened to an 
unstoppable wave.104 Wilhelm Sievers himself counseled the Bund to ask itself, “’How 
can we approach the farmer? How can we catch the nationalist wave and get in with the 
nationalist forces.’” 105 Concurring, a sympathetic delegate demanded Iversen’s 
resignation “because otherwise no connection with the farmers and the nationalist wave 
would be possible.”106 Even an article published in the magazine of the Bund in the 
convention’s wake acknowledged that the organization stood to benefit from 
reinvigoration by the “’nationalist wave’,” though it rejected the implication that 
Nazism’s formal, partisan influence on the Bund should be facilitated.107 It was not their 
partisanship, the opposition, however, argued, that hampered the Bund. Rather, it 
asserted, it was Iversen's loyalties to the German People's Party that alienated the base of 
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the Bund,108 especially when all the while the organization was being prevented by him 
and his clique from coming to reflect the region’s political make-up.109 Iversen and his 
colleagues, these critics held, were “leaders without a people” elected by a “coincidental 
majority of delegates, which for the most part have no contact and resonance with the 
most vital parts of the people,”110 whereas Nazism with its mass support, evidenced by 
the party’s performance in the July Reichstag election, possessed the “moral right to 
leadership.”111 Only recognizing Nazism’s claim to authority and linking up with its large 
base would ensure that the Bund would once again be run “in the spirit of its founders,” 
one article maintained, making explicit the claim that its mass character gave the Nazi 
movement a peculiar connection with the post-war era’s ethos and therefore a particular 
right to its legacy’s stewardship.112 By contrast, the opposition predicted, as long as the 
Bund continued to shut out Schleswig-Holstein’s “activist groups” – that is, the Nazi 
party and the sympathetic Land- und Bauernbund – it would remain condemned to 
“failure and fruitlessness.”113 
The critics certainly did their part to make this prophesy come true. Delegates to 
the annual convention, appreciative of the all-important if slow-moving work the Bund 
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had long done and still loyal to the principle of party-political neutrality that the Bund 
had followed since its inception, voted down Sievers’ candidacy for the chairmanship 
with sixteen votes to Iversen’s sixty-seven.114 Following this result, Gauleiter Lohse 
declared his party comrades’ memberships in the Bund void the day after the 
convention115 and within the month the party set up its own border-political bureau, 
though it is not clear that it ever did anything.116 More than the establishment of the 
bureau, though, it was the flowering in the months after the congress of the seeds of 
doubt about the leadership sown there that proved the undoing of the Bund and that 
prevented Iversen and his team from regaining the “initiative.”117 Instead, they struggled 
to contend with repeated setbacks: Dr. Schmidt’s branch would not expel the 
troublemaker and when his membership was removed at an advisory board meeting, it 
was in the face of thirteen abstentions.118 Leaders of branches of the Bund outside 
Schleswig-Holstein, heretofore the most loyal, were beginning to falter in their steadfast 
support, given the criticism to which Iversen’s headship exposed the organization. In 
Berlin, the regional Bund leader reported, Nazi members were agitating at the level of the 
branches against the central leadership. Accommodating Sievers, he suggested, might 
curb this dynamic.119 Iversen’s suitability was drawn into question further when his 
leadership of the Bauernverein and, most importantly, his renewed German People's 
Party candidacy in the November Reichstag election lent credence to the opposition’s 
charge that it was he who was a “party man,”120 though he quickly withdrew from both in 
favor of serving the border political cause that had always been his highest priority.121 
 
114 Schwensen, Der Schleswig-Holsteiner-Bund, 372. 
115 “Anordnung!,” Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung, September 6, 1932. LSH, Abt. 417 Nr. 91; 
Schwensen, Der Schleswig-Holsteiner-Bund, 373.  
116 “Grenzlandbüro der NSDAP. in Flensburg,” Kieler Zeitung, September 29, 1932. LSH, Abt. 417 Nr. 91. 
117 “Initiative”; Schwensen, Der Schleswig-Holsteiner-Bund, 377. 
118 Ibid., 376-377. 
119 Ibid., 378. 
120 “Parteimann”; “Iversen schreibt seine neuen Erkenntnisse nieder: Grenzkampf. Eine Antithese,” 
Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung, November 8, 1932. LSH, Abt. 417 Nr. 91. 
121 Schwensen, Der Schleswig-Holsteiner-Bund, 378-380. 
 101 
Despite Iversen’s rowing back, the Land- und Bauernbund, which was largely Nazified, 
and the Verein Heimattreuer Nordschleswiger broke away from the Schleswig-
Holsteiner-Bund too. In their announcement of their formation of an alternative border-
political cooperation, they criticized the Bund for its disconnect from the people.122 All 
the while, the narrative of the Bund about the convention failed to gain traction with a 
membership and wider population that had become variously too “’fanaticized’” or 
“disoriented” to be receptive.123 That dynamic could not have been helped by the constant 
stream of critiques of the Bund run not only by the Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung 
but also by likeminded local papers like the Schleswigsche Nachrichten, provocative 
press coverage that has been repeatedly cited here but hardly features in Schwensen’s 
account.124 Recognizing the extent to which confidence in his leadership had been 
undermined, Iversen finally resigned on December 15, 1932125 and on February 12, 1933, 
less than two weeks after Hitler’s rise to power, Sievers took control of the Bund, efforts 
to fence him in with old-guard board members having come to naught.126  
The case of the Schleswig-Holsteiner-Bund was as remarkable as it was untypical. 
The Nazi movement’s eventually successful campaign to take over the venerable 
association was indicative primarily of the electoral strength it had developed by then, 
which emboldened it to aggressively stake out leadership claims even in an arena, in 
which it had been wont to cooperate and to emulate established traditions. Nazism’s 
permeation of commemorative organizations had been correspondingly gradual and 
informal, though no less effective for that. The movement’s only claim to distinctness in 
commemorative regards was the mass base on which it could draw to more effectively 
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take charge of the post-war struggle’s legacy and of the pursuit of irredentist goals that 
this heritage was generally taken to imply. In this and other ways, set out by the 











Propaganda for Contested Regions 
 
 The iconic struggles of the post-war years and the episodes, large and small, 
recalled about the borderlands in egodocuments make plain that these regions had a 
distinct historical experience. This heritage and the regions’ continued exposed situation 
were marshalled all too often, as Rudolf Rietzler has shown for the case of Schleswig-
Holstein, by the right to generate a politically charged Sonderbewusstsein. The Nazi 
movement too fostered and engaged this mentality. Dedicated borderland pages, which 
were regular features of some regions’ party newspapers, and frequent so-called 
Grenzlandkundgebungen portrayed these provinces as German through and through – 
historically as well as currently – and as exceedingly loyal in their Germandom, despite 
their much-belabored beleaguerment. The Nazi movement itself was celebrated as the 
culmination of this steadfast Germandom, powerful enough to defend the imperiled 
regions. Thus, propaganda proffered Nazism as a solution to anxieties and animosities 
that it simultaneously kept awake. In contrast to this posturing, however, some ostensible 
Grenzlandkundgebungen hardly addressed border issues at all and organizationally the 
movement was often neglectful of remote border regions. As so often, then, Nazism 
spoke to the concerns of a specific segment of society, without there being much 
substance behind the rhetoric. How Nazism tried to rhetorically position itself in the 
borderlands is, however, no less pertinent for that.  
In Schleswig-Holstein, the foundation for the Nazi party’s strong showings lay, 
Rudolf Rietzler argued, in an “elaborately cultivated, elitist Sonderbewußtsein” as a 
borderland.1 Starting with the nationalist plebiscite campaign committee, right-wing 
organizations linked rejection of Versailles with repudiation of the republican 
government.2 Subsequently, the so-called Schleswig-Holsteiner movement, a regional 
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variant of the reactionary Heimat movements flourishing at the time, took hold, 
spearheaded by the Schleswig-Holsteiner-Bund but propagated also, for example, at the 
university in Kiel.3 Many of its historians agitated for the retaining of North Schleswig 
during the plebiscite campaign and for its reintegration into Germany throughout the 
1920s on the basis of a skewed, völkisch portrayal of the region’s history.4 Supposedly 
misunderstood and insufficiently supported by the rest of the country, Schleswig-Holstein 
was said by exponents of Schleswig’s Heimat movement to have a nationalist mission, 
against Denmark on the one hand but domestically on the other.5 Particularly racially 
pure and equipped with the strong sense of Volksgemeinschaft that its frontier location 
and plebiscite experience had engendered, it was to revitalize Germany and lead it to 
renewed might.6 These attitudes should not be understood as simply the zeitgeist, which 
implies they were a “detached natural phenomenon,” but rather, Rietzler emphasizes, as 
the product of conscious manipulation by the “anti-Weimar right wing.”7 It was because 
the Nazi party dovetailed in rhetoric and goals with this politicized Heimat movement 
while additionally boasting tighter organization and a superior propaganda machinery, he 
then asserted, that it prospered there, displacing older associations.8 This argument was 
echoed four years later by Peter Heinacher in his study of the NSDAP’s rise in Flensburg, 
though he considered Rietzler’s work valuable but overly “monocausal.”9 Rietzler, who 
explicitly acknowledged that no “gapless and direct causality” existed between Nazism’s 
compatibility with the politicized Heimat movement and its ascendancy, was arguably 
only aiming to draw attention to a previously unrecognized factor in the party’s success 
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story.10 What is more problematic about his work is that he did not actually show how 
precisely Nazism engaged with the borderland consciousness he had described, instead 
following up his meticulous chronicling of that mentality’s formation with a very 
organization-centric account of the NSDAP’s re-establishment in 1925 and ensuing 
growth. Only of the Schleswig-Holsteinische-Tageszeitung, founded in 1928, does he 
mention that it was designed to bring “the ‘Heimat consciousness’ of its readers into an 
identificatory connection with National Socialism.”11 Finally, Rietzler concludes his 
narrative in 1928, covering only the time before Nazism’s electoral breakthroughs. 
Focusing on the subsequent years, the engagement of Nazi propaganda with borderland 
mentalities, only posited by Rietzler, will be probed here. 
The assumed fundamental Germandom of the borderlands and the animosities 
governing them, both so central to these regions’ political culture, were portrayed by the 
Nazis as rooted in a liberally falsified version of history, which served to justify their 
chauvinist expansionism. Several Abel respondents, as has already been shown, 
described their families’ settlement of the Eastern border regions as the peopling and 
cultivation of “empty Eastern space,” even when their families had only come as part of 
the settlement schemes of the previous few decades.12 In the same vein, articles in Nazi 
newspapers derived a German claim to regions, which they held had never been truly 
Polish, from the benefits German settlers had brought them. In 1932, for instance, the 
Pommersche Warte ran an article maintaining that before the Migration of the Peoples 
Germanic tribes had inhabited the surroundings of the Vistula river. When they moved 
West, they were replaced by Slavs, who advanced all the way to the Elbe. There, in the 
time of Charlemagne, the Slavs encountered the Germans, who had since then been 
pushing them back east. This process had occurred in waves as Germany’s strength 
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waxed and waned over the centuries: when in the Middle Ages, the Holy Roman Empire 
had been a major power, German settlers had been invited by Eastern European rulers 
and the Teutonic Order had built castles that testified still to its bygone might. A time of 
weakness followed, but then East Prussia, West Prussia, and Posen became German and 
under Frederick the Great German power peaked, while Poland conversely experienced 
absolute decay. When Germany crumbled under Napoleon’s onslaught, a Polish state was 
briefly resurrected, but it lasted only until Prussia’s recovery. The German Empire had 
been strong, but after 1918 the republican government had willingly abandoned the lost 
territories.13 Also turning to the Migration of the Peoples, a spurious, Germanized version 
of Upper Silesia’s history printed in the Völkischer Beobachter in 1930 hoped to remedy 
Germany’s supposed lack of emotional and financial investment, in comparison to 
Poland, in its part of the region through increased awareness of its German past. The 
Silingians, a Germanic tribe, had settled there first and given the region its name, but for 
unspecified reasons they had voluntarily evacuated the area. Tentatively, the Slavs had 
taken their place, but they were never able to populate the land as densely as the 
Silingians had and, concentrated in settlements near rivers and ponds, they lived 
primitively from fishing and hunting. Incompetent attempts at agriculture did not yield 
anything more than the occasional bowl of “millet gruel,” the Beobachter scoffed.14 The 
Piasts, Upper Silesia’s medieval sovereigns who according to the Beobachter had strong 
familial ties to Germandom, eventually invited German settlers, so that they might help 
them transform their desolate realm into a flourishing one. Indeed, the German settlers 
soon established thriving towns and villages, introduced German jurisprudence, and 
founded monasteries. Through their superior culture they benevolently and non-violently 
assimilated the inferior Slavs. The survival of Polish names, the Beobachter insisted, was 
owed only to German tolerance. If they had suppressed Slavic names, as Poland was now 
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removing every German signboard, there would soon have remained no indication of 
erstwhile Slavic settlement. Over the ensuing centuries, Upper Silesia’s Germans proved 
their perseverance, maintaining their settlements in the region even through the fighting 
they had to do and the deprivation and destruction they had to endure during the wars in 
which the region was involved, particularly during the 16th- and 17th-century religious 
conflicts. This hardy love of Heimat endured even now that the region had been torn 
asunder for a decade.15  
A series of extracurricular lectures at the university in Königsberg, which 
promoted similar, factitious histories of Germandom in various contested parts of Eastern 
Europe, was written up by the East Prussian party organ Preußische Zeitung in 1931. The 
first lecture asserted that Eastern Europe had seen three Germanic settlement waves. 
During the first, in prehistoric days, Germanic tribes had peopled Eastern Europe from 
the Baltic to Odessa. However, they had eventually migrated in search of better land and 
Slavs had filled the void, though their settlement was sparser. Later, in the Middle Ages, 
Eastern European rulers had invited a second wave of German settlers, who had 
introduced accomplishments like German law into the territories where they took up 
residence. With the exception of the Teutonic Order’s conquest and military rule, this 
colonization and the ensuing Germanization of Slavs had been peaceful, the lecture, like 
the Beobachter, maintained. Since the 17th and 18th centuries a third wave of dynastically 
driven colonization had set in. The lecturer, referring to the benefits Eastern Europe had 
supposedly reaped from German settlement, concluded, “Civilized behavior and culture 
give the highest right in history.”16 This declaration, the Preußische Zeitung rejoiced, 
proved that scientific research arrived at the same opinions about Eastern Europe as 
Nazism did. While the first lecture had thus been boastful, the second, on the history of 
the Baltic Germans, struck a gloomier, if still chauvinist, note. Though the Baltic 
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Germans had historically belonged to the urban bourgeois and the landed classes and 
even now occupied prominent positions in politics and society, they had taken 
disproportionate economic hits in the postwar period, particularly through expropriation 
and redistribution of land. That measure had been justified with invocations of centuries 
of mistreatment by landowners, an accusation that, the lecturer held, was untrue. German 
landowners had, he claimed, implemented social reforms of their own accord and made 
peasants’ leases heritable in the nineteenth century. By the turn of the twentieth, most 
land had ostensibly been farmed by such hereditary leaseholders. Though their social 
rank had secured Baltic Germans influence at the highest levels, the speaker bemoaned 
that the lack of German common folk, particularly of farmers, had frustrated 
Germanization. German teachers and clerics had contributed to this failure by acting 
“ideologically short-sightedly.”17 They had, on the one hand, allowed anyone regardless 
of ethnic background access to German schools, thus displaying a misplaced faith that 
anyone could be Germanized, and, on the other hand, protected the Baltic languages, 
neglecting even the task of cultural Germanization. To this day, Baltic Germans’ lack of 
assertiveness meant that there was no German irredenta in the Baltics. However, Baltic 
Germans did maintain a flourishing German school system despite their situation’s 
worsening in the war’s wake, which showed some German spirit. Generally, the struggle 
in the Baltics, the lecturer declared, was one between German spirit and – by implication 
Slavic – matter. “We wish the Germans in the Baltic region at least a victory of the spirit 
over matter,” the Preußische Zeitung concluded, but, “This victory will however 
probably only come when the Baltic Germans seek and cement intimate contact with the 
Hitler spirit.”18 The last documented lecture made the case that the benefits wrought by 
German settlers in Eastern Europe were reflected in the architecture of Toruń and 
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Kraków, two of Poland’s grandest cities. That of the former was allegedly that of native 
Germans, that of the latter of German colonizers. In conclusion, Germany’s “national 
forces” were called on to win through steadfastness a “new victory for Germandom” in 
these “areas soaked with German culture and German blood.”19 
It was not only the German East but Schleswig too that was held to be German by 
its deepest nature, with the rival ethnicity and culture merely overlaid on it. A 1932 
article about “The population of the Nordmark” in the Schleswig-Holsteinische 
Tageszeitung recounted the nationality struggle there. Despite Danish accusations to this 
effect, it averred, there had been no “Germanization since the Reformation” in the region, 
for its population had always been German, as demonstrated by its support of North 
Schleswig’s Duke of Holstein against the Danish crown as far back as 1420.20 
Nevertheless, once the Holy Roman Empire crumbled at Napoleon’s hands, calls for the 
complete integration of Schleswig into Denmark arose in that country. The king only 
complied with such demands cautiously and many educated Danes, one of whom is 
quoted as having acknowledged German as Schleswig’s primary language and 
condemned its potential separation from Holstein, supposedly advised against them. Even 
so, those who wished to see Schleswig’s incorporation into Denmark continued to gain 
influence, such that through the intervention of France, England, and Russia the province 
was granted to that kingdom in the wake of 1848, even though during that year’s 
upheavals the population had made clear “that it in its overwhelming majority was 
willing to be German.”21 During the ensuing period of Danish rule, there were some few 
in Flensburg who supported it, but others who preferred a return to personal union under 
the Danish king and many more yet who identified as Germans. In the rest of Schleswig, 
 
19 “Wir wollen unsere Mahnungen an die nationalen Kräfte unseres Volkes richten, auf daß ihre 
Charakterfestigkeit in diesen, durch ein tragisches Schicksal entrissenen, mit deutscher Kultur und 
deutschem Blute getränkten Gebieten, einen neuen Sieg des Deutschtums erfechten möge!" 
“Die deutsche Stadt in Polen,” Preußische Zeitung, January 29, 1931. MOB. 
20 “Germanisierung seit der Reformation”; “Die Bevölkerung der Nordmark,” Schleswig-Holsteinische 
Tageszeitung, April 13, 1932. KSI. 
21 “daß sie in erdrückender Mehrheit gewillt war, deutsch zu sein”; Ibid. 
 110 
the majority for Germany was even more pronounced. Not only south of Flensburg did 
everyone consider themselves German, but in the district of Åbenrå too only Germans 
were elected, while the northernmost and later notoriously Danish district Haderslev was 
allegedly much more German at the start of Denmark’s reign than it was when it returned 
to Germany a decade and a half later. This change was deemed the product of aggressive 
Danization, efforts at which continued with the toleration of the much too lenient Empire 
even after Schleswig’s reintegration into Germany. Now again part of Schleswig “had 
been surrendered” to Denmark, while Danish activism tried to penetrate not just the 
district of Flensburg but even the more southerly county of Schleswig.22 In the first few 
elections after the war, Schleswig’s voters had still been blind to this and given the 
“Jewish democrats” many votes, but now “National Socialism has awakened the 
Nordmark.”23 History was instrumentalized in this as in the other articles to present 
Nazism as the entity liable to rectify the discrepancy between contemporary and 
ostensible historical reality. 
 Borderlanders were considered by the Nazis not only intrinsically but even 
exceptionally profoundly German.This conception of borderlands and their residents was 
a long-established nationalist trope, which presumed that constant confrontation with 
other nationalities brought out the national character of individuals.24 The Nazi 
movement’s engagement with the competing nationalist narratives about Masuria is 
especially illustrative of this conception of borderlands populations. Polish nationalists 
emphasized that native Masurians had in the Middle Ages come to East Prussia from the 
Polish region of Masovia and that they retained a Polish dialect as their vernacular. 
Eventually, they hoped, the Masurians would therefore awaken to their Polish national 
identity. To that end, minority schools were established in Masuria by a Polish school 
 
22 “ausgeliefert worden”; Ibid. 
23 “die jüdischen Demokraten,” “Aber der Nationalsozialismus hat die Nordmark geweckt."; Ibid. 
24 Pieter Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the language frontiers of imperial Austria 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 20-22. 
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association, a van driver for which was attacked in late 1931 by the residents of 
Jedwabno in response to plans to open a school in nearby Groß Dembowitz.25 When the 
public prosecutor some weeks afterward visited to investigate the incident, rioting 
ensued, for which over a hundred villagers – a third of them Nazis – were tried in January 
1932.26 Polish newspapers considered the attackers not truly German. The Gazeta 
Olsztynska, for instance, argued that the 1910 census’ record of native language proved 
Jedwabno’s Polish nature. The deed could thus only be that of string pullers who availed 
themselves of “the hand of our duped compatriots.”27 In another article, the same 
newspaper deemed the defendants’ swagger in the courtroom credible perhaps from real 
Germans but not from Masurians. They seemed, it wrote, to want to give themselves the 
“appearance of better Germans than the Germans themselves,” not realizing that they 
would always be regarded by Germans with derision.28 The Mazur likewise thought the 
defendants only the “willing tools” of German instigators, who stirred up resentment 
against everything Polish in their newspapers.29 Despite the acquittal in which the trial 
resulted, the Mazur hoped that by highlighting Masurians’ manipulation by Germans and 
thereby contributing to the “awakening of Masurians’ national spirit” it would be a 
victory after all.30  
Later in 1932, the Kurjer Warszawski with similar optimism conjectured that 
Masuria like Upper Silesia would eventually develop a Polish nationalist movement and 
 
25 "Deutsche Gerechtigkeit," Kurjer Poznanski, March 1, 1932, trans. in Gesamtüberblick über die 
polnische Presse, March 9, 1932. APO, RO, 1882. 
26 “Jedwabno: Von unserem nach Neidenburg entsandten Redaktionsmitglied,” Preußische Zeitung, 
January 19, 1932. MOB. 
27 “der Hand unserer betörten Landsleute”; “Neue unerhörte Ausschreitungen der Deutschen in Jedwabno,” 
Gazeta Olsztynska, January 13, 1932, trans. in Gesamtüberblick über die polnische Presse, January 20, 
1932. APO, RO, 1882. 
28 “Diese wollen sich den Anschein besserer Deutschen [sic] geben als die Deutschen selbst…”; 
“Bemerkungen zum Prozeß in Neidenburg,” Gazeta Olsztynska, January 28, 1932, trans. in 
Gesamtüberblick über die polnische Presse, February 3, 1932. APO, RO, 1882. 
29 “willige Werkzeuge”; article, Mazur, March 2, 1932, trans. in Gesamtüberblick über die polnische 
Presse, March 9, 1932. APO, RO, 1882. 
30 “Erweckung des nationalen Geistes der Masuren”; Ibid. 
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deemed its embrace of Nazism a positive step in that direction. Outwardly, the Kurjer 
explained, Masurians may have acted “arch-German,” but their retention of their Polish 
mother tongue revealed their true Polish-ness.31 Since Masurians, however, more yet than 
other Poles in the German East, were incapable of “independence”32 and were prepared 
only to “blindly and obediently follow people whom they regard as legitimate leaders,” a 
Polish nationalist movement had nevertheless not yet taken hold.33 Nazism was, at least, 
an oppositional movement. Elsewhere in Eastern Germany, notably in Upper Silesia, 
Polish nationalism had grown out of such movements and the Kurjer hoped for a similar 
result in Masuria. 
Nazi propaganda, by contrast, claimed profound Germandom for border 
populations like Jedwabno’s. In “With tears in the eyes: Deutschlandlied,” the 
Preußische Zeitung described the interrogation of the defendants as “a picture of the 
Masurian loyalty to the German Heimat, a living tableau of these borderland Germans’ 
will to assertion.”34 These simple, loyal people, it went on, had not intended to riot. What 
had occurred had rather been “the spontaneous outbreak of the people’s will,” the 
expression of “the desperation of the Masurian soul, which felt betrayed in the fight for 
the Heimat” by the prosecutor’s appearance.35 Another piece, under the heading “’We 
were, are, and remain German, we Masurians!’ – Speeches for the defense in the 
Jedwabno trial,” reported that one of the defense attorneys had invoked the “’burning 
 
31 “kerndeutsch”; “Die Masuren,” official summary of the article “Das Problem der masurischen Seele” in 
the Kurjer Warszawski,  Tagesbericht über die polnische Presse, August 18, 1932. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 
77, Tit. 856, Nr. 172. 
32 “Selbständigkeit [sic]”; Ibid. 
33 “Er könne nur blind und gehorsam Leuten folgen, die er als berechtigte Führer betrachte.”; Ibid. 
34 “Die Vernehmung der Angeklagten, die immer noch andauert und noch die dritten Tag in Anspruch 
nehmen wird, ist ein Abbild der Masurentreue zur deutschen Heimat, ein sprechendes Gemälde des 
Behauptungswillen dieser Grenzlanddeutschen…”; “Mit Tränen in den Augen: Deutschlandlied,” 
Preußische Zeitung, January 20, 1932. MOB. 
35 “der spontane Ausbruch des Volkswillens,” “die Verzweiflung der masurischen Seele, die sich verraten 
fühlte im Kampf um die Heimat”; Ibid. 
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border’,” whose threat the defendants felt acutely.36 “Let us not make desolate,” he urged, 
“this village at the border, the men of Jedwabno have other things to do than to sit idly in 
prison.”37 The defendants’ role as defenders of Masuria’s Germandom was reiterated 
once more toward the end of the day, when the rioters’ ringleader shouted the rallying cry 
quoted in the article’s title. In other regions too, loyal, authentic Germandom was 
attributed to borderlands residents. Thus Heinz Gefaeller, an Abel respondent from 
outside Tilsit, who already as a young boy had experienced the loss of the neighboring 
Memel territory as formative, in adulthood gave up his civil service job to instead take 
work as a coachman in a hamlet immediately on the border, where he felt at home, 
“because I recognized the people at the Greater Lithuanian border as real Germans.”38 
Such praise of borderland residents’ steadfast Germandom was frequently linked 
to the role as their champion that Nazism claimed for itself. In 1929, for example, the 
Ostdeutscher Beobachter in an article celebrating the movement’s recent penetration into 
eastern Masuria emphasized that the “economic and national misery,” which Masurians 
had reaped following their resounding commitment to Germany in 1920, had facilitated 
their acceptance of Nazism.39 A piece in a different, unidentified newspaper similarly 
extolled the rise of the Nazi party in Masuria in the face of the neglect the region had 
suffered, despite having made “a profession of loyalty such as no borderland tribe has so 
far made” during Germany’s “most difficult time” and in defiance of Polish promises and 
 
36 “‘brennenden Grenze’”; “'Wir waren, sind und bleiben deutsch, wir Masuren!’ - Die Verteidigungsreden 
im Jedwabno-Prozeß,” Preußische Zeitung, February 3, 1932. MOB. 
37 “Veröden wir nicht, so schloß er, dies Dorf an der Grenze, die Männer von Jedwabno haben etwas 
anderes zu tun, als tatenlos im Gefängnis zu sitzen.”; Ibid. 
38 “Ich fühlte mich dort wohl, weil ich die Menschen an der großlitauischen Grenze als echte Deutsche 
erkannte.”; Heinz Gefaeller, accessed January 15, 2020, 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58393/span-classqueryhlheinzspan-span-
classqueryhlgef?ctx=0abf8302-6d19-404b-a745-eaa8b022525a&idx=0. 
39 “wirtschaftliche und volkliche Not”; “Ost-Masuren: Es geht vorwärts!,” Ostdeutscher Beobachter, 
December 1, 1929. GStA PK, XX. HA, Rep. 14, Nr. 17. 
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chicanery.40 Even a booklet of election propaganda, Kampf und Vormarsch, in its account 
of a speaker’s tour of Masuria paid tribute to the region’s “own tribe of arch-German 
men” with a “particularly pronounced Heimat feeling.”41 This impassioned patriotism 
that came with being a border population would, a 1935 history of Widminnen’s NSDAP 
chapter hoped, allow Masurians to play a particular part in the Third Reich.42 In its turn, 
the movement would safeguard Masurians’ chosen Germandom from Polish 
encroachments. Electoral violence was motivated and excused by this aim, as a later 
chapter will discuss. More rhetorically, the Preußische Zeitung urged Masurians to wake 
up and protect their decision for Germany by rallying more closely yet around the Nazi 
standard over the rather trivial incident of a fraternity at the University of Poznan 
publishing a call to donate books for Polish libraries in Masuria. The appeal, the paper 
averred, was one of many signs of Poles’ disregard for “your German profession of 
loyalty at the plebiscite.”43 This affinity between border populations, accustomed to 
nationality struggles, and Nazism, with its struggle for Germany, was alluded to 
elsewhere as well. In June 1932, for instance, a Nazi activist from Berlin recounted in the 
Pommersche Zeitung how he had first privately travelled to Eastern Pomerania some 
years ago and had found to his surprise that the fearful resentment inspired by the border, 
only three kilometers distant, had not engendered political engagement. Since then, he 
had regularly mailed party newspapers to friends in Eastern Pomerania and was pleased 
to note that whenever he returned more people had embraced the movement. Nazism’s 
 
40 “schwerster Zeit,” “[e]in Treuegelöbnis, wie es bisher kein Grenzstamm abgelegt hat”; “In Masuren 
beginnt die Verfolgung!. Ein Ausschnitt aus dem Kampf um Ostpreussen - Schwere Bluttat,” copy of 
article, [1932]. GStA PK, XX. HA, Rep. 240 C ,64a.  
41 “Masuren hat seinen eigenen Stamm urdeutscher Männer. Ein besonders ausgeprägtes Heimatgefühl 
spricht aus ihren Worten.”; “Tagebuchblätter aus dem Wahlkampf,” Kampf und Vormarsch, [1930]. GStA 
PK, XX. HA, Rep. 240 D, 100b. 
42 “als Grenzlandbevölkerung”; “Die Geschichte der Bewegung der NSDAP- Ortsgruppe Widminnen - Kr. 
Lötzen - Gau Ostpreußen aufgestellt vom Ortsgruppenleiter Ernst Daher,” 1935. GStA PK, XX. HA, Rep. 
240 C, 61b. 
43 “Ostpreußen, Masuren wacht auf, gebt acht: so wird heute nach 10 Jahren Euer deutsches 
Treuebekenntnis bei den Abstimmungen von den Polen geachtet.”; “‘Die Idee des polnischen Ostpreußens’ 
- Polnische Kulturarbeit in Masuren," Preußische Zeitung, March 12, 1931. MOB. 
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militantly nationalist message had resonated with a population that felt threatened in its 
Germandom and sending the journals had contributed to Eastern Pomerania having been 
the constituency with the second most votes for Hitler in the first round of the 
presidential election in March, after Schleswig-Holstein.44 In the run-up to that election, 
the Gau Pomerania had, in fact, issued a brochure emphasizing Hitler’s credentials as not 
only a worker, frontline soldier, and politician but also as a borderland German. Readers 
were urged to cast their vote for Adolf Hitler, “the borderland German, who in his youth 
experienced Germandom’s torn-ness.”45 In Germany’s most Nazified region, Schleswig-
Holstein, general Litzmann in an address in Flensburg remarked that “You up here will 
know best, after all, what it means to fight for the Heimat.”46 This knowledge he clearly 
deemed pertinent to participation in the political struggle that Nazism, in its turn, waged 
for Germany.  
 This special relationship between Nazism and borderland inhabitants was 
acclaimed even though local campaigners at times acknowledged that their movement’s 
leadership in actuality took no great interest in border regions. They charged, for 
instance, that it was not only the reviled government that treated Masuria as “Mother 
Germania’s poorest stepchild,” but that the Nazi leadership too, at least early on, did not 
take much interest in the party’s development in the region.47 “Only three quarters of a 
year ago,” a newspaper recounted in 1929, “National Socialism held its planned entry 
into Masuria. But no ‘big speakers’ came to us from the Reich, no ‘Reichstag 
 
44 “Die Zeitung auf Vorposten,” Pommersche Zeitung, June 15, 1932. KP. 
45 “…dem Grenzlanddeutschen, der in seiner Jugend die Zerrissenheit des Deutschtums erfahren hat, der 
sein Bekenntnis zum Großdeutschland im Felde, in der Festung [can’t see whether any other words there 
due to binding] einem Leben des Kampfes niederlegte."; “Wer wird Reichspräsident? Hindenburg oder 
Hitler?,” [1932]. APS, NPS, 39. 
46 “Sie hier oben werden doch am besten wissen, was es heißt, um die Heimat zu kämpfen.”; “Es sprach in 
Flensburg im Deutschen Haus: Prinz August Wilhelm von Preußen,” Flensburger Nachrichten, July 21, 
1932. SHLB. 
47 “Mutter Germania ärmstes Stiefkind”; “In Masuren beginnt die Verfolgung!. Ein Ausschnitt aus dem 
Kampf um Ostpreussen - Schwere Bluttat,” copy of article, [1932]. GStA PK, XX. HA, Rep. 240 C, 64a.  
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delegates’.”48 Instead, “Gauleiter Koch and Gau executive director Heidrich showed the 
way, then they said: ‘Help yourselves’!”49 It was despite the leadership’s neglect that 
“our swastika banner rises higher and higher” in Masuria.50 The Masurian NSDAP files 
in the Prussian Privy State archive do indeed convey the impression that local party 
leaders’ requests to send speakers were usually rebuffed by the leadership in Königsberg, 
because the Masurian branches were unable to muster the speaking fees. The unsupported 
nature of their hard work for the movement in a “miserable area” was invoked by Heinz 
Anrissus, an Artaman on an estate near Lyck and a local organizer, at the beginning of a 
letter to Heidrich, which suggested a visit by the leadership figure and took an affirmative 
answer for granted.51 The guilt-tripping was taken further by Allenstein’s district leader 
Heinrich Berg. Writing to Hitler himself because it was rumored he would be making a 
trip to East Prussia, Berg asked that the 200 party members in Western Masuria, who 
lived in “the furthest corner of the strongly suffering province, strongly besieged by the 
Poles,” not be forgotten.52 “When I can write that, immediately by the border, German 
workers, perhaps without having even a weekly pipeful of tobacco, are absolutely 
determined to lead the fight for the third Reich to victory,” he pronounced, “your 
appearance will surely not be denied us.”53 In the end, though, Hitler first visited Masuria 
in 1932. In Schleswig-Holstein too, the Schleswigsche Nachrichten, which openly 
sympathized with the NSDAP, conceded in 1932 that unfortunately neither the 
government in Berlin nor the party leadership in Munich had so far taken sufficient 
interest in the North Schleswig question. That what interest had arisen in the matter in 
 
48 “Erst vor einem Dreiviertel Jahr hielt der Nationalsozialismus seinen planmässigen Einzug in Masuren. 
Doch zu uns kamen keine ‘grossen Redner’ aus dem Reich, keine ‘Reichstagsabgeordneten'.”; Ibid. 
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Ibid. 
50 “Und in Masuren steigt unser Hakenkreuzbanner höher und höher.”; Ibid. 
51 Letter to Georg Heidrich, August 6, 1929. GStA PK, XX. HA, Rep. 240 C, 62c.  
52 “Wir wohnen an der äußersten Ecke der schwer leidenden und von Polen hartbedrängten Provinz.”; 
Letter to Adolf Hitler, February 9, 1929. GStA PK, XX. HA, Rep. 240 C, 34b. 
53 “Wenn ich schreiben darf, daß hart an der Grenze, deutsche Arbeiter, ohne vielleicht auch nur 
wöchentlich eine Pfeife Tabak zu haben, fest entschlossen sind den Kampf um dritte Reich bis zum Siege 
zu führen wird uns Ihr Erscheinen nicht versagt sein.”; Ibid. 
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Munich at least during the struggle for the Schleswig-Holsteiner-Bund would not subside 
again would, however, be ensured, it claimed, by Schleswig-Holstein's vigorous Nazi 
movement.54 
 Despite the disinterest of the party's higher rungs, the link between the threat to 
the borderlands and Nazism was continually affirmed in party-run newspapers in 
particular, especially in their dedicated borderland pages. In Schleswig-Holstein, for 
instance, the page “Kampf in der Nordmark” was a regular feature of the Schleswig-
Holsteinische Tageszeitung. The page chronicled how the domestic political struggle 
between the left and the Nazi movement was playing out in Schleswig-Holstein 
specifically, but also commented on the relationship with Danes and Denmark. One such 
page, for example, imputed anti-fascist intrigues to Communists in Altona, summarized 
ordinary local SA propaganda marches, and also enjoined Germans not to buy Danish 
products in a piece titled “Boycott as defense.”55 Another article under the “Kampf in der 
Nordmark” rubric reported on a large border-themed rally. It further tried to refute the 
accusation, often brought up in the borderlands, that Nazism was abandoning Southern 
Tyrol to its fascist Italian ally by pointing to the party program’s proclamation that, “’All 
who are of German blood, whether they today live under Danish, Polish, Czech, Italian or 
French sovereignty, shall be united in a German Reich’,” presumably an elaboration of 
the first of the manifesto’s twenty-five points.56 The “Brennende Grenze” feature of the 
East Prussian Preußische Zeitung, which appeared frequently but irregularly, was 
dedicated to nationality politics in East Prussia and in Eastern Europe more widely. One 
representative page from January 7, 1931 featured long articles about the plight of the 
Sudeten Germans, a nostalgic thought piece about looking across the border into the 
 
54 "Grenzpolitische Wochenschau," [Schleswigsche Zeitung], [September 1932]. LSH, Abt. 417 Nr. 91. 
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der Volksnationalen Reichsvereinigung.” Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung, May 9, 1930. SHLB. 
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Memel area, and a warning about the threat posed by the Polish Western Marches 
Association. Later that month, the first in the university of Königsberg’s lecture series 
about Germandom in the East was summarized in a “Brennende Grenze” page, as, in due 
course, were the following installments.57 The condemnation of the Polish fraternity’s 
book collection for Masuria appeared in this rubric too.58 The mistreatment of Germans 
and the curtailment of their rights in Eastern European countries regularly furnished 
material for articles. One piece, for example, publicized the demands of the Heimatbund 
Ostpreußen to the League of Nations regarding Poland’s treatment of its German 
minorities.59 Others censured the erosion of Alsace’s traditional autonomy under French 
rule,60 the elimination of minority rights in Czechoslovak towns like Brno, where the 
number of Germans at the last census had not met the threshold,61 Polish policies 
designed to decrease German landownership,62 and the Latvian parliament's supposed 
plans to expropriate Riga’s German cathedral and hand it over to the defense ministry as 
a garrison church.63 Internal conflicts both in Germany and among Eastern Europeans 
were also addressed. Many articles concluded as a matter of course with condemnations 
of the German government’s pussyfooting and some centered entirely on such 
denunciations, such as a report about an ethnic German association’s refusal to contribute 
to the planned erection of a Stresemann memorial on the Rhine. Notably, the association 
would have been willing instead to support a memorial to Schlageter, who had 
supposedly rendered outstanding services to Germany’s liberation.64 Polish atrocities in 
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“Baltendeutschtum in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart,” Preußische Zeitung, January 22, 1931. MOB. 
58 “‘Die Idee des polnischen Ostpreußens’ - Polnische Kulturarbeit in Masuren," Preußische Zeitung, 
March 12, 1931. MOB. 
59 “Um deutschen Lebensraum im Osten - Die Forderungen des Heimatbundes Ostpreußen,” Preußische 
Zeitung, March 5, 1931. MOB. 
60 “Absolutistisches Mittelalter. Frankreichs Elsaß-Politik.” Preußische Zeitung, February 6, 1931. MOB. 
61 “Die Volkszählung in der Tschechoslowakei,” Preußische Zeitung, March 5, 1931. MOB. 
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Ukraine65 and the deplorable situation of ethnic Ukrainians in Poland, meanwhile, were 
thematized in order to justify anti-Polish sentiments.66 The newspapers’ borderland pages 
were regular reminders of what Germany's contracted borders meant for its border areas 
as well as for ethnic Germans and of the need therefore to support Nazism. 
 Borderlands consciousness, with a Nazi bent, was also disseminated through 
politicized cultural events. In 1931, for example, a Nazi theatre troupe toured Germany’s 
border regions with the play Es brennt an der Grenze, which told the supposedly true 
story of a farm that caught fire on the Polish side of the border and could not be saved 
because the German firemen who tried to come to its aid were prevented from crossing 
into Poland.67 That the provincial government in the Border Province, a co-owner of 
Schneidemühl’s state theatre, gave permission for such an obviously incendiary play to 
be staged was maligned by the Głos Pogranicza.68 Concurring that the play was clearly 
not just a cultural but an inflammatory political event, in Masuria the Landräte and police 
chiefs were instructed by the Prussian minister of the interior and Allenstein’s 
Regierungspräsident to surveil the performances.69 Meanwhile, the Kampfbund für 
Deutsche Kultur, established and run by Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg, set up 
dedicated borderland chapters, if very late. In June 1932, the Schlesische Zeitung 
reported, it had held its first great rally in Eastern Germany in the three years since its 
foundation, namely in Beuthen. The provincial head of the Kampfbund in his address 
opined that while the German Empire had not been responsible for the war’s outbreak, it 
did bear “völkisch guilt.”70 Now, one had to find one’s way back to “German nature,” 
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70 “völkische Schuld”; “Kampf für deutsche Kultur,” Schlesische Zeitung, June 28, 1932. APO, NPO, 991. 
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which, he argued, should be straightforward in the borderlands, where “national 
consciousness” was well-developed.71 His speech was followed by operatic and dramatic 
performances. In Schleswig-Holstein, the Kampfbund a year later established an “office 
for borderland Germandom,” which was intended to strengthen borderland residents’ 
knowledge of the “treasures of nordmärkisch folklore,” such as sagas and folk dance.72 
This idea that exposure to folk culture would strengthen Germandom and the political 
opinions that were assumed to go hand in hand with it found its most common 
expression, however, in the tacking on of Deutsche Abende to border rallies. The 
newspaper advertisement of a large SA borderland rally in Flensburg in July 1932, for 
example, listed not one but two parallel Deutsche Abende as the final event rounding out 
a day, the program for which also included a field service, military exercises, a 
propaganda march through town, a wreath laying ceremony at the war memorial, and a 
speech by Prince August Wilhelm.73 In June of that year, the NSDAP chapter of 
Schwerin an der Warthe in the Border Province likewise publicized a borderland rally, 
whose program, after a parade and addresses by some of the party’s nationally renowned 
speakers, was to conclude with a dance and a performance by a Nazi theatre troupe.74  
Dedicated to stoking irredentist flames, the so-called Grenzlandkundgebungen of 
which Deutsche Abende were often part constituted an important tool in Nazism’s 
propagandistic repertoire in the border regions, which could sometimes attract large 
audiences and new members. Upper Silesia’s legendary St Anne Mountain was a popular 
site for these as well as for commemorative events. In March 1930, for example, the local 
NSDAP chapter announced an upcoming “big Grenzlandkundgebung” with members 
from nearby chapters and “guests from Czechoslovakia,” which would honor the lost 
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territories.75 It was also at the St Anne Mountain that a Grenzlandkundgebung with 
Hermann Göring in 1932 attracted an audience of 35,000.76 A borderland rally in 
Flensburg in 1932 with Hitler himself drew over 40,000 people by the Schleswig-
Holsteinische Tageszeitung’s estimate.77 After the successful rally many sympathizers 
joined up.78 Also in 1932, Prince August Wilhelm spoke to an “S.A.-Grenzlandtreffen” in 
Flensburg, which attracted an audience of around 2,000. He told of his personal 
connection to the lost territory to the north. “When I speak here in my maternal Heimat,” 
he said, “you can’t hold it against me that I send my gaze with anger into the other 
country, where my mother’s palaces stand under foreign rule.”79 This circumstance, he 
declared, made him feel “tightly connected” with his audience and inspired in him the 
wish “to get out anyone from my maternal Heimat who still has the courage to advocate 
for his people.”80 Likening the fight for Nazism to the borderland struggle, it was then 
that he concluded, “You up here will know best what it means to fight for the Heimat.”81 
Joseph Goebbels too had been meant to appear at a Grenzlandkundgebung in Flensburg, 
but could not make it, so that Danzig’s Gauleiter Albert Forster had to substitute for him 
at the 1931 rally that drew a 4,000-strong crowd.82 Goebbels did, however, speak in Tilsit 
in the summer of that year, where he declared that, “'We are the part of the German 
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1501/126182. 
77 “Adolf Hitler in Flensburg,” Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung, April 25, 1932. SHLB. 
78 Heinacher, Der Aufstieg der NSDAP im Stadt- und Landkreis Flensburg, 363. 
79 “Wenn ich hier in meiner mütterlichen Heimat spreche, so können Sie es mir nicht verdenken, daß ich 
meinen Blick mit Zorn in das andere Land schicke, wo die Schlösser meiner Mutter unter fremder 
Herrschaft stehen.”; “Es sprach in Flensburg im Deutschen Haus: Prinz August Wilhelm von Preußen,” 
Flensburger Nachrichten, July 21, 1932. SHLB. 
80 “So werden Sie es auch verstehen, daß ich mich mit Ihnen eng verbunden fühle und aus meiner 
mütterlichen Heimat jeden herausholen möchte, der noch den Mut besitzt, sich für sein Volk einzusetzen.”; 
Ibid. 
81 “Sie hier oben werden doch am besten wissen, was es heißt, um die Heimat zu kämpfen.”; Ibid. 
82 “Nationalsozialistischer Grenzlandkampf. Pg. Forster (Danzig) in Flensburg.” Schleswig-Holsteinische 
Tageszeitung, November 1, 1931. SHLB. 
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Reich, which will one day give its nation the place in the world which it deserves. Our 
territory has to be expanded. One day we have to blow up the barriers which block our 
way to the East.'”83 Catering to his audience, he went on, “'Here at the border we don’t 
have to prove that a nation cannot be deprived of the necessary space[...]. We demand it, 
so that we can provide bread for our children.'”84  
Evidently, many borderland rallies were characterized by resentment and 
vengefulness about Germany’s post-war borders. In the Border Province, for example, a 
set of rallies titled “’We are breaking the chains – German be the East’” was planned for 
December 6, 1930 in eleven towns and villages.85 Already beforehand, the government 
fretted about the irredentist message and bellicose tone to be expected. Since calls to 
“’self-help’” and threats of “’retribution measures’” might “adversely influence the Reich 
government’s steps against the terrorizing of the Germans in the ceded territories” when 
relations with Poland were already tense, police were to supervise the rallies armed with 
permission to disband them.86 In the event, the one documented meeting, in Flatow, went 
smoothly.87 Two years later Flatow was the scene of a SA rally that courted controversy 
considerably more. Under the motto “Front line against the East!” the event was meant to 
display Germandom’s strength and the SA’s determination, in a district that was home to 
renowned Polish activist pastor Domanski.88 The thousand-strong rally was thus, the Głos 
 
83 "'Jesteśmy tą częścią Rzeszy Niemieckiej, która kiedyś zapewni swemu narodowi miejsce, jakie mu się w 
świecie należy. Nasze terytorium musi być powiększone. Musimy kiedyś wysadzić w powietrze te bariery, 
które zagradzają nam drogę na wschód.'"; Karol Fiedor, "Traktat wersalski w propagandzie i publicystyce 
niemieckiej okresu międzywojennego," Olsztynskie Studia Niemcoznawcze (1989): 96-97. 
84 "'Tutaj nad granicą nie protzebujemy udowadniać, że naród nie może być pozbawiony koniecznej mu 
przestrzeni [...]. My jej żądamy, aby móc zapewnić w ten sposób chleb naszym dzieciom.'"; Ibid., 97. 
85 “‘Wir brechen die Ketten - Deutsch sei der Osten’”; Letter to the Landrat in Flatow, November 27, 1930. 
APK, Landratsamt Flatow, 275. 
86 “Es bedarf keines Hinweises, dass von deutscher Seite alles vermieden werden muss, was die Schritte der 
Reichsregierung gegen die Terrorisierung der Deutschen in den abgetretenen Gebieten ungünstig 
beeinflussen könnte. Insbesondere kann nicht geduldet werden, dass die Redner zur ‘Selbsthilfe’ auffordern 
oder der polnischen Minderheit in Deutschland ‘Vergeltungsmassnahmen’ androhen.”; Ibid. 
87 Report, December 9, 1930. APK, Landratsamt Flatow, 275. 
88  “‘Front gegen Osten!”; “Zur Kundgebung der Nationalsozialisten in Flatow,” Flatower Zeitung, 
September 6, 1932. APK, Starostwo Powiatowe w Złotowie, 280. 
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Pogranicza remarked, part of a pattern of harassment of Domanski by the Nazis, which 
included routine journalistic attacks as well as rare but notable violent excesses.89 At this 
Flatow rally, Reichstag deputy Siegfried Kasche threatened, “’When Adolf Hitler orders 
the SA. to march, the SA. marches and when he orders that the SA. stands at the ready in 
their surcoats, then it simply stands at the ready. And when the Führer orders that we run 
the Poles out of the country, then that is what will happen.’”90 He went on to vow that the 
future reckoning with Poland would take place not at the current border but in Bromberg 
and Posen.91 The Głos Pogranicza justly decried Kasche’s rhetoric as “reprehensible 
warmongering and irresponsible politics by people who don’t know what they are 
doing.”92  
Like the set of events under the motto “’We are breaking the chains – German be 
the East’,” Grenzlandkundgebungen sometimes formed part of a wider targeted effort to 
Nazify the border regions. The plan for the large rally on St Anne Mountain with 
Czechoslovak guests, for one, came just when the local NSDAP chapter organized to 
expand the SA in localities immediately on the border, as was being promoted by the 
SA’s Gau leadership.93 In Schleswig, the first half of 1930 saw a months-long 
recruitment drive by the NSDAP and the SA in the districts adjoining the border. Already 
in December 1929 Flensburg’s police president reported that a sizable “Grenztreffen” 
with the SA’s “Führer ‘Ober-Nord’” was planned for the spring of 1930 in order to 
strengthen National Socialism in the border region. Speeches by Hitler in four of the 
 
89 “Wohin marschiert die SA?,” Głos Pogranicza, September 9, 1932, trans. in Gesamtüberblick über die 
polnische Presse, September 17, 1932 . APO, RO, 1882. 
90 “Wenn Adolf Hitler es befiehlt, dann marschiert die SA. und befiehlt er, daß die SA. im Waffenkleide 
bereit steht, dann steht sie eben bereit! Und wenn der Führer befiehlt, daß wir die Polen zum Lande 
hinauslaufen, dann geschieht das eben!"; “Zur Kundgebung der Nationalsozialisten in Flatow,” 
Flatower Zeitung, September 6, 1932. APK, Starostwo Powiatowe w Złotowie, 280. 
91 Ibid. 
92 “eine sträfliche Kriegstreiberei und eine unverantwortliche Poliitk von Leuten, die nicht wissen, was sie 
tun”; “Wohin marschiert die SA?,” Głos Pogranicza, September 9, 1932, trans. in Gesamtüberblick über 
die polnische Presse, September 17, 1932. APO, RO, 1882. 
93 “Betrifft: Versammlung der Ortsgruppe Annaberg der NSDAP. am 12.3.1930 im Lokal bei Hartmann,” 
March 18, 1930. APO, RO, 1800. 
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province’s cities, including Flensburg, were envisaged for soon after this rally.94 By the 
time this forthcoming recruitment campaign was announced to the ordinary members of 
Flensburg’s NSDAP and SA in January 1930, the regional leadership also had in view 
meetings with Strasser, Goebbels, and Münchmeyer as speakers. At the end of May or in 
early June, it was proclaimed, Schleswig-Holstein’s SA would hold a grand rally as a 
capstone to the recruitment drive; the Gau leadership was working to secure Hitler’s 
attendance.95 More immediately, a February government report relayed, eighteen smaller 
rallies were planned for the districts Flensburg and Südtondern for “the near future.”96 In 
the end, the campaign’s finale was marked by an SA rally in April. 2,000 SA men 
congregated in the town of Schleswig and drove from there to Flensburg and Eckernförde 
with stops along the way, showing local residents the strength of the organization.97  
In contrast to these high-profile occasions, Grenzlandkundgebungen could also be 
routine, local affairs. In Masurian Lyck, for instance, the local SA branch was ordered in 
June 1931 to attend a Grenzlandkundgebung in Oletzko that was due to take place a few 
days later.98 The meeting in question does not appear to have been of any particular 
import but was instead a standard of the local meeting circuit. An event of the same type, 
a “Grenzaufmarsch,” was held a few months later in Schleswig’s Südtondern county.99 It 
seems to have been a borderland rally of such proportions that attracted Richard 
Buntrock, the author of a 1942 history of the NSDAP chapter in Masurian Gablick, to 
Nazism. He recounted how he had been cycling to Oletzko in 1926 when a motorcade 
sped past him. The men in the cars and on the motorcycles were “joyous” and exuded 
“certainty of victory,” Buntrock recalled, and he was informed that they were “’Hitler’s 
 
94 “Betrifft: N.S.D.A.P.,” December 18, 1929. LSH, Abt. 301 Nr. 4557. 
95 “Betrifft: N.S.D.A.P. und S.A.-Treffen in Flensburg,” January 14, 1930. LSH, Abt. 301 Nr. 4557. 
96 “nächste Zeit”; “Betr.: N.S.D.A.P.," February 10, 1930. LSH, Abt. 301 Nr. 4557. 
97 “Kampf um die Nordmark.” Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung, May 9, 1930. SHLB. 
98 “Betr. SA. der NSDAP.,” June 19, 1931. GStA PK, XX. HA, Rep. 14, Nr. 19. 
99  “Grenzaufmarsch des Sturmbann II,” Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung, September 4, 1931. LSH, 
Abt. 301 Nr. 4563. 
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propagandists’” on a borderland drive.100 It was Buntrock’s first encounter with a 
movement he would go on to serve loyally.  
However, not all Grenzlandkundgebungen actually engaged with border issues. 
Many gatherings, including ones with prominent speakers, had the borderland 
designation applied to them without their content reflecting this. In Flatow, for example, 
it was announced that an SA march “to show the Poles that there are still Germans” was 
scheduled for March 22, 1931, but it turns out that it was really only a run-of-the-mill 
convention for the SA’s Border Province-North district.101 The 35,000-strong rally with 
Göring on the Annaberg, meanwhile may have been billed as a borderland one, but the 
admittedly short newspaper report about the event did not mention him bringing up the 
border at all.102 Likewise, when Gauleiter Forster of Danzig spoke in Flensburg in Joseph 
Goebbel’s stead, he, judging by the report in the Kieler Zeitung, spoke only about 
Germany’s domestic political struggle.103 When Hitler spoke in Tilsit in 1932 the report 
about the event in the Preußische Zeitung was titled “Powerful Grenzlandkundgebung in 
Tilsit,” but the subsequent summary of the event and of Hitler’s address made no further 
mention of the border.104 In far eastern Pomeranian Lauenburg too, Hitler in a 1932 
speech there “spent a whole 5 minutes of his ca. hour-long address” on “the most 
important borderland problems,” in the derisive words of a local republican newspaper.105 
 
100 “Ich bin im Frühjahr 1926 auf einer Geschäftsreise. Es ist Sonntag, radle ich auf der 
Kunststrasse6Widminnen [sic] nach Treuburg. Im Wesolower Wälder rasen Motorräder und Autos mir 
entgegen. Freudige Männer, Siegesgewissheit spricht aus ihren Augen, braune Uniform ‘Hitlers 
Propagandisten’, auf der Grenzlandfahrt, lass ich mir später erzählen.”; “Die Ortsgruppe Gr, [sic] Gablick. 
(Ihr entstehen und werden, ihr Kampf und Sorgen.),” March 15, 1942. GStA PK, XX. HA, Rep. 240 C, 
59d.  
101 “den Polen zu zeigen, daß es noch Deutsche gibt”; Letter to the Landrat in Flatow, March 7, 1931. APK, 
Landratsamt Flatow, 275. 
102 “35 000 in Annaberg: Nat.-soz. Grenlandkundgebung,” Der Angriff, July 11, 1932. BArch, R 
1501/126182. 
103 “Nationalsozialisten an der Nordgrenze in Flensburg: Nationalsozialistische Grenzland-Kundgebung 
im ‘Deutschen Haus',” Kieler Zeitung, January 10, 1931. LSH, Abt. 301 Nr. 4563. 
104 “Das stille Städtchen an der Memellandgrenze…”; “Mächtige Grenzlandkundgebung in Tilsit,” 
Preußische Zeitung, October 18, 1932. MOB. 
105 “Auf die wichtigsten Grenzlandprobleme verwandte Hitler ganze 5 Minuten seiner ca. einstündigen 
Ansprache.”; “Hitlers Rede - ein Versager!,” Grenz-Bote, April 6, 1932. APS, NPS, 39. 
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Despite these frequent failures by Hitler and others to actually speak to borderland issues, 
rallies were labeled Grenzlandkundgebungen, it stands to reason, in order to remind both 
attendees and newspaper readers of the presumed special relationship between Nazism 
and the borderlands, even though that connection all too often lacked concreteness and 
depth. 
Where propaganda did concern itself with the border, it depicted the adjacent 
regions as sites, historically and currently, of authentic and steadfast, if beleaguered, 
Germandom. Dedicated newspaper rubrics, cultural events, and ubiquitous 
Grenzlandkundgebungen all portrayed Nazism as the champion of regions that felt 
threatened in their deeply held Germandom. In fact, this Germandom was assumed to in 
and of itself give rise to an affinity for Nazism, supposedly the most German of parties. 
However, not only did the Nazi movement not always live up to its much-extolled role, 
but, as the next chapter will explore, it also had to try to make sense of ethnic realities on 







Beyond the Racial State? 
 
Historical consensus long held that the centrality of race was one of Nazism's 
defining features, setting it apart from other right-wing, nationalist movements in 
Germany and from other fascisms across Europe. In the Nazi view, historians believed, 
race was a stable, clearly defined category and the force structuring both individual fate 
and human history. Consequently, racial ideology, it was agreed, had structured the Nazi 
state and its policymaking about social, economic, and nationality issues and eventually 
about the war. Lately, however, some historians have questioned the primacy of race in 
Nazi Weltanschauung and decision-making, particularly when Nazi administrators were 
confronted with East-Central Europe’s continued widespread national indifference. In the 
borderlands considered here, such difficulties in reconciling a clear-cut racist worldview 
with muddled ethnic circumstances and the traditional nationalist priority of expanding 
membership in the nation arose already during the NSDAP’s pre-1933 phase of ascent. 
The upshot was that borderland Nazis during that period opportunistically employed 
different conceptions of the relationship between race and nationality in response to 
different situations and subjects. Opponents were thus denigrated in sharply ethno-
nationalist terms that drew upon posited racial binaries, while Nazism simultaneously 
availed itself of more flexible, civic notions of Germandom where it recognized the need 
to advance its irredentist agenda through populations' nationalization. What their 
opponents decried as hypocrisy was also and more fundamentally an indication that 
Nazism, however much it emphasized the novelty of its racial approach, like previous 
nationalisms at the frontier required the simultaneous holding in the mind of both 
categorical racial thinking and less ascriptive approaches to nationality, a kind, if you 
will, of nationalist doublethink.  
The most explicit challenge to date to the consensus, set out by Burleigh and 
Wippermann in their 1991 The Racial State, that racial goals underlay virtually all Nazi 
policy, appeared in 2017, when Devin Pendas, Mark Roseman, and Richard Wetzell 
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published the edited volume Beyond the Racial State: Rethinking Nazi Germany. 
Whereas The Racial State argued that “the Nazis had pursued a coherent racial policy,”1 
which excluded various undesirable groups and supported desirable ones in order to 
achieve a racial utopia, Beyond the Racial State has asked, “Have we perhaps lost sight of 
the fragmentary, instrumental, and performative character of Nazi racial discourse?”2 
Contributions to the volume spotlight how Nazi racial thought and policymaking were 
not monolithic and consistent, nor racial goals always prioritized. Roseman’s own 
demonstrates that early 20th-century racial science was not as unified as modern 
observers are prone to supposing and that instead racial thinkers often acknowledged a 
cultural as well as a biological dimension to race.3 In a like vein, Roseman shows, Nazis, 
committed as they were to biological racism, continued to also cast the German people as 
well as its putative enemies as cultural-political communities.4 Race is overall, he 
contended, not necessary to explain Nazism’s genocidal crimes and was “’a secondary 
attribute to nation’,” particularly where race “’marked the boundaries of the national 
community.'”5 
Gerhard Wolf, who authored a chapter concerning the Deutsche Volksliste in 
Poland, shares this assessment. The two first initiatives in the fall of 1939, by the interior 
ministry of the Reich and by the stricterGauleiter Greiser of Wartheland, to categorize 
the population of the newly annexed Western Polish territories both, he stresses, made 
“Volkszugehörigkeit,” proven by individuals’ profession thereof and by traits like 
German language use and interwar German activism, the determinant of citizenship 
 
1 Devin Pendas, Mark Roseman, and Richard Wetzell, “Introduction,” in Beyond the Racial State: 
Rethinking Nazi Germany, eds. Devin Pendas, Mark Roseman, and Richard Wetzell (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1. 
2 Ibid., 7. 
3 Mark Roseman, “Racial Discourse, Nazi Violence, and the Limits of the Racial State Model,” in Beyond 
the Racial State: Rethinking Nazi Germany, eds. Devin Pendas, Mark Roseman, and Richard Wetzell 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 38-39. 
4 Ibid., 42-47. 
5 Pendas, Roseman, and Wetzell, “Introduction,” 9. 
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status.6 Himmler did push for a Volksliste like the one that Greiser had already 
established in the Wartheland to be introduced across the annexed territories. Acceptance 
to category C, which granted members state rather than full Reich citizenship, would, 
unlike in the Wartheland, be made dependent on racial suitability.7 While the interior 
minister signed Himmler’s proposed Volksliste into law, both he and the Gauleiter 
opposed an overly exclusive application of the decree’s racial language.8 Even Greiser, 
who was not unsympathetic to Himmler’s concerns, resisted retroactive expulsions from 
category C of a Volksliste that he had after all already implemented, fearing unrest. 
Himmler had to promise that expulsions from the Volksliste would occur only if the 
individuals concerned could be immediately deported.9 In Danzig-West Prussia, the 
Gauleiter barred the RuSHA from participation in the mandated racial screening process, 
retaining his inclusive approach to residency and citizenship rights.10 In Upper Silesia, 
the Gauleiter would only permit group D to be screened by the RuSHA and even those 
results were widely ignored.11 Himmler’s defeat in this matter was not, Wolf argues, a 
victory of pragmatism over ideology. Instead, it was a triumph of völkisch over racial 
ideology, both of them deeply engrained in Nazism and providing administrators with 
ways to view and frame their interests.12 
That Nazism did not differ fundamentally from earlier frontier nationalisms in its 
handling of these regions’ incomplete nationalization was also observed by Tara Zahra. 
Her monograph about nationalization policies over the course of the 20th century’s first 
half in Bohemia that targeted children contains the most extensive exploration of Nazi 
policies’ adapting to national indifference. It describes how, since the question of what 
 
6 Gerhard Wolf, “Volk Trumps Race: The Deutsche Volksliste in Annexed Poland,” in Beyond the Racial 
State: Rethinking Nazi Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 439.  
7 Ibid., 441. 
8 Ibid., 442. 
9 Ibid., 445-446. 
10 Ibid., 444. 
11 Ibid., 444-445. 
12 Ibid., 448. 
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was ultimately to be done with Czechoslovakia’s inhabitants was left for after the 
anticipated final victory in the absence of anywhere as yet to deport them to,13 efforts 
were made to Germanize them in the meantime.14 Such recruitment to the German nation 
was pursued freely, for the Czechs, by virtue of having been worthy opponents to the 
Germans in the nationalist struggle of the preceding decades, were deemed racially 
valuable and in any case proved impossible to distinguish from Germans by racial 
criteria.15 The Sudetenland’s deputy Gauleiter admitted that, “’A German national is one 
who himself professes to the German nation, as long as this conviction is confirmed by 
certain facts, such as language, education, culture, etc. Persons of alien blood, particularly 
Jews, are never Germans….Because professing to be a member of the German nation is 
of vital significance, even someone who is partly or completely of another race – Czech, 
Slovak, Ukrainian, Hungarian, or Polish, for example – can be considered a 
German….Any more precise elaboration of the term ‘German national’ is not possible 
given current relationships.’”16 This blurriness of national boundaries and Czechs’ 
perceived racial worth meant that most anyone professing to be German and willing to 
endorse Nazism could gain German citizenship, an average of 81 percent of applications 
for which was granted by the local magistrates.17 Such admission to German citizenship 
often occurred notwithstanding a lack of evidence for the applicant’s Germandom or even 
proof against it, so that the loyalties of his or her children could be secured. German 
schools, for example, remained open to the children of such opportunistic converts to 
Germandom, even though this policy meant that the legal limit of twenty-five percent 
Czech-speakers was routinely exceeded.18 More forcible Germanization methods were 
 
13 Tara Zahra, Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 
1900-1948 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 172-173. 
14 Ibid., 186-194. 
15 Ibid. , 191.  
16 Ibid., 186. 
17 Ibid., 190. 
18 Ibid., 187-188. 
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unsuccessful and rare in the Protectorate.19 In Bohemia, in Zahra’s telling, the Nazi 
occupation thus did not employ fundamentally different methods for dealing with the 
region’s nationally often indifferent, ethnically ambiguous reality than nationalist 
movements that had gone before.  
Long before the wartime occupation with which Wolf and Zahra are concerned 
and before even their takeover of power, Nazis were already having to grapple with the 
tensions between national indifference and Nazism’s essentialist race theory in Prussia’s 
own borderlands. That ideology was, naturally, promulgated even there. Reichstag 
delegate Wilhelm Wigand, for instance, declared in a speech in Flatow in 1931, in 
repudiation of the government’s assimilationist policies, that trying to transform a Pole 
into a German was as futile as attempting to turn a black man into a white-skinned one.20 
In an address in Schneidemühl the following year, Wigand, by then described as the local 
deputy Gauleiter, again held up the nationality struggle as one of “race against race” and 
as, in fact, an alternative to the mentality of “class against class” otherwise so 
destructively prevalent.21 
This attitude met with much, though not uniform, condemnation from members of 
Germany’s minorities. Cech, the magazine of the Masurenbund, which advocated 
Masurian autonomy within Germany, was an especial critic. In the November/December 
1931 issue, for instance, it reported on an interpellation in the Prussian Diet, in which the 
NSDAP had demanded the Masurenbund and its leader Dr. Kurt Obitz be tried for 
treason. For the racism underlying this request the Cech had only scorn. The “background 
of the Masurian movement,” after which the Nazi delegates had inquired in their 
interpellation, the article’s author explained, was precisely the discrimination he and his 
 
19 Ibid., 197-198. 
20 Report, September 21, 1931. APK, Starostwo Powiatowe w Złotowie, 275.  
21 “Die Gegner sagen, Klasse gegen Klasse, wir werden aber sagen, Rasse gegen Rasse…”; “Ein Tag der 
deutschen Ostmark in Schneidemühl,” July 1932. APP, Oddział w Pile, Zbiory czasopismo 12/4. 
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ilk had suffered due to their ethnicity and despite their support for Germany.22 Neither he 
nor, in fact, anyone in his village had voted for Poland in the 1920 plebiscite and he had 
served in the military for years. Even within that institution, internal immigrants to 
Masuria had derided locals like him as “’dirty and stupid Pollacks’” and when he left the 
army, he had been denied the customary civil service post.23 Treatment like this impelled 
Masurians to organize to defend their rights. This thus far astute piece finally concluded 
with preposterous examples of Nazi racism’s ramifications, like a supposed insistence on 
permission to keep sterilized Polish-speakers as prostitutes. In the next issue, the Cech 
observed that the racist exclusion of Masurians from the German national community by 
the Nazis mirrored their barring therefrom of Jews. “The Hitler party and its abettors see 
inferior people in the Jews and in the Masurians because of their descent,” it wrote.24 
Kurt Obitz himself, in his Dzieje ludu mazurskiego, likewise warned, “’It is so, we will 
go too, together with the Jews. Their opponents are also our enemies.’”25 He admonished 
also that if only space, not people, could be Germanized in Nazis’ view, then they must 
be planning to take non-Germans’ land and to remove them from all official posts. 
Interestingly, however, not all borderland Poles shared these misgivings about the 
racial order proposed by the Nazis, as Brendan Karch has documented. Most of the time, 
Nazism was denounced, he acknowledged, as terroristic, but on some occasions its 
advent was greeted with relief. Nazis' insistence on the separation of the races was, the 
Nowiny Codzienne, for example, once wrote, “’in the interest of the purity of both 
cultures’.” That Germans “’will no longer tolerate the preponderance of these cultural 
hybrids’,” who “’count themselves part of the German people but were never really 
imbued with its high culture’” and remained “’Germanized Slavs’,” was to be welcomed. 
 
22 “die Hintergründe der masurischen Bewegung”; “Der Landtag beschäftigt sich mit der 
Masurenfrage,” Cech, November/December 1931. SBB. 
23 “‘dreckigen und dummen Pollacken’”; Ibid. 
24 “Die Hitlerpartei und ihre Helfershelfer sehen in den Juden und den Masuren wegen ihrer Abstammung 
minderwertige Menschen.”; “Alle sieben Jahre paßt ein Flick!,” Cech, January/February 1932. SBB. 
25 “’Tak jest, idziemy także razem z Żydami, Ich przeciwnicy są także naszymi wrogami.‘“; Kurt Obitz, 
Dzieje ludu mazurskiego, ed. Grzegorz Jasiński (Dąbrówno: Moja Biblioteka Mazurska, 2007), 17. 
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When Hitler, in his new capacity of chancellor, in May 1933 proclaimed in the Reichstag 
that, “’The notion of Germanization, this spiritual mentality of the past century, that one 
can make Germans out of Frenchmen and Poles, is for us equally foreign, such that we 
are turning ourselves passionately against the reverse efforts [to de-Germanize 
Germans]’,” the Nowiny applauded.26 Both sides had an interest in drawing the national 
lines definitively and bringing the vying over the national grey zone to an end.  
In the event, however, borderlands Nazis only invoked essentialist rhetoric when 
doing so could help justify political animosities and altercations. The former approach of 
opportunist racial essentialism is particularly strikingly illustrated by the discourse that 
surrounded the 1932 Potempa murder. The murder had taken place in the early hours of 
August 10, perpetrated by a small band of SA men, who late in the evening of August 9 
had been driven from the SA hostel in Upper Silesian Broslawitz, where they were living, 
to Potempa, a village only about three kilometers distant from the Polish border.27 There, 
local tavern owner and SA leader Paul Lachmann treated them to alcohol and cigarettes 
and then, with his friend Golombek as a guide, sent them out into the night to teach local 
Communists, whose names he supplied, a lesson. After unsuccessfully having tried to 
gain entry to the home of one Florian Schwinge, the SA men raided the cabin Konrad 
Pietrzuch, a middle-aged unemployed agricultural laborer with Communist sympathies, 
inhabited with his mother and younger brother Alfons. Having scared the woman into 
silence and beaten Alfons temporarily unconscious, the militants concentrated on Konrad, 
kicking and beating him savagely and firing a departing shot at him.28 It was not the 
bullet that killed Konrad though: In a long and grisly obduction report, the coroner 
concluded that he had died of a kicked-in larynx, which had filled his lungs with blood.29 
As his killers retreated to their van, they were spotted by two patrolling customs officials, 
 
26 Brendan Karch, Nation and loyalty in a German-Polish borderland: Upper Silesia, 1848-1960 
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who apprehended one of the party. His evidence led to the arrest of Lachmann and the 
others later that morning.30 Their deed would have remained one among many during a 
summer rife with political violence, if an emergency decree stipulating the death penalty 
for political murder had not come into effect at midnight. The first to be tried under this 
decree, the Potempa murderers duly received death sentences from the special court 
convened at Beuthen. This ruling was met with outrage by the Nazi movement and by the 
wider German right, who had supported the emergency decree’s introduction under the 
impression that it would be leveled primarily at Communists.31 Succumbing to this public 
pressure, chancellor von Papen in September, less than two weeks after the initial verdict, 
commuted the sentences to life in prison and the murderers were eventually released in 
March 1933.32  
If the nation-wide relevance of this most notorious political murder of the late 
Weimar Republic has been studied, its borderland context has received only superficial 
treatment. The first scholarly account of the killing, published by West German historian 
Paul Kluke in 1957, understandably focused on the Potempa case’s foreshadowing of 
things to come. Kluke told how the Nazis, in their initial support for the emergency 
decree, had even accused the government of not being tough enough and proposed 
concentration camps for political troublemakers33 and how later the murderers’ attorney 
had pleaded soldierly obedience as an extenuation, as so many Nazi criminals did after 
the Second World War.34 In particular, Kluke stressed how the Potempa case showcased 
that the Nazi movement already held the rule of law to be obsolete and not applicable to 
it, citing the nationalist apologia for the murder given by Hitler in a Munich speech and 
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by Alfred Rosenberg in the Völkischer Beobachter.35 Decades later, Johann Chapoutot’s 
Le meurtre de Weimar, which used Beobachter coverage as its virtually sole primary 
source base, took up this interest in Rosenberg’s piece, which argued that jurisprudence 
should be based on the nation’s best interests rather than on supposedly arbitrary legal 
standards, application of which had perversely condemned five Germans to death for the 
death of one Pole.36 Discourse around the Potempa murder, Kluke and Chapoutot thus 
both suggested, foreshadowed the Third Reich’s utilitarian, nation-centric judicial 
regimen.  
 The most influential article about the case, though, is British historian Richard 
Bessel’s 1977 “The Potempa Murder,” which provides a detailed account of the killing 
and its aftermath and spotlights the case’s exposure of the shallowness of the Nazis’ 
pursuit of respectability and legality. The party had striven to seize power through 
electoral politics since hopes for violent take-over were dashed by the failure of the 1923 
Beer Hall Putsch. An aura of respectability was key to appealing to segments of society 
beyond the militant hardliners of the pre-1923 Nazi party and hence to success in the 
electoral arena. After ever-increasing vote shares in the various elections of 1930 through 
early 1932, however, by the summer of the latter year this electoral strategy seemed to 
have exhausted its potential. The NSDAP had, after all, not significantly increased its 
number of votes in the July Reichstag election compared to the presidential and Prussian 
Diet elections of the spring, suggesting that it might have peaked. And though it was the 
single largest party, it had not been tasked with forming a government. Frustration among 
the SA, the party’s most militant wing, ran high and found expression in the violence that 
plagued Germany in early August.37 Violence was particularly rampant in Silesia, where 
a frustrated regional SA leadership coordinated the “most concerted terror campaign” of 
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that summer.38 When both this regional and the national SA leadership rallied behind the 
Potempa murderers, Hitler therefore faced a choice: disavow the murderers and retain the 
electorate’s approbation or embrace them and remain in control of the SA. He chose the 
latter, publicly supporting the murderers.39 It is this casting aside of respectability 
politics, which, months before the Nazis’ assumption of power, exposed Nazism’s true 
nature in all its disrespect for life and the rule of law, for which the Potempa murder, 
thanks to Bessel, has come to stand. 
None of the scholarship on Potempa engages the case’s regional, borderland-
specific reception with any depth. Kluke and Chapoutot, of course, use the Rosenberg 
piece as a key illustration of their points about Potempa’s portending of the Third Reich’s 
nationalist jurisprudence, but they fail to dig any deeper. Bessel, the most rigorous of the 
three, does pick up on the Upper Silesian dimension, but only in a narrative, rather than 
an interpretive, way. His article recounts that “tensions and animosities between German 
and Pole” were added to the “usual conflicts of German political life” in the border 
region and that the Nazi party therefore “stressed its opposition to Poles and Poland.”40 
Pietrzuch, a Pole who had reputedly supported the insurgents in 1921 as well as a 
Communist, was accordingly “an almost perfect target for Nazi hatred,”41 especially 
given that “Lachmann and four others” of the murder party "had been born in towns 
which had fallen to the new Polish state"42 and therefore “probably felt a special 
animosity towards the Poles.”43 Bessel also mentions the argument of defense attorney 
Lowack “that the Potempa case represented a continuation of the struggles of the 
immediate postwar period: the Communists assumed the place of the insurgent Poles, and 
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the German interests were represented by the Nazis.”44 In Bessel’s in any case largely 
descriptive article these matters remain interesting local facets of a murder whose 
symptomatic nature for the bigger, national story Bessel is concerned with. For much the 
same reason, the Potempa case is skipped over, except for a half-sentence mention, in 
Bessel’s later Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism.45 There is little doubt that the 
nation-wide implications of Hitler’s backing of the murderers that Bessel foregrounds 
were indeed for contemporaries the case’s principal point of interest, but the number of 
newspaper clippings and reports about the Nazis’ ethnonationalist justification of the 
murder that survives in government files in the Prussian Privy State Archive and the State 
Archive in Opole speaks to its prominence in regional discourse. Given the fragmentary 
nature of the East Elbian newspaper record it is well-nigh impossible to know precisely 
how much of the coverage about the case this particular strand of exculpatory reporting 
constituted. Considering, however, that it made up about half the coverage in the 
Völkischer Beobachter, is amply documented in government files, and even sparked a 
government investigation, this ethnonationalist defense deserves more in-depth 
examination than has thus far been the case.   
 The central tenet of this ethnonationalist apologia was that the victim had been 
only a Pole and a former insurgent and that it was therefore unjust to sentence five 
patriotic Germans to death on account of someone so unworthy, with right-wing 
reporting playing up both the victim’s nationality and the numerical disproportion. Hitler 
himself declared in a speech in Munich in early September that, “Never would five 
German men be condemned because of one Pole in a National Socialist Reich,” a point 
his party’s press had made repeatedly in the previous weeks.46 Joseph Goebbels’ Der 
Angriff, for instance, had run a headline reading “A Communist Polish insurgent is 
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shot…a German court passes five death sentences: The horror-verdict [Schreckensurteil] 
of Beuthen must never ever be executed.”47 Another piece in the same paper asked, “Who 
dares execute the five condemned workers?” when, as their victim had been a “Polish 
insurgent,” their executor would have to fear being forever shamed and ostracized by 
Germany’s nationalists.48 The Völkischer Beobachter similarly titled an article “The 
death sentences must never be executed: The life of five Germans – among them frontline 
soldiers – is worth more than one Polish traitor.”49 Even after the sentences had been 
commuted, the paper continued to rail against the judicial system, proclaiming that “They 
[the murderers] do not want clemency, they want the reopening of the trial.” After all, 
only a renewed hearing could prove that the original verdict had been an error in terms 
not just of law but also of state policy, for it had put one insurgent before “five German 
frontline fighters and Selbstschutz folk.”50 The regional Nazi paper Deutsche Ostfront 
likewise scorned the sentence’s lightening: “And for this inhuman Polish beast five 
German men shall languish between prison walls for life!”51 A few days later the Ostfront 
reiterated: “For a Polish scoundrel five German men shall slowly languish between prison 
walls. We won’t rest until this ignominy is redeemed through an acquittal!”52 Non-Nazi 
nationalist papers agreed. The Schlesische Zeitung opined that five death sentences were 
far too many to pay for the death of a single man, who was in any case only “a former 
insurgent and then Communist, besides a drunk and a rowdy.”53 The Deutsche Zeitung, 
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meanwhile, reported that rural Upper Silesia and the region’s now-Polish part were in 
“uproar” because of the verdict, with the populace protesting that the victim had been 
only a Polish insurgent.54 This “uproar over the blood verdict,” the Völkischer 
Beobachter averred, was owed to the court’s failure to take into consideration either 
Upper Silesia’s past or the circumstance that the struggle against Communism there was 
not just one against a political party but one against a force that fought “German culture 
and everything that is German.”55 As a former insurgent and a “Communist traitor” to 
boot, the Angriff agreed, Pietrzuch should have had no claim to the protection of the 
German justice system, which had erred gravely when it extended rights to the victim and 
condemned his German murderers.56 The Schlesische Zeitung, meanwhile, remarked 
censoriously, “In Upper Silesia one can understand even less how judges familiar with 
the region could arrive at such a draconian verdict,” especially since a decade previously 
an amnesty for political crimes had allowed the insurgents to go free in spite of having 
committed all manner of cruelties.57 The Ostfront, as usual, put it yet more bluntly, 
writing that the Potempa verdict “appears as if handed down by a Polish court martial,” 
not like one returned by a court in a town that had itself experienced occupation by Polish 
insurgents. The judges, the paper maintained, had with this verdict allied themselves with 
Poland.58  
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 Nationality and personal history were also brought to bear to reinforce the 
exploitation of the contrast between the sentences in the Potempa and Ohlau cases.59 In 
the Lower Silesian small town of Ohlau a street fight between the Social Democratic 
Reichsbanner and SA men had broken out a week before the Potempa murder when they 
were returning from their respective election rallies. In this fray, two SA men were killed. 
The responsible Reichsbanner men received only prison terms, because the deaths had 
taken place before the emergency decree took effect. In an impolitic coincidence, these 
correct but comparatively light sentences were announced on the very same day as the 
death sentences for the Potempa murderers.60 Consequently, the Nazis could portray 
themselves as more harshly treated by the law than their Marxist opponents, an angle 
taken up by the wider right-wing press. Indeed, the argument ran, they were treated more 
severely even though their victim had been only a Pole and insurgent. In an article that 
accused the Marxist parties and the government of collusion with the Poles, the Angriff 
described the contrast between the Ohlau and Potempa verdicts as a prime example of the 
workings of the “new ‘Unity Front’ between Social Democracy and the camouflaged 
Polish bands.”61 The SA murder party, Silesian borderland fighters all, had thought the 
Ohlau deaths had to be avenged. “Now one of these Polish insurgents and Bolshevist 
cutthroats has been killed. The criminals of the new Polish-Social Democratic Unity 
Front got away with laughably light punishments. Five German Silesians, however, were 
condemned to death,” the Angriff fumed.62 The Schlesische Zeitung concurred: “On the 
one hand the systematically prepared and bestially executed attack of the Reichsbanner 
on differently minded Volksgenossen was punished with prison, while the elimination of 
a Pole, who it is known was active in the service of Poland repeatedly, shall be avenged 
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with the death of five German Volksgenossen.”63 In a late September speech before 
13,000 to 14,000 spectators in Kiel, Goebbels too proclaimed that “…there is a 
difference, when 5 front soldiers eliminate a Polish insurgent, who fought with a Polish 
weapon in hand against Germans, or when a German SA man is eliminated by Marxists.” 
The verdict, which disadvantaged Germany’s own people, Goebbels contended, “would 
not have been possible in another state.”64 
 This contempt for Pietrzuch and his rights was rationalized through extensive 
reporting about insurgency-era cruelties attributed to him. The Völkischer Beobachter, for 
instance, ridiculed the idea of Pietrzuch as an innocent victim when it published a story 
reportedly shared under oath by a certain Gertrud Kaluza from Hindenburg under the title 
“This was the ‘poor’ Pietrzuch! And because of this subject 5 Germans shall be delivered 
to the executioner.”65 In 1921, readers were told, Kaluza had worked selling butter door-
to-door. In the course of her itinerant trading, she had one day come across a band of 
insurgents, recognizing Pietrzuch among them from having plied her trade in Potempa. 
They had, “under rude insults of my Germandom,” demanded her wares.66 When she 
refused, they beat and kicked her until she was bleeding from her head and back, then 
made off with her goods. The Nazi daily, borrowing from the regional Deutsche Ostfront, 
ran another testimonial two weeks later, this one from a funeral director from 
Königshütte.67 Reportedly, Pietrzuch and his insurgent gang had threatened this man that 
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they would kill him and his family with hand grenades if they did not quit Königshütte 
within two hours. His apartment and mortuary, he was told, would be taken over by one 
of the insurgents’ friends from Potempa. He later got another glimpse into the insurgents’ 
brutality when he was tasked with giving seven German residents of a miners’ dormitory 
a proper burial, after they had had to dig their own graves in a forest and been murdered 
by Pietrzuch’s band.68A further Ostfront article, titled “Was the insurgent Pieczuch 
involved in the butchery of Germans [Deutschenmetzelei] in Tworog and Zawadzki?,” 
accused Pietrzuch of having been a notorious “brute and sadist,” who had been a leading 
figure in the reign of terror the insurgents had allegedly unleashed in the area around 
Tworog. A chauffeur testified to this effect that Pietrzuch and his accomplices had 
threatened him while he was on the job and that he had only managed to escape because 
he had been able to make a convincing excuse in Polish.69 
 The flipside of the right-wing press’ vilification of Pietrzuch was its extolling of 
the murderers as model Germans who had belonged to the highly respected ranks of 
former Selbstschutz fighters. Praise of the killers in these terms was often paired with 
vituperation against the alleged insurgent Pietrzuch, as when the Angriff wrote: “We have 
already reported on the petitions for death sentences in the Beuthen special court process 
against nine accused National Socialists and Selbstschutz men, who had killed the 
notorious Communist ruffian and Polish insurgent Pietrzuch in Potempa….Could the 
judges follow the petitions of the public prosecutor? Could they manage to condemn to 
death nationalist Silesians who had once stood their ground against the rapacious 
Pollacks and who now fight back against the Polish blood terror hidden behind a 
Communist mask?”70 Yet more notably, other articles not only portrayed the murderers 
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as deserving of mercy due to their Selbstschutz history but even attributed their deed to 
tensions between Poles and Germans that had carried over into the present from the 
region’s recent past. Pietrzuch, the Angriff charged, was not just a former insurgent but 
even now had become a Communist “in order to let his hatred against the German 
Selbstschutz people,” who were these days to be found in the Nazi ranks, “run riot.”71 The 
murderers, meanwhile, were commonly described as motivated by Selbstschutz memories 
and practices. The Angriff, for example, related in gory detail how their memories of 
Polish atrocities were etched into former Selbstschutz fighters’ brains, how much these 
images of “gouged-out eyes,” “lacerated and mutilated bodies,” and “cut-off limbs” 
continued to affect them, implying that these haunting recollections had played their part 
in the murder.72 In another article, which also once again made the assertion that virtually 
all Selbstschutz men were now SA members, the Angriff outright declared the murderers 
“soldiers of the border” and their deed one that “cannot be judged according to dead 
juridical formulas.”73 After all, it had been committed by men who had “experienced 
first-hand what it meant to be a borderlander for Germany” in the course of a struggle 
that continued now under the guise of party politics.74 More brazen yet, the far-right 
Oberschlesische Tageszeitung contended that the killers had “acted as former 
Selbstschutz folks in the mistaken, but for that not less strong belief, that with the 
elimination of a former Polish insurgent they were doing something, which can be 
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justified and which 11 years ago was done repeatedly in national self-defense.”75 They 
had simply failed to assimilate the knowledge that norms had changed since the 
paramilitary war of 1921.  
 The murderers’ heroization and the sense of grievance at their being sacrificed for 
the death of a single Pole is exemplified particularly strikingly by a piece in the 
Völkischer Beobachter consisting of interviews with the convicts’ wives and sisters, 
many of whom told of the men’s suffering and valor during and after the plebiscite 
period. One man’s sister reportedly proclaimed, “’As the sister of the SA man August 
Gräupner, who was condemned to death and who was an Upper Silesian Selbstschutz 
fighter and defended the German Heimat against Poland, I declare that my reason 
threatened to stand still at the announcement of the verdict.’”76 Another’s wife told how 
her husband had defended Upper Silesia as a Selbstschutz fighter and how he had in 
recent years been victimized by the “’Polish Communists’” of his home village to such an 
extent that he had had to move to the Broslawitz SA hostel for safety.77 The story of 
ringleader Paul Lachmann’s wife was most expansive. After having spent four and a half 
years at the front during the war, Lachmann, who had always been an activist for 
Germandom, had campaigned for Germany during the plebiscite and had had to flee his 
home village when it instead fell to Poland. Having endured several years of hardship as 
a refugee, Lachmann had then built up a new life for himself in Potempa. In all these 
women’s tales insurgents were the enemy and they were united in their inability to 
believe that their good, brave borderlanders were to be executed for one such man. One 
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woman remarked: “’But one thing I could not understand, that here so many death 
sentences were handed down because of one insurgent.’”78 
 None of the murderers mentioned ethnicity or nationalist tensions in the surviving 
interrogations and even at the trial it was only the junior defense attorney who, in his 
concluding speech, brought up regional history as an extenuating circumstance. 
Nevertheless, this nationalist narrative about the Potempa murder was taken up by the 
right-wing press and by nationalist organizations. Many respected right-wing 
organizations tendered their support. The Upper Silesian Stahlhelm and the Selbstschutz 
Gleiwitz both sent telegrams to von Papen, arguing that the crime’s borderland 
background “’warrants a milder assessment of the deed’.”79 It should be recognized, the 
Stahlhelm further argued, that the killers had acted out of a belief, widely shared in Upper 
Silesia, in a nationalist “right to self-defense” and the Selbstschutz alleged that even 
Upper Silesians of differing political convictions disagreed with a verdict that ordered the 
death of one Polish insurgent to be compensated by the execution of five Selbstschutz 
veterans.80 The Deutscher Ostbund concurred that the borderlands setting meant that the 
Potempa murderers could not be considered common “’political bandits’.”81 Calls for 
clemency were also submitted by the Pan-German League and the Arbeitskreis für 
ostdeutsches Schrifttum,82 and a German National women’s league declared that it was 
really the League of Nations that belonged on the defendant’s bench, given that “Potempa 
is the fruit of the dismemberment of Upper Silesia.’”83 Even the Gleiwitz branch of the 
Vereinigte Verbände Heimattreuer Oberschlesier wrote to the government to explain that 
it was only the resistance by Selbstschutz, Stahlhelm, and SA that had kept Polish voters, 
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who had swelled the ranks of the Communist party, at bay. Executing the Potempa 
murderers would therefore hardly fulfill the emergency decree’s objective of calming the 
public mood.84 The government, right-wing papers claimed, could only be hesitating to 
give way to requests for pardon because it did not want to be seen as weak for baulking at 
execution at the emergency decree’s first application. However, clemency would actually 
strengthen the state’s authority, it was argued, by exchanging one-size-fits-all justice 
imposed by Berlin for sensitivity regarding regional specificities.85 Kurt Urbanek, the 
German Democratic Party Landrat for Beuthen-Tarnowitz and German plebiscite 
commissar from 1920 to 1922, alluded to this strand of the Potempa discourse when he 
and his fellow district councilors asked von Papen for clemency. While they condemned 
the murder and understood the state’s need to maintain its authority, they wrote, they 
were moved to call for a pardon in the name of that already too plentiful blood that had 
flowed in Upper Silesia after the war.86 Urbanek was a liberal nationalist and an opponent 
of the Nazis and yet even he, out of conviction or political necessity, accepted a narrative 
that invoked nationalist tropes as justification for murder. 
In other instances too, Nazis dressed up political animosities in starkly 
ethnonationalist invective. Albert Grzesinski, the Social Democratic Prussian minister of 
the interior, occasionally became the target of such racist rhetorical attacks, because his 
last name sounded Polish. East Prussia’s Gauleiter Erich Koch, for instance, wedded 
genealogical to political contempt for Grzesinski in a 1929 speech in Pomeranian 
Lauenburg, in which he sneered that “’People like Minister of the Interior Grzesinski, the 
son of a maid, who served in the house of a Pole and was adopted by him etc., would 
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rejoice if we were not represented in parliament.’”87 In 1931, Nazi itinerant speaker 
Helmut Richter repeatedly made similar jibes about Grzesinski while touring Eastern 
Pomerania. Speaking, like Koch, in Lauenburg on two occasions a week apart, Richter 
both times called Grzesinski the son of a “Polish maid,” once adding that his father had 
been “the Jew Cohn.” In speeches in Fiddichow and Groß Sabow, Richter took issue with 
Grzesinski having been made police president of Berlin, when he, a “Pollack,” was the 
son of a “Polish reaper” and the “Jew Cohn” whom she had served.88 In Ankerholz, he 
stressed Grzesinski’s supposed illegitimate birth as the son of a “Polish reaper” and a 
Jew.89 Richter was tried and sentenced for both the slanderous allegation of illegitimacy90 
and his anti-Semitism, but his insults were at least equally anti-Polish – and, moreover, 
almost entirely fabricated.91  Grzesinski had actually been born Albert Lehmann, the 
illegitimate son of a Berlin maid and a butcher’s apprentice, and had taken the last name 
of his stepfather Thomas Grzesinski, who had adopted him.92 Richter’s were thus falsities 
evidently designed to harness ethnic to political hostilities.  
 In 1931, the aspersions on ethnic grounds against police inspector Schiwy, the key 
witness in a case against nationally prominent Nazi speaker Ludwig Münchmeyer, also 
attracted debate. Schiwy had monitored and eventually shut down a rally in Gleiwitz with 
Münchmeyer, in which the latter had insulted (former) ministers Stresemann and 
Severing, Friedrich Ebert, and the Reich colors and imputed that the aforementioned 
politicians had violated the constitution.93 In a notable addition to an article otherwise 
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identical to one run in the Völkischer Beobachter, the Schlesischer Beobachter reported 
that Münchmeyer had responded to the meeting’s closure with accusations that Schiwy 
had been an insurgent back in 1921 and did not really speak German.94 The latter 
allegation resurfaced at the trial, when Schiwy, suffering of tonsillitis, exhibited poor 
pronunciation and Münchmeyer’s attorney, seizing on the inspector’s impaired speech, 
asked him what his mother tongue was. Schiwy’s protests that the question was irrelevant 
to the case the lawyer brushed aside with the argument that if German were not his first 
language, then his German proficiency and hence his reliability as a witness was 
dubitable. At the judge’s request Schiwy eventually answered, acknowledging that he, 
like most Upper Silesians, understood Polish but emphasizing his tonsillitis and his 
otherwise perfect command of German, well known to his superiors.95 Münchmeyer’s 
eventual acquittal had nothing to do with his impugning of Schiwy, but he nevertheless 
subsequently portrayed the case as if it had.96 In a letter to Severing penned a week after 
the trial and requesting a lifting of the speaking bans several Prussian cities had placed on 
him, Münchmeyer argued that these prohibitions were based on suppositions that he 
insulted opponents and fostered disorder that were untrue. Just in this last case it had been 
shown, Münchmeyer lied, that the main witness for the prosecution had had a deficient 
command of German.97 As the Nazi press had done with the Potempa verdict, 
Münchmeyer thus turned an ordinary political row into an ethnically-laden one when all 
else had failed.  
 Religion was, by and large, not employed as ammunition in such race-based ad 
hominem attacks, but the Catholic Center party as a whole was vilified occasionally as 
overly Polonophile. For two of Abel's respondents from Upper Silesia the experience of 
the clergy’s and the Center Party’s putative support for the Polish side during the 
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plebiscite campaign was a radicalizing one.98 More than a decade later, the Potempa 
verdict prompted the Oberschlesische Tageszeitung to note that at the trial “a Center man 
[the attorney?] had behaved as a passionate Communist protector."99 This circumstance 
suggested, the paper speculated, that “Perhaps this combination: Center and Communists 
is the next, which we will experience, a new edition of the old link between the Center 
and the Poles and caused by the Poles in the nests of [coal] pits having now become 
Communists.”100 The Center, after all, “always marches with those, who do not walk in 
step with the national Beuthen.”101  
Often, however, attacks on the Center were rooted in the same type of accusations 
also applied to other republican parties. When a newspaper editor affiliated with the 
Center criticized regional SA leader Edmund Heines for riling up his subordinates about 
the Potempa verdict, for example, the Deutsche Ostfront jeered that someone, whose 
party was full of “creatures, who have never fulfilled their duty toward the Heimat” and 
boasted Carl Spieker, “the specialist for Feme executions," among its members, had no 
right to vilify the SA chief.102 The Social Democrats too had been lambasted in the 
context of the Potempa case for failing to support the SA in its struggle against the Poles, 
much as it had once called nationalist Germans to Silesia to defend the region and then 
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soon after turned them over to the judges for Feme trials.103 In the Border Province, 
meanwhile, a 1930 so-called vaterländische Kundgebung with Prussian minister for 
justice Dr. Hermann Schmidt, organized by the Center Party branch in Meseritz, met with 
the local far right's scorn because an event hosted by the Center could allegedly never be 
truly patriotic due to the party's collaboration with the “anti-clerical Social Democracy,” 
echoing invectives equating the Center with Marxism that Nazis spewed nationwide.104 In 
response, the republican Grenzwacht ran a commentary, apparently penned by the Center 
party, which condemned the DNVP and Stahlhelm as hypocritical for claiming a 
monopoly on patriotism when they had soon afterwards held a recruitment event aimed at 
Catholics. “The border is too close that one may dare to deny a strong third of the 
inhabitants of a county, which lies close to the Polish border, patriotic views out of petty 
partisan reasons,” the Center's statement added.105 The border was thus brought into the 
dispute, but the original attack had not been border-related at all.  
 When Nazis did try to make politics about ethnicity, their opponents had a choice 
of responses: They could either stress the distinction between ethnicity and chosen, civic 
nationality or engage the Nazis on their own ethnonationalist terms. In the Potempa case, 
the opposition chose this latter approach. It did naturally insist that even if he had been an 
“inferior person” – a Communist and a Pole – the SA men had not been entitled “to 
preempt the divine judgement over Konrad Pietrzuch.”106 If nationalist animosity became 
a blank check to kill, the state’s authority would, after all, be undermined and vigilante 
justice effectively legitimized.107 More interestingly, however, some pieces challenged 
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the Nazi narratives’ ascription of clear national sides to the Potempa case’s various 
actors. The Neue Zeitung, for instance, claimed to have dispatched a reporter to interview 
residents of Potempa and nearby Tworog about Pietrzuch. He had found, the paper 
reported, that the Pietrzuch family had been well-respected. Konrad and his brother had 
fought in the war and Konrad had afterwards belonged to a Grenzschutz division until 
April 1919, then returned home to Potempa to support his mother and the still-underage 
Alfons. In 1921, he fought alongside the village’s other Germans to protect Potempa 
from the insurgents and certainly had never been one of their number himself. None of 
the villages’ older residents could remember the gruesome episodes supposedly involving 
Pietrzuch recounted in the Völkischer Beobachter. In the mid-1920s Konrad had further 
been dismissed from his job at a foundry in Polish Upper Silesia alongside other Germans 
who had refused to opt for Poland. He had subsequently been employed by the German 
state railways until becoming unemployed in 1931. Lachmann, in contrast, was, the Neue 
Zeitung claimed, a petty tyrant, who withheld welfare funds from villagers of differing 
political persuasions and was so unpopular even with his fellow local councilors that they 
had not written to request clemency.108 The Deutsche Ostfront rebutted this portrayal 
with its own purportedly first-hand account from Potempa. Lachmann, their reporter 
maintained, was an integral member of a tight-knit village community, which 
encompassed all Germans regardless of political affiliation. Only former insurgents, like 
Pietrzuch, suffered exclusion.109  
Pietrzuch, whose mother and brother had had to be interrogated with the help of a 
translator, probably was from a Polish-speaking background, though his insurgent past 
remains unproven.110 More fruitful a tactic than disputing Pietrzuch’s Polish-ness was 
casting doubt on his murderers’ German bona fides. This was the tack taken by the 
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explosive article “Hitler’s comrade – an insurgent and traitor” in the regional Social 
Democratic newspaper Oberschlesisches Volksblatt, which charged that one of the 
murder party, August Gräupner, had joined the Friedenshütte Selbstschutz as an “agent 
provocateur” in 1920.111 As a result of his treachery many fighters were allegedly 
arrested and sentenced to extended prison terms by the French. When the French cleared 
out a weapons depot Gräupner had betrayed to them, his comrades deduced the spy’s 
identity and handed down a Feme verdict. Such unofficial death sentences were regularly 
carried out by the Freikorps of the immediate post-war years, but Gräupner managed to 
escape to the Polish side and, the Volksblatt claimed, fought as an insurgent against the 
Germans. When the French withdrew from the region, Gräupner left with them, joining 
the Foreign Legion. Only when he had been expelled from the Legion a few years 
previously had he returned to Upper Silesia, where he had joined the NSDAP.112 The 
story was quickly picked up by the national Social Democratic daily Vorwärts,113 at 
which point it sparked an inconclusive government investigation into its veracity.114 Nazi 
journals naturally staunchly denied the accusations, with the Völkischer Beobacher on 
one occasion running a putative letter from an erstwhile Selbstschutz leader, which 
claimed that it had in reality been Pietrzuch who had committed the wrongs now laid at 
Gräupner’s feet.115 No other allegation unfolded the same reach, but others involved in 
the case also had their Germandom questioned. The Neue Zeitung, for one, published a 
list of Nazis who were connected with the Potempa case or had been active in a nearby 
party branch and who, allegedly, had been active for Poland in the plebiscite era. Besides 
Gräupner, two other SA men implicated in the murder and the father of a third 
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featured.116 The Volksblatt, meanwhile, found another target in Lowack, the murderers’ 
junior defense attorney, who in his concluding speech had urged the judges to take into 
consideration the region’s history and mentality and the special animosity that was bound 
to prevail between nationalist Germans and a Pole. Yet Lowack was himself, the 
Volksblatt maintained, “a typical renegate.”117 While his mother was an ardent German 
Nationalist People’s Party deputy, her father had been a Paul Wolny from Pless county, 
one of the most heavily Polish-speaking in Upper Silesia and since 1921 part of Poland. 
Wolny had been a Polish Catholic who spoke barely any German and his other children 
were, for their part, an ardently Polish Carmelite nun on the one hand and a deceased 
priest and “eager Pole,” who had taught Polish at a German Gymnasium, on the other.118 
So much, the Volksblatt remarked, for “’racial purity’.”119 Much as Lowack valorized 
Germandom neither he – nor his clients – met their ideology’s exacting racial standards. 
 Such allegations tried to puncture Nazis’ racist hubris by employing the same 
simplistic and fixed national categories, but other challenges rejected this facile equating 
of ethnicity and nationality and pointed up the Nazi movement’s own failures to enforce 
the concepts' supposed identity. In the wake of the Potempa verdict, one article thus 
pointed out that Pietrzuch, even should he have voted for Poland in the plebiscite in what 
was then an almost purely Polish village, was not necessarily therefore any less genuinely 
German now. After all, the 120 residents of Potempa who in the July election had cast 
their ballot for the Nazi party had in all probability voted the same way in 1921. The 
village’s Nazis were thus “Polish scoundrels” just as much as Pietrzuch and inborn 
ethnicity little guide to nationality or the value of human life.120 The Nowiny Codzienne 
concurred that the circumstance that “there is as big a percentage of insurgent Poles in the 
 
116 “So sehen die nationalsozialistischen Helden aus,” Neue Zeitung, August 26, 1932. APO, NPO, 1025. 
117 “typischer Renegat”; “Rechtsanwalt Lowaks polnischer Stammbaum,” Oberschlesisches Volksblatt, 
August 25, 1932. APO, NPO, 1025. 
118 “ein heißer Pole”; Ibid. 
119 “’Rassenreinheit’”; Ibid. 
120 “polnische Kanaille”; “Potempa in neuem Licht,” September 15, 1932. APO, RO, 1806. 
 154 
National Socialist party as in the Communist party” spoke against pardoning the 
murderers on the grounds of their victim’s ethnicity, for Nazis of Polish descent would 
hardly want to see their lives devalued.121  
In fact, the Oberschlesischer Volksbote had already derisively commented on the 
high proportion of former insurgents in the SA a few days before the Potempa murder 
and warned against the consequences this circumstance might have. On August 5, the 
paper told how a band of SA men, among them a certain Donner, beat up a laborer 
because one in his group of harvesters had jokingly responded “Heil Moscow” to their 
shout of “Heil Hitler.” It observed: “It is interesting that Donner went through that 
strange political development like many from the elite of the brown army. Donner was 
initially an insurgent, then a Communist and now a Nazi.”122 The following day, the 
Volksbote publicized a telegram Upper Silesia’s free and Christian unions had sent to the 
Prussian minister of the interior in the face of disquiet in the immediate border region, 
pleading for the territorial expansion of the police president of Gleiwitz’s jurisdiction and 
for the increase of the forces under his command. “Since particularly in the border 
districts insurgents have on a larger scale entered the SA. and the National Socialist party 
leadership has lost all control during the movement’s unnaturally rabid swelling,” the 
unions explained their request, “there is the danger that more cases of terror will be 
organized by it [the SA], which would also one day encroach on minority members. Our 
German compatriots beyond the borders would have to bear the consequences.”123 The 
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Nowiny Codzienne concurred that the SA consisted in large part of “already Germanized 
youths,” “in national regards unsteady youths,” and out-and-out Polish youths, whose 
parents had not taken enough care.124  
More than in the case of the SA gang’s murder of Konrad Pietrzuch, however, it 
was in the Schiwy case that rejection and mockery of Nazism’s unenforced 
ethnonationalism formed the mainstay of the opposition’s response. In its initial coverage 
of the trial and verdict, the Volksblatt defended Schiwy’s Germandom by scoffing that, 
“Commissar Schiwy could take on a competition in the German language with Mr. Braun 
[Münchmeyer’s attorney] without danger.”125 The following week a longer piece, 
dedicated entirely to the nationality issue as raised at the trial, titled “The German-
blooded Nazis in Upper Silesia,” appeared in the Volksblatt. Münchmeyer’s contempt for 
Schiwy’s pronunciation and for his promotion from uncivilized Upper Silesia to a job in 
West Germany had, the paper argued, exposed the Nazi notable’s disrespect, “despite all 
nationalist talk,” for Upper Silesians and their Germandom.126 Despite their hard 
pronunciation and Slavic last names, the Volksblatt affirmed, Upper Silesians were 
cultivated and loyal Germans, which they had proven during the war and the plebiscite 
period when they had risked life, limb, and home to fight, campaign, and vote for 
Germany. Doubting their Germandom was to disrespect these intrepid demonstrations of 
German disposition. In the face of such disdainful statements by Münchmeyer and other 
quoted Nazis, one might expect, the Volksblatt fumed, that “the National Socialists put 
great value on German-bloodedness and at least among their standard bearers and leaders 
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would not tolerate any men ‘with hard pronunciation’ and Slavic names.”127 And yet, 
whom did the latest issue of the regional party newspaper announce as upcoming 
speakers? “A bunch of ‘Teutons’, descendants of the Vandals and Silingi who once 
settled in Upper Silesia, men of tall stature, blue eyes and flaxen hair, and with names, 
whose relatedness to Gothic linguistic roots everyone notices immediately: Adamczyk, 
Ciomperlik, Harupka, Janitzek, Kowohl, Motzny, Morcinek, Slawik, Sukowski, 
Swatzina. And who commends himself to the citizens of the Third Reich as a party 
comrade or sympathizer? Ciensky, Dokupil, A. Foltis and C. Gruschka, Harnys, Idzinski, 
Kruppa, Maly (like Hitler’s mother), Plusczyk, Robaschik, Sliwka (…), Soika, Zajonc. 
Hopefully Mr. Münchmeyer won’t break his tongue, so precious for the party, when he 
has to pronounce the names.”128 The Volksblatt thus in a snidely humorous manner 
lambasted Münchmeyer and his fellow Nazis for directing against their opponents an 
ethnonationalist rhetoric that did not reflect borderlands reality and that their own 
movement failed to live up to. The Vorwärts made similar effort to expose Nazism’s 
hypocrisy in 1932 by publishing a list of Nazi candidates for the Prussian Diet who bore 
Slavic names.129 Although the NSDAP’s national leadership denied that those were in 
fact names of its candidates, according to the Cech comparisons with the official 
candidate lists bore out the allegations of the Vorwärts.130 
 
127 “…daß die Nationalsozialisten den größten Wert auf Deutschblütigkeit legten und zumindestens unter 
ihren Vorkämpfern und Führern keine Männer ‘mit harter Aussprache’ und slawischen Namen dulden 
würden”; Ibid. 
128 “Lauter ‘Germanen’, Nachkommen der einst in Oberschlesien siedelnden Vandalen und Silinger, 
Männer von hohem Wuchs, blauen Augen und flachsfarbenem Haarschopf, und mit Namen, deren 
sprachliche Verwandtschaft mit gotischen Sprachwurzeln jedem sofort auffällt: Adamczyk, Ciomperlik, 
Harupka, Janitzek, Kowohl, Motzny, Morcinek, Slawik, Sukowski, Swatzina. Und wer empfiehlt sich als 
Parteigenosse oder Sympathisierender den Bürgern des Dritten Reichs? Ciensky, Dokupil, A. Foltis und C. 
Gruschka, Harnys, Idzinski, Kruppa, Maly (wie Hitlers Mutter), Plusczyk, Robaschik, Sliwka (wenn der 
die Nazis nicht verpflaumt!), Soka, Zajonc. Hoffentlich zerbricht sich Herr Münchmeyer nicht seine für die 
Partei so kostbare Zunge, wenn er die Namen aussprechen muß.”; Ibid. 
129 “Nazi-Lügner in der Zange,” Cech, July/August 1932. SBB. 
130 Ibid. 
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 Its critics were right that the Nazi movement did not practice the ethnonationalism 
it preached, a circumstance it even very occasionally explicitly acknowledged. 
Recruitment to the NSDAP thus indeed did not exclude those with Polish surnames. One 
expansive submission to Abel’s essay contest, for instance, came from a G. Goretzki, 
whose Catholic parents from Katowice both had Polish last names.131 Several of those 
charged in connection with the anti-Polish 1929 Oppeln theatre riot likewise bore Slavic 
surnames, as the Nowiny Codzienne pointed out.132 Upper Silesia’s party paper even ran a 
regular column aimed at members from Polish-speaking backgrounds, titled “Pierrona 
Fransek speaks.”133 Many of these Nazi activists with names that hardly smacked of 
racial purity eventually changed them. A recent history of what was then Lyck, for 
example, mentions that “Masurian surnames were not missing in that party – Czygan, 
Turowski, Olscheswski, Kulesza, Olech, Lissek, and others,” adding that from 1938 on, 
when a decree mandated the Germanization of the designations of villages and localities, 
these functionaries exchanged their names for more palatable ones.134 In fact, Upper 
Silesia’s Untergauleiter himself, Josef Adamczyk changed his Slavic name in 1939 to the 
more German-sounding Adams.135  
Due to their ethnic backgrounds, many Nazis also spoke non-German languages. 
Several Masurian respondents to Theodore Abel’s essay contest, for instance, wrote in 
grammatically and orthographically faulty German that potentially hints at a different 
first language.136 Masurians’ use of Polish, even in NSDAP meetings, persisted, to the 
 
131 G. Goretzki, accessed July 21, 2020, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58483/g-span-
classqueryhlgoretzkispan?ctx=6415e05e-16d2-4293-9957-1da6294c93cd&idx=0. 
132 “Die Oppelner Vorfälle vor Gericht.,” Nowiny Codzienne, June 6, 1929. APO, NPO, 267. 
133 Bolko Janus, Germans and Poles: Identity, Culture, and Nationalism in German Upper Silesia, 1918-
1933 (PhD diss., University of New York at Buffalo, 1995), 81. 
134 “A mazurskich nazwisk w tej Partie nie brakowało - Czygan, Turowski, Olscheswski, Kulesza, Olech, 
Lissek i inne.”; Michał Olszewski and Rafał Żytyniec, Ełk – spacerownik po niezwykłym mieście (Ełk: 
Muzeum Historyczne w Ełlku, 2014), 291. 
135 Statisten in Uniform: Die Mitglieder des Reichstags 1933-1945, eds. Joachim Lilla, Martin Döring, and 
Andreas Schulz (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 2004), 3. 
136 Frau Nieke, accessed September 21, 2020, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58403/span-
classqueryhlfrauspan-span-classqueryhlniek?ctx=7122c717-4810-4391-9426-1e17adf1b825&idx=0; 
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party’s frustration, throughout the Third Reich’s reign, as Andreas Kossert has 
demonstrated.137 In Schleswig, an activist touring the region putting on film screenings 
observed about local audiences’ speech: “Their language sounds strange and 
incomprehensible to us, when they converse with one another, mostly they speak Frisian 
or Low Danish, but – National Socialists they are one and all, young and old…”138 Even 
during anti-Polish attacks Nazis occasionally employed Polish. Konrad Pietrzuch’s 
brother Alfons testified that, “In the Polish language one of the two intruders then said: 
‘Away, you damned donnerwetterischen Communists.’”139 When Nazi regulars of a hotel 
inn in Ortelsburg tried to violently expel supposedly Polish guests, who actually turned 
out to be a Czechoslovak university group, the Nazi ringleader’s initial verbal altercation 
with them was similarly conducted in Polish.140 German nationality, denied in opponents 
yet granted to party members of different ethnic backgrounds, was effectively made a 
matter of political convictions. This usurpation of the Polish-speaking milieu by Nazism 
was lamented by the Cech.141 The journals of Upper Silesia’s Polish minority, for their 
part, attributed the Polish party’s ever-diminishing election returns to this participation of 
youths from Polish-speaking backgrounds in Nazi activism and even in anti-Polish 
terroristic gangs.142 
 The admission of ethnic non-Germans to the Nazi movement must be considered 
a matter largely of pragmatism, but very occasionally Nazis did explicitly express 
 
Walter Szimba, accessed September 21, 2020, https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/58735/span-
classqueryhlwalterspan-span-classqueryhlsz?ctx=0416bc77-eb8d-4cc2-95a5-84dd79904157&idx=0. 
137Andreas Kossert, Preußen, Deutsche oder Polen?: die Masuren im Spannungsfeld des ethnischen 
Nationalismus 1870-1956 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2001), 235-243.  
138 “Fremd und unverständlich klingt uns ihre Sprache, wenn sie sich miteinander unterhalten, zumeist 
sprechen sie friesisch oder plattdänisch, aber - Nationalsozialisten sind sie alle, jung und alt…”; “Auf 
Filmfahrt an der Grenze,” Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung, July 3, 1932. KSI. 
139 “In polnischer Sprache sagte dann noch der eine von den zwei Eingedrungenen: ‘Raus, ihr verfluchten 
donnerwetterischen Kommunisten.’”; Article. AAN, Konsulat RP w Opolu, 17. 
140 Verdict in the case against Werner Schulz and Gottfried Heyer, June 5, 1931, p. 2. GStA PK, XX. HA, 
Rep. 240 C, 67b.  
141 “Zurück zu Gott,” Cech, November/December 1931. SBB. 
142 “polnischer Herkunft”; “Die Seuche des Hitlertums im Lande der Piasten,” Nowiny Codzienne, May 14, 
1932. APO, RO, 1882. 
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flexibility regarding the basis of Germandom, principally in the context of aspirations to 
win people and hence territory for Germany. Like most accounts of the plebiscites, 
Nazis’ stressed that these referendums had taken place at a time when Germany was in no 
position to promise prosperity, while Denmark and Poland respectively allegedly did so 
liberally. Wilhelm N.N., long-time leader of Flensburg’s Hitler Youth, thus recalled how 
he and his friends had, as teenage plebiscite activists, pasted strips of paper reading 
“’And you believe that?’” over Danish posters pledging affluence for Schleswig in a 
Danish state.143 By taking these posters sufficiently seriously to feel a need to counteract 
them, activists like Wilhelm tacitly acknowledged that the plebiscites were not simple 
censuses of unalterable, ethnically-rooted national identity. Deplored when it came to the 
original plebiscites, this persistent national fluidity, amenable to being swayed by 
circumstances, was also seen as potential route to the reversal of the territorial losses they 
had engendered. After all, the Flensburger NS-Zeitung contended in 1932, “Truly not 
infrequently one hears people, who cast their vote for Denmark [in 1920] in good faith 
and out of honest disposition, curse that day, which brought them bondage instead of 
freedom and robbed them of hope for future happiness.”144 The answer, the paper 
suggested, was to hold a fresh plebiscite in all of Schleswig, including the region’s now-
Danish part. This vote, the NS-Zeitung was confident, “would turn out differently than 
twelve years ago, it will be an overwhelming commitment to the German motherland.”145 
Only Nazism’s rise could guarantee that such a second plebiscite would transpire: “And 
that this new plebiscite comes quite soon, for that vouches the greatest German people’s 
movement in history, the German National Socialism, for that vouches the leadership 
 
143 “‘Und dat glöwst Du?’”; Peter Heinacher, Der Aufstieg der NSDAP im Stadt- und Landkreis Flensburg 
(Flensburg: Gesellschaft für Flensburger Stadtgeschichte, 1986), 244-246. 
144 “Wahrlich, nicht vereinzelt hört man heute Leute, die in gutem Glauben und aus ehrlicher Gesinnung 
ihre Stimme für Dänemark abgaben diesen Tag verfluchen, der ihnen statt Freiheit Knechtschaft brachte 
und noch dazu die Hoffnung auf einstiges Glück nahm.”; “Entrissenes deutsches Land muß wieder deutsch 
werden! Nordschleswigs Schicksal,” Flensburger NS-Zeitung, August 20, 1932. SHLB. 
145 “Diese Abstimmung wird heute anders ausfallen, als vor 12 Jahren, sie wird ein überwältigendes 
Bekenntnis zum deutschen Mutterland sein.”; Ibid. 
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personality of one Adolf Hitler.”146 Until then, North Schleswig’s Germans, the paper 
urged, had to resist being taken in by “Danish slogans.”147 Similar revisionist hopes were 
conveyed to the Upper Silesian Untergau two weeks after Hitler’s accession to the 
chancellorship by a letter-writer from Polish Upper Silesia. Writing in faulty, sometimes 
incoherent German he averred that “these days even most Polish-disposed Upper 
Silesians welcome the Hitler government” and hoped for the border’s speedy revision.148 
Many who had once identified as Polish, he asserted, were now disillusioned with the 
Polish administration’s corruption and cronyism and therefore “Germany today has the 
best patriots in former idealistic Poles.” 149 In order to diminish Poland’s appeal for 
Germany’s minorities and to  facilitate the country’s fight against the Versailles Treaty in 
the international arena, the letter-writer recommended the new Nazi government engage 
one such convert to address Germany’s Polish-speaking minorities and the League of 
Nations. Back in Schleswig-Holstein, Nazism’s supposed greater capacity for exploiting 
national indifference in the service of the irredentist cause was used against the 
Schleswig-Holsteiner-Bund during Nazis’ 1932 campaign to take it over. In the run-up to 
the annual convention of the Bund that year, the Nazi Schleswig-Holsteinische 
Tageszeitung ran an article that voiced satisfaction that the meeting’s published agenda 
indicated that its main subject would be North Schleswig, rather than the various political 
reforms that had in recent years too often preoccupied the Bund. To make this renewed 
focus on North Schleswig and its German population efficacious, the Tageszeitung 
counseled, the Bund would have to agitate among Schleswig-Holstein’s population “from 
morning to night.”150 It would be necessary to travel the region, advertise, found 
 
146 “Und daß dieser neue Abstimmungstag recht bald kommt, dafür bürgt die größte deutsche 
Volksbewegung in der Geschichte, der deutsche Nationalsozialismus, dafür bürgt die Führerpersönlichkeit 
eines Adolf Hitler.”; Ibid. 
147 “dänische Parolen”; Ibid. 
148 “heute die meisten auch pol. gesinnten Oberschlesier die Regierung Hitler begrüßen”; Letter to 
Adamczyk, February 14, 1933. APK, 147/228. 
149 “in den früheren idealen Polen hat heute Deutschland die besten Patrioten”; Ibid. 
150 “von morgens bis abends”; “Gedanken zur Tagung der Landesversammlung des Schleswig-Holsteiner-
Bundes,” Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung, August 25, 1932. LSH, Abt. 417 Nr. 91. 
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branches, and assign specific tasks to those chapters. If indeed “every place were 
assigned its task it should be possible to win for Germandom many a renegade, many a 
lukewarm person, many an unenlightened one up there.”151 Young teachers working in 
North Schleswig had relayed that, “’Because 25 percent committed Danes live in North 
Schleswig, another 25 percent are committed either tepidly and spiritlessly or strongly 
and consciously to Germandom, the last 50 percent can be won for Germandom.’”152 
Effectual agitation could, however, only occur if the current, inert leadership of the Bund 
resigned and an activist, Nazi team was brought on board, it was argued. National 
indifference, all in all, presented an opportunity for irredentists and one that the Nazi 
movement claimed it was best equipped to seize. 
 Sometimes ambiguous national circumstances were portrayed as neutral or even 
positive realities without being so directly linked to the possibility of renewed plebiscites. 
The Schleswigsche Nachrichten routinely railed against those who, for purely material 
reasons it was assumed, embraced a Danish identity, but in one report on this so-called 
Speckdänentum also conceded that in a borderland genuine national indifference was 
inevitable. “A sharp national dividing line” could never been drawn, the paper argued, 
and a “more or less movable dividing area, in which both nations live with and next to 
one another, often even in the same family” would therefore always persist.153 Unlike 
national fickleness motivated by materialism, this inevitable grey zone posed no inherent 
threat. The Flensburger NS-Zeitung similarly in the summer of 1932 countered recent 
remarks by Danish nationalist leader H.P. Hansen defending Denmark’s right to North 
 
151 “Wenn jedem Ort seine Aufgabe zugewiesen würde, müßte es möglich sein, dort oben manchen 
Abtrünnigen, manchen Lauen, manchen Unaufgeklärten für das Deutschtum zu gewinnen”; Ibid. 
152 “Es gibt viele in Nordschleswig tätige Junglehrer, die sagen: ‘Da 25 Prozent Stockdänen in 
Nordschleswig wohnen, andere 25 Prozent sich lau und flau oder stark und bewußt zum Deutschtum 
bekennen, so sind die letzten 50 Prozent für das Deutschtum noch zu gewinnen’.”; Ibid. 
153 “Eine scharfe nationale Grenzlinie kann und wird es nie geben, sondern stets nur eine mehr oder minder 
verschiebbare Grenzfläche, in der beide Nationen mit und neben einander wohnen, oft sogar innerhalb 
derselben Familie.”; “Grenzpolitische Wochenschau,” Schleswigsche Nachrichten, December 31, 1932. 
SHLB. 
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Schleswig by pointing to the region’s “mixed population of Germans and Jutes.”154 North 
Schleswig was thus hardly “Danish through and through.”155 Nor was it by this 
description unequivocally German, however. Rather, it was precisely the region’s ethnic 
ambiguity that allowed German irredentists to challenge the hold of other nations on 
contested regions and to push Germandom deeper into the grey zone.  
 These interactions in Germany’s Weimar-era borderlands between Nazism’s 
irredentism and racial ideology on the one hand and the reality of ethnic and national 
ambiguity on the other has as yet gone unexamined, even in the flourishing literature on 
national indifference. Yet they illustrate that Nazis on the frontiers were already engaging 
in a nationalist doublethink of sorts: Nazi activists maintained that there existed an 
unalterable identity between ethnicities and nations and, simultaneously, that people 
could be won for Germandom. Both sides of this coin played, at different times, to 
Nazism’s advantage during the period of its ascendancy. Rhetoric that painted the 
borderlands as the sites of clashes between clearly delineated nations, by far the more 
common, could be employed to indict opponents on ethnic and national in addition to on 
political grounds. Then again, recognizing national indifference could provide a 
foundation for irredentism. Pragmatically, of course, the Nazi movement could not afford 
in any case to be too selective regarding its members’ ethnic backgrounds. The contrast 
between these two ways of thinking opened up the Nazi movement to charges of 
hypocrisy, both for not adhering to its own ethnonationalist principles and for continuing 
to expound them in the face of that failure. Infamous as Nazi racial ideology rightfully is, 
evaluating its interplay with borderland realities can thus productively nuance 
understandings of it and its centrality to the Nazi worldview, illuminating its indeed 
 
154 “aus Deutschen und Jüten gemischten Bevölkerung”; “Also sprach H.P. Hansen,” Flensburger NS-
Zeitung, July 16, 1932. SHLB. 
155 “’urdänischer’”; Ibid. 
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“fragmentary, instrumental” nature.156 The connection of nationalities’ mixing and 
ambiguity with political violence will be surveyed in the following chapter.  
 
156 Pendas, Roseman, and Wetzell, “Introduction," 7. 
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The Borderlands’ Violent Contestation 
 
 Nazi activists in Germany’s border provinces were, as the previous chapter has 
established, very much aware of the ethnic ambiguity and national indifference that 
continued to characterize these regions. One response to the knowledge that Germandom 
enjoyed no certain monopoly on the national loyalties of these areas’ populations and 
Germany hence, by the precedent of the post-war settlement, no guaranteed hold on the 
land was violence. Violence – or in this case prospective violence – could on the one 
hand take regimented form, as it did in border protection initiatives. Many Nazis 
volunteered in the Reichswehr-sponsored Grenzschutz, though the leadership remained 
wary of collaboration with other groups in military matters. Instead, it occasionally 
promoted the movement and the SA in particular as the more effective underwriter of 
border defense. On the other hand, the borderlands also saw more spontaneous ethnic 
violence, generally in reaction to Polish activism. Such clashes occurred particularly 
during election seasons but also outside them, for Nazis wished to suppress competing 
visions of their home regions’ national status. Others have stressed that violence 
perpetrated by Nazis in these regions was often exaggerated by nationalist media on both 
sides and in fact even claimed as nationalist when it was in actuality of the quotidian 
variety, drawing on government reports as apparently objective evidence of borderlands 
violence differing little from the political and day-to-day violence elsewhere. The 
government in its difficult foreign political situation, however, had its own motivations 
for contesting claims of nationalist violence where it could. While it may thus be hard to 
tell in hindsight which reported violent incidents were in fact motivated by nationalism, 
the overall pattern suggests that Nazis often responded violently when they felt that the 
aspirational monolithic Germandom of the borderlands was being encroached on. 
 Conflict, it should be noted, is absolutely central to politics. It fashions and 
continually reinforces groups, defines their roles in relation to one another, and by these 
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means upholds the overarching social system.1 Where group identities need creating or 
imbuing with renewed relevance, conflict will even be deliberately provoked or stoked.2 
The German borderlands were such a case where national groups were perceived by 
nationalists to require fortifying. The incompleteness of the nationalization process might 
therefore, in this framework, give rise to an expectation of finding a higher, rather than a 
lesser, rate of violence than in more fully nationalized regions. Tim Wilson has made this 
case in his comparative study of the immediate post-World War I years in Ireland and 
Upper Silesia. Violence in the latter was both more frequent and more gruesome, 
precisely because national groups still had to be generated there and the consequences of 
choosing what was perceived as the wrong one demonstrated.3 Violence might thus be 
thought of as one radical means by which categories of people with a shared trait can 
have higher levels of group-ness instilled in them. Less murderously than during Upper 
Silesia's plebiscite period, this dynamic of fostering group-ness through violence 
arguably continued into the period under investigation here. Furthermore, political 
scientists Roger Petersen has found in a comparative study that resentment at a perceived 
inversion of an ethnic hierarchy is, much more so than other potential triggers like fear, 
the best predictor for ethnic animosities turning violent.4 Such a turning upside down of 
the national hierarchy was certainly considered by Germans to have occurred in the wake 
of the Versailles Treaty and, what was more, it was feared that this reversal might 
intensify, for Poland was widely feared to plan to claim or annex more territory yet. 
Violence was arguably deemed an apt tool for putting the upstart nationality in what was 
held to be its rightful place as well as for buttressing national groups. 
 
1 Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Abingdon: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 1956), 34. 
2 Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence," Annual Review of Sociology 24 
(1988): 433; Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, 104-105. 
3 Timothy Wilson, Frontiers of Violence: Conflict and Identity in Ulster and Upper Silesia 1918-1922 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 111-115. 
4 Roger Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century 
Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 51-52. 
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The lack of a perceived inversion of hierarchies may explain why nationalist 
violence did not plague Schleswig during the Weimar years, despite all resentment of 
North Schleswig's loss and hostility toward the Danes. Of course, Schleswig saw its fair 
share of political violence during the republic’s final years. Some members of the militant 
Landvolk movement, which originated and had its epicenter there, committed bomb 
attacks against Landrat and tax offices.5 The Altona Bloody Sunday of July 17, 1932, 
during which clash between SA men, Communists, and the police eighteen people died, 
became the pretext for the replacement by presidential edict three days later of the 
Prussian government with chancellor Franz von Papen, who was named Reich commissar 
for the state.6 Neither these two episodes of violence, nor any others, had ethnic 
undertones, however. In fact, the nationality struggle in the north, while intense, had 
always lacked the ferocity of that in the East. Long before scientific racism took hold, 
Prussia’s Polish-speaking populations were regarded as of lower civilizational status than 
their German countrymen. Frederick the Great justified partitioning Poland in the first 
place by citing the incompetence of its rulers, the most prominent example of Poles' 
ostensible inability to manage affairs of any sort effectively.7  Masurians, for their part, 
were considered brutish to the point of outlandishness.8 Race eventually became yet 
another way for Germans to assert superiority. Such claims were less viable to make 
about Denmark, which could hardly be claimed to be less developed than Germany and 
whose population was if anything above the German one in the racial hierarchy. Their 
Nordic nature Danes were, it is true, accused of having fallen out of touch with due to 
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their internationalism.9 This detachment from their racial-national background meant, 
Nazis argued, that Germans were currently the better custodians of Danish heritage. In 
Germany in contrast to in Denmark, for instance, the Volkshochschule, a format 
originally conceived by the Danish pastor-educator N.F.S. Grundtvig, thrived, for 
Germans understood better Grundtvig’s putative principle of improving one’s own nation 
first in order to better the world.10 Once Danes reconnected with this sort of Nordic spirit, 
it was insisted, they would recognize Nazism’s truth.11 However much Denmark’s 
annexation of North Schleswig was resented, it would thus not have been considered an 
upsetting of the racial order. Denmark was, furthermore, also a smaller state and a lesser 
geopolitical threat than Poland. Invasion or renewed claims for more German territory by 
Poland, but not by Denmark, were anticipated and feared. Denmark might thus not have 
appeared to pose a threat that necessitated heading off by radical measures.  
 In the Eastern borderlands, in contrast, violence – or at least reporting thereof – 
was a staple of the run-up to elections, particularly to those to the Reichstag in September 
1930 and July 1932 and to the Prussian Diet in April of the latter year. Usually this 
violence was fairly quotidian, consisting of the taunting, threatening, and beating of 
Polish campaigners as well as of the seizure and destruction of their campaign materials. 
Thereby, perpetrators sought to reinforce who, in their view, in these contested regions 
was a legitimate member of the body politic with a right to political participation and 
who, crucially, was not. Upper Silesia, with its active Polish movement and good archival 
record, offers the greatest number of documented examples. In that province’s Ratibor 
county on a spring day in 1932, for instance, a group of Polish campaigners repeatedly 
ran into a band of hostile Nazis, who over the course of these encounters thrashed some 
 
9 “Dänemark und der deutsche Nationalsozialismus,” Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung, April 28, 
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11 “Dänemark und der deutsche Nationalsozialismus,” Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung, April 28, 
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of them, threw stones at their leader, and under threat of beating extracted their 
propaganda materials from two of them.12 Also in the lead-up to the 1932 Diet election, 
two Polish campaigners were beaten – one of them with a rock – and stoned by a group 
of Nazis when they were distributing flyers near a village polling station in Rosenberg 
county.13 In a separate incident in the same district, a band of ten Nazis hurled stones at 
two Polish activists who consequently had to abandon the village before they could hand 
out their flyers.14 Often, campaign materials were destroyed outright.  Before the Diet 
election, for instance, a group of Polish campaigners cycled through a Ratibor county 
village, two of them sporting posters showing the Polish party’s lead candidates on their 
torso and back. When they encountered a notorious local Nazi, he, aided by a mob of his 
political comrades, attacked them and tore the posters off them.15 The same article also 
touched on another incident, which had occurred near Gleiwitz, during which a Polish 
campaigner had been encircled by a gang of Nazis and had had his fliers destroyed.16 A 
week and a half later another piece told how a lone Polish campaigner in a Cosel county 
village had stood near the village church with a Polish party poster when a twenty-strong 
crowd gathered around him. One of the mob stuck a Hitler handbill on the Polish sign. 
Then two men, one of whom first tore up the poster altogether, set about beating the Pole, 
with three further individuals throwing stones at the Polish poster all the while.17 Near 
Oppeln, another solitary Pole similarly experienced a series of antagonistic encounters 
during a day of campaigning for the Diet election. The day began with a quarrel over the 
putting up of a Polish poster. Then he stationed himself outside the church to pass out 
flyers but exiting Nazi congregants tore up many of them and beat him. When he took up 
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16 Ibid. 
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position elsewhere to distribute the remaining leaflets, the same Nazis attacked him a 
second time. Finally, he happened upon some youths tearing down the initially contested 
poster and, when he warned them against doing so, was threatened with a knife.18 
Perhaps the most extensively recorded single incident, however, took place in the county 
town of Cosel in the lead-up to the 1930 Reichstag election. There, the Polska Zachodnia 
reported, the Polish campaigner Klinik had been peacefully passing out leaflets in the 
main square during the weekend market when Nazi “shock troops” attacked him.19 The 
police, however, allegedly intervened only when a group of Communists rushed to 
Klinik’s aid and the situation developed into a more general brawl. Even then, the police 
made no arrests, though the Nazis reputedly threatened to incinerate Polish homes.20  
 Polish election rallies were another favorite target of violence. In a village in 
Rosenberg county, for example, young men, most of them members of the Hitler Youth, 
gathered outside the pub where a Polish campaign event for the 1932 Diet election was 
about to be held. Arguing that Poles “belonged behind the border,”21 they threatened to 
break up the gathering and once the speech was underway duly began howling like a 
“horde of savages.”22 The meeting was consequently abandoned after half an hour. 
Following another Polish rally in the same county during that time, the speaker’s car on 
its way back drove over a plank with nails sticking out of it, purportedly placed there by 
Nazis.23 Only because it was being driven at low speed, the Nowiny Codzienne 
maintained, could the car and its occupants avoid veering into a ditch or tree.24 In East 
 
18 “Wahlterror im Oppelner Schlesien” (translation), Nowiny Codzienne, May 5, 1932. APO, NPO, 112.  
19 “Stosstruppler”; “Ein schändlicher preussischer Terror gegenüber den Polen im Oppelner Schlesien. Die 
Stosstruppler und Polizeibeamten, die Schinder des polnischen Volkes” (translation), Polska Zachodnia, 
October 13, 1930. APO, NPO, 109.  
20 Ibid.  
21 “…sie gehörten hinter die Grenze”; “Noch Fälle von Wahlterror” (translation), Nowiny Codzienne, May 
22, 1932. APO, NPO, 112. 
22 “eine Horde von Wilden”; Ibid. 
23 „Unter dem preußischen Stiefel. Ein barbarischer Anschlag der Hitlerleute auf ein Automobil mit 
polnischen Referenten.“ (translation), Polska Zachodnia, April 17, 1932. APO, NPO, 112.  
24 “Eine Falle auf die polnischen Funktionäre” (translation), Nowiny Codzienne, April 17, 1932. APO, 
NPO, 112.  
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Prussian Allenstein, meanwhile, the evening preceding the July 1932 Reichstag election 
saw the storming of the Polish club house, where 200 Polish youths had congregated, by 
armed Nazis.25 Most notably, though, violence broke out in September 1930 in 
Pomeranian Bütow county when pastor Domanski was slated to speak there. By the time 
Domanski arrived, the meeting hall was already full of a hundred-strong throng of Nazis 
under the leadership of the Protestant pastor Becker, who demanded that Domanski 
deliver his address in German. If Domanski did insist on speaking in Polish, the 
policemen present declared, they could not guarantee the safety of the meeting, though 
after Polish objections they had backed away from their initial outright support for 
Becker’s request. They further refused to call in reinforcements. To Domanski’s 
admonitions that breaking up the election meeting would constitute an infringement of 
Poles’ constitutional right to equal treatment, the Nazis responded that they would not 
tolerate a Polish-language speech regardless. All the while, members of the crowd roared 
things like “Get out to Poland.”26 Finally, the owner of the hall withdrew her permission 
of the meeting and it disbanded. As the participants dispersed, the Nazis, under the cover 
of darkness, reportedly perpetrated a veritable “pogrom,” savagely beating many 
attendees.27 Even pastor Becker, mistaken for a Pole in the dark, was pounded by his 
men.   
 One particularly well-documented case of electoral violence, which illustrates 
such clashes’ aim of enforcing Germandom in contested regions, occurred in the 
Masurian county town of Ortelsburg a month prior to the 1930 Reichstag election. On the 
morning of August 23, the inhabitants had awoken to find Polish party flyers distributed 
 
25 “Überfall der Hitlerleute auf das polnische Vereinshaus in Allenstein,” Kurier Poznanski, August 2, 
1932, trans. in Gesamtüberblick über die polnische Presse, August 10, 1932. APO, RO, 1882. 
26 “’raus nach Polen’”;  “Skandalöse Vorgänge in Oslawdamerow und Damsdorf. Hakatistische Banden 
überfallen die Polen. – Asiatische Zustände im Kreise Bütow. – Wir verlangen die Entfernung des 
Regierungspräsidenten in Köslin und des Landrats in Bütow,” Głos Pogranicza, September 17, 1930, trans. 
in Gesamtüberblick über die polnische Presse, September 24, 1930. APO, RO, 1880.  
27 “Pogrom”; Ibid.  
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throughout their downtown.28 Since they had been seen in the company of a well-known 
local Polish activist, a visiting group of students were suspected of responsibility for this. 
Accounts of the ensuing events differ, but the verdict when they came to trial concluded 
that when three Nazis – Werner Schulz, Gottfried Heyer, and Gustav Trzaskia – returned 
to Ortelsburg from an election rally in a nearby village that evening, they stopped by an 
inn, where they heard that the foreign party was rumored to be staying at Julius Wrobel’s 
Central Hotel.29 That establishment’s taproom was incidentally the local Nazi hang-out, 
to which they had in any case been planning to head. Once there, they questioned Wrobel 
about the rumored presence of Poles among his guests, but he denied it. They stayed in 
the taproom, where accusations that the students were lodging in the hotel continued to 
circulate. Eventually therefore, Trzaska and Chittka demanded to see the guestbook, a 
request that Wrobel refused. Wrobel then left the hotel’s public area to give tempers a 
chance to cool, while Chittka phoned the police, so that someone might be sent to check 
out the guests’ nationality. Presently, the local Polish activist, in whose presence the 
visiting group had earlier been seen, turned up at the hotel and the headwaiter, mistaking 
him for one of the visitors, led him up to the guestrooms to the great agitation of the 
patrons.30 At this point, Wrobel, having returned to the lobby, admitted that his guests 
were indeed foreign; whether they were Polish Schulz, who had emerged as the Nazis’ 
ringleader, could go and ascertain himself. Schulz immediately went upstairs. The young 
man on whose door he knocked first informed Schulz that he and the rest of his group 
were not Polish but Czechoslovak and produced a corresponding passport when Schulz 
demanded proof. In the meantime, two unidentified Nazis had followed Schulz upstairs 
and more students had emerged from their rooms. An altercation between what was by 
then something of a crowd developed in the corridor, during which one of the Nazis 
 
28 Verdict in the case against Werner Schulz and Gottfried Heyer, June 5, 1931. GStA PK, XX. HA, Rep. 
240 C, 67b.  
29 Statements in the case against Werner Schulz and Gottfried Heyer. GStA PK, XX. HA, Rep. 240 C ,67b; 
"Bericht: über den Überfall auf den Studentenausflug in Ortelsburg.” GStA PK, XX. HA, Rep. 240 C, 67b. 
30 “wegen seines typisch fremdländischen Aussehens“; Ibid. 
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slapped a Czechoslovak visitor and Schulz threatened, “’You have to leave within ten 
minutes!’”31 Much of this heated exchange was conducted, even on the part of the Nazis, 
in Polish. One of the students rang for the headwaiter, who rebuked Schulz and headed 
downstairs to call for the police, just to find that the policeman for whom the Nazis had 
earlier called had arrived. Still under the impression that he was there simply to check the 
visitors’ passports, the officer did not take the Nazi rowdies’ names and later remembered 
only Schulz, who had stayed for a time while he inspected the guests’ documents. On his 
way out, the policeman finally dispersed a twenty-strong crowd that had gathered outside 
the hotel, shouting “’Poles out’ and the like.”32 The Czechoslovak group departed the 
following day. Having been thought Polish and involved in Polish electoral propaganda, 
they had fallen victim to Nazis’ drive to demarcate whose participation in political life 
and, in fact, mere presence was in their view permissible in the region. 
It is worth noting that the perpetrators and victims in many of these hostile 
encounters knew one another. While the Czechoslovak students were visitors unknown to 
their attackers, the local activist with whom they were supposed to be in league was 
clearly a figure of whom the Nazis were aware. Similarly, in newspaper reports about 
other instances of violence the leaders of Polish campaigners’ assailants were usually 
listed by name. One compendium of electoral violence published in the Nowiny 
Codzienne in May 1932, for instance, reported on eight separate incidents and gave 
names in every case.33 Among the episodes chronicled in that compilation were that of 
the repeatedly stoned and beaten campaigners in Ratibor county, that of the cyclists who 
had had the posters of the Polish candidates that they had been wearing torn off them, and 
that of the activists who had been encircled and had their flyers destroyed near Gleiwitz. 
 
31 “’In zehn Minuten müsst ihr raus!’”; Verdict in the case against Werner Schulz and Gottfried Heyer, June 
5, 1931. GStA PK, XX. HA, Rep. 240 C, 67b.  
32 “’Polen raus’ und ähnliches”; Ibid. 
33 “Wahlterror im Oppelner Schlesien,“ Nowiny Codzienne, May 10, 1932, trans. in Gesamtüberblick über 
die polnische Presse, May 20, 1932. APO, RO, 1882. 
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The articles about the lone Polish campaigners who had been assaulted near Cosel34 and 
Oppeln respectively both provided names as well. 35 Pastor Becker, of course, featured 
prominently in reporting on the disruption of the Bütow county rally with pastor 
Domanski. Perpetrators’ names, as a rule, do not appear to have been freely invented by 
the Polish press, for when German authorities investigated, they could usually find and 
bring in for interviewing those named in the newspaper pieces. Certainly, as Mathias 
Niendorf has highlighted in the context of the Border Province, both sides’ nationalist 
activists often came to and caused trouble in villages whose inhabitants ordinarily 
coexisted peacefully.36 In fact, many of the Polish campaigners mentioned above were 
visiting from elsewhere to promote their cause. That Poles often accused people known to 
them of violence, however, suggests at least that assaults occurred within networks of 
nationalist activists that were aware of one another. Often, Nazis were thus not assailing 
strangers, but members of their own or nearby communities. 
While those accused by name of having perpetrated attacks appear generally to 
have been real people, to what extent confrontations were genuinely motivated by 
nationalist politics was and is debated. After all, the Polish press, from which all above 
examples except that of the disturbance in the Ortelsburg hotel are taken, had a vested 
interest in heightening the population’s perception of nationalist division and strife. In 
frontier regions like Upper Silesia and Masuria, where nationalist loyalties had not yet 
become firm, activists first needed to implant the nationalist view of the world as split 
into mutually exclusive, often antagonistic nations. It was owed to this need, Pieter 
Judson has argued in his book about the imperial Austrian language frontier, that 
accounts of violence proliferated – it was not so much violence itself that was endemic as 
propagandistic press portrayals thereof. Accounts of violence became such a staple of 
 
34 “Nochmals vom Wahlterror,” Nowiny Codzienne/Dziennik Berlinski, May 29, 1932, trans. in 
Gesamtüberblick über die polnische Presse, June 4, 1932. APO, RO 1882.  
35 “Wahlterror im Oppelner Schlesien” (translation), Nowiny Codzienne  May 5, 1932. APO, NPO, 112. 
36 Mathias Niendorf, Minderheiten an der Grenze: Deutsche und Polen in den Kreisen Faltow (Złotów) und 
Zempelburg (Sępólno Krajeńskie) 1900-1939 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1997), 336. 
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nationalist reporting that they could become quite schematic, he explained, such as the 
genre of what he calls the schoolhouse drama, in which acts of vandalism against 
nationalist private school associations’ schoolhouses were characterized as expressions of 
deep-seated nationalist animosities in the respective affected village.37 If narratives like 
these are taken at face value, he cautioned, analyses risk underestimating other, more 
ordinary causes for violence and overestimating the intensity of nationalist sentiment. It 
may be, he proposed, that nationalism was not so much the cause of violence as violence 
was a nationalizing force.38 Others have voiced the same concern that violence was 
manipulated by the press and was not, in fact, representative of life in the localities where 
it occurred. As mentioned, Mathias Niendorf in his monograph about the Border Province 
argued that instances of nationalist violence were actually exceptions to usually tranquil 
village life, often brought about by outsiders who settled or visited there. Increased 
reporting of violent nationalist conflicts by regional newspapers hence amounted to 
spotlighting what were actually the exceptions to the day-to-day calm.39 Brendan Karch 
agreed that unpolitical brawls were depicted as anti-Polish by Upper Silesia’s floundering 
interwar Polish movement in an attempt to use the need for defense against a common 
threat to mobilize Polish-speakers.40  
In the interwar German borderlands, it is true, Polish journals’ articles about 
violence noticeably served the rationalization of the Polish nationalist movement’s 
downturn under what were after all better legal circumstances than in the empire. Reports 
of assaults on Polish campaigners tended to be published after the election in the lead-up 
to which they had taken place, usually in the formulaic format of compendia, like the 
above-mentioned one of eight cases. Their evident purpose was to impress on readers the 
 
37 Pieter Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the language frontiers of imperial Austria 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 53-63. 
38 Ibid., 62-63. 
39 Niendorf, Minderheiten an der Grenze, 336. 
40 Brendan Karch, Nation and loyalty in a German-Polish borderland: Upper Silesia, 1848-1960 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 163. 
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intensity of Poles’ repression, so that the Polish movement’s electoral failures would not 
appear to be owed to its own organizational and policy shortcomings.41 This exculpatory 
message was explicitly articulated by some pieces. Domanski, as head of the Union of 
Poles’ electoral committee, for instance, released a statement following drastic Polish 
losses in the July 1932 vote proclaiming, “We openly admit the defeat, but we do not 
admit a weakness of the Polish people in Germany.”42 The Polish movement had suffered 
a diminution of votes only, the declaration read, on account of an increased number of 
renegades, who had been led astray by Communist promises of economic relief, Center 
Party Germanizing from the pulpit, and, of course, fear of Nazi violence,43 which last had 
rendered Polish campaigning “veritably impossible.”44 After the Diet elections earlier 
that year, the Polska Zachodnia had similarly maintained that “the traditional anti-Polish 
moral and physical terror” having “recently been doubled by the Hitler shock troops” had 
made poor Polish showings at the ballot box well-nigh inevitable.45 Another piece 
published after that election went so far as to suggest that Nazi terror had been easily able 
to quell Polish activism in Upper Silesia because it had reawakened the Polish 
population’s memories of plebiscite-era violence.46   
The German authorities’ investigations of violent incidents are often treated as 
proof that, in contrast to how these were represented in Polish reporting, they were 
ordinary brawls, which were only later enlisted for propagandistic purposes. Brendan 
 
41 “Wahlterror im Oppelner Schlesien,“ Nowiny Codzienne, May 10, 1932, trans. in Gesamtüberblick über 
die polnische Presse, May 20, 1932. APO, RO, 1882. 
42 “Wir geben die Niederlage offen zu, wir gestehen jedoch nicht eine Schwäche des polnischen Volkes in 
Deutschland ein.”; “An die Polen in Deutschland!,” Nowiny Codzienne, August 4, 1932, trans. in 
Gesamtüberblick über die polnische Presse, August 10, 1932. APO, RO, 1882. 
43 “Was weiter?,” Nowiny Codzienne, August 4, 1932, trans. in Gesamtüberblick über die polnische Presse, 
August 10, 1932. APO, RO, 1882. 
44 “geradezu unmöglich”; “Der furchtbare Wahlterror im Oppelner Schlesien” (translation), Ilustrowany 
Kurier Codzienny, April 30, 1932. APO, NPO, 112. 
45 “den traditionellen antipolnischen moralischen und physischen Terror hinzufügen, der gegenüber den 
Polen angewandt wird und letztens durch die Hitlerstoßtrupps vedoppelt wurde”; “Der brutale preußische 
Terror hat eine neue Wahlniederlage der Polen im Oppelner Schlesien verursacht” (translation), Polska 
Zachodnia, April 25, 1932. APO, NPO, 112. 
46 “Hitler-Methode,” trans. in Gesamtüberblick über die polnische Presse, May 11, 1932. APO, RO, 1882.  
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Karch, for one, employs the example of a drunken melee at a village Mandolin Club 
dance, which was subsequently publicized as an anti-Polish attack despite a government 
investigation that confirmed its unpolitical nature, to illustrate that a faltering Polish 
movement was inventing nationalist violence.47 Besides the riot that broke out in Oppeln 
when a visiting Polish theatre troupe performed a Polish opera there, he does not provide 
additional cases of violence that was portrayed as anti-Polish but according to the 
government was not, though further such examples do exist, including some to which 
Nazis were party. When the Polish campaigner Klinik lodged a complaint that the Nazi 
Lasinka brothers had harassed him twice owing to his Polish-ness, not only the right-
wing Schlesische Zeitung48 but also the government inquiry concluded that the 
altercations had been nothing more than drunken pub fights that Klinik was exploiting, as 
he had reportedly announced at the time that he would.49 In another case, the Union of 
Poles protested on behalf of a man, who had allegedly been beaten up and blackmailed 
due to his membership in a Polish choir. When government officials questioned him, 
however, he averred that he was an NSDAP member. They gathered that he had probably 
suffered ill-treatment not for his involvement with the singing group but for his secret 
relationship with a girl from the neighboring village.50 In a different instance, a quarrel 
arose over the price of a cow, which, the two Nazi buyers grumbled, would be much less 
in Poland than what the Polish-speaking cottager was asking. That dire threats and 
violence followed this exchange was not confirmed by eyewitnesses. Nevertheless, the 
incident, paired with the unlawful removal earlier in the day of a poster hung by the 
cottager, was taken by the Polish press to amount to voter intimidation ahead of the Diet 
election.51 In reality, it appears to have been an ordinary economic dispute, if overlaid 
 
47 Karch, Nation and loyalty in a German-Polish borderland, 162-163. 
48 “Die Polen fabrizieren Terrormeldungen,” Schlesische Zeitung, [December 1930]. APO, NPO, 108. 
49 “Betrifft: August Klinik – Dziergowitz,” December 3, 1930. APO, NPO, 108.  
50 “Beschwerde des Polenbundes an den Völkerbundsrat wegen eines angeblichen Überfalles auf den 
Grubenarbeiter Edmund Adamiok aus Kamienietz, Kreis Gleiwitz," May 24, 1932. APO, NPO, 112. 
51 ““Betrifft angeblicher [sic] Terror gegen den Häusler Schierz in Lugnian,” May 23, 1932. APO, NPO, 
112; Witness statements, May 1932. APO, NPO, 112.  
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with xenophobia. This discrepancy between press and government reporting was also 
picked up on by Pieter Judson, who focused on the case study of a brawl in the Bohemian 
village of Bergreichenstein. While the German and Czech press accounts had in common 
that they saw the fight as the product of the population’s split into two well-defined and 
antagonistic nations, the government’s inquiry foregrounded the contingent factors that 
led to the disturbance of the peace and characterized the hostile sentiments underlying it 
as transitory, still remediable through determined intervention. The government report 
did not consider the population’s division into nationalities final.52 However, Judson does 
acknowledge that the authorities recognized nationalism as a cause for the unrest, though 
they considered it the province of a nationalist hard core with whom the crowd had gone 
along.53 In comparisons of the nationalist press and official government reports like this, 
Judson and other historians implicitly treat the latter as objective. Karch even explicitly 
affirmed that, “the historical record shows a pattern of fairness and authoritativeness in 
German investigations” of the Polish minority’s complaints, which was “prompted by 
concern over the fair treatment of the much larger German-speaking minority in 
Poland.”54 
However, while nationalist reporting had indeed long falsified accounts of 
clashes, including between Nazis and Poles, the German government’s reports in the 
Weimar period had their own reasons to downplay such violence. For one thing, Polish 
articles regularly charged that the authorities had done too little to check Nazis’ violent 
nationalist excesses. After the Bütow county rally with pastor Domanski, at which the 
intruding Nazi mob had demanded that he give his address in German, for example, the 
Głos Pogranicza called for the dismissal not only of the two policemen present, who had 
failed to defend the Poles’ rights or to call for backup, but also of the Landrat, who, the 
 
52 Judson, Guardians of the Nation, 187-206. 
53 Ibid., 215-218. 
54 Brendan Karch, “Nationalism on the Margins: Silesians between Germany and Poland, 1848-1945” (PhD 
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paper argued, had been either so complicit or so incompetent as to send so few officers in 
the first place.55 In the context of Klinik’s beating in Cosel too, the police was 
condemned for supposedly having intervened too late and for having made no arrests, 
even though the Polish population too paid the taxes that maintained the police force.56 
Regarding previously unmentioned events too, newspaper pieces complained of official 
foot-dragging. When a Polish campaigner was beaten and had his briefcase stolen by 
Nazis in the lead-up to the 1932 Diet election, for instance, the policeman who eventually 
accompanied the victim back to the crime scene reputedly merely took the culprits’ 
personal information before departing, leaving the Pole to his fate. A second policeman, 
who happened to pass, did keep the Nazis at bay long enough for the campaigner to 
escape, the Nowiny Codzienne admitted, but the first official’s behavior was nevertheless 
used to castigate the police.57 Before that same election, police in Groß-Strehlitz county 
were said to have failed to intervene in a severe beating, even though it ostensibly 
occurred within earshot of the station.58 The coordinator of Beuthen’s Polish campaign 
for the July 1932 Reichstag election, for his part, allegedly met with “very tactless and 
haughty” treatment when he went to the police after having been beaten by three SA men 
for having defended the right of one of his subordinates to pass out flyers.59 By the time 
the police condescended to return with him to the site of the attack, the Nowiny 
Codzienne reported, his assailants were long gone.60 Since the German authorities were 
 
55 “Skanalöse Vorgänge in Oslawdamerow und Damsdorf. Hakatistische Banden überfallen die Polen. – 
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die polnische Presse, September 24, 1930. APO, RO, 1880.  
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August 5, 1932, trans. in Gesamtüberblick über die polnische Presse, August 10, 1932. APO, RO, 1882. 
60 Ibid. 
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subject to keen scrutiny by the international community, they could hardly let such 
accusations, which linked them with Germany’s most radical nationalists, stand. They 
denied all insinuated dereliction of duty. In Cosel, in the official telling, the intelligence 
that Klinik was being harassed had taken some time to reach the policemen at the other 
end of the marketplace and so had crossing the bustling square to reach him.61 In Groß 
Strehlitz, the assault had, in fact, taken place outside of hearing range from the police 
station.62  
 Beyond simply trying to clear themselves, German authorities also contradicted 
that the incidents reported in the Polish press had been brought about by one-sided 
wrongdoing on the part of Germans. They were quick to place blame for altercations on 
the Polish victims themselves, whom they routinely accused of unfriendly and irritating,63 
“brusque,”64 and “provocative” behavior.65 The Polish activist, whose briefcase had been 
stolen, for instance, was said to have forced his way onto a farm, whose German owners 
had made clear that he was unwelcome, in the course of his campaigning, thereby 
provoking the attack on him.66 In Cosel, Klinik’s pushiness about his flyers had prompted 
the Nazi intervention that became violent. It was likewise his ceaseless taunts in the 
police station’s waiting room afterwards that roused the Nazi ringleader into threatening 
the smoking out of the town’s Polish residents.67 Outright distortion was evidently in play 
when the investigating authorities claimed that this menacing remark had been 
immediately followed up with the clarification, “’By that I mean, that the Hitler party will 
win on September 14 and that the Polish party will be prohibited. Just like Germandom is 
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NPO, 112. 
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64 "brüskes"; Ibid.. 
65 Report, April 27, 1932. APO, NPO, 112. 
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67 Report, October 24, 1930. APO, NPO, 109. 
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prohibited and oppressed in Poland.’”68 That anyone would append such a stilted 
qualification to a threat in the midst of heated verbal sparring seems unlikely. Similarly, 
an official report about the disrupted campaign rally with pastor Domanski in Bütow 
county maintained that following the meeting’s disbanding, the Polish attendees had 
lured the German intruders, who had stayed behind in the meeting hall, outside with cries 
for help, only to beat them up when they got outside.69 That the Nazis’ purposeful 
dispersal of the meeting had turned into a cleverly laid ambush on them seems, again, 
implausible. Regarding complaints about the removal of Polish posters too, authorities 
pointed to wrongdoing on both sides. After all, they pointed out, minority members in 
their turn took down German posters.70 This tendency to relativize German misconduct 
also raises the possibility that reports dismissing violent incidents as ordinary brawls may 
not always have been altogether truthful, though assessing their trustworthiness is now 
impossible. It is noteworthy, at the very least, that internal government reports often went 
through the Polish papers’ compilations of instances of harassment simply to dismiss the 
charge of nationalist motivations case by case.71 This brushing-off of allegations that 
violence had anti-Polish motives was just as formulaic as the Polish nationalist press’ 
making of such claims. 
It is true that the German government’s handling of reported nationalist violence 
was guided by its concern for its international reputation and also, as Karch stresses, for 
the situation of the German minority in Poland. Republicans did point to the risk of 
aggravating the condition of the Volksdeutsche as a reason to take all necessary measures 
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to rein in Nazi terror, as will be shown later. The desire to avoid incidents going for 
mediation to international organizations, to whom the Polish government did submit 
complaints, is a – usually unspoken – undercurrent in all the government’s investigations. 
What has been overlooked, however, is that displaying a scrupulous treatment of Polish 
complaints was not the only way to deflect international scrutiny, but that denying the 
existence of a nationalist violence problem was another. Rather than take government 
investigations into alleged cases of nationalist violence as accounts of what truly 
happened, one should therefore weigh official and press accounts, with their respective 
biases, against one another. Sometimes played up and sometimes played down, 
nationalist violence, in which Nazis were prominently involved, does appear to have 
played a notable role in borderlands politics, especially in the run-up to elections, serving 
to delineate acceptable political activity in regions whose national belonging remained 
contested.  
It was not only during election seasons that nationalist violence occurred. In late 
1931, for instance, a crowd of Nazis disrupted and dispersed a Christmas party for Polish 
children and youths in the Upper Silesian village of Nakel.72 Around the same time, it 
came to a knifing in an Upper Silesian county bisected by the border when two Nazis, 
who were celebrating payday in a pub, caught sight of one of their party comrades 
entering the premises with a companion whose brother, they charged, had been a Polish 
insurgent back in 1921. This accompanying man was dangerously stabbed in the spleen 
during the ensuing brawl,73 for which one of the Nazis received a three months’ prison 
sentence.74 In the spring of that year, meanwhile, a Nazi sympathizer had showered abuse 
on a group of Polish youths that was on its way home from a Polish theatre performance 
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and her companion, an NSDAP member, had beaten one of the young men.75 Most 
infamously, six truckloads of SA men fell upon a fire brigade festival held in the village 
of Glumen in the Border Province in August of the following year, in which Polish 
residents had participated alongside Germans.76 There appears to have been general 
fighting, with Polish papers further detailing how the attackers had invaded a pub, where 
they beat up two Poles, and a private residence, whose inhabitants they assaulted and 
furniture they smashed.77 The SA's planned drive on to nearby Zakrzewo, where pastor 
Domanski was resident, was prevented by the police.78 Unprovoked acts of violence like 
these were in most ways simply manifestations of the Nazi culture of violence. However, 
they did occur in the context of a decades-old nationalist struggle, which arguably led 
radical German nationalists like the Nazis to consider simply being Polish an 
encroachment on the aspirations for monolithic Germandom in the contested regions. 
When Nazis pummeled Polish-speakers on a local train from Danzig to adjacent Sopot, 
for instance, they apparently did so because the Poles had "provocatively made use of 
their mother tongue" and they had “energetically refused to tolerate this provocative 
behavior."79 Even in the absence of any activism, the mere act of speaking Polish – like 
participating in village life or attending a Polish play - was considered to warrant 
repression. 
Where even passively being Polish sparked retribution, activism that consciously 
promoted Polish identities could lead to sometimes spectacular violence, as demonstrated 
by two notorious episodes, namely the riots that met the Polish School Association’s 
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decision to open a minority school in Masurian Groß Dembowitz and a Katowice theatre 
troupe’s guest performance of a Polish opera in Oppeln. The former affair got underway 
in December 1931, when the sons of the Gemeindevorsteher of Groß Dembowitz 
thrashed Gottlieb Pozny, the elderly pub owner who had instigated the foundation of the 
minority school.80 In nearby Jedwabno, the School Association’s chauffeur was beaten 
and stabbed by the Nazis Sawitzki and Dimitrowitz while the surrounding mob tried to 
topple his van.81 A month passed, but then in January 1932 a state prosecutor was 
dispatched to Jedwabno to investigate and make arrests.82 This belated effort at law 
enforcement sparked violent protest, during which the state prosecutor was beaten. It was 
this mob violence against a government official and the resulting trial that, more than the 
original attacks, aroused government and media attention. The ringleader of the violence 
against the state prosecutor, a certain Otto, and over one-hundred of his accomplices were 
tried speedily in a well-publicized court case,83 though they were all cleared or got off 
lightly, Otto with a ten-day prison sentence that pre-trial custody was considered to have 
fulfilled.84 Sawitzki and Dimitrowitz85 as well as Pozny’s attackers, in the meantime, 
were acquitted altogether due to an ostensible lack of evidence against them.86 
Predictably, Polish newspapers aired their outrage. The contrast between the 
month-long delay in sending the state prosecutor after the initial attacks and the swift 
trying and sentencing of the state prosecutor’s assailants was decried as a clear sign that 
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the German state valued its authority more than the rights of the Polish minority.87 Even 
the punishments of the state prosecutor’s assailants were preposterously modest.88 
Furthermore, Sawitziki and Dimitrowitz had been cleared despite the testimony of a 
whole group of Polish-speaking school children against them. Whereas adult witnesses 
sympathetic to the perpetrators professed not to have seen or recognized them, the 
youngsters affirmed that they had witnessed the attack from a hill while sledding. Their 
statements in court were less assured than their avowals of Sawitzki and Dimitrowitz’s 
guilt during pre-trial hearings, but the Gazeta Olsztynska maintained that it was mainly 
the denigration by the children’s German teachers of their intellect and of their 
supposedly “lively imagination” that led to the dismissal of their evidence. 89 Having 
failed to apprehend Sawitzki and Dimitrowitz promptly in the first place, the German 
justice system contrived to let them go free.  
 In contrast, the local German press, first and foremost the regional NSDAP organ, 
portrayed the initial attacks as German self-help against the encroachment that were 
Polish schools, to which the republican government had overreacted by making arrests. 
Thereby it had unleashed the expression of the villagers’ sense of justice in the form of 
mob violence against the state prosecutor. The Allensteiner Zeitung, for instance, was 
reported to have termed the coming to naught of the plan to found a minority school at 
Groß Dembowitz, brought about by the assaults as well as a failure to recruit sufficient 
numbers of prospective students, “’the good success of gratifying self-help’.”90 The 
Neidenburger Zeitung likewise gloated that "'the ground under [the Poles’] feet is 
beginning to burn’,” though it did admit that the attack on a state prosecutor, who had 
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after all been dispatched so late that no severe penalties for the arrested could have been 
expected, had been unwise. 91 Their certainty of this kind of public support, even from the 
non-Nazi press, might have emboldened the rioters to fall upon the state prosecutor in the 
first place, the Gazeta Olsztynska alleged.92  
It was the Nazi party’s Preußische Zeitung, though, that launched the largest-scale 
press campaign about the Jedwabno case. After all, of the 104 villagers standing trial for 
the assault on the prosecutor thirty-one were Nazis.93 Long Jedwabno’s residents had to 
look on in frustration, the party organ explained, “as the Pollak gained ground step by 
step, how the Polish element grows in influence with every passing day due to the 
regulations regarding minority schools and extends its positions by the most rigorous 
means.”94 Flouting the constitution’s stipulation that schools should teach in the spirit of 
international understanding, unlike German schools, minority schools were nothing less 
than “an advance guard of the Polish army system,” the journal insisted.95 Due to the 
German government’s misplaced “’objectivity’” in the treatment of the two nationalities, 
there had been “Nowhere a dam, nowhere a halt” to check Poles’ activism.96 In 
December 1931, the “will to self-assertion of these borderland Germans, who in an 
eternal fight resist Polish presumption and arrogance” had finally burst forth.97 
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Jedwabno’s inhabitants no longer being able to tolerate the provocation that were Polish 
schools in a province as vulnerable as East Prussia, a “spontaneous outbreak of the 
people’s will” had occurred.98 When the crowd rioted in response to arrests being made 
for this righteous outburst, it was composed, the Preußische Zeitung stressed repeatedly, 
of fundamentally “peaceful and upstanding people,” whose disaffectedness simply 
manifested itself in a “somewhat robust” manner.99 They had been unable to comprehend 
that fellow villagers were being apprehended merely because some Poles had received a 
“slap on the wrist.”100 “[I]n the eyes of ‘real Germans’,” 101 that “some Polish provocateur 
or agitator had been thrashed by some East Prussians who love their country”102 in 
reaction to the "Polish challenge in the border zone"103 would after all have been a 
“trifle.” 104 All that had happened was that “a few Polish provocateurs, who had presumed 
to abuse German people on German ground, had gotten a roasting” and now the 
government was in effect putting a whole village on trial for standing up to an outsized 
response to such an occurrence.105 Naturally, the Preußische Zeitung called for the trial to 
end in a general acquittal, for that outcome alone “could put Polish arrogance in its 
place.”106 Anything less would only create “martyrs of the German cause,” behind which 
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all East Prussia allegedly stood.107 This unity in support of Jedwabno’s rioters was 
finding expression, the journal told time and again, in a wave of increased support for the 
Nazi party. Echoing Wilhelm II’s August 1914 speech, the paper declared that in 
Jedwabno “there are no more political parties, there are only National Socialists.”108 In 
the village, fifty new members had reportedly joined the party.109 Even a 67-year-old had 
reputedly vowed to become an active fighter in the SA now that this episode had 
rejuvenated him and rekindled his investment in politics.110 An account of a reporter’s 
day trip to Jedwabno made a particular point of relating the solidarity of the villagers 
with one another and with the Nazi movement.111 The Preußische Zeitung 
propagandistically exploited the violent reaction of villagers, among them many Nazis, 
who felt that the plan for the establishment of a minority school encroached on the rights 
and security of a region that was German, but vulnerably so. 
 Grander yet in scale and repercussions was the violence that erupted in Oppeln, 
German Upper Silesia’s capital, when a theatre troupe from Katowice, the capital of the 
region’s now-Polish part, visited to perform the Polish opera Halka in the spring of 1929. 
The troupe’s initial application to perform had been rejected by the town’s Social 
Democratic mayor on the grounds that a Polish production would constitute a political 
event, for which the municipal theater was not available. This decision was, however, 
overridden by Oberpräsident Hans Lukaschek, who pointed up the importance of 
adhering to minority protection agreements, which among other things safeguarded 
minorities’ right to a cultural life, and of thereby hopefully ensuring similar opportunities 
for the German minority in Eastern Upper Silesia.112 The performance was thus 
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scheduled to go ahead on April 28, but while the republican press dutifully if reluctantly 
advertised it, the nationalist papers, first and foremost Lothar Knaak’s far-right 
Oberschlesische Tageszeitung, were up in arms.113 On the day, Nazis passed out leaflets 
in the downtown that expressed opposition to the performance and to the government that 
had permitted it. Eight young members of the party, alongside two Stahlhelm youths, 
subsequently sneaked into the performance without tickets and threw stink bombs from 
the balcony. They were apprehended and escorted out, such that the cast could finish the 
show. Upon its conclusion, however, the actors and musicians found that a crowd of 
people, which law enforcement officers were trying to push back, had gathered outside 
the theatre. Nervous, they left the theatre by the back exit, unaccompanied by police, and 
made for the train station. Part of the throng followed them and once at the station some 
of its members, many of them alleged to be Nazis, cornered and beat performers in the 
tunnel connecting the entrance with the main hall. The attack only came to an end when 
the police arrived at the scene.114  
  The response to the events was swift. Polish newspapers decried the upheaval, 
underscoring its brutality, which they considered premeditated and which they routinely 
exaggerated.115 Across Poland, anti-German protests were held.116 In Katowice, the 
German theatre troupe had its posters defaced and was debarred from use of the city’s 
municipal theatre.117 That aggression had been bound to precipitate negative 
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consequences for Eastern Upper Silesia’s German minority, as well as for German 
foreign policy, was foregrounded by German republican journals’ denunciations of the 
violent excesses.118 In order to limit the fallout from the incident, this press now sought to 
dissociate Germandom at large from perpetrators portrayed as mere irresponsible youths. 
Their conduct, which the papers tried to brush off as a boyish prank, would, it was hoped, 
not be assigned too much weight.119 The German right likewise propagated the image of 
the offenders as hot-headed youths, whose actions should not be treated with too much 
seriousness, but it simultaneously defended as righteous their nationalist motive of 
fighting back against an infringement of Upper Silesia’s Germandom, committed by the 
Polish actors and facilitated by the German government. Though the conservative 
Ostdeutsche Morgenpost joined in lamenting the repercussion of the disturbance, 
particularly for the Germans of Eastern Upper Silesia, it also emphasized the provocation 
the Polish troupe and the regional government had given by putting on and permitting, 
respectively, a performance that was an insult to “Upper Silesia’s German consciousness 
[Deutschbewußtsein].”120 More vociferously, the Oberschlesische Tageszeitung, deeply 
implicated in the agitation against the show, foregrounded the government’s culpability 
for authorizing the production to go ahead and for thereby triggering the population’s 
justified anger. If this indignation and the thrashing the performers had resultantly 
received had come as a surprise to the government, then it, the paper scoffed, had fatally 
misread the popular mood in the German East, which spurned “the new-Prussian 
minority politics, which grants the Poles more rights than the Germans.”121 This 
widespread, feverish vexation at the coming of the theatre troupe had gone to the heads of 
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the attackers, impetuous youths “for whose actions nobody can be made responsible.”122 
For all their imprudence, though, these “German fanatics” were, one headline in the 
Tageszeitung proclaimed, preferable to “traitors” like those in control of the 
government.123  
Nazi propaganda too laid the unrest at the government’s door and endorsed the 
miscreants’ nationalist, defensive impulse. The incendiary leaflet that NSDAP members 
had handed out in town on the day of the performance had already lambasted the 
government for pursuing a “politics of lacking völkisch pride, of bourgeois spinelessness 
[Knochenerweichung] and of political horse trading” in an ill-judged effort to guarantee 
the rights of Eastern Upper Silesia’s Germans.124 It was a product of this approach that 
the Polish theatre company had been enabled to put on a profoundly political, 
propagandistic spectacle “in the German city Oppeln and in Upper Silesia, which since 
the plebiscite of 1921 unequivocally belongs to Germandom.”125 In order to reject the 
authorities’ tactic, readers were urged to join the Nazi movement, which instead fought 
for the preservation of “German honor” and the creation of a strong Germany, which 
alone would be in a position to “truly help our brothers beyond the current borders.”126 
After the show’s disruption and the assault on the performers, a statement released by 
Oppeln’s party chapter averred that its members, though they had handed out the 
oppositional leaflets and sat in on the production without tickets, had taken part in 
neither.127 However, the communiqué went on to reiterate that, “Also after these incidents 
the party stands by the view laid down in its flyer that the preferential treatment of the 
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Polish machinations by the authorities constitutes a danger for Upper Silesia, because 
through this the false impression is awakened that Upper Silesia is really a Polish 
land.”128 “If the performance had proceeded smoothly,” the statement continued, “the 
Polish newspapers would surely have written that Oppeln’s population is Polish or at 
least Polonophile [polenfreundlich].”129 Bluntly, Oppeln’s NSDAP branch articulated the 
rationale that underpinned much nationalist violence in the borderlands: Polish activism, 
particularly if successful, had the potential to belie the narrative that the border regions 
were profoundly, indubitably German. Therefore, it had to be made clear to residents of 
these areas that a Polish identity was beyond the pale and to the wider world that the 
provinces were anything but Polish. For this purpose, Nazis and their ilk did not hesitate 
to resort to violence. 
The scorn for the government's attitude continued into the subsequent period of 
trials, with their defenders arguing that the official stance towards the violence was 
prejudicing the culprits' treatment. Within two days of the performance, Oberpräsident 
Lukaschek, responsible for pushing through the authorization of the event in the first 
place, sent a telegram to Beuthen's Polish consulate, in which he pledged to do 
everything in his power to apprehend the perpetrators and bring them to justice.130 
Foreign minister Stresemann made similar promises to Poland.131 Stresemann's 
assurances in particular were said to bias the proceedings against the accused, even in the 
admitted absence of direct government pressure on the court, when in June the stink 
bomb throwers became the first to be tried.132 It was this lack of objectivity that 
 
128 “Auch nach diesen Vorfällen hält die Partei an ihrer in dem Flugblatt niedergelegten Stellungnahme fest, 
daß die Begünstigung der polnischen Umtriebe durch die Behörden deshalb eine Gefahr für Oberschlesien 
bildet, weil durch sie der falsche Eindruck erweckt wird, als sei Oberschlesien eigentlich ein polnisches 
Land."; Ibid. 
129 "Wäre die Aufführung reibungslos verlaufen, so hätten die polnischen Zeitungen sicher geschrieben, die 
Oppelner Bevölkerung sei polnisch oder mindestens polenfreundlich.”; Ibid.  
130 “Dr. Lukaschek an den polnischen Generalkonsul,“ Oberschlesische Tageszeitung, May 1, 1929. APO, 
NPO, 266. 
131 Ibid. 
132 “Staatsanwalt beantragt Gefängnis,“ Oberschlesische Tageszeitung, June 5, 1929. APO, NPO, 267.  
 192 
Stresemann's commitments had ostensibly created that the stink bomb throwers 
themselves cited when they unsuccessfully requested a postponement of the trial until 
such time as they had found a Nazi replacement for their public defender and when they 
subsequently refused to testify.133 At their appeal two months later, the Nazi party’s 
leading lawyer, Hans Frank, who successfully took charge of their defense, made out that 
the state prosecutor had only pressed charges at all at Stresemann's behest.134 Further 
agitating the right, the government, beyond vowing punishment, paid travel allowances to 
the artists, so that they could return to Oppeln to testify in court against "innocent 
Germans,"135 and awarded the Polish minority a considerable theatre subsidy as 
compensation, just because, as Gauleiter Brückner put it in a speech, some insolent actors 
had "gotten a proper thrashing."136 Sentencing the perpetrators of disturbances that had 
been, to use Brückner's term, proper would only, it was argued, brand the events as 
sufficiently severe to warrant punishment and hence legitimate the Polish bellyaching 
about them.137 
In the absence of government firmness towards the Poles, the unrest had been a 
defensive act, it was argued, necessary to show that Oppeln and the province whose 
capital it was remained firmly German and akin to the fight for the region's Germandom 
in the plebiscite era. The trauma of that time was claimed to have roused the perpetrators 
to action. Their traumatized nationalism should have been taken seriously as an 
extenuating circumstance, the Oberschlesische Tageszeitung insisted about the stink 
bomb throwers, especially as a counterweight to the considerations introduced by 
Stresemann's assurances.138 Having experienced the Polish insurgencies and “Polish 
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propaganda and…its victory in the whole East” less than a decade earlier and being 
motivated by their “love of Germandom” and their “deep desire for freedom,” they had 
sought to stand up to the latest iteration of this threatening Polish propaganda, 
unrestrained by the prudence of adulthood, the paper explained.139 In that vein, the editor 
of the Oberschlesische Tageszeitung, Lothar Knaak, who was later tried for and acquitted 
of incitement, subsequently also hosted an overflowing protest meeting “against the 
verdict of the Court of Lay Assessors of June 4, against the gagging of German cities’ 
freedom and against the increasing Polonization of Western Upper Silesia.”140 At this 
event, Knaak alleged that the production of Halka had constituted the "first victory" of a 
wider Polonization campaign and had been intended to help incite a new Polish 
uprising.141 He further likened this supposed present danger to the past perils of the 
immediate postwar era. In what was now Bydgoszcz in late 1918 too, he declared, the 
authorities had laughed off the notion of danger – until it was too late and West Prussia 
largely lost to the Poznań uprising. Knaak called for Germans to rally around 
Germandom’s defense again like they had in the plebiscite period, though doing so was 
now too often prohibited out of unsound foreign policy considerations, or else, he 
warned, the dead of the St Anne Mountain would have fallen in vain for the preservation 
of Upper Silesia’s inclusion in Germany.142 Two months later, the stink bomb throwers’ 
appeal was heard and the Nazi party’s leading lawyer, Hans Frank, came to Oppeln to – 
successfully – argue their case. A leaflet announcing a rally with the visiting Nazi 
luminary not only condemned Stresemann’s assurances to Poland, but, as Knaak had 
done, also urged the region’s Germans to bethink themselves of the spirit of the plebiscite 
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era and become “masters of the situation” again.143 At the retrial, Frank himself in a 
speech openly lauded the unrest that had greeted the performance for proving that “this 
city really is German and that its population is ready to defend Germandom.”144  
In October, those suspected of participation in the beatings at the train station had 
to appear in court. The Nazis among them, alongside their attorneys, turned up sporting 
buttons that read “Hands off Upper Silesia,”145 which were also being sold at Nazi rallies 
around this time.146 Again, the implication was that the perpetrators conceived of Upper 
Silesia as under imminent threat from Polish territorial claims. The judge in the case, as 
in the stink bomb throwers', demonstrated some sympathy for this view. He did sentence 
five men to between three and eight months in prison and one youth to a fine, expressing 
disapprobation of an attack that, all understandable motivations aside, had targeted artists, 
including women.147 However, he also hinted that the court should indeed consider what 
the Polish performance’s – by imputation provocative – purpose had been. He 
appreciated that the young attackers had been of an impressionable age when they had 
witnessed the violence of the plebiscite era and that they had been taught ever since to 
consider Eastern Upper Silesia part of the Heimat still.148 The idea that the rioters had felt 
they were acting to protect Upper Silesia from a threat akin to that it had faced in the 
plebiscite era was thus appealed to throughout the trials, with some success. 
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During that last trial, it emerged that the Polish side had consciously substantially 
exaggerated the damage wrought by the attack at the train station. For one, the policemen 
and doctors who had been called to the scene testified that, contrary to Polish claims, the 
victims’ injuries had, with one exception, been minor.149 More damagingly yet, a certain 
Wende, who was a German-speaking musician with the Katowice troupe, gave evidence 
that he had been instructed to report injuries and the destruction of his instrument, though 
neither he nor his instrument had been harmed.150 Others too, he said, had borne false 
witness. Wende was backed up by his colleague Langer, a fellow German-speaker, who 
attested that the troupe’s leadership had pressured him into reporting damage when he 
had not been injured nor his instrument ruined.151  
This Polish exaggeration of the assault’s consequences is invoked by Brendan 
Karch to support his view that the episode was simply the most prominent instance of 
violence being dramatized and often falsified in its after-the-fact portrayal by the region’s 
competing nationalist movements in order to suggest the presence of firm and 
antagonistic dividing lines among nationalities, though the aggressive acts had at best, as 
in this case, a complicated relation to such divisions. After all, not only did Wende and 
Langer identify as German but so did ten of the troupe’s members in total, one of whom 
was the only casualty of the beating whose wounds were sufficiently serious to require 
bandaging.152 That non-Poles had fallen victim to anti-Polish violence is a testament in 
Karch’s eyes to the murkiness of national identity in the region. Furthermore, Karch 
stresses that the disturbance would not in itself have become such a major issue, 
occupying Upper Silesia for months, had the Polish and German nationalist movements 
not instrumentalized it for the purposes of mobilization, the one by exaggerating its 
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brutality, the other by turning the performance into a portent of renewed threat to Upper 
Silesia’s Germandom.153 While Karch is correct that the episode would not have attained 
the same noteworthiness without its heavy instrumentalization, that circumstance does 
not change that even without magnification by the press the unrest was a large-scale 
event, driven by nationalist resentments and fears. Republican papers at the time did 
make the case that it had been newspaper magnates and party leaders who had stoked in 
the small fry that were the perpetrators the misguided nationalism so often invoked as an 
apologia for the unrest.154 The nefarious influence of Knaak and his ilk is beyond doubt, 
but republicans had their own motivations to foreground it. Putting the spotlight on a few 
prominent nationalist firebrands was better for Germany's reputation than acknowledging 
violent mass nationalism. That anti-Polish antagonisms, surely not simply implanted by 
recent press and party rhetoric, actuated the perpetrators is accepted even by Karch.155 
Certainly, propaganda that denounced the threat posed by Polish intrusions into the 
German consensus aspired to by German nationalists flourished before, not only after, the 
show. That the German identity of some victims complicates the nationalist nature of the 
attack seems dubious, moreover. Germans’ membership in the Katowice troupe speaks 
more to the presence of sizeable minorities on either side of the border than to the fluidity 
of national identities. In his eagerness to stress the persistence of national indifference 
and grass-roots coexistence, Karch thus seeks to fit even a nationalist riot into the 
narrative typical of the literature on national indifference that holds violence in 
borderland regions to have been both less common and less nationalist than it was made 
out to be. While this may be true, nationalist violence did exist, impelled, the Oppeln 
theatre case illustrates, by fears that Upper Silesia, as home to a Polish-speaking 
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minority, continued to have the same vulnerability to being claimed by Poland that it had 
exhibited during the plebiscite period. 
All this is not to deny that there do exist cases, in which nationalist resentments 
like those that fueled the Oppeln theatre riot merely served as superficial justifications for 
violence that had in actuality been perpetrated for unrelated reasons. Most notably, the 
Potempa murder was turned into a right-wing cause célèbre by the nationalist press, 
though none of the killers ever professed to have targeted Pietrzuch on account of his 
ethnicity. While there was a portion of Nazi violence in the borderlands whose nationalist 
motivations it is unhelpful to belittle, it thus of course remains necessary to be aware of 
the utility it could have for Nazis to camouflage wanton violence in a widely acceptable 
nationalist guise. 
 To return to Oppeln theatre case, it was above all the plight of Eastern Upper 
Silesia’s ethnic Germans that, besides the legacy of the plebiscite era, was invoked as 
good reason to counteract the government’s perceived indulgence of Polish activism. The 
Oberschlesische Tageszeitung, for one, railed that popular anger at the government’s 
authorization of the performance was all the more justified considering that it was 
granted despite anti-German terror, which the refugees in the crowd had personal 
experience of, continuing to rage in Polish Upper Silesia.156  This anti-German 
persecution Poland neither apologized for nor punished, so that Germany’s one-sided 
propriety regarding the handling of nationalist violence was, in a different piece, held by 
the paper to amount to kow-towing before the “small predator state Poland.”157 On the 
occasion of the stink bomb throwers’ trial, meanwhile, the Tageszeitung made the case 
that their righteous indignation at the authorities’ permissiveness towards Polish 
propaganda, when all the while Germans in the lost territories suffered oppression, should 
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have counted in their favor in court.158 When it was the turn of the paper’s editor to be 
tried for incitement, his attorney boldly argued that Eastern Upper Silesia’s Germans, the 
negative consequences for whom of the unrest were so often stressed, did not in fact 
resent Knaak’s incendiary journalism, nor the violence it was accused of having 
fomented. He read out a letter supposedly sent by a group of German families from 
Katowice to express their support for Knaak, which, echoing far-right demands for 
Germany not to disavow nationalist violence unless Poland did the same, demanded that 
the editor’s trial be postponed until Poland in its turn brought murderers of German 
minority members to justice.159 The Nazi party, for its part, argued not only against 
penalizing the instigators and perpetrators of the violence in Oppeln but outright 
continued to stand behind it. The above-quoted statement released by the party's Oppeln 
chapter concluded with the pronouncement that, “We will also in future take the view 
that the Germans in Eastern Upper Silesia are best served, if they have support of a self-
confident Germandom in Western Upper Silesia,” a brand of Germandom the rioters 
were evidently held to exemplify.160 The communiqué also reiterated the demand of the 
flyer handed out on the day of the performance for the abandonment of the government's 
“politics of lacking völkisch pride, of petit bourgeois softening of the bones, and of 
political horse-trading,” pursued in the mistaken hopes of securing the rights of Polish 
Upper Silesia's German minority.161 Real relief for the minority could, however, only be 
achieved through a strengthening of the German people and state, the pamphlet had 
contended. Concerns that violent German assertiveness might, to the contrary, adversely 
impact the German minority were repudiated. The Nazis' leaflet, foreseeing this 
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objection, for example, asserted that a short-term exacerbation of the persecution the 
minority suffered regardless in the service of its future deliverance would not make it any 
less steadfast in its Germandom than it had been so far.162  
 It was just such considerations for the German minority that republicans 
emphasized. They admitted that “infuriation about the continual attacks and rapes of the 
German minority through the League of Insurgents” was not just widespread but 
legitimate.163 Violence, however, would only lead to “a new sedition [Verhetzung] on 
both sides," aggravating that problem, they persisted.164 Only a politics of mutual 
goodwill could secure continued privileges, like the operation of a German theatre in 
Katowice, for the German minority, the renowned Vossische Zeitung concurred.165 That 
theatre, the Upper Silesian Volksblatt described, had been protested in response to the 
disturbance in Oppeln and banned from the use of the municipal theatre building.166 
Across Poland, a “general prohibition on all German theatre performances” had moreover 
been demanded, though the country had previously regularly welcomed German artists, 
including Thomas Mann, to great acclaim.167 The aggression in Oppeln had upset a 
fragile but theretofore functional balance. 
 This dispute about how best to respond to nationalist violence in the borderlands 
given the oppression of Poland's Germans arose not only after the theatre riot. In August 
1932, violence swept Silesia again. In reaction to this upsurge of violence, the free and 
Christian unions of Upper Silesia wrote to the Prussian minister of the interior, urging 
him to shore up Gleiwitz’s police department and the powers of its president. This 
request they justified with the expectation that Eastern Upper Silesia’s German minority 
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would have to bear the consequences should Poles decide to retaliate for rampant Nazi 
anti-Polish terror.168 During this time, the Potempa murder also sparked discussion about 
the relationship between German nationalist violence and the position of the German 
minority in Polish Upper Silesia. Nationalists claimed that minority members agreed that 
five death sentences for the death of a former insurgent constituted an overreaction.169 
However, the republican Volksbote printed a submission, reportedly sent in by a German 
from Polish Upper Silesia, that confronted this Nazi reasoning that someone like 
Pietrzuch had "'no right to avail himself of the protection of the German state authority'," 
as the Angriff had phrased it.170 For over a decade, he pointed out, Germans in Poland had 
contested their discrimination by avowing that, though they had in many cases fought or 
campaigned for Germany immediately after the war, they were now, after their defeat, 
loyal Polish citizens, who deserved to participate in public life and politics. If Germans, 
however, denied erstwhile insurgents like Pietrzuch such protections and opportunities, 
the German minority could not credibly demand them from Poles. The Nazis' rhetoric, he 
seethed, was naive and counterproductive.171 Violence, republicans all concurred, could 
not be allowed to become a nationalist tit-for-that, even as they struggled to check it. 
 Though the German government strove to appease Poland and therefore to rein in 
Nazis' extrajudicial violence against Polish activism and fellow citizens, it too believed in 
the threat of invasion by the neighboring country. Therefore, the diminished Reichswehr 
set up a volunteer Grenzschutz in the Eastern provinces, designed to supplement the 
regular troops in case of Polish attack. The relationship between these official border 
protection measures and the National Socialist movement became a matter of some 
consequence for both sides when the latter came to dominate the nationalist milieu in the 
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German East in the early 1930s. The two historians who have investigated the relations 
between the Reichswehr and the Nazis concerning border defense, Thilo Vogelsang and 
Richard Bessel, agree that these were smoothest in East Prussia, where the awareness of 
being an island cut off from the rest of Germany lent defense preparations added 
urgency.172 In other provinces, dealings were more ambivalent, with SA leaders 
displaying reluctance to permit their memberships to be placed under the command of 
non-Nazis but ordinary Nazis as individuals joined the Grenzschutz in significant 
numbers.173 Bessel foregrounds this mass participation, arguing that, for all the concerns 
about command structure, the SA was eager to cooperate with the border protection units. 
Not only would anything else have drawn into question its nationalist bona fides in 
regions where the Grenzschutz enjoyed broad popular support, but involvement in the 
divisions also afforded SA members the opportunity to live out their military fantasies. 
The organization as a whole, meanwhile, could boost its respectability through 
collaboration within the Grenzschutz with the army and the established right.174 
Vogelsang, however, highlights that the SA's persistent equivocation about its 
willingness to cooperate with the army on border protection, despite its members' mass 
participation, contributed to increased willingness on the part of the federal government 
to take steps against the paramilitary in 1932. In March of that year, investigations had 
uncovered documents showing that the SA in Pomerania and the Border Province 
contemplated raiding the weapons' stores of the Grenzschutz for use in domestic political 
struggles and that the SA considered biding its time in case of Polish invasion, which 
would have fatally hampered the capabilities of divisions after all largely composed of 
SA men. Furthermore, Hitler had openly declared in a speech in Eastern Pomeranian 
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Lauenburg that the SA would not defend the borders until the republican system had 
ceased to exist. The publication of this material by the Prussian government some weeks 
later convinced even the reactionary Kurt von Schleicher to move against the SA.175 
While participation in the Grenzschutz did have all the advantages for the SA that Bessel 
enumerates, it is, as Vogelsang's account implies, worth taking the SA's reservations 
about cooperation seriously and to examine the idea that the Nazis put forward that their 
movement, with its mass base and militancy, offered Germany's borders the best 
protection. 
  The SA leadership's ambivalence toward the Grenzschutz is best documented in 
East Prussia, where for a brief period in early 1931 Gauleiter Erich Koch's doubts about 
the wisdom of permitting loyalties in SA men to any organization other than the party 
and about the trustworthiness of the new commander in chief of the army resulted in 
temporary bans on Grenzschutz membership. Police reports from Prostken, the Masurian 
border police’s seat in Lyck county, reflect how changing directives played out on the 
ground. Initially, in early February 1931, it was announced at a meeting that the Gau had 
“warned of any agreements with the army or state authorities regarding Grenzschutz 
questions," out of distrust of general Kurt von Hammerstein, an opponent of the Nazis 
who had been involved in the Fememord prosecutions.176 Membership in the state border 
protection units would, however, still be tolerated where it facilitated the military training 
of SA men or the discovery of arms depots. For the latter purpose, one local SA leader 
even established a reconnaissance patrol.177 Overall, though, the enjoinment by the Gau 
to avoid cooperation with the Grenzschutz resulted in “a whole number of resignations 
from the official mobilization organizations.”178 The prohibition on participation in the 
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official defense initiative was reiterated at an SA assembly the following month,179 but by 
mid-May it was reportedly overridden by an oral order that allowed SA members to once 
again take part in state-sponsored border protection.180 The divisional chaplain for East 
Prussia, a particular advocate for the Nazis within the Reichswehr, had intervened and 
repaired relations.181 By the following month, training in official border protection units 
was considered imperative. It was “the holiest duty of the SA man to stand in the front-
most line in the defense of the fatherland” against the “main enemy," Poland, one speaker 
proclaimed at a rally in Allenstein, before urging all SA members between ages eighteen 
and forty-two to enroll for training in one of the branches of service of the 
Grenzschutz.182 Instruction, provided by Reichswehr officials, would begin on August 1 
and sign-ups were taken immediately after the speech.183 In August, some SA men in 
Lyck were ordered to attend a lecture on border protection questions by a major.184 After 
that, the police only reported on the SA's links with the Grenzschutz again in March 
1932, when a tally at one meeting yielded the result that fifty-two of the seventy-six SA 
members present had already completed a “Grenzschutz course.”185 When the 
Grenzschutz "requested" thirty men from Lyck's SA around this time, the chapter could 
only supply seven who were not yet active therein anyway.186 Two local SA leaders, the 
police learned the next month, were even considering leaving the SA in order to teach in 
the official border protection divisions.187 Another enjoined that trained SA men should 
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be incorporated immediately into the Grenzschutz, though he instructed them not to speak 
to the police, which was not to be trusted, should they be arrested in the course of their 
army activities.188 Despite this resumption of good relations, the Nazi party still looked 
askance on the demands the Grenzschutz made on its members and their time. In 
November 1932, for example, Lyck's Ortsgruppenleiter felt it necessary to reprimand his 
flock that, "'Attendance at membership meetings comes before all other meetings, also 
before the Grenzschutz.’”189 He and his East Prussian colleagues were hardly alone in 
retaining a certain coolness towards the Grenzschutz. Both Bessel and Vogelsang 
mention that the SA leaderships of Pomerania and Silesia rejected placing their 
subordinates under a command other than their own. Even in the Border Province, where 
the relationship with the Grenzschutz was generally good,190 SA chief Manthey called for 
the staffing of the organization with “’our leaders’," so as to preclude conflicts of 
loyalty.191 If this request were not honored, he stressed, the Nazi movement controlled 
sufficient manpower to handle border defense on its own.  
  Hitler articulated this Nazi reluctance to defend the borders of a republic his 
movement rejected in a controversial 1932 speech in Lauenburg. He reminded his 
listeners that, in the Nazi telling, already once before, in 1921 in Upper Silesia, his party 
comrades had been ready to defend the borders but had been betrayed by the republicans. 
Therefore, next time the Nazis would only protect the frontiers if the whole of Germany 
stood behind them. Hitler did not want to "sacrifice his fighters for the system" and 
would consequently not help safeguard the borders until "the sponsors of today's system 
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are destroyed."192 When Hitler came under fire for these pronouncements, he tried to 
backtrack by reiterating in speeches in Allenstein,193 Lyck,194 and Flensburg that it had, 
ostensibly, been the republicans who had abandoned the borders during the post-war 
struggles, while he had since mobilized thirteen million Germans, on whom the 
borderlands could count.195 Other Nazi dignitaries, however, had earlier made similar 
statements. Silesian Gauleiter Helmuth Brückner, for one, in 1930 disparaged the army 
as costing more in its diminished state than it had before the war, all while it only served 
to uphold Germany's republican system of government rather than to preserve its 
borders.196 The Nazis, for their part, Brückner pronounced in a different 1930 speech, had 
"signed up voluntarily and put our lives at stake for our German people and fatherland" a 
decade previously, unlike the republicans.197 Now, "We will protect our borders from 
intruders, but only if the SPD marches in front of us, for otherwise we will receive the 
stab with the dagger from behind.'"198 Fellow Upper Silesian Hüttmann professed at a 
December 1930 event that "today's system" was seeking Nazi assurances of help in 
border protection, but that Nazis' reply would be, “’We will protect Prussia and Germany, 
but first away with the red government!’”199   
 It was not just the government, though, with which the NSDAP was reluctant to 
collaborate in defense matters. In the Gau Ostmark, which included the Border Province, 
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the Stahlhelm and the agrarian Landbund had initiated a so-called Selbstschutz, Gauleiter 
Wilhelm Kube informed the NSDAP's chief administrator Gregor Straßer in late 1931.200 
Local Stahlhelm and Landbund leaders had pressed Nazis to join these new companies, 
which Straßer,201 Kube,202 and district leaders all prohibited.203 Technically, Straßer told 
Kube, the national SA directorate had permitted that SA men be active in "local 
Selbstschutz associations," but, Straßer contended, this authorization had been meant to 
apply only to short-term campaigns against concrete "attempts at plundering."204 
Committing to longer-term involvement, in contrast, might lead to the energy invested in 
the Selbstschutz being lost to the Nazi party in "the great, decisive political battle."205 The 
SA had to remain at the party's unrestricted disposition, especially to defend against 
"Communist ventures."206 Where Nazis did participate in local Selbstschutz groups, local 
and district leaders should if nothing else be reminded, Straßer remarked, that these 
associations ought to be in the hands of the Nazi Ortsgruppenleiter. Only where there 
were very few Nazis could the leadership of the Stahlhelm or Landbund be accepted.207 
Certainly, those two organizations could hardly expect to create border defense units and 
then to confront the NSDAP, as the largest party, with this fait accompli. If they wanted 
their participation, the Nazis should have been included in the planning and, by 
implication, in the distribution of responsible posts.208  
 Beyond all the grounds on which Nazis could not agree to join the Selbstschutz 
formations, Straßer did also present the SA as in itself sufficient alternative. The Nazi 
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paramilitary was, he wrote to Kube, the best Selbstschutz, having proven its 
efficaciousness in the fight against the Communists. It furthermore already had in place 
the infrastructure necessary for an effective border defense, for purely local companies, 
like the ones organized by Stahlhelm and Landbund, would be no use if localities were 
invaded. Reinforcements would have to come to their aid from outside and the SA 
provided a framework for such assistance.209 Similar portrayals of the Nazi movement as 
in any case the borders' best guardian cropped up again and again. A 1932 news article 
titled "SA as Grenzschutz" in the Preußische Zeitung, for instance, maintained that 
Germans, located in the heart of Europe and wedged between countries hostile to it, had 
always been warriors. This warlike character, the paper avouched, remained preserved in 
the SA now that the German army's size had been constricted and Germans were being 
trained, against their nature, to be peace-loving. In this spirit of perpetuating Germans' 
martial nature, border protection exercises of the Masurian SA had taken place under the 
direction of former general Litzmann, inspiring pride in the participants that they 
numbered among those upon whom Germany could count in case of danger.210 That the 
Nazi party was ostensibly "An army, on which East Prussia too can rely"211 and that 
"stands in the first line behind the boundaries of the Reich" was underlined by Hitler too 
in the aftermath of his contentious speech in Lauenburg.212 A local Nazi speaker in 
Masuria, meanwhile, vociferated that, “The NSDAP will understand to defend the 
country against a possible attack. He who attacks Germany will perish.”213 A fellow 
Masurian likewise blustered that “’the Polish pigs’ or ‘lice-ridden Pollacks’…want to 
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have something, then they should just come. The SA stands ready and will then come 
marching from the South and West.’”214  
 The government was accused of failing to foster comparable potency and a mass 
character in its border protection units. When right-wing groups in 1930 repeatedly held 
demonstrations protesting the anti-German terror that had swept Eastern Upper Silesia 
during the recent election season there, one recurrent Nazi demand was, “The immediate 
protection of the Eastern border and the deployment of an armed Grenzschutz.”215 In 
support of this request as well as of appeals to terminate trade relations with Poland and 
to exclude Poles from state employment, the party's Ratibor branch collected roughly 
8,000 signatures in November 1930.216 A month later, Ratibor's Nazis hosted a protest 
march in parallel to a more sizeable one orchestrated by the Vereinigte Verbände 
Heimattreuer Oberschlesier, because the latter event's line-up of speakers did not include 
a Nazi. The call to establish an armed Grenzschutz appeared on the banners carried by the 
2,000-strong crowd, alongside denigrations of an ostensibly hypocritical government that 
was speaking out now against the terrorizing of Eastern Upper Silesia's Germans but that 
had earlier signed the shameful treaties of Versailles and Locarno.217 During the keynote 
speech, Josef Adamczyk, then a Nazi city councilor in Ratibor, began by arguing that the 
republican parties, whose politicians had, like the Center's Carl Ulitzka, allegedly stabbed 
the Selbstschutz in the back in 1921 or, like Social Democracy's Arthur Crispien, 
professed to know no fatherland called Germany, had disqualified themselves from 
suddenly "grandstanding" against Polish terror.218 The government should, Adamczyk 
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went on, create a Grenzschutz, but, he acknowledged, it would balk at doing so, since it 
was bound not to enjoy the support of such an organization.219 As a government-
sponsored Grenzschutz did already exist, it appears that what Nazis were more 
specifically seeking was a border protection force that would be a standing, professional 
body rather than a mere reserve. This supposition is lent credence by the Nazi Reichstag 
faction's introduction of a motion, also in late 1930, that proposed the twin alleviation of 
border and economic insecurity through the formation of a Grenzschutz along the Polish 
border out of at least a 100,000 members of Germany's “millions-strong army of the male 
unemployed.”220 
 As usual, there was more bluster than substance behind the Nazi rhetoric on 
border defense. The Reichstag bill went nowhere and beyond occasional drills like that 
with Litzmann, there seems to have been no preparation for deploying the SA for the 
borders' protection. The only semblance of a plan was issued by Ernst Röhm in mid-
January 1932, when a survey of the SA's constituent districts found precisely that a 
unified understanding of the paramilitary's Grenzschutz tasks was lacking. 
Fundamentally, however, Röhm was only concerned with the scenario of a Nazi take-
over of power, in which case the movement of German Marxists out of and foreign 
Marxist couriers into the country was to be prevented. The SA's task would be limited to 
supplementing the efforts of the army and customs service to monitor train, automobile, 
and plane traffic near the borders and to patrol the hinterland off the major roads there. It 
was not even the main part of the SA but only the SA reserves that were to be utilized for 
these purposes and planning for these tasks continued to be left to the individual SA 
districts.221 Despite this desultory approach to border protection, both Nazis and Poles 
depicted what trainings took place as far more formidable than they were. The 
 
219 Ibid. 
220 “Millionenheer der männlichen Arbeitslosen”; “Nationalsozialisten fordern Grenzschutz-Ost,” 
Ostdeutsche Morgenpost, November 27, 1930. APO, RO, 1802. 
221 Decree, January 15, 1932. APO, RO, 1805. 
 210 
aforementioned article "SA as Grenzschutz," for instance, read like an account of a real 
battle, so much did it stress the realism and grand scope of the event. In Upper Silesia, 
meanwhile, Polish papers in September 1931 insisted that the local SA was engaging in 
large-scale border protection drills. While the Kurier Codzienny asserted that the SA held 
“veritable military exercises” near Beuthen, Ratibor, and Gleiwitz, often within sight of 
Polish villages across the border,222 the Polska Zachodnia alleged that Nazi units of thirty 
men each were being housed in villages bordering Poland's Rybnik district, where they 
held extensive military-style exercises.223 Such accounts were, however, not confirmed 
by government investigations and, as one official report pointed out, groups of tens of 
armed men would have been difficult to conceal.224 Beyond a basic but consistent 
emphasis by the Gau leaderships on the value of maintaining SA branches immediately 
along the borders, Nazis' border defense activities were thus erratic, highly local, and 
poorly organized.225 Nevertheless, Nazis' at least professed belief in their movement as 
the most efficacious border protection was one justification provided for their ambivalent 
stance towards joining with others in Grenzschutz efforts, a risky one in regions where 
such efforts enjoyed practically unanimous support.   
 This popular backing of Grenzschutz efforts was rooted in fear of Polish invasion. 
Anxieties about more subtle forms of Polish encroachment on the borderlands' 
Germandom paired with resentment at the perceived post-war inversion of the ethnic 
hierarchy, accompanied by considerable territorial losses in the East for Germany, drove 
the less formal nationalist violence routinely perpetrated by the Nazis in the border 
regions. Such violence was clustered in election seasons in particular, but also often 
greeted cultural activism and day-to-day expressions of Polish identity. Even shared 
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wariness of Poland, however, could not persuade the Nazis, at least at the leadership 
level, to commit reliably to cooperation with the government or with other right-wing 
groups. This denigration of the government's and rival organizations' conducting of 
borderland matters will be further explored in the next chapter. 
  
 212 
Nazis, Nationalists, and State Authority 
 
 The Nazis' well-known contempt for the state and federal governments had, as the 
preceding chapter has begun to illuminate, dimensions specific to the borderlands. In 
particular, the authorities were castigated for their perceived permissiveness towards 
minority nationalities internally and rival countries externally. Minorities' supposedly 
pernicious activities were allowed to run unchecked, while neighboring states' demands 
were acceded to and permitted to shape official policies and actions. Instead of this 
disgraceful meekness, the Nazis promised, a future government headed by them would 
resolve the border and minority issues through forcefulness. In order to underscore the 
gulf between the assertiveness Nazism offered to implement and the obsequious approach 
of the current government, Nazi delegates in the German and Prussian parliaments time 
and again introduced bills proposing drastic measures to contain the threat emanating 
from minorities and neighboring states. Except in that Hitler was acclaimed as a 
particularly able and resolute defender of the borderlands, with a special connection to 
them due to his Austrian heritage, Nazi critiques of the authorities, boasts of greater 
firmness, and methods of expressing them differed little from those of the movement's 
longer-established far-right rivals. This likeness of outlook and strategy engendered 
mutual sympathy, cooperation, and side-by-side participation in the Grenzschutz, 
particularly at the grassroots level and in the press. Far-right groups' higher echelons, 
however, did occasionally treat the Nazis with coolness as that movement began to 
rapidly outstrip theirs, while the Nazis in their turn every so often charged that the 
established right prioritized catering to landowners' economic interests over safeguarding 
border regions' Germandom. These criticisms of one another never dominated relations, 
though. Republicans, for their part, rejected the disparagements of their handling of the 
nationality struggle and instead stressed that especially in the borderlands it was 
important for authority not to slip away from the government into the hands of violent 
bands. In order to avert such an outcome and the outcries from neighboring countries that 
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so often accompanied anti-minority excesses, the government endeavored to prevent or 
punish violence. It also continued to submit to the rules and processes of international 
bodies. Besides the convinced democrats who upheld such policies, however, the civil 
service at the local level in particular also contained many who had much greater 
sympathy for their nationalist compatriots than for the minorities whom they were 
enjoined to protect. Some officials, notably ones employed in the customs service, even 
joined the Nazi party, to their superiors' considerable consternation. These sympathies for 
the Nazis and their approach on the part of civil servants complicated the government's 
efforts to stem a violent tide that jeopardized sensible nationality politics. The fraught, 
complex relationship between the Nazi movement and the government on the one hand 
and the established right on the other will be examined here in its borderlands-specific 
iteration. 
 The federal government, for one, was routinely accused in Nazi speeches and 
articles of failing to take a stand for Germany's rights and aims in the nationality struggle. 
Whereas Poland in particular like an ill-mannered child made a fuss and thereby got what 
it wanted, Upper Silesian speaker Filusch charged in 1929, the German government, 
personified by foreign minister Stresemann, was incapable of simply "banging its fist on 
the table" and asserting itself.1 Such complaisance was, Filusch sneered, "not decent for a 
German man," but encouraged by the international system within which the government 
was mistakenly striving for acceptance.2 In the wake of a 1932 League of Nations 
summit, Hitler himself ridiculed chancellor Brüning for "defending the Eastern territories 
with speeches in Königsberg," when he should have done so in Geneva.3 There, however, 
"prudence, restraint, caution, tactics" had been Brüning's watchwords.4 Instead of turning 
to the League, one local Nazi functionary in a similar vein proclaimed at an election rally 
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in Schneidemühl in 1932, Germany should "sharply oppose" Lithuania and Poland head-
on.5 Instead, Germany was giving up things it had a right to, just in order to keep its 
neighbors happy. In 1932, for example, Wilhelm Sievers, the Nazi mayor of Eckernförde, 
had arranged for the North German public radio station to broadcast the Grenzlandfeier 
held there on the first evening of the annual convention of the Schleswig-Holsteiner 
Bund. The Danish state broadcasting agency protested, however, citing an agreement that 
neither country's radio stations would disseminate border-related propaganda, and the 
German authorities in response rushed to give assurances that they would look into the 
matter. Instead of doing so, Nazi critics said, they should have stood up for Germany's 
right to transmit the event, especially as Danish stations routinely transmitted Danish 
ministers' border propaganda.6 Worse yet, the government had permitted Poland to cancel 
a three-million-mark debt that it supposedly owed as compensation for the Upper Silesian 
uprisings, Filusch charged, presumably in order to foster detente with that country.7 What 
proposals the government did make for the retention of influence in lost territories was 
derided as insufficient. In 1932 the Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung printed a 
supposed submission from a reader from North Schleswig, who claimed to have been 
involved in the negotiation of the German-Danish border in 1920. The Tiedje line, which 
would have included in Germany a largely German strip of a few kilometers' width north 
of the current border, had only been a compromise put forward at a time at which 
Germany could hope for nothing better, he disclosed. Yet it was only that Tiedje line that 
republicans now demanded, though Germany should, he argued, lay claim to Schleswig 
all the way up to the Kongeå river. A border revision to this effect would only be 
accomplished though, he asserted, if Nazism came to power. The Tageszeitung praised 
the piece as "German language," which "holds water," unlike proposals, presumably by 
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the government, for the "creation of a Memel area" or a "special status for the 
'borderland'." 8 When foreign minister Curtius in 1931 reportedly did acknowledge at a 
League of Nations' conference that Germany hoped for a revision of the borders, this was 
used to derisively highlight the contrast with the government's usual spineless position.9 
 In fact, the government behaved so accommodatingly toward rival nations and 
their foreign backers that it was on the brink of abandoning the border regions to the 
former, Nazis maintained. Masurian Gaukommissar Martini, for instance, gave a speech 
at an SA rally in Lötzen in 1931 that amounted to a tirade against the government. The 
republic, he argued, had long failed Masuria by, among other things, signing the peace 
treaties, treating East Prussia “as a stepchild,”10 and watching the economic situation 
worsen, with its Osthilfe reaching not native Masurians but “Galician," which was 
shorthand for Jewish, “profiteers.”11 Now, Martini feared, the government was poised to 
sell out Masuria “like a flock of lambs” to Poland for a “despicable traitor’s reward.”12 
All previous insults, Masuria had borne, but, Martini declared, “In two areas we 
Masurians won't tolerate any interference: we won’t let our Heimat be taken from us, and 
nor will we have the faith of our fathers ripped out of our hearts.”13 Making himself 
plainer still, Martini added, “He who extends his hand [against us] henceforth will learn: 
‘Distress knows no command but: Kill! kill!’ We loyally German Masurians refuse to 
become Pollacks, we Protestant Masurians will not let ourselves – neither in good nor in 
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evil – be led back into the lap of the Church that alone can bring salvation.”14 What 
international rapprochement meant for irredentism was exemplified, Nazis averred, by 
the treaty of Locarno, in which the government had ratified the Western borders. Fear of 
a so-called eastern Locarno was consequently fanned. As the speaker at a 1931 rally in 
Masurian Lyck exclaimed, “What an Eastern Locarno [Ostlocarno] means every German 
must know, namely the recognition of the current borders and even further, maybe the 
systematic relinquishing of East Prussia to Poland.”15 Even when there was a concrete 
diplomatic risk to the preservation at least of Germany's current borders, the government, 
it was alleged, failed to act. In a 1929 speech, East Prussian Gauleiter Koch claimed that 
federal authorities had been aware of a Polish memorandum to France, in which Poland 
offered to take on some of Germany's debts and to abstain from objecting to an Austrian 
merger with the Reich if it were granted East Prussia and Danzig. Despite being 
conscious of this insult to German sovereignty, the government had done nothing, nor 
had it alerted the German people.16 
 A Nazi government would be a different, “go-getting government," Nazi 
propaganda affirmed.17 "...[T]hrough National Socialism," the Preußische Zeitung 
maintained, "the German people must find its way to our, national might, which will and 
must no longer take much time, so that our international demands will be lent the 
necessary forcefulness."18 Accusations of lacking assertiveness on the current 
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18 "...daß das deutsche Volk durch den Nationalsozialismus seinen Weg zu unserer, nationaler [sic] Macht 
finden muß, was keine lange Zeit mehr dauern wird und darf, damit unseren internationalen Forderungen 
der nötige Nachdruck verliehen werden kann."; “Agrarrecht und Minderheitenrecht in Polen,” Preußische 
Zeitung, February 6, 1931. MOB. 
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government's part were often followed up with declarations that a Nazi government 
would do better. A different piece in the Preußische Zeitung, for example, told of 
chicaneries against Memel's Germans, of which the German ministry of foreign affairs 
knew but which it had done nothing about. "We in any case do not expect this foreign 
ministry to take steps," the newspaper jibed, "We will get even [with the Lithuanians] one 
day!"19 On another occasion, the paper reported on demands voiced at a rally in Poland, 
hosted by an organization that enjoyed the support of Polish strongman Piłsudski, for the 
Polish borders to be extended to the Oder river. Such comments, it urged, had to be met 
with a German foreign policy that ensured not only that no further land would be severed 
from Germany but also that the lost territories would be reconquered. "Of course, a 
government like today's will never be able to realize such aims," the article concluded, 
"for that men are necessary like those that a Third Reich under the leadership of Adolf 
Hitler will once provide."20 At a thousand-strong rally in Gleiwitz, a speaker from 
Breslau in a similar vein denounced “the measures of the former Reich government 
[during the fight against the insurgency] and the minority and foreign policies of the 
current Reich government” and boasted that the Nazis would make undone the loss of 
Upper Silesia, incurred by the republic's ineffectuality, though this would only be 
possible if the Social Democratic and Center parties were eliminated first.21  
 This greater Nazi assertiveness Poland had or would learn to fear, it was 
contended. When a native of Masurian Neidenburg wrote to the nationally renowned 
Vossische Zeitung to lament that Hitler had done so well there in the 1932 presidential 
 
19 "Von diesem A.A. erwarten wir auch keine Schritte. Wir werden eines Tages abrechnen!"; “Litauen 
macht sich breit im Memelgebiet,” Preußische Zeitung, March 19, 1931. MOB. 
20 “Freilich, eine Staatsführung wie die heutige wird solche Ziele nie verwirklichen können, dazu sind 
Männer vonnöten, wie sie das Dritte Reich unter Führung Adolf Hitlers einst stellen wird."; “Der 
Vernichtungskampf gegen das Deutschtum in Oberschlesien,” Preußische Zeitung, January 29, 1931. 
MOB. 
21 “die Massnahmen der damaligen Reichsregierung und die Minderheiten- und Aussenpolitik der jetzigen 
Reichsregierung”; “Betrifft: Polizeiliche Auflösung einer öffentlichen Versammlung der NSDAP. in 
Gleiwitz am 25. März 1931 wegen Duldung von Verstössen gegen das Republikschutzgesetz,” April 14, 
1931. APO, RO, 1804. 
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election even though it was his opponent Hindenburg who had masterminded the Battle 
of Tannenberg, which had freed the region from Russian invasion, a Silesian wrote to 
Neidenburg's NSDAP chapter in order to refute this logic, hoping that his letter would be 
passed on to the author of the piece in the Vossische. Far from being perverse, he 
asserted, the election result demonstrated “that one has recognized sharply in our most 
important border area what is necessary to assert oneself.”22  Whereas “today’s 
compliancy and wimpishness” were bringing Germany and its borderlands only 
disadvantages,23 “malicious neighbors will be more vigilant against a determined 
Germany.”24 In fact, the Preußische Zeitung wrote, Poland already feared Hitler and his 
supporters. "Poland knows well," it posited, "who alone in Germany has understood 
Eastern matters correctly and acts accordingly."25 It was for that reason that Polish 
newspaper railed against the Nazis almost daily, that it trembled at every German 
election, and that a "public 'burning of Hitler'" had allegedly taken place on Torun's main 
square.26 It was in a future Nazi government that any hope of resolving Germany's 
international situation advantageously supposedly rested. 
 The German government was considered not only to be rendering the country the 
"plaything of nations" internationally, however, but also to be dealing with the minorities 
within Germany in a lax fashion.27 According to Upper Silesian Nazi speaker Hüttmann, 
“the German government in Berlin is sleeping and hears and sees nothing that happens in 
Upper Silesia.”28 Therefore, Hüttmann recounted, Nazi Reichstag deputy Filusch had 
 
22 “Das beweist, daß man in unserem wichtigsten Grenzgebiet scharf erkannt hat, was notwendig ist, um 
sich zu behaupten.”; Letter to the NSDAP chapter in Neidenburg, March 19, 1932. GStA PK, XX. HA, 
Rep. 240 C, 64a.  
23 “die heutige Nachgiebigkeit und Weichlichkeit”; Ibid. 
24 “denn vor einem entschlossenen Deutschland werden sich die böswilligen Nachbarn anders hüten”; Ibid. 
25 “Polen weiß genau, wer allein in Deutschland die Ostfragen richtig erkannt hat und darnach handelt."; 
“Das ist die polnische Seele…,” Preußische Zeitung, December 22, 1932. MOB. 
26 "öffentliche ‘Verbrennung Hitlers’"; Ibid. 
27 “Spielball der Völker”; “Der Kampf um Nordschleswig,” Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung, May 4, 
1930. SHLB. 
28 “Hüttmann streifte auch die Minderheitenfrage und erklärte, daß die deutsche Regierung in Berlin 
schliefe und nichts höre und sehe, was in Oberschlesien vorgehe."; “Betrifft: Polizeiliche Auflösung einer 
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remarked to interior minister Joseph Wirth, “’No, my dear Mr. Wirth, we understand it 
completely. When it is about the interests of the German people, then you lot cannot do 
anything….’”29 It was only when the interests of the German elite or the republic's 
foreign policy were at risk that the government intervened, Hüttmann charged, not when 
völkisch concerns were at stake. One specific, oft-criticized manifestation of the 
government's permissiveness was its "forbearance," as the Border Province's Reichstag 
deputy Siegfried Kasche put it, towards minority schools.30 In Flatow, for instance, a 
local Nazi speaker alleged that his district's inspector of schools did not know Polish and 
hence could not accurately ascertain the spirit in which minority schools were raising 
their charges. For this failure of oversight, the speaker contended, the inspector had been 
awarded honorary membership in the Polish minority, which thanks to it could continue 
its nefarious activities unhindered.31 In East Prussia, meanwhile, Oberpräsident Siehr and 
two regional education officials partook in a check-up on a minority school located in the 
strip of West Prussia that had been allocated to East Prussia after the war. One of the 
regional functionaries had joined in the use of Polish when the children's progress in their 
native language was tested and Siehr had thanked the headmaster for his efforts, wishing 
the school "a favorable development and the accomplishment of the goal, which it has set 
for itself."32 Since minority schools' presumed aim was to prepare the incorporation of 
border regions into Poland, Siehr's congratulations were decried as traitorous, even 
though he tried to pacify the nationalist opposition by reassuring them that his comments 
had just been injudicious polite commonplaces. His resignation and replacement with 
someone who would handle the Polish schools with the proper toughness, presumably a 
 
öffentlichen Versammlung der N.S.D.A.P. in Beuthen O/S. am 22. Januar 1931 wegen Duldung 
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Volkes handelt, da könnt Ihr nichts unternehmen. . . . . . . .’”; Ibid. 
30 “Duldsamkeit”; copy of a report, April 25, 1932. APP, NPP, 169. 
31 Report, March 10, 1931. APK, Starostwo Powiatowe w Złotowie, 275. 
32 “eine günstige Entwickelung [sic] sowie die Erreichung des Zieles, das sie sich gesteckt haben”; “Siehr 
auf Abwegen: Oberpräsident beglückwünscht polnische Schule,” Preußische Zeitung, February 18, 1931. 
MOB. 
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Nazi, was called for. In Schleswig-Holstein too the Nazi movement took exception to the 
Danish schools established in Schleswig33 and Flensburg.34 
 On other issues too, the authorities were considered too trusting or obliging. 
Polish pilots who landed in Germany, supposedly because they had gotten lost, were 
taken at their word and let go time after time, even though the right suspected that they 
were compiling aerial photographs of border provinces.35 Similarly, the Social 
Democratic police chief of Upper Silesian Gleiwitz had denied that a buttressed gravel pit 
and earthworks behind a supposed carp pond constituted a danger in the case of a military 
confrontation with Poland, as Nazis had warned. An official military inspection of the 
structures had, however, came to the conclusion that they might in fact be a hazard in 
case of war and resulted in a directive for them to be levelled, proving the Nazis right, as 
they boasted.36 Equally controversially, authorities tolerated Polish propaganda and its 
promulgators. In 1932, for instance, the sale of land in Bütow county through the 
Settlement Commission to a supposed Polish agitator, with ties to other well-known 
Polish activists, was not just approved but rushed through by the Prussian minister for 
agriculture, despite the resistance of the affected municipality.37 Such surrender of 
German land to Poles should, the Nazi Pommersche Zeitung demanded, be punished as 
treason and the minister relieved of the right to interfere in settlement decisions.38 The 
Landrat of the Border Province's Flatow district was similarly held to be sabotaging the 
German cause, because priest and prominent Polish nationalist activist Domanski 
 
33 Letter from Pastor Schmidt-Wodder to Zachi, January 12, 1932. LSH, Abt. 399.71 Nr. 122. 
34 “Bomben auf Eckernförde!,” [Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung/Kieler Zeitung], [September 3, 
1932]. LSH, Abt. 399.105 Nr. 71. 
35 “Polnische Spionage - Wieder ein polnisches Flugzeug über Johannisburg,” Preußische Zeitung, January 
12, 1932. MOB; “Die polnische Provokation in Oppeln - Die polnischen Flieger werden verhört,” 
Preußische Zeitung, January 12, 1932. MOB; “Die polnische Presse zum Zwischenfall in Oppeln,” 
Preußische Zeitung, January 13, 1932. MOB; “Die polnischen Flieger,” Pommersche Zeitung, August 4, 
1932. KP. 
36 "Polnische Befestigungen auf deutschem Boden,” Pommersche Zeitung, August 13, 1932. KP. 
37 “Preußen siedelt Polen an!,” Pommersche Zeitung, [July 1932]. KP. 
38 “Polen siedeln im deutschen Grenzkreis,” Pommersche Zeitung, July 10, 1932. KP. 
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reportedly enjoyed his special protection.39 Due to this privileged position, Domanski and 
the Poles he led could act as "lord and master" in the district, a circumstance that was 
claimed to have provoked the Nazi attack on Polish residents of Glumen at that village's 
fire brigade festival.40 In the wake of that episode, the "negligent authorities" had arrested 
the SA men, who were portrayed as having merely defended themselves against an 
ostensible Polish assault, and failed to take the Poles' personal details, such that they, 
when they did supposedly come under suspicion by the investigating officials, could not 
be found and taken into custody.41 In Upper Silesian Markowitz, meanwhile, a Pole had 
himself ascended to a responsible position when he was confirmed by Severing as 
chairman of the local council. This ratification of his election had occurred even though 
he, according to Josef Adamczyk's accusations, had held election rallies and agitated 
against Germandom in Polish Upper Silesia in the run-up to elections there in the pay of 
the Polish state.42 Day-to-day Polish campaigning too was accepted by the authorities. In 
Masuria, for example, Polish activists were claimed to be knocking on doors distributing 
Polish literature and keeping lists about the national convictions of those visited. The 
Preußische Zeitung called this tactic out as "presumptuousness" and asked rhetorically 
how long the government intended to continue tolerating it.43 Even the exaggeration and 
occasional invention of reports of harassment of Poles during German election seasons 
were not counteracted. While the propaganda of the Vereinigte Verbände Heimattreuer 
Oberschlesier was prohibited, the Oberschlesische Tageszeitung remarked, the 
dramatizations of the Polish press were not, as that, the paper sneered, "could harm 
 
39 “Der Polackenüberfall auf unsere S.A.,” Völkischer Beobachter, August 21/22, 1932. CUL. 
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41 “die nachlässigen Behörden”; “SA. in Notwehr gegen Polen,” Pommersche Zeitung, August 20, 1932. 
KP. 
42 “Betrifft: Öffentliche Protestkundgebung gegen die polnischen Terrorakte, veranstaltet von der 
Ortsgruppe Ratibor der NSDAP,” December 10, 1930. APO, RO, 1802. 
43 “Polnische Wühlarbeit: Wie lange duldet die Regierung die polnische Anmaßung?,” Preußische Zeitung, 
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German-Polish rapprochement!" 44 The Nazi Schlesischer Adler likewise maligned the 
government's failure to silence the minority's inflated complaints of terror.45 This 
acquiescence to Polish propaganda was just one more symptom of the government's 
discreditable lenience towards the minorities. 
  The government's supposed pusillanimity towards Poles and Poland came under 
particular fire, as touched on in the previous chapter, in the aftermath of the riots that 
greeted a Polish theatre troupe's performance of the Polish opera Halka in Oppeln in 
1929. Responsibility for the unrest was attributed to the government's authorization of the 
event, which contrasted with the anti-German policies that reportedly obtained in Poland.  
"We see the persecution of Germandom in Eastern Upper Silesia, Posen, and Pomerania," 
the Oberschlesische Tageszeitung editorialized, "and cannot understand that the German 
government does not stand up more strongly for the oppressed, that it to the contrary 
abets Polish propaganda in the part of the Eastern marches that remains German."46 If 
future disturbances were to be avoided, the journal reiterated elsewhere, Germans 
demanded of their government not only that it support the German minorities in Poland in 
the face of anti-German terror there but also that it take measures for the "protection of 
the German character in Western Upper Silesia."47 Government assurances to Poland that 
violence like that in Oppeln would not occur anew were likewise denounced, for they 
implied, a far from penitent Oberschlesische Tageszeitung maintained, that Polish actors 
might be invited to perform in border areas in future again. If such renewed invitations 
 
44 “das könnte ja der deutsch-polnischen Verständigung Abbruch tun!”; “Die polnischen Terrormärchen 
hören nicht auf,” Oberschlesische Tageszeitung, May 20, 1932. APO, NPO, 112. 
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47 “Schutz des deutschen Wesens in Westoberschlesien”; Ibid. 
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were issued, the paper warned, the government with its servility should be prepared to 
lose its mandate at the next election.48  
 The Nazis strove to present themselves as the electoral alternative toughest on the 
minorities through speeches and articles but also through interpellations and policy 
proposals submitted by their delegates to the parliaments. Their 1930 Reichstag bill 
urging the formation of a 100,000-strong, standing Grenzschutz out of the "millions-
strong army of the male unemployed" has already been mentioned in the previous 
chapter.49 In a similar call for improved border protection, the Diet delegate Heukeshoven 
in a 1932 speech to the newly founded Working Group of National Socialist Police 
Officials in Upper Silesian Gleiwitz pressed for the town's police chief to be replaced 
with a Nazi one. Under the incumbent, the police force had, he charged, been sapped of 
the "requisite nationalism" to be "the vanguard of a great people's army" in case of a 
conflict with Poland.50 In a more cultural vein, the Prussian Diet's Nazis submitted a 
motion that sought to guarantee borderlands Germans "'equal rights'" in the supposedly 
Polonophile Catholic church, to end putative clerical anti-German agitation, and to shield 
German children from it.51 Prussia's detested minority schools, meanwhile, should be 
closed, another interpellation, probably from 1929, recommended, and all autochthonous 
teachers and other civil servants in bilingual regions dismissed.52 Since the report 
mentioning this drastic proposition came from the Cech, it is likely that adverse impacts 
were feared mainly for the self-consciously Masurian activists making up its small 
readership and less for the nationally indifferent or German-identifying segments of the 
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borderlands populations whom Prussia’s Nazis were trying to attract. The enrollment of 
children in minority schools should, for its part, the 1930 proposed "'Law for the 
Protection of the Borders'" propounded, disqualify their guardians from purchasing real 
estate. Moreover, landowners who permitted their workers to send their offspring to 
Polish schools or who employed Polish seasonal laborers were to incur penalties.53 Two 
years later, an interpellation to the Prussian Diet contended that "the attempts of the 
Polish state to directly or indirectly come into possession of farms within the German 
borders" were growing ever larger in scope.54 It therefore urged the Prussian state 
ministry to make full use of the provisions of a 1915 law for the regulation of the sale of 
agricultural properties and to consider introducing additional and harsher laws. One 
realtor who had sold some land parcels to Poles when tasked with parceling an estate in 
far eastern Brandenburg the Diet's Nazi deputies even wished to have indicted for 
treason.55 Likewise, Wilhelm Kube, the Gauleiter responsible for the Border Province, 
asked that the editor of Cech be charged with high treason for his use of the phrase 
"'German cultural outrage'."56 He further demanded that the editor be fired from a post he 
supposedly held in the police department and that the "Polish background" of his deeds 
be examined.57 Prussian minister of the interior Severing's refusal to act upon these 
requests, because, for one thing, the editor had never worked for the police, was 
dismissed by the far-right Deutsche Zeitung as nepotism towards a presumed party 
comrade.58 It was precisely to be rejected by officials that all these impracticably radical 
proposals seem to have been designed, for such rebuffs had the potential to make the 
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government look unwilling to take the necessary steps to protect the borderlands' 
Germandom. The Nazi party, in contrast, appeared as the forceful, proactive champion of 
tough measures.  
 In addition to these bills intended to demonstrate assertiveness towards Poles and 
Poland, the party also made a point of introducing ones that heralded greater aid and 
understanding for the borderlands under the Nazis. Engaging borderland residents' fear of 
Polish invasion, for instance, in 1930 Nazi deputies enjoined the federal and state 
governments to take all "suitable and permissible" action for East Prussia's defense,59 if 
need be, an addendum urged, in violation of the armaments limits imposed by the Treaty 
of Versailles, "because the security of the province and the life of its inhabitants must be 
regarded more highly than the formal fulfillment of indecent and unlawful treaties."60 "In 
particular the immediate new construction of armored cruiser B and the further expansion 
of the fleet, as well as the setting up of the passive gas and air raid protection for the 
defenseless population, are to be tackled immediately," they insisted.61 The call for 
increased defense measures did in fact pass the provincial Diet, but the proposal to flout 
the peace treaty did not.62 As for keeping farmland in German hands, a January 1933 bill 
in the Prussian Diet complemented the Nazis' plans for restrictions on Poles' purchasing 
rights. It pressed for the capping of interest rates, the ending of the forced collection of 
taxes, and the cessation of foreclosures, with creditors instead to be compelled to conduct 
re-negotiations of debt settlement plans with their debtors. The preservation of German 
landownership, the initiative argued, was more important in border regions than the 
upholding of conventional ideas about the necessity of repaying debts or of paying 
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taxes.63 In support of the German school system in border areas, the NSDAP caucus in 
1932 petitioned the Prussian Diet to refrain from applying a recent decree there that 
prohibited the take-over by the state of municipal schools. The aim was, it seems, to 
prevent the closure of failing German schools in regions where the competing minority 
schools were considered a real threat. It was further asked that youth hostels in the 
borderlands, where students from across the country could witness the regions’ plight, no 
longer be made to pay rent to the state for their leases.64 For the borderlands' theatres too, 
Nazi delegates demanded aid from the Prussian Diet. Instead of the allocated 200,000 
marks of the state's theatre budget they insisted on 700,000 for the theatres of East 
Prussia, Silesia, and Schleswig-Holstein. After all, these theatres, unlike Berlin's, which 
had received the lion's share of funding, were important Kulturträger, who spread 
German culture in contested regions and fortified Germans' spirits there. Their role was 
to “spiritually raise up the borderland population and to show it again and again that it is 
not fighting a losing battle,” because the “hinterland” supports it.65 Schleswig-Holstein's 
authorities at least seemed woefully unaware of this cultural work's importance, however, 
the Flensburger NS-Zeitung charged, and had therefore failed to push more successfully 
for federal subsidies by playing up the province's beleaguered borderland status, as 
Silesian and East Prussian officials so often did. Since in this case those other two 
provinces had also received few funds, the Nazi critique, like all of these policy 
proposals, was less about actual failures than about portraying the government as having 
done too little for the population of the borderland, when the Nazis were in contrast 
lobbying for it vigorously. Nazi schemes occasionally appeared to benefit border 
populations only at first glance though. In 1932, the East Prussian SPD, for example, 
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published a flyer calling attention to the Nazi demand in the Prussian Diet for the 
complete suppression of day-to-day border traffic. Once, the province had thrived on 
cross-border trade with Russia, but with the creation of Lithuania and Poland this had 
ceased, rendering many unemployed. Since then, impoverished workers had at least been 
able to buy staple foods cheaply in the new neighboring countries. The Nazi policy would 
only be advantageous for the border strips' artisan trades.66   
 This superficiality of Nazism's championing of the borderlands is also evident in 
the role in the regions' deliverance attributed to Adolf Hitler. One speaker proclaimed 
that “nobody from the assistant to Landeshauptmann Woche and Regierungspräsident 
Lukaschek” had done anything for Upper Silesia’s retention and that gratitude for it was 
instead owed to Hitler, a bizarre claim considering Lukaschek had been the Landrat of 
the region’s most heavily Polish-speaking county and a leading figure in the Schlesischer 
Ausschuss whereas Hitler had never set foot in Upper Silesia during the plebiscite 
period.67 A 1932 election poster from East Prussian Königsberg, meanwhile, professed 
that “Adolf Hitler is the only German politician who has not consorted with any 
Frenchman, who has received no French or Polish politician and no French or Polish 
journalist.”68 For thirteen years he allegedly had, as the first to do so, “incessantly pointed 
to the East as the big future issue of the German nation.”69 He had furthermore fought not 
only the Treaty of Versailles but also the German East’s continued endangerment, while 
the “November parties” had relinquished German territory after the war.70 These parties 
now feared the Nazi movement and had, the poster urged, to be proven right in their 
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anxieties at the polls. Most full of pathos was an article titled “Bleeding Borders!” in a 
1932 election supplement to the Preußische Zeitung, which related how Poland and 
Lithuania supposedly oppressed their German minorities and wished to usurp East 
Prussia. “And Mr Brüning?,” the piece asked. “He is scandalized. He bangs his fist on the 
table. He ascertains a breach of international law. He protests, he calls upon the Hague 
court. And Mr President von Hindenburg assures the German East that he will never 
forsake it. Never! Meanwhile the ‘cousins’ [Poland and Lithuania] disregard German 
rights ever more audaciously and unconcernedly. France is laughing up its sleeve and Mr 
Brüning holds election speeches,” it answered its own question.71 “Into the anxious, 
starless nights, into the gloomy days” ethnic Germans’ hearts therefore cried, “For your 
sake and for ours, elect the Führer before whose strong fist, before whose hard will, the 
Pole, the Lithuanian, and the Frenchy already today shiver. Help us, or we are lost. Adolf 
Hitler, come and save us.”72 While parliamentary interpellations proposed and publicized 
what were held to be better, firmer policies, Hitler was portrayed as the corresponding 
leadership alternative. One article even tried to buttress this savior role ascribed to Hitler 
by invoking his Austrian background. While some, the piece claimed, held his lack of 
Prussian heritage against him, Prussian-ness, it maintained, was really a quality that could 
be assimilated and that many South and West Germans, the Hohenzollern among them, 
had attained before him. In fact, Hitler had a greater understanding for the troubles of the 
Prussian East than many born Prussians, the article ventured, because he was “in a certain 
 
71 “Und Herr Brüning? Er ist entrüstet. ER schlägt mit der Faust auf den Tisch. Er stellt einen Bruch des 
Völkerrechts fest. ER protestiert, er ruft den Haager Gerichtshof an. Und der Herr Reichspräsident von 
Hindenburg versichert dem deutschen Osten, daß er ihn nie im Stiche lassen werde. Nie! Inzwischen 
schalten die ‘Vettern’ [Polen & Litauen] immer dreister und unbekümmerter mit deutschem Recht. 
Frankreich lacht sich ins Fäustchen und Herr Brüning hält Wahlreden.”; “Blutende Grenzen,” “Schlagt 
Severing!” - Sonderbeilage der “Preußischen Zeitung,” March 30, 1932. GStA PK, XX. HA, Rep. 240 D, 
100c. 
72 “Und die blutenden Grenzen, die verratenen Herzen schreien es in die bangen, sternlosen Nächte, in die 
düsteren Tage hinein: Ihr Brüder und Schwestern, die ihr noch in Deutschland leben dürft, helft uns! Wählt 
euch und uns den Führer, vor dessen starker Faust, vor dessen hartem Willen schon heute der Pole, der 
Litauer und der Franzmann zittern. Helft uns, sonst sind wir verloren. Adolf Hitler, komm und rette uns.”; 
Ibid. 
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sense a borderland German and even perhaps also an ‘East German’.”73 “His political 
direction,” it continued, “he acquired in Vienna, one bulwark of Germandom against the 
East, (Königsberg is the other)…He grew up himself in the area, which carried the idea 
of Germany toward the East into Slavic-ness, as is also East Prussia’s task.”74 The 
baselessness of these exaltations is evident.  
 With the exception of this occasional promotion of Hitler as the borderlands’ 
rescuer, attacks on the government’s handling of border issues were neither new nor 
unique to Nazism, for the Stahlhelm and DVFP had long similarly rebuked the 
authorities. Like their Nazi peers and independently from them, for instance, the 
Stahlhelm men of the Border Province’s Flatow district routinely targeted the priest and 
leading Polish activist Domanski. At one rally targeting Domanski in 1930, the Stahlhelm 
speaker censured the authorities' perceived weakness and pusillanimity in the face of 
Polish agitation, criticizing the government's habit of justifying its approach by invoking 
of the interests of the German minority in Poland, because those were never going to be 
honored anyway.75 This critique echoes the complaints of the NSDAP branch at Oppeln 
following the theatre riot there. As early as 1926, meanwhile, a speaker at a 
Grenzlandkundgebung hosted by the Stahlhelm in Oppeln castigated the government's 
indulgence of minority schools, when German minorities across Eastern Europe were not, 
according to him, even granted the right to religion lessons in their native language in 
public schools.76  
In addition to their critiques and animosities, the Nazis and the older far right also 
had in common their manners of communicating them, with the latter, for example, also 
 
73 “Er ist in gewissem Sinne ein Grenzdeutscher und sogar vielleicht auch ein ‘Ostdeutscher’."; "Hitler und 
Ostpreußen,” Preußische Zeitung, April 2/3, 1932. GStA PK, XX. HA, Rep. 240 D, 93a. 
74 "Seine politische Richtung hat er in Wien, der einen Trutzburg des Deutschtums nach dem Osten, 
(Königsberg ist die andere), erworben…Er selbst ist auf dem Raume groß geworden, der den Gedanken 
Deutschlands in das Sklaventum [sic] nach Osten trug, wie es auch die Aufgabe Ostpreußens ist.”; Ibid.  
75 “Stahlhelmaufmarsch in Zakrzewo,” Die Grenzmark, November 18, 1930. APK, Starostwo Powiatowe w 
Złotowie, 272. 
76 “Betrifft die am 28. Juni d. Js. in Oppeln stattgefundene Grenzlandtagung,” June 30, 1926. APO, NPO, 
990. 
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given to airing its grievances about border politics from within governmental bodies or to 
them. The leadership of the DVFP in Masurian Ortelsburg, for instance, wrote to the 
Prussian ministry of the interior in 1925 to announce that their party's district convention 
and the subsequent public meeting had unanimously endorsed a resolution that “’raised 
flaming protest against the state government looking on idly as Polish propaganda is 
conducted in our Masuria.’”77 “’We proved our loyalty and love for the Heimat in the 
plebiscite and’,” they warned, “’expect the state government to intervene before we 
proceed to self-help.’”78 A resolution was adopted too at the parallel overflowing German 
Nationalist People's Party rallies that in June 1929 protested the verdict against the Nazi 
and Stahlhelm youths, who had thrown stink bombs during the performance of Halka in 
Oppeln. The missive complained about the inroads Poles were supposedly making in 
German Upper Silesia and about “the privileging of the Polish minority and the 
undignified yieldingness” of the authorities that facilitated them.79 In the face of Polish 
activism and governmental mismanagement, President Hindenburg was therefore called 
upon to step in and once again save "our Heimat." 80 
From their elected positions, DVFP delegates to legislative bodies joined in such 
denunciations of the reigning government. In 1925, for instance, DVFP Diet deputies 
Stock and Wulle, ostensibly motivated by the mass of “indignant mail” they were 
receiving from Upper Silesia, submitted an interpellation querying why the Prussian state 
ministry had not acted on an earlier DNVP submission that had accused the Catholic 
religion teacher at Oppeln’s Gymnasium of “subversive activity in the Polish interest” in 
 
77 “‘Wir erheben flammenden Protest dagegen, daß eine Staatsregierung untätig zusieht, wie in unserem 
Masuren polnische Propaganda betrieben wird.'"; Letter from the district leadership of the DVFP 
Ortelsburg to the Prussian interior ministry, August 16, 1925. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 856, Nr. 170. 
78 "'Wir haben bei der Abstimmung unsere Treue und Liebe zur Heimat bewiesen und erwarten, daß die 
Staatsregierung eingreift, bevor wir zur Selbsthilfe schreiten.’"; Ibid. 
79 “Bevorrechten der polnischen Minderheit und würdelose Nachgiebigkeit”; “Oppeln und die polnischen 
Theaterspiele,” Ostdeutsche Morgenpost, June 11, 1929. APO, NPO, 267. 
80 “Rettung unserer Heimat”; Ibid. 
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the form of promoting Polish-ness among his pupils.81 Two years later, the working 
group of right-wing deputies, led by DVFP politician Teschke, in Flatow's Kreistag 
tabled a resolution against the introduction of Polish language instruction in the district’s 
public schools, a matter that as a state-wide policy fell outside the remit of that body. Due 
to this lack of competence, the Landrat declined to discuss the petition and, when 
Teschke vehemently objected, saw himself forced to close the meeting. This incident 
prompted Teschke's DVFP comrade Koerner to tender a complaint to the Prussian Diet, 
to which he was a deputy, in which he charged the functionary with inadequate support of 
Germandom. Koerner asked the state ministry whether it condoned the conduct of the 
Landrat and which steps it would take either to replace him with someone more 
sympathetic to Germandom’s struggle in the East or to find an alternative solution.82 The 
state ministry naturally found, however, that the Landrat had behaved correctly, heading 
off a potential clash between völkisch members of the Kreistag, who had “little political 
insight,” and Domanski, who also formed part of the body.83 It was unfortunate, the 
document concluded, that the district’s Germans showed so little understanding for the 
necessity, if one wanted to safeguard the interests of the German minority across the 
border, of accommodating the Polish minority this side of it.84 In the nearby Schlochau 
district, another DVFP Kreistag member went public with his opprobrium for the 
republic in 1926 in response to a travel report published in the Berliner Tageblatt. That 
piece's author had detailed the province’s travails with sympathy and stressed the region's 
importance. Its requests for financial aid, he had written, were “not undue.”85 However, 
the Border Province’s voters should also consider, he admonished, whether their 
 
81 “die empörten Zuschriften,” “Wühlarbeit im polnischen Interesse”; “Nr 900 A: Kleine Anfrage Nr 436,” 
July 16, 1925. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 856, Nr. 698. 
82 Kleine Anfrage Nr. 1968, November 23, 1927. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 856, Nr. 274. 
83 “geringen politischen Einsicht”; “Betrifft: Kleine Anfrage des deutsch-völkischen Landtagsabgeordneten 
Dr. Koerner vom 23. November 1927,” December 17, 1927. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 856, Nr. 274. 
84 Draft “Antwort auf die Kleine Anfrage Nr. 1968 des Abgeordneten Dr. Körner, Deutsch-völkische 
Freiheitspartei, betr. Vorgänge im Kreise Flatow.,” April 1928. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 856, Nr. 274. 
85 “nicht unbillig”; “Grenzmark Posen-Westpreußen: Reiseeindrücke,” Berliner Tageblatt, August 12, 
1926. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 856, Nr. 14. 
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continuous election of anti-republican politicians detracted from their claim to aid from a 
government they thereby undermined. Schröder, himself one of these anti-republican 
officials, responded in the Deutsches Tageblatt that making aid contingent on political 
support curtailed electoral freedom and hardly improved the regard the republic enjoyed 
in the Border Province. “’Democracy’ at its finest,” he fumed.86 In both tone and content, 
far-right petitions and complaints like these were akin to later Nazi ones.  
Another custom the far-right and Nazi movements in the border regions shared 
were the ubiquitous borderland rallies and marches. One notable Stahlhelm event of this 
type took place in Zakrzewo, Domanski’s home village, in 1930. That particular rally had 
been initiated by the Gau leadership for Pomerania and had the strong support of the 
national directorate, a circumstance that gave the Stahlhelm district leader an excuse not 
to call off the march when the Landrat asked him to.87 At the rally, the speaker professed 
that the Stahlhelm would not tolerate German villages being “subjected to the despotism 
of Polish priests” nor rest “until Germany’s borders in the East are moved behind the 
Vistula.”88 Despite this incendiary rhetoric, no altercations occurred, thanks largely to the 
Landrat having called Domanski in advance, who persuaded local Poles to stay home.89 
In 1928, a similar event took place in far eastern Pomeranian Stolp, at which the speaker, 
as was de rigueur, invoked irredentist ambitions and loyalty to Germans cut off from the 
fatherland by the borders’ alteration. The visiting East Prussian Stahlhelm chief declared 
that rather than being a borderland Pomerania should be linked to East Prussia by land. 
 
86 “‘Demokratie’ in Reinkultur: Nur Gesinnungstüchtige sollen Staatshilfe erhalten!,” Das Deutsche 
Tageblatt, September 18, 1926. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 856, Nr. 14. 
87 “Betrifft: Grenzlandmarsch des Stahlhelms,” November 10, 1930. APK, Starostwo Powiatowe w 
Złotowie, 272. 
88 der Willkür polnischer Pfarrer ausgesetzt sind,” “bis Deutschlands Grenzen im Osten bis hinter die 
Weichsel verlegt sind”; “Betrifft: Grenzlandfahrt des Stahlhelm,” November 16, 1930. APK, Landratsamt 
Flatow, 272. 
89 “Bericht über die Stahlhelmdemonstration am 16. November 1930 im Kreise Flatow,” November 17, 
1930. APK, Starostwo Powiatowe w Złotowie, 272. 
For an account of this episode, see also: Mathias Niendorf, Minderheiten an der Grenze: Deutsche und 
Polen in den Kreisen Flatow (Złotów) und Zempelburg (Sępólno Krajeńskie) 1900-1939 (Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz, 1997), 333-334. 
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Franz Seldte, the Stahlhelm’s founder, sent a telegram for the occasion from the East 
Frisian town of Emden, where he was attending an equivalent rally directed against the 
border with Denmark. To his assurance of that Gau’s solidarity with Pomerania, the 
response from Stolp read, “Unshakable is our resolve, unbent our will, not to cease the 
fight until the route Emden-Stolp-Königsberg leads through a free, undivided 
Germany.”90 As Seldte’s telegram indicates, Grenzland rallies took place on Germany’s 
northern border as well as in the East. Seldte himself participated in another, 2,000-strong 
demonstration in the North in 1930, this time in Flensburg.91 In Eastern Pomerania too, 
Grenzland rallies recurred. In 1930, a Stahlhelm contingent of 500 marched in Varzin, 
where Bismarck, hailed at the event for supposedly having foreseen the “danger in the 
East,” had once lived.92 The  program kicked off with a speech by the district leader of 
the Stahlhelm, who spoke of the need to demonstrate one’s presence and strength in the 
face of Poland’s increasing rebelliousness and constant border violations. Then the 
participants trooped to the Bismarck memorial, which stood immediately next to “the 
border that must not be,” and the district leader there addressed them again, prophesying 
that Germans would one day through “courage and blood” win freedom.93 The Deutscher 
Abend that followed adopted a resolution decrying Polish boundary breaches and 
exhorting the government to finally begin defending the borders more energetically, 
including by arming the entire borderland population.94 In nearby Lauenburg, around 
2,000 demonstrators gathered in 1929 when the Stahlhelm convoked rallies across the 
organization's East German Gaue in solidarity with one in Danzig that had been 
 
90 “Unerschütterlich ist unser Entschluß, ungebeugt unser Wille, den Kampf nicht einzustellen, bis der Weg 
Emden-Stolp-Königsberg durch ein freie ungeteiltes Deutschland führen wird.”; “Unerhörte Kundgebung 
in Stolp,” Kurjer Poznanski, September 15, 1928, trans. in Gesamtüberblick über die polnische Presse, 
September 22, 1928. APK, RK, 4368.   
91 “Nachweisung über die Versammlungstätigkeit der rechts-und linksradikal eingestellten Parteien und 
Organisationen gem. Verfüg. vom 10.6.29 I.P.P.623-6,” November 1, 1930. LSH, Abt. 309, Nr. 22669. 
92 “Gefahr im Osten”; “Stahlhelmaufmarsch in Hammermühle und Varzin,” Zeitung für Ostpommern, 
[December 2] 1930. APK, RK, 4364. 
93 “Grenze, die nicht sein darf,” “Mut und Blut”; Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
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forbidden. That prohibition, the Lauenburger Zeitung asserted, was illustrative of the 
danger Germandom faced in the East and in the free city in particular. Poland, it 
maintained, had discovered Danzig’s weaknesses, “parliamentarianism and foreign 
influence,” and once Danzig had fallen to Poland that country would direct its attention to 
Eastern German territories.95 Despite clashes with local Communists on the preceding 
day, the Lauenburg march went smoothly, but not so one spontaneously embarked on by 
the Stahlhelm group from the Border Province's Grabau.96 Its members had travelled to 
nearby Gross Peterkau to practice at that village’s shooting range and afterwards they 
marched to the border where a lieutenant gave a speech about the organization’s 
determination to win back the land on the other side thereof. Since a passing Polish 
border official overheard it, this address almost resulted in a confrontation and a border 
violation.97 Beyond the Stahlhelm, other societies too held border-related events, with the 
Alldeutscher Verband, for example, hosting an Eastern Marches convention in Upper 
Silesian Gleiwitz in March 1931, which drew around 500 attendees, many of them 
Stahlhelm or NSDAP members.98  
More so than the Nazis, the Stahlhelm maintained close ties to the army and 
supported its Grenzschutz initiative, as documented by repeated investigations into this 
relationship's potentially problematic nature. In 1925, for example, a republican Diet 
deputy, who had heard from his party's branch secretary there that the Stahlhelm had 
twice in a month participated in official military parades in Meseritz in the Border 
Province, wrote to the Prussian minister of the interior. The police had apparently not 
intervened.99 Another letter, this one to the Oberpräsident, dismissed the complaint as a 
 
95 “Parlamentarismus und fremdländischen Einfluss”; “Stahlhelm-Aufmarsch am 5. Mai in Lauenburg i. 
Pom.,” Lauenburger Zeitung, April 17, 1929. APK, RK, 4368.   
96 “Bericht betreffend Stahlhelm-Aufmarsch am 4. und 5. Mai 1929 in Lauenburg i.Pom.,” May 8, 1929. 
APK, RK, 4368.   
97 Letter from the police outpost in Gross Peterkau to the Landrat in Schlochau, June 20, 1932. APP, NPP, 
172.  
98 “Betrifft: ‘Ostmarkentagung’ des ‘Alldeutschen Verbandes’ am 21./22. März 1931 in Gleiwitz,” April 
21, 1931. APO, NPO, 991. 
99 Letter to the Prussian interior minister, December 9, 1925. APP, NPP, 170. 
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product of the unpopularity since the border fights of the immediate post-war period of 
local Stahlhelm leader Count Dohna with the Poles, thereby casting aspersions on the 
national loyalties of the complainant and of his local informer.100 When the party 
secretary, whom the Diet delegate had cited as his source, was eventually called in for 
questioning by the authorities, it turned out that his information about Dohna's 
participation in the parade had been second hand. While Dohna had not stood 
immediately next to the presiding officers, the party secretary had heard, he had been 
recognizably part of the group and though he had not greeted the army regiments as they 
marched past, he had saluted the Stahlhelm members that followed them in like 
manner.101 Meseritz's Landrat and several police officials, meanwhile, averred that 
Dohna had remained apart from the group of officers.102 In any case, he and the 
Stahlhelm had participated in the army event, no matter how informally. In Flatow, the 
bonds between local military functionaries and the Stahlhelm similarly came under 
scrutiny in 1926. The investigating official reported to the police headquarters in Berlin 
that the army’s Kreis commander acted as a contact man between his organization and 
the Stahlhelm, helping to plan Stahlhelm maneuvers and providing feedback at them. His 
predecessors too had kept up close links with the Stahlhelm group, occasioning their 
transferal elsewhere. A sergeant stationed in Flatow, meanwhile, had actually been 
assigned by the army to act as an assistant and sports teacher to the local Stahlhelm 
group, in which the army took a particular interest because it would be one of the first to 
be called up in case of Polish attack.103 A different report denied all this.104 While the 
military was glad of additional manpower it could rely on in case of invasion, republican 
officials were nervous about granting the far right access to the army's resources. In 
 
100 Letter to the Oberpräsident, January 12, 1926. APP, NPP, 170. 
101 Protocol of interrogation, March 15, 1926. APP, NPP, 170. 
102 “Betrifft: Uebung der Pioniere bei Betsche.,” March 17, 1926. APP, NPP, 170. 
103 “Betrifft: Vorgänge in Flatow,” October 13, 1926. APK, Landratsamt Flatow, 272. 
104 “Betrifft: Tätigkeit des Oberstleutnants a.D. v. Negelein,” November 9, 1926. APK, Landratsamt 
Flatow, 272. 
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Eastern Pomerania, for instance, the regional government worried in 1931 that if the right 
ever concluded it could not gain power legally and attempted a coup, the Grenzschutz 
would be perfectly positioned to plunder the "secret weapons depots of the 
Reichswehr."105 After all, the border defense units' membership in the area consisted 
almost entirely of Stahlhelm members, supplemented by some Nazis, and they were 
therefore unlikely to remain loyal to the republic.106 
Aside from participation in the official Grenzschutz, the Stahlhelm also 
independently made preparations for the possibility of fighting Poland. When in 1930 
Polish anti-German terror in Eastern Upper Silesia was perceived to be at its peak, for 
instance, the Stahlhelm alongside various other Upper Silesian nationalist paramilitaries 
considered setting up a joint border defense force. That project, however, foundered on 
disputes about the distribution of leadership roles among the involved organizations. 
Even from within the Stahlhlem two Ratibor men split off over the issue, setting up their 
own Oberschlesische Heimwehr.107 In 1932, meanwhile, the Stahlhelm solicited the 
rental of a manor house as a paramilitary sports school, which was to train Upper 
Silesia’s youth for border protection, from the region’s Oberpräsident.108 Poles certainly 
did understand such Stahlhelm activities as a threat, with the Kurjer Poznanski, for one, 
reporting in 1926 that the organization was training day and night, allegedly transforming 
border towns into military camps and building watchtowers that were being inspected by 
the military. While this, like many Polish reports, was dismissed as exaggerated and 
many no doubt were, there can be no doubt that the Stahlhelm did anticipate and train for 
a conflict with Poland.109  
 
105 “‘gedeckten Waffenlager’ der Reichswehr”; Letter, October 16, 1931. APK, RK, 4368. 
106 Ibid. 
107 “Betrifft: Gründung einer ‘Oberschlesischen Heimwehr’,” July 2, 1931. APO, NPO, 991. 
108 Letter from the Stahlhelm to the Oberpräsident, June 9, 1932. APO, NPO, 998. 
109 “Angebliche deutsche militärische Uebungen an der deutsch-poln. Grenze,” June 1, 1926. APK, 
Starostwo Powiatowe w Złotowie, 272. 
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 More immediately threatening to borderland Poles than militaristic posturing was 
day-to-day violent harassment, which Stahlhelm men and other right-wing radicals 
routinely engaged in. In 1925, for example, Upper Silesia’s Katolik Codzienny reported 
that “’Heimattreue’” had attacked a group of teenagers who were singing a Polish ditty 
while walking, without the police intervening.110 That same year, the paper also 
publicized that two brothers, at least one of whom belonged to the Stahlhelm, had broken 
into the home of a Polish man and terrorized him and his wife.111 In the spring of 1926, 
meanwhile, the Katolik carried a story about Stahlhelm members disturbing and 
eventually breaking up a Polish theatre performance in Wieschowa by shouting “Heil 
Front” and singing nationalist songs.112 At around the same time, a local Selbstschutz 
leader in Biskuptiz had, according to the Katolik, intimidated an inn owner into 
cancelling a Polish Easter play, for which he had previously agreed to rent out his hall.113 
The following year, a dance in Beuthen erupted into chaos when two tipsy men began 
singing a mix of German and Polish songs, since thereupon a fellow attendee, who 
reportedly belonged to the Stahlhelm, accused one of the singers of having participated in 
the Polish insurgency and called him a “’bloody insurgent’.”114 In 1928, some Stahlhelm 
men as well as a Pole were sentenced to fines in Städtisch Dombrowa for battery and 
“throwing with stones.”115 Later that year, the Stahlhelm held an anti-Polish rally just 
outside the Polish consulate in Beuthen, singing Siegreich wollen wir Polen schlagen.116 
 
110 “Aus Michowitz,” Katolik Codzienny, trans. in Gesamtüberblick über die polnische Presse, September 
30, 1925. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 856, Nr. 762.  
111 Copy of an article by the editorial staff of the Gesamtüberblick über die polnische Presse, December 14, 
1925. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 856, Nr. 762. 
112 “Terroristischer Überfall auf eine polnische Vorstellung,” copy by the the editorial staff of the 
Gesamtüberblick über die polnische Presse, April 29, 1926. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 856, Nr. 762. 
113 “Brutaler deutscher Terror in Biskupitz,” copy by the the editorial staff of the Gesamtüberblick über die 
polnische Presse, April 9, 1926. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 856, Nr. 762. 
114 “‘Du verfluchter Insurgent’”; “Schlägerei aus politischer Ursache,” September 8, 1927. APO, NPO, 
1024. 
115 “Schlägerei in Städtisch-Dombrowa,” January 23, 1928. APO, NPO, 1024. 
116 “Unchristliche Kultur,” Katolik Codzienny, trans. in Gesamtüberblick über die polnische Presse, August 
14, 1928. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 856, Nr. 385.  
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The occurrence of this sort of minor incident continued into the early 1930s. In 1930, a 
"nationalist parade" in the Border Province's Preußenfelde, in which Stahlhelm members 
reportedly participated, had allegedly chanted "Poles out, the German fist toils here" 
outside the homes of the village's Poles. In 1931, meanwhile, Stahlhelm men who, 
cycling near the Upper Silesian border, sang Siegreich wollen wir Polen schlagen caused 
the government some trouble, for a local inn owner reported them, claiming that a Polish 
customs official had overheard their singing.117 Shortly thereafter, bashed-in windows 
were reported by the Bank Ludowy in Groß-Strehlitz118 and also by a man who had been 
active for the Polish party during the plebiscite era, who suspected members of the 
recently founded local Stahlhelm branch.119 On New Year’s Eve 1931, meanwhile, 
Stahlhelm men barged into the village pub of Upper Silesian Salesche, where Poles had 
gathered to celebrate, and beat the clientele using both their fists and iron chairs,120 all the 
while berating their victims, interestingly, in the region's Polish dialect.121 On a larger 
scale 300 Stahlhelm men put a stop to a party hosted by the minority school in 
Pomeranian Oslawdamerow, motivated, according to the Bütower Anzeiger, by a cry for 
help from that village’s German population. This supposed plea had reached the men - 
how is unclear - while they were attending a Deutscher Tag nearby.122 They promptly 
headed to Oslawdamerow, where, the Polish School Association detailed in its complaint, 
their leaders made incendiary speeches, ordering their men to tear down the Polish 
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garlands. Some of the men forced entry into the school, which they demolished, and 
others into the Polish teacher’s home, menacing him. Another teacher was hiding in a 
private home, which the Polish school rented, with his charges, who began to cry when 
Stahlhelm men broke in and threatened him. The son of the house's owner was also the 
target of insults. Under these circumstances, the party could not go ahead and the children 
had to be taken home early.123  
 As was more widely common, reports of this Stahlhelm intimidation at 
Oslawdamerow appeared alongside accounts of Nazi violence. In the Głos Pogranicza, 
for instance, the same article recounted both the incident in Oslawdamerow and the 
Nazis’ disbanding of an assembly with Polish leader Domanski in Damsdorf.124 Both 
episodes, which had prompted outrage in Poland and ostensibly outside Germany more 
generally, were portrayed as illustrative of the negligent passivity of German local 
authorities, who were accused of having let them happen. Both incidents, among many 
others, were likewise discussed in a German submission to the Mixed Commission 
responding to anti-Polish incidents in Prussia in the last quarter of 1930.125 A seventy-
two-page Polish complaint made to the League of Nations, meanwhile, listed the 1931 
Stahlhelm assault on a Polish New Year’s party and the beating by Stahlhelm members, 
on two separate occasions, of an employee of the Union of Poles in Germany in Tost and 
of a farmer respectively. The document charged Nazis, for their part, with assailing a 
Pole in Rosmierka and, in a different episode, the Polish campaigner Adamiok, with 
forming an SA troop in a village in Neidenburg county in reaction to the establishment of 
a minority school there, and with scaring a Polish man out of his memberships in Polish 
organizations through an anti-Polish article in a Rhenish-Westphalian Nazi paper.126 That 
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Nazis and other far-right militants were often lumped together as interchangeable by 
Poles is further illustrated by another report to the Mixed Commission, which detailed an 
assault by “eight Hitler supporters” on Polish campaigners.127 Two of the attackers were, 
however, described as “wearing uniforms of the Stahlhelm organization.”128 They, the 
complainants speculated, “had chased us away from the cemetery,” where they were 
passing out flyers, “only because they knew the Hitler supporters were waiting for us.”129 
In fact, the Nazis and the rest of the far right did make common cause on 
borderland issues. This symbiosis is particularly apparent in the far-right press’ crucial 
encouragement of the Nazi movement. Far-right newspapers, as has been discussed in 
previous chapters, generated a flood of press coverage in defense of the Potempa 
murderers as well as of those, Nazis prominently among them, who rioted in Oppeln in 
1929. Especially where surviving Nazi papers are scarce, such favorable accounts of Nazi 
activism and violence in the wider far-right press are important source material. In one 
case, the Kurier Poznanski even alleged a direct link between Nazi violence and the far-
right press’ incendiary rhetoric. A recent Nazi raid on the Polish clubhouse in Masurian 
Allenstein, in which the Polish bank was also housed, and a skirmish with the 200 youths 
who were gathered there at the time, the paper contended, had been enabled by the 
nationalist press’ attacks on the Polish bank, which had “filled the Hitlerites with 
courage” to ambush the place.130 Many of these papers that provided incitement and 
cover for the Nazi movement retained non-Nazi identities, but some, like the 
Schleswigsche Nachrichten or Flatow’s Grenzmark, adopted the party line outright, 
remaining only nominally independent.  In fact, not only the were the Grenzmark editors 
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vocally supportive of the movement, but its typesetter and print shop manager was the 
secretary of Flatow’s NSDAP branch.131  
On the ground, collaboration took the form of side-by-side participation in rallies 
and violence. In Oppeln, it has already been mentioned, Stahlhelm and Nazi youths 
together disrupted the 1929 Polish theatre performance by throwing stink bombs. 
Members of both organizations got involved in the official Grenzschutz units and 
therefore mingled in those. The most illustrative and best-documented instance of 
fraternization, however, is the 1931 Stahlhelmtag, an annual event that that year was held 
in Silesian Breslau. The overtly irredentist rally, titled “’In the East lies Germany’s 
future’,” provoked outrage and worry in Polish quarters, as a German official summary of 
Polish reporting indicates.132 An indignant Polska Zachodnia, for example, quoted from 
the speech given by Stahlhelm head Franz Seldte. The former frontline soldiers, Seldte 
proclaimed, would “never acknowledge the wresting away of Upper Silesia, East Prussia, 
Danzig, and Memel” and, while they did not want war, would not be content with a 
“slave’s existence,” particularly as concerned the East.133 On Seldte’s command attendees 
had furthermore performed a turn such that they stood facing menacingly eastward. The 
Polish envoy in Berlin apparently subsequently called in on the Foreign Office to lodge a 
complaint about the event and about the Reich government’s failure to do anything about 
it.134 While the Poles fumed, the Nazis had welcomed the Stahlhelmtag. The Nazi 
Schlesischer Beobachter, for instance, reviewed the event favorably, praising the 
Stahlhelm for pioneering the fight against the post-war system and for being, through the 
Stahlhelmtag, the “first practical Osthilfe that has come to Silesia.”135 At the rally itself, 
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many Nazis were in attendance as audience members or “traveling salesmen with 
newspapers and refreshments.”136 The chants they now and again tried to start were 
drowned out by the noise of the crowd and the Stahlhelm leaders ignored Nazi attendees 
or treated them coolly. Between rank-and-file Nazi and Stahlhelm men, however, 
spontaneous “demonstrations of sympathy” occurred throughout the event.137 Ordinary 
Nazi and Stahlhelm members habitually consorted, there and in other, local settings, like 
the Grenzschutz units, because the parallels between their enmities and strategies 
encouraged it.   
While the grassroots rubbed shoulders amicably, the Nazi party did have to set 
itself apart from far-right competitors. Its propaganda aimed to achieve this by giving the 
usual criticisms of these parties as unsocial a borderland-specific twist. The practice of 
landowners, the traditional constituency of the right in the East, of relying on the cost-
efficient labor of Polish seasonal workers was denounced as endangering not only the 
interests of the borderlands' German everymen but also the German character of these 
regions. Therefore, the already-mentioned 1930 proposal for a “’Law for the Protection 
of the Borders’” put forward plans for the punishment of those who employed foreign 
seasonal workers.138 Already in the spring of 1929, a Masurian Nazi speaker had in this 
vein taken Albrecht von Graefe, one of the DVFP's national leaders, to task for having 
engaged Polish laborers since 1925, having before that poorly treated the members of the 
Artaman League whom he had employed.139 Condemnations of the taking on of foreign 
laborers grew more frequent during the unemployment crisis that took hold in the 
following years. In 1930 a Nazi speaker in Masurian Lötzen, for example, reportedly 
repeatedly criticized the use of Polish labor, demanding that it not be hired until all 
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Germans had found work.140 That same year, a former estate owner, who had had to flee 
from the Province of Posen, spoke in Flatow and was asked during question time what 
the NSDAP would do against Polish seasonal labor. Despite his landed background, the 
speaker replied that the party would ensure that German employers hired only 
Germans.141 The following year, an article in the Preußische Zeitung vociferated against 
the employment of 100,000 Polish seasonal laborers by sugar beet farmers, which was 
only a reduction of one third compared to the previous year. Already then, the economic 
crisis had necessitated the premature sending home of seasonal labor and meant that 
countless German hired hands had been unable to find work at all. That only an 
inadequate reduction in hiring targets had occurred was, the paper's analysis of the 
German sugar industry concluded, a sign that the republic was failing to push through 
solutions to socio-economic problems, at a time when thousands of Germans were 
unemployed and willing to do farm work.142  
Landowners' economic practices were censured not just on economic grounds, 
though, but on völkisch ones as well, as the “’Law for the Protection of the Borders’” has 
already suggested. Following the Nazi attack on Poles at a fire brigade festival in Glumen 
in the Border Province, which the Nazi press portrayed as a backlash to the dominance 
Poles had achieved in the village's district, the Völkischer Beobachter laid responsibility 
for "these conditions" squarely at the feet of "certain estate owners, to whom cheap labor 
is more important than the German people's interests."143 Their custom of employing 
Poles had facilitated the district becoming one of supposedly many "Polish colonies" on 
German soil.144 One visiting speaker from Czechoslovakia went so far as to argue at an 
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NSDAP rally in Masurian Lyck in late 1931 that the breaking up of estates in the German 
East would be necessary for Germandom's preservation there. Neither in 1830 nor in 
1848 had a true revolution taken place, he contended, because the reign of money and 
property had not successfully been broken. To safeguard vulnerable regions given the 
revolutions' frustration, “[a] division of the large farms would also be necessary, 
especially in the border district, which would in a certain sense serve as a defensive wall 
on the border," the speaker insisted.145 “If this had already happened before the war,” he 
averred, “we would today have no ceded territories, no corridor, and no minority 
peoples.”146 
Beyond economic reproofs, the non-Nazi right was occasionally accused of more 
generally showing little determination in border matters. When in early 1932 over a 
hundred residents of the Masurian village of Jedwabno were tried for mob violence 
against the state prosecutor who had recently come there to investigate an earlier assault 
on functionaries of the Polish minority school association, the riot was blamed by the 
Nazi press on insensitive handling of the situation by police. The Kreistag, the 
Preußische Zeitung reported, therefore wrote to the Landrat to request the transferal of 
the village police chief and his superior. Only the SPD delegates and the representative of 
the agricultural association, who was also the district leader of the Stahlhelm, did not 
sign, which incensed the village's peasants and rank-and-file Stahlhelm membership. 
"This is what the fight for Germandom with the black-white-and-red sash looks like when 
worst comes to worst," the Preußische Zeitung sneered.147 Previously too, such 
accusations of indifference to border issues had been made. At a rally in Masuria, Graefe, 
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one of the DVFP's national chairs, had not once in his address brought up the Polish 
danger, a report to Gauleiter Koch by the Nazi activist who had challenged him during 
question time disdainfully noted.148 In a DVFP rally in Masurian Lötzen the following 
year, Gauleiter Koch countered accusations by the speaker that the Nazi party had made 
its peace with the loss of ancient German lands that it was, to the contrary, the NSDAP 
that ceaselessly called for Germans of all classes to stand together for the recovery of the 
ceded territories, while the DVFP failed to do much.149  
These criticisms of the established right's handling of borderland issues were, 
however, not pushed terribly much, presumably since so little in actuality differentiated 
the Nazi movement's approach. Certainly, weaknesses in other right-wing organizations' 
tackling of borderland problems were not typically cited by Abel's respondents as reasons 
for quitting them and joining the NSDAP instead. Rather, they, like converts to Nazism 
across Germany, gave platitudinous reasons for their withdrawal from the traditional 
right. Upper Silesian Marleiter, for instance, claimed to always have considered the 
DNVP, in contrast to the insufficiently nationalist Marxist and Center parties, the 
smallest evil, but nevertheless too classist.150 Erich Hinz, who resided near the border in 
East Prussia after having had to flee Poland, where his family still lived, likewise offered 
as the only explanation of his having left the Stahlhelm in 1928 that it was too 
unsocial.151 Only Jakob Bösch, from the Rhenish Palatinate, described how he turned to 
the DNVP after Germany’s disintegration in 1918 but quickly recognized that the party’s 
effective representation of nationalist positions would always be hamstrung by its 
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“liberal-capitalist” and unsocial character.152 “As a farmer on Germany’s southwestern 
border, only 15 km distant from the French border, with a blood-wise connection to 
people & soil,” he wrote, “I was always unsatisfied by this.”153 Inefficacy on border 
issues, in addition to the classism that so frustrated him and others, had supposedly driven 
him to the NSDAP. Bösch was, however, very much a solitary case and, for the most 
part, the occasional disparagement of rival far-right parties’ border efforts gained little 
traction among Nazism’s following.  
Fellow far-right organizations, in their turn, did try to maintain a distinct identity 
and a certain distance from Nazism, as the rising appeal of that movement caused a 
decline in their fortunes. The Stahlhelm leadership, as mentioned, looked coolly upon the 
participation of Nazi activists in their group's flagship event, the Stahlhelmtag, in 
Breslau. In the Border Province, the leadership of the Stahlhelm chapter in Tirschtiegel 
went further, instituting a ban in 1930 on simultaneous membership in the NSDAP. This 
measure backfired, however, for when forced to choose many opted for the up-and-
coming movement, leaving the branch's membership depleted by half.154 Elsewhere in the 
Border Province, concurrent membership was not forbidden, but the Stahlhelm 
nevertheless stagnated. In Jastrow, officials considered the Stahlhelm branch past its peak 
now that there was a successful NSDAP group operating in the village as well. In 
Tarnowke, meanwhile, the foundation of a Stahlhelm branch had long been anticipated, 
but it would probably not come to pass after all, authorities speculated in 1930, if the 
NSDAP set up one too.155 This transferal of enthusiasm from the Stahlhelm to Nazism is 
illustrated by a meeting of the Jungstahlhelm in the province's capital Schneidemühl the 
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previous year. There, attendees had cheered Hitler and sworn loyalty to him.156 It was 
quite possibly this rapidly spreading enthusiasm for Hitler that prompted a speaker in 
Meseritz, in the same province, to stress in 1930 that the Stahlhelm had never accepted 
the Treaty of Versailles and had long insisted on Germany's right to Lebensraum.157 The 
defense at least of the existing borders was another venue for the efforts of the Stahlhelm 
to maintain its distance and even potentially obstruct Nazism. In Schleswig-Holstein in 
1929, for one, the Stahlhelm distanced itself from a Nazi proposal for the creation of so-
called Nordmark- und Heimatwehren. In the past the organization had supported the idea 
of such formations, but it did not wish to collaborate on a project that had been initiated 
by the NSDAP and would involve working with that party.158 In East Prussia, the 
established right, according to Nazi Gauleiter Koch, openly hoped that once it had 
"gouged out" the two "eyes" of the Nazi movement, whatever those were considered to 
be, it would be able to divert erstwhile Nazis "into the camp of the Stahlhelm and of the 
Grenzschutz formation standing behind it."159 
The preservation of established right-wing organizations as distinct and influential 
entities might, the authorities too hoped, help stem the Nazi tide. A 1929 report from 
eastern Pomerania noted, for example, that the Stahlhelm remained a thriving 
organization in its own right, with branches still proliferating, even though it had in 
Nürnberg agreed a closer cooperation with the Nazi party. Some estate owners involved 
in the Stahlhelm were beginning to develop Nazi affinities, but other, moderate leaders 
were counted on to keep the group on the straight and narrow and to preserve it as a more 
harmless alternative to Nazism.160 A strikingly similar report penned in the same region 
two years later expressed hope that moderate leaders within the Stahlhelm would be able 
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to curb Nazism’s spread, despite the above-mentioned Nürnberg accord and some local 
Stahlhelm leaders’ increasing attraction to Nazism.161 In Upper Silesia, moderate 
Landbund district leaders in 1929 answered government queries concerning Nazism's 
clout in their areas with promises to counter Nazi agitation should it occur, even as some 
fellow Landbund office holders themselves made anti-government propaganda.162 At 
times, the existence of healthy right-wing organizations did indeed hold back Nazism’s 
expansion. In Schleswig-Holstein, for example, a 1930 report cited the province’s 
Landräte, who, though police numbers admittedly suggested otherwise, attested that the 
Nazi party had not increased its membership numbers significantly in the first quarter of 
that year. In the three districts directly adjoining the border with Denmark, the report 
found, the NSDAP had by then taken root, but its membership remained small, which, the 
piece argued, might be due to the long-standing popularity there of the Jungdeutscher 
Orden and the Volksnationale Reichsbewegung. Besides, the document conjectured, long-
established, “goal-oriented” cultural work in these districts, which state and 
municipalities supported and in which all segments of society participated, might have 
been lessening Nazism’s appeal in comparison with districts elsewhere in the province, 
where such a vigorous, popular nationalist movement had not previously existed.163 As 
late as December 1932, another report noted that the Flensburger NS-Zeitung, which had 
been launched that summer, had failed to reach the expected circulation of 15,000 copies 
largely because the older, right-wing Flensburger Generalanzeiger had adopted a pro-
Nazi line, even recruiting the disaffected co-founder of the NS-Zeitung. Despite Nazism’s 
immense popularity in the province, the Nazi newspaper foundered, having attained a 
circulation of merely 6,000.164 While most everywhere the Nazi party, perceived as the 
most potent champion of positions, including on border issues, that were widely shared 
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among the right, was eclipsing older associations by the 1930s, in some few, highly local 
settings those established organizations retained enough popular loyalty and vigor to hold 
Nazism's spread back. 
The government treated these older organizations with the same apprehension as 
it did the Nazis, aware of the problems their excesses could cause internationally and 
therefore working to forestall them. It has, for example, already been touched on that the 
local Landrat successfully defused the potential for confrontation when the Stahlhelm 
planned a large borderland rally in the Border Province's Zakrzewo. Initially, he appealed 
to the local Stahlhelm leader, but was rebuffed with the explanation that the event had 
been instigated by the Gau and that he therefore had no authorization to cancel it. The 
Stahlhelm chair furthermore noted that he was not able to guarantee that his men would 
maintain their peaceful conduct if Polish bystanders failed to take off their hats for the 
German anthem, thereby indicating that the demonstration was intended to be 
provocative. Having thus become aware of the consciously confrontational nature of the 
event, the Landrat phoned up Polish nationalist leader Domanski, resident in the village, 
who agreed to instruct Polish inhabitants to stay off the streets on the day of the 
Stahlhelm gathering. Thanks to the intervention of the Landrat, the march took place 
without incident in a deserted village.165 In that same year, the Border Province's 
Oberpräsident issued a directive enjoining that in future no rallies, at which anti-Polish 
comments could be expected, were to be permitted within earshot or sight of the Polish 
border.166 As late as February 1934, the Border Province's regional SA chief Arno 
Manthey was asked to remind the SA and SS that marches were not permissible within 
ten kilometers of the border, after one such parade had taken place in Schwenten, just 
three kilometers from the borderline.167 In February of that year, the Regierungspräsident 
further requested that Manthey issue a decree against the singing of anti-Polish songs, 
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which the SA had done on four recent occasions. Such practices after all hampered the 
Hitler regime's rapprochement with Poland, which the German-Polish Non-Aggression 
Pact of January 1934 had formalized.168 
Where violence and intimidation did occur, the authorities often set out to deny or 
downplay the incidents. In the German response to a Polish round-up of anti-Polish 
incidents in Prussia in the last quarter of 1930, for instance, the Stahlhelm attack on the 
school festival in Oslawdamerow was, like all the other listed episodes, dismissed as 
Polish invention. The party, the memorandum claimed, had been delayed by heavy rain, 
not by the Stahlhelm men, who had in any case supposedly arrived before its start and not 
in reaction to it. They had, furthermore, allegedly not caused any property damage and 
the police, contrary to Polish accusations of neglectfulness, had dutifully prevented 
clashes, the report professed. Oslawdamerow’s Poles, in contrast, had during the 
departure of the Stahlhelm from the village insulted Germany through word and gesture. 
They had, moreover, exaggeratedly publicized the episode in the Polish press without 
ever making a formal complaint about it to the German police. Judicial proceedings 
against the Stahlhelm had therefore, the authorities declared, been abandoned.169 In the 
same document, the government tried to allay concerns over an order the regional 
Stahlhelm leader for Eastern Pomerania had issued. The directive had instructed 
Stahlhelm groups to monitor Polish rallies in Pomerania's border region, but once he had 
been made aware by them of the legally problematic nature of this decree, the authorities 
maintained, he had followed it up with an explanatory guideline that substantially 
tempered the original edict. Although the Stahlhelm had thus been reined in, Polish 
organizations had subsequently in their turn called for the surveillance of German 
activism on their side of the border, unnecessarily unnerving the German minority 
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there.170 The following year, the complaint about Stahlhelm men who had sung Siegreich 
wollen wir Polen schlagen and shouted “’Down with Poland’” while cycling along the 
border near Silesian Lukasine was likewise minimized. Protest had been lodged by a 
certain Klose, who operated a tavern adjacent to the German side of the border and who 
averred that a customs official over in Poland had overheard the commotion. Klose 
affirmed that the agitated Polish bureaucrat had remarked that such behavior from the 
Germans suited Poland well given that a League of Nations summit was coming up. 
Instead of Klose's testimony, though, German authorities privileged that of a local 
German customs official, who affirmed that the Stahlhelm men, though they had indeed 
sung and shouted, had been well out of earshot of Poland. It was only Klose himself, the 
official said, who had been ruffled.171 Since the Stahlhelm men in question could no 
longer be traced, the organization's local leader pledged to prevent similar occurrences in 
the future, and sources in Eastern Upper Silesia confirmed that the episode had not 
caused a stir there, the investigation was dropped.172 This pattern of making light of anti-
Polish incidents was not a phenomenon only of the early 1930s, though, but had already 
taken hold years earlier. In 1925, for instance, a group of Upper Silesian youths were 
ambushed by Heimattreue for singing Polish songs as they walked, without the police 
coming to their aid, according to the Katolik Codzienny. The authorities, however, 
maintained that the police had known nothing of the supposed incident and that the Poles 
had once more not made it aware of the affair before going public. Even if anything had 
happened, further pursuing the Katolik's accusation was not held to be "in the public 
interest," for the German passers-by would after all have felt "justified indignation" at the 
young Poles' singing.173 Furthermore, the four Polish youths' testimonies in any case 
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differed too greatly to prove that anything remiss had occurred.174 When a theatre 
performance in nearby Wieschowa was purportedly interrupted and then dispersed with 
shouts of “Heil Front” and renditions of Siegreich wollen wir Polen schlagen the next 
year, the official inquiry held that the disruption of the play had been caused by a 
drunken guest of the tavern where the play was being staged. While he had been rowdy, 
he had not, however, made anti-Polish remarks. After the performance's end, Stahlhelm 
men had sung the German anthem, but they had not disturbed the play itself, shouted 
“Heil Front,” or sung anything anti-Polish.175 Overall, the Narod was right when it wryly 
observed that the German people and its government strove to portray minorities’ 
situation as favorable and cases of violence and harassment, where they were admitted to 
have occurred at all, as exceptions.176  
While many government reports remained for internal purposes only, some 
investigations were part of multilateral consultations about the incidents concerned. This 
was the case, for example, for the German government's response to the Polish survey of 
anti-Polish incidents in Prussia in the last quarter of 1930, which treated the 
Oslawdamerow episode and the controversial Stahlhelm order to surveil Polish rallies. 
The spontaneous rally that had taken place in the Border Province after a nearby village's 
Stahlhelm group visited Gross Peterkau's shooting range also gave rise to discussions 
between local German and Polish officials. An investigation into the episode was 
initiated by the office of the starost in the adjacent Polish county of Chojnice, but his 
telegram inviting German district officials to the deliberations arrived late, such that only 
the responsible divisional head from the police department could be sent. The conference 
he attended in the end reportedly found that no border violation could be said to have 
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occurred, since the Stahlhelm men, whose impromptu rally had taken place in a forested 
area far away from any roads that crossed the border, could not have known that Poles 
would be within earshot. They had thus not intended to provoke. The German district 
administration, for its part, could not have known of what was after all a spontaneous 
event more than a kilometer distant from the village center, it was apparently agreed. 
Besides, the Stahlhelm men’s armbands had read simply “’Stahlhelm, Grabau branch’,” 
not “’With God for the fatherland against Poland’” as the original complaint had averred, 
it was concluded.177 Meanwhile, the cancellation of an Eastertide religious Polish play 
due to a Selbstschutz leader’s alleged threats towards the tavern owner, in whose hall it 
was to be held, made it all the way before the Mixed Commission for Upper Silesia. An 
initial German report denied that threats had been the cause of the performance's calling 
off, claiming that the tavern owner, in whose hall the play was to be staged, had come to 
fear trouble of his own accord when he overheard young, drunken Germans “remark 
disparagingly” about the upcoming event.178 Subsequently, the German authorities 
brought in various witnesses for interview, bidden by the chairman of the Mixed 
Commission, who was inclined to believe the Polish account of the episode, to identify 
the Selbstschutz man in question. One of these, a certain Klyszcz, corroborated the 
German version of events.179 Klyszcz, who claimed not to belong to the Selbstschutz, told 
the investigators that he had discussed the indignation about the Polish performance he 
had observed among the villagers with fellow guests in the tavern, which was how its 
owner had learned of the local umbrage. He had, however, never threatened anyone, 
Klyszcz maintained. This story was confirmed by the tavern owner himself, though a 
Polish clergyman testified that he had heard from the theatre troupe’s leader that Klyszcz 
had threatened that the Selbstschutz would storm the tavern if the performance went 
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ahead. The troupe’s head himself, though, only spoke of menacing letters that the tavern 
owner had allegedly mentioned to him.180 The balance of the testimonies led the 
Commission to find in Germany's favor in the end, though it stressed that due to the anti-
Polish atmosphere in Germany Poles understandably easily suspected threats.181 
 Despite the German government routinely shielding the radical right, including 
the Nazi movement, in its anti-minority outbursts, it was routinely derided by these 
militants as biased against the right and as resultantly too hard on it judicially. After the 
theatre riot in Oppeln, in which Nazis, Stahlhelm men, and German National journalists 
were jointly implicated, for instance, the Oberschlesische Tageszeitung railed at 
republican papers for disparagingly labeling the rioters rowdies, deserving of strict 
punishment, when they in contrast always mustered sympathy for leftist culprits.182 
Rehabilitation, the Tageszeitung decried in another piece on the riot, was the maxim of 
contemporary penal philosophy, which the republicans subscribed to, except where far-
right offenders were concerned, even though harsh punishment only risked deepening 
their “fanaticism” and making them nationalist “martyrs for Germandom.”183 In actuality, 
far-right perpetrators were shown considerable leniency. Even the Potempa murderers' 
sentence was commuted less than two weeks after it was handed down and the offenders 
in more minor incidents fared better yet. Most of those who had participated in the attack 
on the state prosecutor in Jedwabno went free, with the instigators sentenced only to 
fines.184 In Oppeln, the editor of the Oberschlesische Tageszeitung, Dr. Knaak, was 
acquitted of incitement after the theatre riot there,185 as were most of those who had 
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participated in the assault on the performers at the train station.186 Some few were 
sentenced to short prison terms, as were those who had thrown stink bombs during the 
play, though the latter's punishment was reduced to fines between fifty and seventy marks 
on appeal.187 The judges188 and even one of the state prosecutors in these Oppeln trials 
openly acknowledged sympathy for the perpetrators’ nationalist motivations.189 In 
Ortelsburg too, the ringleader of the scuffle at the local hotel with the visiting 
Czechoslovak students, who were presumed to be Polish, received only a 250 mark fine, 
for though he had committed unauthorized assumption of authority by checking the 
guests' passports and had acted in a way that had the potential to harm official foreign 
policy, his nationalist motives were considered an extenuating factor.190 On appeal, he 
was absolved altogether.191 
Besides pardoning and downplaying far-right intimidation of minorities, the 
German government also funneled substantial amounts of cash to right-wing, irredentist 
organizations along the new borders. To ethnic German associations abroad, it did so 
through intermediate organizations. Domestically, nationalist groups regularly appealed 
to the state for funds. The members’ magazine of the Schleswig-Holsteiner Bund and the 
Verband der Vereine Heimattreuer Nordschleswiger received substantial official 
subsidies, with the Prussian ministry of the interior granting the latter at least 10,000 
marks over the course of a twenty-two-month span between 1926 and 1928.192 In 1925, 
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the Vereinigte Verbände Heimattreuer Oberschlesier likewise urgently requested money 
from the Prussian interior ministry for its advice centers for refugees from now-Polish 
Eastern Upper Silesia. Underfunded and understaffed as they currently were, the group 
wrote, the centers could not provide the care required to prevent disgruntled refugees 
from turning to “radical organizations.”193   
Despite this support for right-wing associations' irredentist struggle, the 
government was also frequently accused of sidelining the borderlands. In 1926, for 
instance, a professor delivering the keynote lecture to a Grenzland conference in Oppeln, 
which was attended by local civil servants as well as by leaders of the Stahlhelm and the 
Landesschützen, contended not only that Mathias Erzberger had in his day told a French 
guest of his that no Eastern German could be permitted to achieve an elevated 
government position but also that visiting foreign commissions were intentionally never 
shown Eastern Germany.194 Later, the Nazis voiced many similar complaints. After the 
Oppeln theatre riot, for example, Nazi speaker Max Filusch accused the government of 
promising the Poles five million marks for cultural events as compensation, when all the 
while "[n]othing though is done for Germandom."195 In early 1930, meanwhile, the 
Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung charged that that province had been excluded from 
borderland aid by the Reichsrat, with the votes of the Prussian delegates who supposedly 
represented the region, because Nazism was so popular there.196 The Reichstag election 
that took place later that year provided fuel for further conflicts over the borderlands' 
putative willful neglect when chancellor Brüning toured Eastern Pomerania a few months 
afterwards. The right already interpreted the haste of the trip, which allowed the 
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chancellor only to visit each town for an hour or two, as a signifier of disinterest.197 It 
grew more incensed yet, however, when Brüning in answer to questions about the 
economic misery that in the East was generally held to be exacerbated by the impact of 
the post-war borders said that the 1930 election result had hampered the delivery of 
effective aid to the East. "Only if sources of error and inhibitions in the Eastern territories 
themselves did not frustrate relief measures" could they be effectual.198 The gains of the 
Nazis had, or so Brüning's argument ran according to the Schlawer Zeitung, negatively 
affected Germany's credit and thereby prevented there being larger sums of money 
available.199 The residents of the Eastern marches were being blamed for their own 
hardship and abandonment by the political establishment, the same paper decried, just 
because they did not support Brüning's Center party. Had the ban on assemblies along 
Brüning's route perhaps been passed, it asked, so that he could avoid seeing Nazism's 
black flags?200  
That that movement was a greater help to the borderlands than the government, 
republicans naturally denied. Repeatedly they warned that the sway Nazi gangs enjoyed 
there was hardly in the interest of the border areas, much like they had done when the 
lingering of bands of Freikorps fighters had underpinned the first Nazi boom in Upper 
Silesia in the early 1920s. Three documents from 1931 illustrate this republican concern. 
In March, Reichstag delegate Karl Bäcker, who was disturbed by the situation in 
Masurian Lyck, wrote to the Prussian interior minister. He had visited the small town 
four months previously and been beaten up, alongside friends from the German farm 
laborers' association, by Nazi youths. Now, he had received a letter from a friend in Lyck 
reporting that Nazis were parading through town in their brown shirts and staging 
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paramilitary exercises and courses. Such classes should be forbidden, Bäcker demanded, 
for they were threatening the "safety of the border areas" and taking place in a town that 
was after all the site of a Polish vice consulate.201 The following month, the Upper 
Silesian Volksblatt reported on the foundation of a SA home in Beuthen. The paper called 
on Marxists to fight the establishment of this institution, which was sure to be used 
against them, but also on the government to do the same. After all, "particularly in the 
border districts there eminently exists an interest in preventing the formation of armed 
gangs."202 In the summer, finally, the Reichsbanner held a rally in Rathsamnitz in Eastern 
Pomerania, the advertisement of which emphasized that a large turnout was important for 
showing the supporters of Hitler and Hugenberg that the organization was being vigilant. 
Demonstrating watchfulness would be of especial value as "[p]articularly our border area 
is a stomping ground for reactionaries of all shades."203 Therefore, "[w]e republicans in 
the border area have a particular duty to fulfill."204 Nazi activities, republicans agreed, 
dangerously undermined the authority of the state in its most vulnerable regions. 
 However, a considerable number of individual, lower-ranking civil servants in the 
borderlands were not republicans and hence joined the very Nazi movement that their 
employer, for all that it often self-interestedly protected German nationalist offenders 
against Polish accusations, sought to curb. Cases of officials with an affinity for Nazism 
were reported right from the republic’s beginning, with the Zgoda, for example, alleging 
in 1923 that Upper Silesia’s police was neglecting to mop up the Freikorps fighters that 
still plagued the region and its Polish-speakers because many policemen sympathized 
with the militants.205 In the fall of that same year, a note to the region's Oberpräsident 
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reported on a hundred young, in some cases armed men, who had paraded with a large, 
wooden swastika through the village of Grottkau. The police’s failure to intervene was 
attributed to its rapport with the marchers.206 Throughout the 1920s the Polish press in 
particular continued to depict the German authorities as in league with or, more often, 
willfully blind to far-right offences. By the early 1930s, such charges of complicity on the 
part of civil servants, especially on that of policemen, often revolved around Nazi 
excesses. In May 1932, for instance, the Nowiny Codzienne recounted how, in the run-up 
to the Prussian Diet election, Polish campaigners on their way to the Lower Silesian 
border village of Mittenwalde had spotted a band of Nazis. They sheltered in the forest to 
await the Nazis' next moves, but a customs official in league with the Nazis encountered 
them there. He asked them for their papers and then took them to the police station, with 
the Nazis following along and insulting the Poles. Once at the police station the customs 
official soon had to release the campaigners, as there were no actual grounds for holding 
them, but by then a crowd had gathered outside. This mob beat the Poles, calling them 
insurgents and following them all the way to the train station, where it attacked them 
once more.207 A year earlier, the Oberschlesischer Volksbote had similarly reported the 
perpetration of Nazi violence by customs officials, though then a fellow civil servant had 
been the hapless victim. Following a farewell party for a Regierungsassessor Dr. Würtz, 
a group of customs officials had drunkenly roamed the streets. One of them shouted “Heil 
Hitler” repeatedly, for which a passing policeman reprimanded him, pointing out that the 
customs official received his salary from the republic that Hitler opposed. In response, 
the customs official yelled that the Prussian prime minster could lick his ass and, together 
with his mates, set about beating the policeman. They then took the unfortunate officer to 
the police station, on the grounds that in the future Third Reich it would be he, not the 
Hitler-saluting customs official, who should be reported. They were, of course, promptly 
 
206 Message to the Oberpräsident, November 9, 1923. APO, NPO, 989. 
207 “150 gegen 7,” Nowiny Codzienne, May 21, 1932, trans. in Gesamtüberblick über die polnische Presse, 
May 28, 1932. APO, RO, 1882. 
 260 
kicked out.208 When the Volksbote publicized the incident and demanded that Würtz, who 
had participated in the assault, be removed from his responsible government position, the 
police investigated. Naturally, the police officer and the customs officials gave 
contradictory evidence, but the accounts of those police officials present at the station 
when their colleague was brought in and the injuries he had had then confirmed the 
policeman’s story.209 Other civil servants expressed their Nazi convictions in non-violent 
ways. Also in 1931, for example, the Kreuzburg magistrate exempted the local NSDAP 
branch’s performance of the play Sturm, which was being staged in celebration of the 
Upper Silesian plebiscite’s tenth anniversary, from the amusement tax because the 
proceeds were to fund youth and sports programming – even though that programming 
was avowedly propagandistic, rather than educational.210 At that year's plebiscite 
commemoration in Kruppamühle, meanwhile, a Gerichtsrat gave a speech, which 
according to a report moved “in Nazi channels,” to an audience that included numerous 
children in Hitler Youth uniforms.211 
Many civil servants not only sympathized with but outright joined the Nazi party, 
sometimes in leading positions. Josef Adamczyk, Upper Silesia’s Untergauleiter and a 
teacher, is the prime example. A 1930 complaint to the Oberpräsident about his 
detrimental influence on his young charges recounted how Adamczyk held parades 
through town with them every Friday and quipped that he probably even taught them 
“Wotan worship.”212 Even though he was raising his pupils as National Socialists, 
Adamczyk, a refugee from Eastern Upper Silesia, retained his employment and 
additionally received so-called Wartegeld. Through the latter in particular the 
government itself was enabling him to devote his time to party agitation.213 Various other 
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low-ranking civil servants, meanwhile, were to be found in the rank and file of the Nazi 
movement. Abel respondent Hubert Schummel, for instance, was born near Flatow, in the 
later Border Province, but was living in Potsdam by the end of the war, from where he, a 
police officer, was transferred for a year each to Upper Silesian Gleiwitz and Pomeranian 
Stolp. In Gleiwitz, he boasted, he became one of the co-founders of the NSDAP branch, 
which was well received by Upper Silesia’s völkisch milieu. In Stolp, he participated in 
the local group’s dissemination of Nazi propaganda in the surrounding countryside, all 
the way to “immediately before Poland’s borders.”214 Erich Femke, meanwhile, came to 
Upper Silesia as a customs official, rising to the rank of Oberzollsekretär and joining the 
party in iconic Annaberg in 1930.215 Nazi customs officials like Femke repeatedly called 
forth disapprobation and apprehensiveness among supervising authorities. The police 
office in Ratibor, for one, dedicated a 1931 report to “Reich civil servants as members of 
the NSDAP,” because many civil servants there, particularly those working for the 
customs bureau and the state railways, belonged to the party “as members or strongly 
sympathizing followers.”216 While no railway employees were named, three customs 
officials were identified by name, of whom one sat on the party’s local mediation 
committee and another had attended the recent opening of Oppeln’s Brown House with 
his wife. More generally, the report observed, the party’s Ratibor rallies routinely 
attracted many customs officials from throughout the district, possibly as the result of 
pressure by more senior staff on their subordinates.217 In the preceding year, a similar 
report from Annaberg, in the same county, had also provided a list of local Reich civil 
servants with NSDAP membership, which consisted wholly of customs officials, five in 
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all. Two of them had been Nazi candidates in the most recent municipal election and 
three sat on the NSDAP branch’s entertainments committee.218 It was prominent Center 
Party politician Carl Ulitzka, however, who kicked off the longest internal exchange 
about NSDAP membership among customs officials when he reported in July 1931 on 
the founding of an NSDAP chapter in the village of Koschwitz, two of whose most active 
members were the customs officials and SA members Skaba and Raabe. As Nazi 
agitation jeopardized the small border village’s tranquility, Skaba should be transferred 
away from Koschwitz, Ulitzka appealed, as Raabe had already been.219 A police 
investigation prompted by Ulitzka’s protest found that it was true that Skaba and Raabe 
were involved in the Nazi movement. Raabe merely promoted it in conversation, while 
Skaba additionally subscribed to a Nazi newspaper, which he displayed in the pub. 
Nevertheless, it was not this political activism that had been the cause for Raabe’s 
transfer, who, rather, had, as a Versorgungsanwärter, gotten a position with the postal 
service elsewhere for a time and was now back in Koschwitz. However, the investigation 
had discovered that a third customs commissar, Peitsch, from nearby Gowsdzian also 
actively supported the party and frequented Nazi rallies in the area. His subordinates were 
feared to be patronizing them too “to ensure the goodwill of their superior.”220 In the past, 
there had been insufficient concrete evidence to officially report frequent Nazi activity on 
the part of customs and tax officials in Upper Silesia, but with this new evidence in hand, 
the police report concluded, intervention should now occur. Though the Prussian 
prohibition on civil servants’ NSDAP and KPD membership did not apply to Reich civil 
servants, the document pointed out, it was, after all, nevertheless inappropriate for them 
to act in ways that threatened the state and sowed disquiet among the loyal population.  
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While in many of the above cases, the police investigated and tried to counteract 
civil servants' Nazism, the movement drew members from that branch of the government 
too. Hubert Schummel, as mentioned, was one such Nazi police officer. In Gleiwitz, his 
colleagues even founded the “Working Group of Nat. Soc. police officials,” as the Nazi 
Deutsche Ostfront chronicled in an article on the group’s second meeting, which had 
already attracted greater numbers than the first, including higher-ranking officials. In the 
rally's keynote speech, Member of the Prussian Diet Heukeshoven charged that the 
government had robbed the police of the “requisite nationalism” to act as an instrument 
of “national defense” and fulfill its role as “the vanguard of a great people’s army” in the 
case of armed conflict with Poland.221 Given the probability of such fighting, 
Heukeshoven declared, one could not in a borderland afford to accept a police president 
who indulged in “pacifist and Polish lines of thinking.”222 Instead, a police chief who 
knew what “national honor and dignity” demanded of him at the border was needed.223 
As the Nazis were portrayed as the only “bearers of real national will,” it was presumably 
a Nazi president Heukeshoven was calling for.224  
Some were fired from the police for such expressions of Nazi commitment. At a 
1931 rally with Untergauleiter Adamczyk in Ratibor, for instance, a certain Faber 
sounded off during question time, telling how he had worked for the police after serving 
in the army at Upper Silesia’s Polish and Czech borders. As a police officer, he said, he 
had come to realize that NSDAP rallies were only being supervised in order to gather 
information about speakers that would make it possible to arrest them. Having evidently 
developed Nazi affinities, Faber had the previous year joined in the final “Deutschland, 
erwache!” at a meeting he was meant to be overseeing. Reported by his colleagues, he 
was suspended by the police president, a step that he, as a “front and Selbstschutz 
 
221 “notwendigen Nationalismus,” “Landesverteidigung,” “die Vorhut einer großen Volksarmee”; “Die 
Gleiwitzer Polizei wird nationalsozialistisch,” Deutsche Ostfront, September 12, 1932. APO, RO, 1806. 
222 “pazifistischen und polnischen Gedankengängen”; Ibid. 
223 “nationale Ehre und Würde”; Ibid. 
224 “Träger wirklichen nationalen Willens”; Ibid. 
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fighter,” protested against.225 While his only semi-coherent rant oddly enough went on to 
grumble about being called a “Pollak” by colleagues and about the minority office’s 
inaction in response to his complaint, his Nazism, given the context in which he made 
these comments, is undeniable.226 Meanwhile, an April 1932 article recounted how the 
owner of a manor in the Border Province permitted Nazi rallies to take place on her 
property, including one attended by 500 uniformed SA men in the dead of night, and how 
she had taken in the district SA leader. This SA boss, the piece mentioned, had moved in 
after being dismissed from the police.227 While the numerical scope of the problem of 
Nazism among border areas’ civil servants is impossible to assess, it was sufficient to 
weigh on the administration, which saw its authority and principles disputed from within. 
The government was indeed much questioned by the Nazi party and other far-
right associations and derided by them as weak in the face of neighboring countries and 
of the international community. They, these groups averred, would act in a decisively 
more determined and intrepid fashion to regain Germany’s territory and standing. Nazi 
critiques and avowals of this kind differed little from those of their rivals. Though Nazis 
did occasionally try to depict their competitors as acting in contravention of their tough 
talk and rival groups in turn tried to distance themselves from a movement that was 
threatening to absorb the far-right milieu, the profound parallelisms in rhetoric and 
militant behavior about border and minority issues fundamentally fostered cooperation 
between them in the borderlands, particularly at the rank-and-file level. How Nazism, 
including its relationship with the German government, was viewed by non-Germans and 
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Nazis, Non-Germans, and Ethnic Germans 
 
 Whereas the preceding chapter surveyed how the Nazi party and German 
audiences within that country interacted with one another, this one considers how 
minorities as well as German nationals on the other side of the new borders regarded the 
ascendant movement. Famously, the latter yearned for a return Heim ins Reich and 
therefore later enthusiastically welcomed the annexation first of the Sudetenland and then 
of the Wartheland, Danzig-West Prussia, and Eastern Upper Silesia. In North Schleswig, 
which was never incorporated into the Third Reich, many German residents hoped for 
such an outcome until the Second World War's end. Before the Nazis' take-over of 
power, however, the view of Nazism held by ethnic Germans in these regions was more 
equivocal. Certainly, some looked to the Nazi movement as ethnic Germans’ most 
effective and forceful advocate within Germany and potentially their liberators down the 
line. Such a perspective could facilitate close relationships between NSDAP chapters in 
the German borderlands and like-minded groups across the borders. Other ethnic 
Germans, however, viewed with skepticism Nazism's militancy, its undermining of the 
established nationalist organizations that had thus far maintained the ties between 
Germany and the German minorities abroad, and its shallow understanding of the 
circumstances in which ethnic Germans lived and conducted their activism. For the 
propagandists of ethnic minorities within Germany, meanwhile, Nazism's utility lay 
mainly in the ability to use invocations of its pugnacious methods as justification for their 
movements' failure to flourish in the relatively liberal, permissive environment that was 
the Weimar republic. In this quest for rationalizations, Nazism was portrayed as the true, 
bared face of all Germandom and moderate forces within Germany were usefully tarred 
with the same radical nationalist brush. Only rarely did activists advocate – and then 
often only half-heartedly – that minority members stand with the republic against the 
movement that threatened that state and the minorities both. 
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 In the decade since the First World War, ethnic minorities had witnessed a steep 
decline in their vote shares and the anxiety surrounding this development shaped their 
engagement with Nazism. In Upper Silesia’s Landkreis Oppeln, for instance, the Polish 
Catholic People’s Party, which had won over two-thirds of votes in some of the district’s 
villages before the war, still garnered twenty-three and twenty-five percent in the two 
Reichstag elections of 1924. By 1930, however, it only received 14.4 percent and it 
continued to decline to 5.7 percent in July 1932 and 4.6 percent in November of that 
year.1 The Danish Schleswigsche Verein fared equally badly. An article about the 
November 1929 election to the district of Schleswig’s Kreistag recorded side-by-side the 
Danish votes in that election and in the preceding one of 1925 for a number of villages. 
The decreases in Kropp from thirty-nine to four Danish votes and in Süderstapel from 
twenty-five to seven were just the starkest exemplars of a trend that affected all but two 
of the listed villages.2 Writing about Upper Silesia, Brendan Karch has attributed this 
downturn to the Weimar Republic’s granting of wide-ranging liberties to its minorities 
regarding language use, particularly within schools and churches. Satisfied with these 
rights, the Polish-speaking, nationally indifferent segment of the populace abandoned a 
Polish nationalist movement that prior to the First World War had held attraction largely 
as a party of protest. In the absence of concrete causes for complaint, Upper Silesians 
were reluctant to embrace high-commitment nationalism.3 A similar development appears 
to have transpired in Schleswig. Eastern Upper Silesia’s Polonia, edited by Wojciech 
Korfanty, was alone, however, in acknowledging at the time that radical brands of 
nationalism might simply not resonate with voters and in urging a minority leadership 
 
1 Brendan Karch, Nation and loyalty in a German-Polish borderland: Upper Silesia, 1848-1960 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 176. 
2 “Kreistag Schleswig: Sechs Nazis!,” Der Schleswiger, November 18, 1929. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 
4030, Nr. 106. 
3 Karch, Nation and loyalty in a German-Polish borderland, 176-178. 
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beholden to the Polish reactionary-nationalist regime, which Korfanty opposed, to take a 
good look at itself and at what it had to offer minorities.4 
 Instead of facing changes in the political dynamic head-on, however, the minority 
parties simply tried to get voters perceived as national renegates back on the nationalist 
track. Before the July 1932 Reichstag elections, for instance, the Upper Silesian Nowiny 
Codzienne charged that any Polish-speaker who failed to vote, at all or for the Polish 
party, was committing treason by their people and their religion.5  In a different piece, the 
paper urged its readers to remember to follow “the voice of your conscience," which was 
presumed to impel them to vote Polish.6 Casting a vote for the Polish party, the article 
explained, was never a waste but rather an important stand against Germanization. The 
Danish Schleswiger similarly ran a feature expounding “Why you should always vote 
Danish, therefore also now on April 24, 1932” before that year's Prussian Diet election, 
which likewise emphasized that the ballot should be used to express belonging to the 
Danish people, not to take a stand on economic and ideological disputes that "the 
Prussians" were best left to settle among themselves.7 The failure to abide by such 
enjoinders was lambasted in the wake of the July Reichstag election in another Danish 
paper, which reserved especial ire for parents who sent their children to Danish schools 
but did not vote Danish. They were, the journal bristled, using Danish resources without 
supporting the Danish cause where it really mattered, namely at the ballot box.8 As late as 
March 1934, the Border Province's Głos Pogranicza, in an article about Polish-speaking 
school children who supposedly took part in "Hitlerian divisions" that sang anti-Polish 
songs, depicted Polish-speakers who participated in German political life as "renegates" 
 
4 “Die Niederlage der Polen im Oppelner Schlesien,” Polonia, April 26, 1932. APO, NPO, 112. 
5 “Alle unter das Banner der polnisch-katholischen Volkspartei,” Nowiny Codzienne, July 24, 1932, trans. 
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who misguidedly determinedly tried to pass for German, because they falsely believed 
Poles to be "people of second class" in Germany rather than citizens with all the same 
rights.9  
Besides on renegates’ perfidy, the decline of organized minority nationalist 
movements was blamed on German repression. Nazism, however, was considered no 
more oppressive than "any other German party," in Karch's telling.10 In fact, Karch has 
argued, Nazism's racial essentialism offered minority activists hope by promising an end 
to nationalist competition and assimilation, which were not consistent with this Nazi 
worldview and on the losing side of which minorities were finding themselves.11 
However, besides the few press snippets cited by Karch there is little documentation of 
the hope putatively put in Nazism's essentialist racism. Of all the sources I looked at, only 
the 1934 article about school children joining in anti-Polish songs requested that the 
German authorities put a stop to such renegate behavior because anyone who engaged in 
it violated the "injunctions of their Führer."12 In contrast, examples of Nazism being 
invoked by minority activists as an existential threat abound. Following the July 1932 
Reichstag election, for instance, the Flensborg Avis speculated that voters had been 
scared into voting against their Danish inclinations by the presence of small groups of 
Nazi toughs outside rural polling stations.13 Many such tales of Nazi intimidation, 
discredited officialdom by linking it to Nazis' evidently ignominious excesses. In the 
compendia of electoral violence routinely published by Polish newspapers to bring home 
the inevitability of the minority's electoral failures, reports of minor anti-Polish acts 
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committed by civil servants were mixed in, as if equivalent, with tales of much more 
severe Nazi and Stahlhelm misbehavior. Police officers, bureaucrats, and judges were 
furthermore accused - in these compilations of violence as well as in articles dedicated to 
individual noteworthy episodes like those in Glumen, Jedwabno, and Oppeln - of having 
failed to handle Nazi violence with the necessary promptness and severity either on scene 
or afterwards. Even though the Nazis had placed Poles above even Communists on their 
“blacklist,” even the Polonia asserted, violence against them was not seriously being 
“taken action against.”14  
Not just individual officials but the attitudes of parties and governments more 
generally were, Polish propaganda made out, smoothing the way for far-right movements. 
The strength of the Stahlhelm, for instance, was blamed on public school teachers' 
nationalist outlook and on the federal government's Ostpolitik by the Ilustrowany Kurier 
Codzienny on the occasion of the 1931 Stahlhelmtag in Breslau.15 The Germanizing 
policies implemented in public schools and from church pulpits were similarly said by 
the Nowiny Codzienne to have been responsible for the greater rise in NSDAP and KPD 
votes than in Polish ones in the 1930 Reichstag election. Only such manipulation could, 
the paper maintained, drive the innately Polish voters of Upper Silesia into the arms of 
Germany’s most radical parties instead of into those of their natural Polish nationalist 
political home.16 After the same election, the Polska Zachodnia too claimed that not only 
the “organized militants of the Hitlerites and Communists, who had everywhere tried to 
terrorize our compatriots,” but rather “the German population and even individual civil 
servants” also had "been against the Polish population in the current elections."17 "The 
 
14 “Der Terror der Hitler-Leute gegenüber den Polen im Oppelner Schlesien,” Polonia, August 22, 1932, 
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attitude of the authorities," of other official circles, and of the German press was, through 
its buttressing of the stance of those many Germans who sought to eradicate any 
"national particularism" in their country, furthermore held responsible by the Union of 
Poles for the persistence of Nazi and Stahlhelm terror inside but also outside election 
seasons.18 A Nazi rally with the defense attorneys of the perpetrators of the violence 
against the Katowice theatre troupe in Oppeln, as a “public glorification of the attackers” 
and a “public invitation to further anti-Polish violent deeds,” was, the Polska Zachodnia 
curiously charged, a taste of “the era of the ‘liberal’ government of Oberpräsident 
Lukaschek.”19 
 People and parties who had no connection with Nazism were thus, like 
Lukaschek, brought into disrepute by linking them, however spuriously or vaguely, to the 
movement, a trend that was particularly noticeable in the run-up to elections. The Nowiny 
Codzienne article that proclaimed those who neglected to vote Polish in the impending 
July 1932 Reichstag treasonous, for instance, underlined the imperativeness of doing so 
by describing a recent 4,000-strong Nazi march through Gleiwitz. The declaration that 
not just the Nazi party with its radical nationalism but indeed all German parties were 
undeserving of Poles' electoral support was simply tacked on, with the governing Center 
and Social Democratic parties denounced for the increase in assimilationist policies they 
enacted so as not to lose ground to the right and the Communists for their anti-religious 
Bolshevism.20 The Polonia likewise charged in June 1932 that the right pursued 
Germanization through militancy, the Center from the pulpit, and the Social Democrats 
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through their emphasis on the “unity of the proletariat.”21 “Today the Hitlerites have 
taken up the initiative in an already open fight against the Polish element, a ruthless fight 
waged with the most extreme methods,” the paper went on, “and independently of them 
so have the liberalizing nationalist circles.”22 The specific development treated in the 
remainder of the article was a bill against Polonization from the pulpit that the Nazi Diet 
delegates had introduced. A story in the same journal before that year's Diet election 
about the car of a Polish speaker that had crashed after driving over a nail-studded plank, 
ostensibly placed on the road by Nazis, similarly moved beyond castigations only of 
Nazism to aver that the Nazis through terror, the Center Party through the “misuse of 
religion and the church” for the spreading of Germandom, and the government through 
undue scrutiny of Polish campaigners all worked to create an image of an Upper Silesia 
unmarred by Polish-ness.23 Articles opportunistically tied all parties to the Nazi 
extremism they were written to protest.  
 This conscious propagandistic instrumentalization of Nazi excesses to bring not 
just that party but Germany more generally into disrepute is most remarkably illustrated 
by plans made by the Polish consul in Oppeln in the aftermath of the 1929 theatre riot 
there. The testimony of musicians Wende and Langer, which corroborated that the theatre 
troupe's leadership had pressured members into overstating the damage done to them and 
their instruments, had made clear that Poles intended to take as much advantage of the 
misfortune that had befallen the performers as possible. In this spirit, the consul proposed 
to put together a brochure about the incident. The trials that came out of the episode had 
produced much material, not only about the riot itself but also, he claimed, about the 
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backdrop of Germans' anti-Polish attitudes against which it had occurred. Published, the 
consul argued, this material would provide readers with an accurate - that is, Polish 
nationalist slanted - picture of the disturbance at Oppeln and of German Upper Silesian 
society.24 The chapter plan devised by the consul would have seen the booklet open with 
an introduction about the Oppeln episode’s “genesis” and the disputed performance’s 
significance for Polish cultural life in the region, followed by a series of chapters on the 
German government’s, the press’, and the League of Nation’s responses to the violence, 
on the subsequent trials, and on press coverage of these.25 In order to obscure that the 
pamphlet originated in the consulate, it was to be published by the local Union of Poles, 
which had already expressed its willingness. A print run of 500 German and Polish 
copies each was to be released, with detailed summaries to be made available in English 
and French.26 This ambitious plan came to naught because the Foreign Ministry in 
Warsaw deemed it good but, at a projected cost of 1,500 marks, too expensive.27 
Nevertheless, it stands as an exemplification of the tendency to purposefully implicate all 
Germans in the anti-Polish misdeeds of the right fringe. With the government's approach 
of counting on "the gradual pulling across of Polish-speaking segments of the population 
into the German Kulturkreis" apparently triumphing over minorities' nationalist activism, 
the republic and republican parties had to be represented as Polish-speakers' enemy even 
in the absence of much actual cause for complaint.28 The attribution of Nazi violence to a 
belligerently anti-Polish atmosphere fostered by the authorities in this proposed 
pamphlet, as in various newspaper articles about other violent episodes, was therefore 
arguably not meant literally or, as Karch suggests, to relativize the scourge that was 
Nazism but rather to tar German government and society with the same extremist brush.  
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26 Ibid. 
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 Since the republic was routinely deprecated and all parties portrayed as equal 
threats to the minorities, at election time minority members were urged to vote for 
minority parties or not at all. Before the first round of the 1932 presidential elections, for 
example, several Polish papers pronounced that Poles had no civic duty to vote in it. 
After all, the Głos Pogranicza explained, there was no Polish candidate, as there were in 
Reichstag or Diet contests. Rather, all contenders were Germans and none offered any 
guarantees of Polish rights. If readers really felt impelled to vote, Hindenburg was 
grudgingly recommended, but it was strongly implied that no such responsibility to vote 
obtained.29 The Nowiny Codzienne concurred that Poles had no obligation to vote and 
likewise half-heartedly commended Hindenburg to readers, should they nevertheless 
choose to do so. Though “chauvinism” and “chicaneries” had proliferated under his 
reign,30 the paper wrote, he was the candidate of the republic, which was a better 
underwriter at least of Polish liberties than Thälmann with his anti-religious Communism 
or Hitler and German Nationalist Düsterberg, the greatest enemies of the Poles.”31 The 
Polonia went further, enjoining readers to either not vote at all or cast an empty ballot.32 
In the run-up to the Prussian Diet election that took place the following month, 
meanwhile, the Danish minority paper Der Schleswiger argued that strategically voting 
for republican German parties would be counterproductive. To illustrate this standpoint, 
it printed a numerical example. If the usual 5,000 or so Danish votes were distributed 
among German parties, the journal conjectured, the Social Democrats would likely 
receive 3,000, the Communists 1,900, and the Nazis 100. What, however, if the Social 
Democrats needed 3,001, the Communists 1,901, but the Nazis only 99 additional votes 
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to win another seat? Rather than risk sending another Nazi delegate to the Diet, Danes 
should vote Danish. “No-,” the piece finished, “let the Prussians sort it out among 
themselves…”33 The Social Democratic Volkszeitung was quick to criticize the 
Schleswiger for its reliance on an implausible numerical scenario and for the detachment 
toward the republic and its fate betrayed by the article. In reality, it pointed out, the 
danger of the Nazis securing an additional Diet seat was much greater if Danes engaged 
in "demonstrative" voting for a minority party that would likely gain no mandates 
anyway.34 The minority could only afford to “make themselves foreigners” in the manner 
advocated by the Schleswiger, the Volkszeitung pointedly observed, while “the 
democratic form of government is secured through the republican parties.”35 After all, the 
paper noted, “the persistence of a republican Germany is a requirement for life” for the 
Danish minority.36 Danes could therefore not countenance withdrawing from German 
politics at a time when the election promised to reflect a Germany split closely between 
“reaction and progress.”37  
 The Volkszeitung need not have worried overmuch, for the very need for minority 
papers to publish advice to desist from supporting German parties indicates that ordinary 
voters were not already doing just that. In such voting behavior only the Masurian Cech, 
a magazine aimed at that region's autochthonous population without espousing Polish 
nationalism, occasionally supported them. It alone issued an enthusiastic endorsement of 
Hindenburg before the presidential election's first round. “Dear friends!,” the journal 
wrote, “’I too speak Polish.’ Do you know who spoke these words? None other than our 
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president Hindenburg, when the Poles, who have lived there for years, greeted him 
among other people in Cologne.”38 Hindenburg, who had rescued Masuria from the 
Russians and preserved Germany from Communism, now wanted to save the country 
from Nazism, the piece approvingly proclaimed. It finally concluded, “Our Masurian 
people should follow the lead of this brave and famous person and all the more because 
this savior of East Prussia belongs to those people who can speak Polish. We Masurians 
therefore vote for our Hindenburg.”39 In its January/February 1933 issue, meanwhile, the 
magazine admonished Masurians that they had hopefully seen the error of their Nazi 
ways now that harsher minority politics were beginning to be made by the new 
government without any native Masurians being included in the policy deliberations.40 
For the upcoming March 1933 election, the journal then commended the German State 
Party to its readership as the embodiment of Prussian "objectivity and tolerance."41 Even 
the Cech, however, counseled voting for the Masurian party when one was created for the 
1932 Diet election, if only because the more ballots the group received, the more money 
would be pumped into Masurian schools, municipalities, and job creation schemes on 
account of the "'Polish danger'."42 By and large, though, denouncing of the republic 
prevailed in newspapers aimed at minority members. 
 Whereas minority activists equated other parties with Nazism, ethnic Germans 
across the new borders recognized Nazism's approach to borderland matters as differing 
from that of Germany's political establishment, a divergence to which their response 
varied. Some, particularly in Czechoslovakia, considered the NSDAP a welcome, 
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militant, and close ally in the struggle for their irredentist goals. This mutual support 
notably manifested itself in the participation by ethnic Germans in Nazi events held in 
German border regions and by borderlands Nazis, in their turn, in rallies across the 
border. When, for instance, the NSDAP chapter in Annaberg planned a borderland rally 
to commemorate the lost territories for May 1930, it anticipated that “guests from 
Czechoslovakia” would take part.43 On the occasion of Hitler’s speech in Flensburg that 
year, visiting Germans from North Schleswig were explicitly greeted by the speaker who 
introduced the party leader.44 For the 1932 Hitler rally in Tilsit too, Germans from the 
Memel region had come from over the border, the Preußische Zeitung reported.45 While 
it is unverifiable whether ethnic Germans really were present at Nazi rallies in German 
borderland towns, documents do conclusively show that Upper Silesian Nazis frequently 
attended Nazi events in the adjacent parts of the Sudetenland. In 1930, for instance, thirty 
German Nazis, including Silesian leadership figures Brückner and Hüttmann, participated 
in the Czechoslovak NSDAP’s party congress in Fryvaldov, where the welcoming of the 
distinguished guests formed a central element of the gathering’s opening. The congress’ 
chairperson hailed Brückner as “’Hitler’s stadtholder in Upper Silesia’” and rejoiced, 
“’Your presence is a guarantee for us that our brother movement, which has become so 
strong, intends to be a loyal patron of Germandom outside the Reich borders.’”46 Some 
months after the congress, a Sudeten German Nazi delegate to, presumably, the 
Czechoslovak parliament apprised the readers of the Preußische Zeitung that the event 
had resulted in the Sudeten German Nazi party carrying out a wave of propaganda for 
regional autonomy so strong that the Czechoslovak government had been unable, despite 
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its best efforts, to put a stop to it. The ideal of autonomous regions for Czechoslovakia’s 
various national minorities had circulated since that country's inception, but only 
Nazism's arrival on the political scene, the deputy wrote, had shaken Sudeten Germans 
out of political torpor, typified by invariable discussions about whether to take active part 
in Czechoslovak politics in order to obtain rights and privileges for the minority or to 
disengage from politics rather than acknowledge Czechoslovakia as a legitimate political 
entity at all, and revived their agitation for it.47 In the same year as that apparently pivotal 
party convention, Sudeten and Reich German fraternities with Nazi affinities also got 
together in Fryvaldov in order to found an association that encouraged the groups “to 
support each other in mutual contact” and “to visit National Socialist rallies on both sides 
[of the border].”48 One Sudeten German speaker present at this meeting, a government 
report about it noted, had already addressed a Nazi election rally in Upper Silesian 
Ziegenhals.49 In 1931, meanwhile, ninety-five Reich Germans travelled from the Upper 
Silesian small towns of Neustadt, Steubendorf, Wiendorf, and Leobschütz to the NSDAP 
district festival in Osoblaha. An official report observed about the festivities that, “The 
population of this border region [the Sudetenland] sees in belonging to the NSDAP not 
the party as such but rather an open profession of Germandom.”50  
 Beyond visits to the Sudetenland's Nazi gatherings, the Upper Silesian NSDAP 
also organized a clandestine courier service to facilitate communication with the Sudeten 
German Nazi party. In October 1932, for example, a letter asked Upper Silesian Nazi 
leadership figure Count York von Wartenburg about a potential get-together with Nazi 
activist Wiesner from Český Těšín. A first attempt to arrange this meeting had recently 
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failed, since the service relied on relaying messages orally and this one had been passed 
on incorrectly. Wartenburg was therefore requested to propose another date at least two 
weeks in the future, to allow for the time it could take to transmit information by 
courier.51 The network came to the government’s attention in 1931, when a report fretted 
that through it Helmuth Brückner was “in close contact with the National Socialist party 
in the CSR.”52 A follow-up report a month later revealed that messages were largely 
relayed via the Fryvaldov law firm of Sudeten German party secretary Heindl, a popular 
Nazi leader in the region who was planning to stand as a Nazi candidate at the next 
election. A former Austrian officer’s hotel reportedly also served as a hub for 
messengers. Weapons, which the Nazis and the Stahlhelm had bought from old 
Reichswehr stocks, were meanwhile smuggled into Czechoslovakia from the inn of the 
Upper Silesian border village Gostitz.53 A conversation between the police president and 
a trusted Czech informant confirmed that the Czechoslovak like the German security 
services were paying particular attention to the courier link. Between them, the agencies 
had uncovered the two routes that the messenger service utilized: one led from Annaberg 
to Oderberg and the other from Leobschütz to Münzerei, a popular excursion spot 
without border controls. The messengers’ names, however, had not been discovered.54  
 Cross-border relations were not all harmonious, however. For one, the same 
instability and infighting that plagued the splintered völkisch-nationalist scene across 
Germany in the Weimar years affected these links, as the case of Eastern Upper Silesian 
Nazi district leader Sosna illustrates. In March 1933, a certain Ludwig Nowak wrote to 
the NSDAP chapter in Upper Silesian Hindenburg, asking to join it, because the party 
chairman in his Eastern Upper Silesian village of Nowawies was so incompetent and 
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corrupt that he hampered what should be the easy expansion of the party. Nowak 
demanded that the chairman be reprimanded upon his next visit to Hindenburg and that 
Sosna appoint a replacement for him.55 But by this time, Sosna did not himself enjoy 
much trust. In November of the previous year, he had been tasked by Count York von 
Wartenburg with smuggling a large amount of Nazi writings back with him across the 
border into Eastern Upper Silesia when he next visited the German part of the region.56 
The writings had indeed been picked up, but the very letter that confirmed this also 
mentioned that the head of a Katowice veterans’ association had warned that Sosna was 
badly off financially and motivated in his NSDAP activism mainly by “material hopes.”57 
A March 1933 letter finally counseled Count York von Wartenburg to treat Sosna, who 
had proven his lack of reliability by not in fact smuggling the pamphlets into Poland, with 
caution.58 Although an April letter to an associate of Count York von Wartenburg’s 
dismissed the accusations against Sosna as sabotage not just of him but of the party, 
which one could not allow to “fall asleep again” on account of such irresponsible 
wrecking, it is doubtful that Sosna enjoyed the party career for which he had apparently 
hoped.59  
 More unique than careerism, incompetence, and corruption to Nazism's relations 
with ethnic Germans specifically was the mistrust with which many of them regarded 
Nazism due to its forays into minority politics, conducted despite its lack of 
comprehension of or sensitivity toward the context of the lives of members of German 
minorities. Ludwig Nowak's letter, for example, complained not only about the party 
chairman of Nowawies but also about all those comrades who had been in the Nazi party 
for fourteen years, yet had "left the border without reasons" or had "no idea what is going 
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on."60  These men were failing, he implied, to live by their party's radical nationalist 
credo, which preached solidarity with the borderlands and lost territories. Equally 
deprecatory were the reactions to letters Nazi activist Gutenberger from Beuthen, 
describing himself as “the Upper Silesian leader of the greatest German youth 
movement,” sent out to young men who occupied leadership positions in German youth 
groups in Poland.61 Gutenberger asked them to write back before he entrusted them with 
further details about, presumably, the Hitler Youth, but apparently only one recipient did 
so. The single follow-up letter Gutenberger hence composed characterized Nazism as an 
unstoppable anti-liberal movement, which aimed to teach all Germans, including those 
beyond Germany’s borders, and particularly youths “völkisch thinking” and anti-
Semitism.62 The other recipients were spared this presumptuous depiction of Nazism, 
since they did not answer Gutenberger to begin with. One youth leader from Łódź 
observed in a letter to a friend, who had apparently like him received Gutenberger’s 
initial letter, that Gutenberger had been injudicious to get in touch when “ideational 
cooperation” with Reich German groups was punishable by law in Poland.63 Only if 
Gutenberger should “express himself more clearly” and let them know what precisely he 
was after, the letter-writer commented, would he consider replying.64 Another friend of 
his, he told, had merely confirmed his address – perhaps this was Gutenberger's 
aforementioned sole respondent. Ethnic German frustration with Nazis' ignorance of their 
circumstances was not unjustified. Even an associate of Count York von Wartenburg's 
acknowledged in a December 1932 letter to the dignitary that their party had paid Eastern 
Upper Silesia's Germans little heed until that year.65 When it did begin to engage with 
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these ethnic Germans, it appears, it was hamstrung by its unfamiliarity with their 
situation. 
  Ethnic Germans’ wariness of Nazism was more pronounced yet in North 
Schleswig, where the minority’s leadership openly opposed Nazism. The minority's 
leader Pastor Schmidt-Wodder complained in a January 1932 letter to a Schleswig-
Holstein Nazi that the movement worked only with "emotions" and "forceful noises.” It 
failed, however, when one wanted "something that is more than noise."66 Schmidt-
Wodder urged the letter's recipient to use his influence to persuade the party to participate 
in the united, steady borderland work that was actually necessary to sustain North 
Schleswig's Germandom until such a time as a border revision was practicable. His 
antipathy toward the NSDAP came to the fore more publicly nine months later, when he 
stood by the directorate of the Schleswig-Holsteiner-Bund during the controversy over 
the Nazis’ split from it.67 The minority’s Nordschleswigsche Zeitung correspondingly 
lamented Gauleiter Lohse’s decree that all Nazi party members leave the Bund, as this 
schism meant “for now not the strengthening of borderland work but the splintering of 
forces and thereby the weakening of the fulfilment of the tasks of the Schleswig-
Holsteiner Bund, which the Nat.-Soc. party also acknowledges as necessary.”68 The 
Nazis with their "unobjective" dissent, the paper speculated, had "wanted the break" all 
along.69 Their ad hominem attacks on chairman Iversen had compelled him to stay on to 
preserve his "honor," when otherwise he may have stepped down voluntarily, the journal 
claimed, and other delegates, who agreed with the substance but not the tone of Nazi 
critiques, to stay silent.70 The Nazis had also declined the invitation to join the steering 
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committee of the Bund and to thereby help shape the organization.71 This willful 
provocation of a parting of the ways could not but be considered irresponsible from the 
perspective of the minority, the paper pronounced, since it would have to contest 
municipal and parliamentary elections soon and would only be able to do so successfully 
if it could rely on the support of a united nationalist front in Schleswig-Holstein. The 
minority could therefore only support any designs there might yet be for Schleswig-
Holstein’s “national circles” to reunite, the article concluded.72 The statement on the 
matter issued by the Schleswigsche Wählerverein, North Schleswig’s central ethnic 
German political organization, similarly acknowledged that it hoped that Nazism's surge 
would bring "a vigorous strengthening of the Heimat front" and that minority individuals 
were certainly free to sympathize with specific political parties.73 The minority as a 
whole, however, could have no use for disunity, for which reason the Wählerverein 
regretted the schism and hoped for its resolution. The Schleswig-Holsteiner, the members' 
magazine of the Schleswig-Holsteiner Bund, reprinted the communiqué of the 
Wählerverein, eager to showcase that ethnic Germans, the championing of whom was 
one of the major tasks of the Bund, disapproved of the Nazis' severance of ties with the 
association. 
 Already before the Nazis' falling out with the Bund, the Schleswig-Holsteiner had 
deplored that the heating up of party-political competition was making it difficult for 
ethnic Germans to maintain the necessary cohesion. They took a keen interest in “the 
wrestling of the forces in the Reich,” knowing that their future too depended on the 
direction German politics took, but it was precisely this “knowledge of community of 
destiny,” the magazine explained, that also had long convinced them of the 
imperativeness of standing together across party lines, like they had during the 
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plebiscite.74 With political tensions in Germany running high, Schleswig-Holstein as a 
bastion of Nazism playing a significant part in them, and the Danish press reporting 
constantly on German Nazism and on "the consequences of this movement on the 
German-Danish border questions suspected by it," however, ethnic Germans were being 
drawn into "these things" and the self-restraint underpinning their unity was wearing 
thin.75 The piece in the Schleswig-Holsteiner went on to share allegations made by the 
nationalist Danish newspaper Hejmdal that the DNSAP, the Danish Nazi party, had 
recently recorded growth driven in part by the joining of ethnic Germans, among them 
the vice president of the Wählerverein. The vice president had in fact quickly clarified in 
the Nordschleswigsche Zeitung that he had rescinded his application for membership in 
the DNSAP as soon as he found out that it was a Danish nationalist party. The newspaper 
had furthermore printed a warning against getting involved in the DNSAP that had been 
issued jointly by the region's minority organizations, but the Schleswig-Holsteiner 
nevertheless used Hejmdal claims to underline its, otherwise valid, warning about 
Nazism's threat to the precarious political unity among ethnic Germans and by 
implication among nationalists at home.76 
 Nazi activists naturally tried to repudiate this portrayal of them as party-political 
sowers of discord who put the minority at risk. Prominent Nazi speaker pastor Peperkorn, 
for instance, responded to condemnations of the party’s split from the Bund with a piece 
in the Nazi Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung intended to "[p]olitely, but clearly" – at 
least according to the piece's title – refute them.77 The Wählerverein had charged that 
“’the border matter’” was being turned into a “’party matter’” when ethnic Germans 
wished to fight for North Schleswig’s Germandom “in self-responsibility and solidary 
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unity," a position that, Peperkorn averred, the Nazi party in actuality supported.78 It was 
out of respect for the minority’s autonomy, he added, that the Nazis had not spoken out 
even when they disagreed, as they often did, with its standpoints. Nazis had not thus far, 
for example, publicly challenged the minority’s choice to focus its politics largely on 
economic questions, even though they believed that bread-and-butter issues could only be 
resolved within the context of fighting for an overarching ideology. They had moreover 
not criticized Schmidt-Wodder, despite his “strange” views about Nazism.79 The 
Nordschleswigsche Zeitung had, in contrast, like Schmidt-Wodder, misrepresented Hitler 
and thereby Nazism, even though it was well known that North Schleswig’s Germans 
longed for “every word from the mouth of Adolf Hitler.”80 Information was being 
withheld though ethnic Germans sought it. Simultaneously, the Wählerverein, whose 
reproof of the Nazi party's split from the Bund the Nordschleswigsche Zeitung had 
publicized, hypocritically hoped to profit from the upsurge in nationalist activism that 
Nazism's rapid rise brought on. It was hence the journalism of the Nordschleswigsche 
Zeitung, which “perhaps generates the favor of a certain master class, but which insults 
the feeling of the people," that was stoking tensions, Peperkorn contended, not he with 
this article or his fellow Nazis through their repudiation of the Schleswig-Holsteiner-
Bund.81 Nazis could no longer tolerate “the treatment of National Socialist thoughts and 
deeds and the shameless journalistic disparaging of Adolf Hitler you practice,” Peperkorn 
in conclusion threatened the Nordschleswigsche Zeitung.82 He therefore urged the 
journal's editor to give up his post in favor of a “younger man” with a better 
understanding of the fight for Germandom.83   
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 Contrary to Peperkorn's assertions that the Nazi party had until then refrained 
from criticism of the minority, the Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung had in fact 
already in February 1931 taken to task Schmidt-Wodder, despite “all respect we bring his 
personality,” for publishing an unsympathetic article about Nazism.84 Nazis did agree 
with Schmidt-Wodder, the piece began, that the issues of will and social policy were 
coming to a head. In fact, it was their movement that promoted a “new [national] will” 
and that, in spite of being right-wing, made more radical social policy demands than did 
the Social Democrats.85 Schmidt-Wodder, however, had charged that the Nazis' social 
policy propositions were unrealistic and professed his faith in the persistence of the 
Social Democratic and Center parties. The Nazi reply, however, insisted that it would 
soon force a decision between those parties and itself. Schmidt-Wodder had furthermore 
accused the Nazi party of prematurely committing to a policy of friendship with Italy and 
Britain. All it was in reality doing, the Tageszeitung averred, was building tentative 
alliances with countries that, like Germany but unlike France, had grown disenchanted 
with the Treaty of Versailles. Finally, Schmidt-Wodder had taken exception to “the 
spread of National Socialism in North Schleswig.”86 The Tageszeitung retorted that 
Nazism was a German movement that proliferated organically and conquered “the hearts 
of Germans” without asking “whether it is convenient.”87 Schleswig-Holstein's Nazis 
thus did in their turn chastise North Schleswig's minority leadership for the mistrust it 
showed their movement, but until Hitler's appointment as chancellor it remained cool 
towards his party. With the exception of visits by the Nazi student group at the university 
of Kiel to the minority's annual Knivsberg festival, ties between borderland Nazis and 
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ethnic Germans do not appear to have developed.88 After the Nazi take-over of power, 
however, the minority and its organizations were Nazified swiftly, with Schmidt-Wodder 
pushed out, revealing a reservoir of Nazi sympathies in the ethnic German community. 
 Nazism's brand of militant irredentism was, all in all, received in differing ways. 
Some ethnic Germans viewed Nazism askance due to its divisiveness and ignorance of 
their circumstances, while others welcomed the movement's forcefulness and vigor. The 
latter group maintained strong ties with their Nazi comrades in the German borderlands. 
Non-German nationalist activists, meanwhile, instrumentalized Nazism's aggressive 
behavior toward minorities to explain away their movements' decline. The Nazi 
movement's anti-minority misdeeds were opportunistically portrayed as emblematic of 
German parties and German society more widely, such that, the argument ran, minority 
activism could not but wane. Disengagement from German politics was therefore 
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Conclusion: The Third Reich and Its Aftermath in the Borderlands 
 
 Contrary to justifiable anxieties about the danger Nazism's rise posed to 
minorities, the Third Reich in its early days pursued a policy of conciliation with Poland 
in particular. In January 1934, it ratified a non-aggression pact with Poland. In 1937, a 
bilateral minorities treaty was additionally concluded.1 The non-aggression pact 
especially improved Poles' condition. Thus, the Polish vice consul in Lyck reported in 
1935 that the town's sole book rental, which was Nazi-owned, had created an exhibit 
titled "'Our Neighbor'" in its display window consisting of Polish novels, magazines with 
Piłsudski on the cover, and posters depicting the Polish White Eagle and Polish folk 
scenes.2 Meanwhile, the Bund Deutscher Osten, the Nazi umbrella organization for 
Eastern matters, was involved in arranging city partnerships between Germany and 
Poland.3 In Schleswig, the so-called Ostersturm campaign of 1933, during which local 
Nazi activists sought to pressure Copenhagen into renegotiating the German-Danish 
border through a mixture of fiery rhetoric and the rapid Nazification of North Schleswig, 
was suppressed by the Nazi government in Berlin. Hitler and other government figures 
were quick to appease the ruffled Denmark.4  
 This deceptive quiet in the borderlands did not last long, however. In Schleswig, 
the appointment of Wilhelm Sievers, the mayor of Eckernförde and leader of the Nazi 
take-over of the Schleswig-Holsteiner-Bund, to the position of Flensburg's Landrat 
suggested that there would eventually be "further National Socialist activities in the 
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border area."5 In the East, meanwhile, Germanization was reintroduced as re-
Germanization and from 1938 the members of Polish organizations were harassed, with 
some leadership figures being incarcerated in concentration camps.6 This persecution was 
framed as retribution for similar ill treatment of Germans in Poland, much like the 
outbreak of war was in due course justified as a response to a – staged – Polish raid on 
Gleiwitz's radio tower.7 Subsequent massacres of ethnic Germans in Poland during the 
first days of hostilities, like Bydgoszcz’s notorious Bloody Sunday, were used to further 
underline the supposedly just cause of the war.8 Soon, the lost territories, with the 
exception of North Schleswig, were reincorporated into the Reich, while the remainder of 
Poland and indeed much of Eastern Europe was occupied. This recouping of German 
territory, paired with the subduing of the Polish minority and the elimination of the Polish 
state appeared, for a time, to resolve borderlands residents' concerns. The war, Edmund 
Spevack noted in an article about the Border Province, enjoyed concomitant support 
among them.9  
 Nazi leaders from the border regions examined in this dissertation certainly were 
profoundly implicated in the Third Reich's crimes. Wilhelm Sievers, after his service as 
Landrat and then simultaneously mayor of Flensburg, was transferred to Brandenburg an 
der Havel in 1938, where he was a hardline "National Socialist until the final hour." 10 In 
late April 1945, he insisted on defending Brandenburg, which was in a hopeless position, 
against the advancing Red Army. He refused to evacuate the civilian population or to 
open food depots to it that the army had made available.11 Sievers' superior Lohse, 
 
5 “die weitere nationalsozialistische Aktivitäten im Grenzraum vermuten ließ”; Ibid., 206. 
6 Jaworski, "Die polnische Grenzminderheit in Deutschland 1920-1939,” 68-69. 
7 Ibid., 69. 
8 Edmund Spevack, “Borderland Nationalism, Westward Migration, and Anti-Polish Aggression: The Case 
of the Grenzmark Posen-Westpreussen, 1919-1939,” East European Quarterly 30 (1996): 324. 
9 Ibid., 322-323. 





meanwhile, acted as Regierungspräsident of Schleswig-Holstein throughout the entire 
twelve years of Nazi rule and in addition headed the civilian administration of the 
Reichskommissariat Ostland. Based in Riga for this post, he participated in the 
dispossession of local Jews and in the organization of their as well as deported Jews' 
murder.12 One of Lohse’s subordinates was Wilhelm Kube, erstwhile Gauleiter for the 
Border Province and now commissar for the district of White Ruthenia. He acquiesced to 
the liquidation of Russian and Polish Jews but protested that of German Jews deported to 
Belorussia.13 East Prussia's Gauleiter Erich Koch, for his part, was put in charge of the 
Reichskommissariat Ukraine as well as of Polish areas adjoining his Gau. There, he 
instituted a reign of terror so brutal that it was criticized even among the Nazi 
leadership.14  
 The war and the years immediately afterwards saw large-scale population 
movements, which aligned political and ethnic boundaries in Central and Eastern Europe 
more closely than they had ever been before. Ethnic Germans from far-flung corners of 
Eastern Europe were resettled in Germany, often under poor conditions, during the 
conflict. Afterwards, Germans fled or were expelled from the areas East of the Oder 
river, including Pomerania, Silesia, and what had been the Border Province. Masurians, 
whose attempted flight had been overtaken by the Red Army but who resisted the 
subsequent Polonization drives, left for Germany virtually in a body once de-Stalinization 
permitted it in the late 1950s.15 Germany's claims to the home regions of these displaced 
persons were not abandoned soon. Much like the Weimar Republic never formally 
recognized its Eastern border, so West Germany only ratified the Oder-Neiße border in 
 
12 "Hinrich Lohse (1896 – 1964)," Gedenkorte Europa 1939-1945, accessed September 17, 2020, 
https://www.gedenkorte-europa.eu/de_de/article-hinrich-lohse-1896-ndash-1964.html. 
13 "Kube, Wilhelm," Deutsche Biographie, accessed September 17, 2020, https://www.deutsche-
biographie.de/sfz46481.html. 
14 "Erich Koch," Portal Rheinische Geschichte, accessed September 17, 2020, http://www.rheinische-
geschichte.lvr.de/Persoenlichkeiten/erich-koch/DE-2086/lido/57c93684e751d2.41638850. 
15 Andreas Kossert, Preussen, Deutsche oder Polen?: die Masuren im Spannungsfeld des ethnischen 
Nationalismus 1870-1956 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2001), 311-318; Blanke, Polish-speaking Germans?, 
297-310. 
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1970 under chancellor Willy Brandt. In the preceding decades in particular, the so-called 
Vertriebene and the associations they formed constituted an influential force in German 
politics, especially within the Christian Democratic party. When the country was reunited 
in 1990, some observers worried that a newly powerful Germany would resuscitate 
irredentist claims to former Eastern provinces.16 Such demands did not arise, however, 
and East-Central Europe remains the domain of fairly ethnically homogeneous nation 
states. Some minorities endure, with Upper Silesians, who resisted Germanization during 
the war and Polonization after it, Poland's largest at about two percent of the population 
as of the 2011 census.17 In Schleswig, where no border changes have occurred since 
1920, minorities also remain on both sides of the border, though they live in harmony 
with the majority populations now.18 
 Such amity did not reign during the interwar period. Recent territorial losses had 
starkly illustrated to Germans what the failure of the nationalist ideal of the nation and 
the state as coextensive to obtain implied. The continued visible presence of ethnic 
minorities in the remaining border regions kept these anxieties running high. These 
realities and concerns Nazism had to interact with as it flourished in Germany's border 
regions, for there later Nazi activists – and audiences – had been influenced formatively 
by their personal experience of the nationality conflict. Moreover, the heritage of the 
post-war paramilitary and plebiscitary defense of the borders shaped political culture, so 
that the Nazi movement sought to link itself and its struggles with these earlier ones. 
Borderlands consciousness, with its radical nationalist potentialities, was fostered and 
capitalized on. Despite these appeals to a nationalism usually conceived of as race-based, 
Nazis did preserve a measure of flexibility regarding the basis of national belonging, for, 
 
16 Spevack, “Borderland Nationalism, Westward Migration, and Anti-Polish Aggression,” 326. 
17 Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Raport z wyników: Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 2011. 
Warsaw: Zakład Wydawnictw Statystycznych 2012. 
https://stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/lud_raport_z_wynikow_NSP2011.pdf, accessed September 17, 2020. 
18 Peter Thaler, Of Mind and Matter: The Duality of National Identity in the German-Danish Borderlands 
(West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2009), could not check page due to lack of access to CUL during 
corona crisis 
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they knew, in order to accomplish irredentist goals they would have to win over the 
nationally indifferent. On the other hand, however, Nazis regularly committed nationalist 
violence, exaggerated by the press and minimized by the government, that aimed to 
suppress the visibility of non-Germans in the borderlands. The Nazi movement shared 
this violent tactic as well as views about border issues with the wider far right, though the 
party did occasionally try to set itself apart from it by criticizing its handling of these 
matters. The government's management of borderland affairs the Nazis censured far more 
sharply and frequently yet. Finally, Nazis' behavior in the borderlands shaped how non-
Germans and ethnic Germans positioned themselves vis-à-vis the movement. Its manner 
of engaging with the borderlands' situation was, to be sure, just one facet of its appeal 
there. Some, though, could undoubtedly say with August Marleiter that it was their 
borderland experiences that had drawn them to Nazism.19 
 






















Appendix: The Press in the Borderlands  
 
The coverage by the regional press of Nazi activism in the borderlands is one of 
the sources on which this study most heavily relies. Considering how fragmentary the 
record from many border regions is, those newspaper editions and press clippings that 
survive have been invaluable. However, a search through the archives for anything 
relating to Nazism necessarily directs the researcher’s focus preferentially to documents 
that concern themselves with that movement. Governmental collections of press clippings 
are, in addition, by their nature made up of articles that were or might have become 
sources of controversy. This selective nature of both document collecting and document 
perusing creates a risk of overestimating Nazism’s centrality to regional politics and 
discourse. The question thus arises to what extent the journalistic texts cited here and 
their depiction of Nazism are representative of the regional press landscapes and of their 
discussion of the ascendant movement. 
Circulation numbers can serve as one indicator of papers’ impact. No such 
numbers are available, however, for the few regional NSDAP organs cited in this study. 
Founded in the late 1920s at the earliest, the ALA Zeitungskatalog of 1925 does not yet 
encompass them, while they had ceased publication by the time Sperlings Zeitschriften- 
und Zeitungsaddressbuch came out in 1947. While a listing for the regional Nazi paper 
Schlesischer Adler is included in Bernhard Gröschel’s Die Presse Oberschlesiens von 
den Anfängen bis zum Jahre 1945, it does not contain circulation statistics.1 Circulation is 
easier to assess in the case of Nazi-leaning, independent newspapers. Of the papers 
published in the Border Province Posen-West Prussia in 1925, for instance, the 
Grenzmark had, at 6,000 copies, the joint second-highest circulation.2 This circulation 
was equal to that of the Center Party’s Grenzwacht and second-only to the nationalist 
 
1 Bernhard Gröschel, Die Presse Oberschlesiens von den Anfängen bis zum Jahre 1945: Dokumentation 
und Strukturbeschreibung (Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 1993), 216. 
2 Ala-Anzeigen-Aktiengesellschaft, Zeitungskatalog (Berlin: ALA, 1925), 34.  
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Gesellige.3 By the early 1930s, the still nominally unaffiliated paper was run by NSDAP 
members.4 Masuria’s biggest newspaper, meanwhile, was the Lycker Zeitung, which in 
the 1925 ALA catalogue is categorized as associated with the DNVP.5 At a circulation of 
6,500, it was also the third-largest DNVP paper in all of East Prussia, with the larger two 
both published in the capital of Königsberg.6 This was also where the NSDAP organ, the 
Preußische Zeitung, which did not yet exist at the time of the ALA catalogue’s 
appearance, was later produced. While the province’s single largest paper for which the 
ALA register gives a circulation figure was the Königsberger Allgemeine Zeitung, 
affiliated with the center-right DVP, and the SPD maintained the Königsberger 
Volkszeitung, though no circulation figures are provided for that, overall the East Prussian 
press landscape had a definite right-wing bent.7 When in the early 1930s the Lycker 
Zeitung became notable for its outspoken support for Nazism, it therefore had limited 
differently minded competition. All the other, smaller newspapers published in the region 
were also nationalist or, at best, purely advertisement sheets. The situation was 
comparable in Pomerania’s easternmost counties. There, the Lauenburger Zeitung was by 
far the most important newspaper, with a circulation of 10,800 copies.8 In 1925, it, like 
the Lycker Zeitung, was affiliated with the DNVP and, as in Masuria, its locally 
published competitors were either also nationalist or, according to the ALA catalogue, 
unpolitical. In far eastern Pomerania, as in Masuria and the Border Province, newspapers 
sympathetic to Nazism, it is thus fair to conclude, constituted a highly influential part of 
the journalistic ecosystem.  
In Upper Silesia, though, the press landscape looked different. In 1925, the largest 
newspapers in that province were the nationalist Oberschlesische Morgenzeitung at a 
 
3 Ibid. 
4 Z notesu Ericha Hoffmanna: Kronika Złotowa i okolic część III (lata 1921-1952), ed. Joachim Zdrenka 
(Złotow: Muzeum Ziemi Złotowskiej w Złotowie, 2011), 107. 
5 Ala-Anzeigen-Aktiengesellschaft, Zeitungskatalog, 44. 
6 Ibid., 43. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 45.  
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circulation of 35,000 copies,9 the independent Oberschlesischer Wanderer at 32,000,10 
the Center Party’s Oberschlesische Volksstimme at 30,000,11 and the conservative 
Ostdeutsche Morgenpost at 29,800.12 The second rung of Upper Silesian newspapers 
exhibited similar ideological diversity. The Center Party’s Oppelner Nachrichten13 and 
its Oppelner Kurier in the early 1930s both had circulations of around 10,000 copies.14 
The Ostdeutsche Morgenpost still had a print run of 30,000 then, but declined 
precipitously to one of 15,210 by 1933.15 The radical German National Oberschlesische 
Tageszeitung, published by Dr. Knaak, Upper Silesia’s version of Alfred Hugenberg, 
however, had grown from a circulation of 6,000 in 1925 to one of 10,800 in 1932, 
establishing itself firmly in that second tier of the region’s newspapers.16 While the Nazi 
Schlesischer Adler seems to have been short-lived and the bulk of the province’s press 
remained, like the Center Party with which so much of it was affiliated, hostile to 
Nazism, the segment of the Upper Silesian population that identified as nationalist 
Germans – between 25% and 35% throughout the Weimar period - thus had in the 
Oberschlesische Tageszeitung an increasingly high-profile mouthpiece.17 
Schleswig-Holstein, meanwhile, was home to the oldest Nazi daily continuously 
published through 1945, the Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung.18 Despite its 
longevity, though, the circulation of the Tageszeitung never exceeded that of a reasonably 
large county town newspaper, according to Markus Oddey’s detailed study of the 
 
9 Ibid., 68. 
10 Ibid., 64. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Gröschel, Die Presse Oberschlesiens, 49.  
13 Ibid., 199. 
14 Ibid., 214. 
15 Ibid., 49. 
16 Ibid., 208. 
17 „Reichstagswahlen: Provinz Oberschlesien“, Wahlen in Deutschland, accessed July 25, 2021, 
https://www.wahlen-in-deutschland.de/wuupoberschlesien.htm. 
18 Rudolf Rietzler, “Kampf in der Nordmark”: Das Aufkommen des Nationalsozialismus in Schleswig-
Holstein (Neumünster: Karl Wachholtz Verlag, 1982), 432. 
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province’s press and its relationship to Nazism.19 Throughout the Weimar period, it sold 
mainly in and around Itzehoe in Holstein, where it was published. In other parts of the 
province, the NSDAP was reliant on sympathetic coverage by existing newspapers. In 
Kiel, for example, the emphasis on agrarian propaganda in the Tageszeitung was ill-
suited to urban realities,20 while in Kiel’s rural surrounds the Tageszeitung could only be 
received by post and hence with a delay.21 That the Kieler Zeitung adopted a favorable 
attitude toward the NSDAP was hence very advantageous for the party. In the immediate 
border region, similar relationships between party and press existed. The NSDAP gladly 
cooperated with the Lecker Anzeiger, for example, which was published in Südtondern 
county. There, as well as in the rural parts of neighboring Flensburg county, timely 
delivery of the agrarian-oriented Tageszeitung could not be guaranteed, but the local 
Flensburger NS-Zeitung also could not gain traction, focused as it was on urban 
concerns.22 Supportive coverage from the Anzeiger filled this void. A similar role fell to 
the Schleswiger Nachrichten. In Schleswig county too, the Tageszeitung was not readily 
available; in fact, it had only 434 subscribers there as of August 1930.23 The NSDAP 
was, however, really interested in Schleswig and Flensburg counties. It had tried to 
negotiate a cooperation with a local printing press, so that the Tageszeitung could be 
printed locally, but this idea had fallen through.24 Therefore, the party focused its efforts 
on the Nachrichten. Gauleiter Lohse and district leader Meyer-Quade paid a visit to the 
paper’s editor, who was anti-republican but skeptical of Nazism, and tried to secure a 
more positive portrayal of their party by flattery. The editor, relishing being courted by 
politicians of regional importance, was receptive to this tactic and soon, especially after 
Meyer-Quade invited him to a rally with Hitler in Hamburg, became a genuine admirer of 
 
19 Markus Oddey, Unter Druck gesetzt: Presse und Nationalsozialismus in Schleswig-Holstein. Struktur, 
Wahrnehmung, Herrschaftsakzeptanz. (Eutin: Lumpeter & Lasel, 2006), 215. 
20 Ibid., 130. 
21 Ibid., 134. 
22 Ibid., 95. 
23 Ibid., 108. 
24 Ibid. 
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the party and of its leader. He even gave the local NSDAP Ortsgruppenleiter his own 
column in 1931.25  
When they cooperated with independent newspapers, the Nazis were not merely 
making a virtue of necessity, however. Party organs, NSDAP leaders recognized, reached 
far fewer readers than established newspapers and in any case preached only to the 
converted. It was therefore strategic to disseminate the Nazi message also through regular 
local papers. Some newspaper men did try to cement their cooperation with the NSDAP 
by joining it26 or had relatives or seconds-in-command do so.27 But Meyer-Quade, for 
one, also defended the editor of the Schleswiger Nachrichten against party hardliners’ 
criticism that he had failed to join up: The editor’s enthusiastic support of but 
simultaneous independence from the Nazi party, Meyer-Quade argued, made the paper’s 
pro-Nazi message all the more credible to bourgeois readers.28 The NSDAP’s Reich press 
secretary echoed this sentiment in July 1932: A sympathetic news item read by 50,000 
readers of the bourgeois press held more value for the party than a, in the Nazi view, 
more accurate or ideologically pure piece that reached only 5,000 readers of the party 
press.29 
Collaborating with the NSDAP held advantages for the newspapers too. In a 
highly competitive newspaper market, adopting a friendly stance toward Nazism could 
serve to set a journal apart from its competitors and to bind a sizable circle of readers to 
it. In many localities in Schleswig-Holstein, therefore, there was in the early 1930s one 
republican local paper and another that was Nazi-oriented.30 The party was aware of the 
bargaining power that this profitability of Nazi-friendly reporting granted it. In July 1932, 
for example, the NSDAP press secretary for Neumünster pressured the editor-in-chief of 
 
25 Ibid., 105-106. 
26 Ibid., 132. 
27 Ibid., 86. 
28 Ibid., 110. 
29 Ibid., 108. 
30 Ibid., 203-204. 
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the General-Anzeiger für Neumünster: “’With today’s political constellation and in view 
of the result of the impending Reichstag election the acceptance of these articles should 
be connected with no economic risk for you.’”31 
 Often, newspapers nevertheless tried to play things safe. Many papers, for 
instance, continued to uphold the republic and even to criticize the Nazis in the national 
and international sections, all the while reporting favorably about Nazi events in the local 
pages. The Heider Anzeiger, for its part, printed press releases by the state and national 
governments without marking them as such and at the same time in the local portion 
published more and more NSDAP press releases about its local events.32 The Lübecker 
General-Anzeiger, meanwhile, warned readers against the right-wing extremists’ 
propaganda that claimed that Hindenburg was a candidate of the left ahead of the 1932 
presidential election, but simultaneously reported positively on the NSDAP in the local 
section.33 That section’s editor, a man who had joined the Nazi party in 1932, was even 
promoted and given a permanent position as the second editor-in-chief.34 The 
Landeszeitung, a right-wing paper affiliated with the regionalist Landespartei, similarly 
made a journalist, who had joined the NSDAP and become its district press secretary, the 
second editor for the local section.35 A variant on this strategy of keeping the political 
orientations of the local and supraregional sections of a newspaper distinct was for the 
same publishing house to operate two newspapers of different political stripes in the same 
locality.36 The Kieler Zeitung, for instance, was put out by the same company also 
responsible for its republican rival, the Kieler Neueste Nachrichten.37  
 
31 „‘Bei der heutigen politischen Konstellation und im Hinblick auf den Ausfall der bevorstehenden 
Reichstagswahl dürfte die Aufnahme der Artikel […] mit keinerlei wirtschaftlichem Risiko für Sie 
verbunden sein.‘“; Ibid., 149. 
32 Ibid., 113-114. 
33 Ibid., 117. 
34 Ibid., 119. 
35 Ibid., 195. 
36 Ibid., 216. 
37 Ibid., 127. 
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These dynamics unfolded in the border area’s papers too. The Lecker Anzeiger 
filled its local section, even outside election periods, with as many reports about events 
hosted by the NSDAP as about those organized by bourgeois parties and by civil society 
associations.38 The Flensburger General-Anzeiger also concentrated favorable reporting 
about the NSDAP in the local section, promoting the party’s events as ones of the small 
business milieu. This positive coverage, which it further intensified in the fall of 1932, 
helped the General-Anzeiger differentiate itself from the Flensburger Nachrichten, which 
remained hostile toward the NSDAP. Its friendliness toward the party even helped the 
General-Anzeiger weather the arrival on the journalistic scene that year of the 
Flensburger NS-Zeitung, one of whose staffers it furthermore poached. Whereas the NS-
Zeitung with its circulation of about 6,000 never gained much traction, the General-
Anzeiger, arguably thanks to having lastingly captured the Nazi market niche, actually 
recorded a slight increase in subscriptions during the fall of 1932, which was otherwise a 
troubled time for Nazism.39 
Printers and publishers, whether for business reasons or out of real Nazi 
conviction, rarely resisted the press’ rapid self-Nazification. Commitment to the republic 
was skin-deep. In fact, Oddey found, only the province’s Marxist journals – and to a 
lesser degree the few DDP-affiliated ones -  combatted Nazism right through to 1933. 
Just one newspaper, the Itzehoer Nachrichten, remained steadfast in its critique of 
Nazism from a conservative, Hindenburg-loyal standpoint until that time.40  
Schleswig’s press landscape is the best documented, but it appears to have been 
emblematic of that in most other border provinces. While party organs either did not exist 
at all there or did not enjoy a wide reach, right-wing, anti-republican newspapers sold 
well and were the norm. As the NSDAP began its steep ascent in the early 1930s, these 
pre-existing journals provided increasingly sympathetic coverage, trying to lock in a 
 
38 Ibid., 92-94. 
39 Ibid., 122. 
40 Ibid., 171. 
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readership base that was abandoning older far-right parties in favor of the NSDAP. 
Opposing journalistic voices became rare everywhere but in Upper Silesia, where Center 
Party papers continued to dominate, even though the Oberschlesische Tageszeitung too 
was an increasingly powerful voice. Thus, though both archives and archival research are 
by nature selective, the themes and rhetoric highlighted in this dissertation are 
representative of political discourses that were hegemonic in many border provinces and 
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